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ABSTRACT 
Six main empirical studies are reported. 
Study 1 employed the "thinkaloud II procedure in the minimal 
group paradigm (MGP) and concludes that social categorization 
is insufficient to cause social identity or intergroup 
discrimination, and that no theoretical explanation of minimal 
group behaviour is adequate to explain the variety of 
strategies employed within that paradigm. 
Study 2 employed both "Tajfel matrices" and new "allocation 
grids II in the MGP and concludes that two distinct forms of 
intergroup discrimination need to be distinguished: one which 
maximizes in-group profit consistent with positive in-group 
distinctiveness, and another which maximizes positive in-group 
distinctiveness by accompanying in-group profit with out-group 
derogation. 
In Study 3 subjects completed three sets of Tajfel matrices in 
the MGP : individually, in II sub-groups" , then again 
individually. Mean intergroup discriminatory behaviour 
polarized and mean intergroup equitable behaviour depolarized 
between the first and the latter two conditions. The best 
account of the results was concluded to be a normative one. 
Study 4 demonstrated that the self-esteem hypothesis within 
social identity theory (SIT) is best tested using a state 
measure of specific social identity contingent self-esteem and 
concludes that this hypothesis has to date been both 
inadequately formulated and inadequately tested. 
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Study 5 compared predictions from SIT with those from Tesser's 
self-evaluation maintenance model concerning the consequences 
of social comparison outcomes and concludes that a modified 
version of the former theory is best able to account for the 
results obtained at both group and individual levels of 
comparison. 
Study 6 investigated a host of issues within SIT and concludes 
that the theory is too simplistic in respect of many of its 
key notions and propositions. 
A general discussion argues that a modified version of SIT can 
be developed which improves on Taj fell s "original" social 
identity theory by more adequately specifying the processes by 
which group phenomena are manifest. 
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CHAPTER 1: TAJFBL' S SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORy 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
After specifying the broad aims of this thesis, this chapter 
begins with a detailed exposition of Tajfel's social identity 
theory. This is followed by a close examination of the form 
and implications of what might be called the "sufficiency 
condition" claim of that theory, namely "that the mere 
perception of belonging to two distinct groups - that is, 
social categorization per se is sufficient to trigger 
intergroup discrimination favouring the in-group" (Taj fel & 
Turner, 1979: 38). Two arguments central to much of the 
material to follow in this thesis are then introduced. The 
first is a claim that social identity theory is rather too 
individualistic to provide a "genuinely social" theory of 
group and intergroup behaviour, and the second involves 
distinguishing between individuals identifying themselves "as" 
group members in contrast to individuals "identifying with" 
groups and/or their members. Finally, details are given of 
the specific content of each of the chapters to follow. 
Overall, the chapters to follow this one have two main aims. 
The first is to investigate the psychological and behavioural 
effects of mere social categorization upon those categorized, 
and also the processes by which such effects come about. The 
second is to investigate the psychological and behavioural 
effects of "non-mere" social categorization, and again the 
processes by which such effects come about. In each case 
attempts are made to specify where Tajfel's social identity 
theory is supported, and where that theory needs or might 
benefit from modification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global aim of this thesis is explicit in its sub-title: to 
reappraise and develop Tajfel's social identity theory. The 
basic components of that theory are straightforward. 
Individuals sometimes think of themselves and act toward 
others in terms of characteristics and situations more or less 
unique to them as individuals. When they do this, people can 
be said to be operating in terms of their personal identities 
and they act toward others on an interpersonal level. 
However, individuals also sometimes think of themselves and 
act toward others in terms of characteristics and situations 
they share with other individuals because they belong to the 
same groups as them. When they do this, people can be said to 
be operating in terms of their social identities and they act 
toward others on an intergroup level. All individuals, 
whether operating in terms of their personal or their social 
identities, have a need for satisfactory (or positive) self-
esteem. When social identities are operative, self-esteem 
becomes inextricably tied up with evaluations of the groups 
providing those social identities ("in-groups"). In-groups 
are evaluated in terms of whether they are superior or 
inferior to other groups ("out-groups"): if they are superior 
they are evaluated positively and if they are inferior they 
are evaluated negatively. 
groups provides positive 
inferior groups provides 
Thus, membership of superior in-
self-esteem and membership of 
negative self-esteem. Finally, 
because of the universal need for positive self-esteem, people 
try to belong to superior groups and/or try to make the groups 
they are members of positively distinct, via intergroup 
discrimination if necessary. 
This thesis has three principal aims. The first is to 
challenge certain interpretations of social identity theory 
and certain hypotheses ostensibly derived from it. For 
example, it is argued that despite sometimes persistent claims 
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to the contrary (see below for references), social identity 
theory does not justify the predictions and/or assertions: (i) 
that perceived social categorization inevitably leads to 
intergroup discrimination; (ii) that strength of social 
identity will positively correlate with extent of intergroup 
discrimination; (iii) that level of self-esteem will 
negatively correlate with subsequent intergroup 
discrimination; or, (iv) that extent of intergroup 
discrimination will positive correlate with subsequent levels 
of self-esteem or change in self-esteem. 
The second major aim is to test certain key aspects of social 
identity theory, and to use the results of those tests to 
suggest necessary modifications to that theory. For example, 
the claim that in-group evaluation is determined by the 
outcome of between-group social comparison outcomes is tested 
and it is suggested in the light of the results that in-group 
evaluation is affected by movement toward or away from in-
group goals, as well as by attainment or non-attainment of 
them, and also that positive in-group distinctiveness is only 
one (non-necessary) such goal. 
The third main aim is to identify areas in which social 
identity theory might benefit from modification, regardless of 
the validity of the theory as it stands at present. One such 
area concerns extending the theory beyond the strictly 
intergroup arena so as to include predictions concerning 
individual and inter- individual phenomena. A second concerns 
making the normative component of social identity theory much 
more explicit, in such a way as to justify the claim that the 
theory can provide a "genuinely social" social psychological 
account of group and intergroup phenomena. 
Another way of describing the main aims of this thesis is to 
state that it investigates a single (compound) question which 
lies at the heart of Tajfel's social identity theory, namely: 
what are the psychological and behavioural effects of 
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(multigroup) social categorization, both when it occurs "in 
isolation" and when it occurs in combination with other 
factors, and by what processes do such effects come about? In 
particular, when 
categorization lead 
discrimination? 
and how does (multigroup) social 
to (perhaps various types of) intergroup 
TAJFRL'S SOCIAL IDBNTITY THEORY: A DETAILED EXPOSITION 
Tajfel's social identity theory is a theory of intergroup 
conflict intended to supplement Sherif's "realistic conflict 
theory" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 33-34). The latter theory 
holds that intergroup conflict develops when members of two or 
more groups attempt to satisfy negatively interdependent group 
goals {Campbell, 1965; Sherif et aI, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 
1953, 1967).1 
Tajfel maintained that realistic conflict theory needed 
supplementing because:-
(1) Realistic conflict theory "does not focus either upon the 
processes underlying the development and maintenance of group 
identity nor upon the possibly autonomous effects upon the in-
group and intergroup behaviour of these 'subjective' aspects 
of group membership" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 34), and 
(2) Empirical studies suggest that negative interdependence 
of group goals may be neither necessary nor sufficient for 
intergroup conflict to occur. 
Social identity theory supplements realistic conflict theory 
by proposing that some intergroup conflict is the result of 
variables "inherent in the intergroup situation itself" 
1 Negative interdependence of goals means that progress 
toward one goal entails, requires or is identical to movement 
away from the other. 
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(Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). It claims that in addition to 
"realistic" or "instrumental" competition stemming from 
negatively interdependent group goals, there is also "social" 
competition which "is motivated by self-evaluation and takes 
place through social comparison" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 41). 
A need for self -evaluation, or rather a need to obtain, 
maintain or enhance satisfactory self-esteem (i.e. a 
satisfactory self-concept), is the motivational engine of 
social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978a: 61; Tajfel, 1978b: 9; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). To understand how that self-
esteem need will operate in contexts where group membership is 
salient it is necessary to distinguish between personal and 
social identity. 
Personal identity comprises of the cognitive, emotional and 
evaluative aspects of an individual's self-concept which 
derive from their awareness of themself as a unique human 
being. Social identity consists of the cognitive, emotional 
and evaluative aspects of an individual's self-concept "which 
derive from membership of social groups that are salient to 
them" (Tajfel, 1978b: 14; Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). Social 
groups are salient to group members if they "have internalized 
their group membership as an aspect of their self-concept: 
they must be subjectively identified with the relevant in-
group" (Taj fel & Turner, 1979: 41; see also Taj fel, 1982 : 
491) . 
Social identity is "positive or negative according to the 
evaluations ... of those groups that contribute" to that social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). Evaluations of specific 
in-groups, in turn, "are determined with reference to specific 
other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-
laden attributes and characteristics. Positively discrepant 
comparisons between in-group and out-group produce high 
prestige; negatively discrepant comparisons between in-group 
and out-group result in low prestige" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 
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40. See also Tajfel, 1978a: 83, 95; Tajfel 1978b: 16-19). It 
should be noted that "in-groups do not compare themselves with 
every cognitively available out-group: the out-group must be 
perceived as a relevant out-group" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 41, 
emphasis added) for in-group evaluation, social identity and 
self-esteem to be affected. It should also be noted that 
" [n] ot all between-group differences have evaluative 
significance (Tajfel, 1959), and those that do vary from group 
to group" (Taj fel & Turner, 1979: 41). If between-group 
differences do not have evaluative significance for in-group 
members in-group evaluation, social identity and self-esteem 
will be unaffected by such differences (Tajfel, 1982: 491). 
The term positive in-group distinctiveness can be used to 
refer to superiority of salient in-groups to relevant out-
groups on dimensions valued by in-group members and the term 
negative in-group distinctiveness can be used to refer to 
inferiority of salient in-groups to relevant out-groups on 
dimensions valued by in-group members. 2 
Despite the first sentence of the preceding paragraph, two 
factors other than between-group differences affect in-group 
evaluation, social identity (derived from the in-groups in 
question) , 
(Tajfel & 
and (social 
Turner, 1979: 
identity 
45) .3 
stability and legitimacy of such 
contingent) self-esteem 
These are the perceived 
between-group differences. 
The perceived stability of positive or negative in-group 
distinctiveness affects how secure resulting in-group 
In this thesis the terms positive and negative in-
group distinctiveness will be restricted to such situations. 
It should be noted that in other literature these terms are 
frequently used more generally to refer to any in-group 
superiority or inferiority, regardless of in-group salience, 
out-group relevance and dimension value. 
3 The phrase "social identity contingent" self-esteem is 
used as a reminder that social identity only affects self-
esteem when that social identity is salient, and only fully 
determines individuals' self-esteem when only their social 
identity is salient. 
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evaluations, social identities and self-esteem are. If valued 
in-group distinctiveness is perceived to be stable, (or, in 
the jargon of social identity theory, "cognitive alternatives" 
to the present situation do not exist), resultant effects on 
in-group evaluations, social identities and self-esteem will 
be secure. If valued in-group distinctiveness is perceived to 
be unstable (i.e. if cognitive alternatives to the present 
between-group status differential do exit), resultant effects 
on in-group evaluations, social identities and self-esteem 
will be insecure (Tajfel, 1978a: 87; Tajfel, 1978b: 7; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979: 45). This is important because social 
identity and self-esteem will only be "satisfactory" when they 
are both positive and secure, and will be unsatisfactory when 
they are either negative or insecure. 
The legitimacy of in-group distinctiveness refers to whether 
that distinctiveness is perceived to be "related to a conflict 
of values, i.e .... based on unfair advantages, various forms 
of injustice, exploitation, illegitimate use of force, etc." 
(Tajfel, 1978a: 89). Where in-group distinctiveness is 
perceived to be illegitimate (i.e. where it results in or is 
accompanied by a conflict of values) then the "usual" effects 
of that distinctiveness on in-group evaluation, social 
identity and self-esteem may be cancelled or even reversed. 
That is, positive in-group distinctiveness accompanied by a 
conflict of values may result in neutral or even negative 
effects on in-group evaluations, social identity and self-
esteem, while negative in-group distinctiveness perceived by 
the inferior group to be illegitimate may result in neutral or 
even positive effects on in-group evaluations, social identity 
and self-esteem. 
To summarize so far, legitimate positive in-group 
distinctiveness results in positive contributions to in-group 
evaluations, social identity and self-esteem, while legitimate 
negative in-group distinctiveness results in negative 
contributions to in-group evaluations, social identity and 
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self -esteem. 4 Illegitimate valued in-group distinctiveness 
has less predictable effects on in-group evaluations, social 
identity and self-esteem, as such effects will depend on the 
relative importance or weight of the in-group distinctiveness 
compared to that of the perceived illegitimacy associated with 
it. Further, the effects of valued in-group distinctiveness 
on in-group evaluations, social identity and self-esteem will 
be secure if that distinctiveness is stable, and insecure if 
it is unstable. 
As was mentioned above, the "fundamental motivational 
assumption" within Taj fel' s social identity theory is that 
individuals strive to obtain, maintain or enhance satisfactory 
self-esteem. Such self-esteem is satisfactory if it is both 
positive and secure; self-esteem is unsatisfactory if it is 
either negative or insecure. Because of the effects of social 
identity on self-esteem, therefore, individuals will strive to 
be members of securely and legitimately positively distinct 
in-groups. If in-groups are negatively distinct, or if their 
positive in-group distinctiveness is perceived to be 
illegitimate and/or unstable, membership of those groups will 
contribute to unsatisfactory social identity and self-esteem, 
and the individuals concerned will be motivated to take steps 
to become members of securely and legitimately positively 
distinct in-groups. 
When social identity is unsatisfactory group members have at 
their disposal two main possible strategies to bring about 
membership of securely and legitimately positively distinct 
4 The word "contributions" here is crucial. In-group 
evaluations, social identity and self-esteem are each multiply 
determined. Positive or negative in-group distinctiveness for 
a single in-group from a single out-group on a single valued 
comparison dimension is unlikely to ever fully determine 
overall evaluations of that in-group (which is dependent on 
the outcome of multiple comparisons on multiple dimensions 
from multiple out-groups), let alone overall social identity 
(which is dependent onrnultiple in-group memberships) or self-
esteem (which personal identity also contributes to) . 
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groups: leaving the unsatisfactory in-group (i.e. "exit") or 
changing the in-group so that it becomes satisfactory (i.e. 
"voice") . There are various options within these two main 
strategies. 
Exit is essentially an individualistic response to 
unsatisfactory social identity, in that it involves 
individuals leaving whichever group is contributing to that 
social identity. Exit can be actual, where individuals 
physically leave the unsatisfactory group, or psychological, 
where individuals physically remain in the group but 
psychologically distance themselves from it (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979: 43). Usually, exit from an unsatisfactory group is 
accompanied or followed by an attempt to join (or establish) 
a more satisfactory group (known as "social mobility"). The 
"usually" in the previous sentence implies that occasionally 
exit alone can occur, i.e. exiting individuals simply renounce 
membership of the unsatisfactory group without attempting to 
join (or establish) a more satisfactory one (i.e. rather than 
"exchanging" an unsatisfactory social identity for a more 
satisfactory one, such individuals exit from the 
unsatisfactory group in order to simply operate in terms of 
more satisfactory personal identities). 
Exit is not always an available or an attractive option. 
There can be barriers both to leaving the unsatisfactory group 
and to joining more satisfactory ones. Leaving a group may be 
physically impossible, e.g. where others continue to treat one 
as a member of the group no matter how much one tries to 
distance oneself from it, or it may "conflict with important 
values which are themselves a part of [the individual's] 
acceptable self-image" (Tajfel, 1978a: 64), e.g. where 
membership of and loyalty to the group is important to the 
individual, and where leaving it would seem like treachery, to 
the group and/or to themself (Taj fel & Turner, 1979: 35). 
Similarly, joining a more satisfactory group may be physically 
impossible (e.g. because one does not have the requisite 
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"entry qualifications"), or it may be psychologically 
impossible (e.g. where there is a cultural prohibition on 
social mobility, or where others refuse to accept one as a 
member of the new group, or where joining the alternative 
group conflicts with the would-be exiting individual's 
acceptable self-image) . 
The alternative to exit in the face of unsatisfactory group 
membership is voice. This is essentially a social strategy in 
that it requires numbers of individuals to remain in the 
currently unsatisfactory group and to take steps to make it 
satisfactory. Again, there are a number of options within the 
strategy of voice. 
The first is direct social competition. This is where group 
members employ intergroup discrimination in an attempt to 
obtain secure and legitimate positive in-group distinctiveness 
where such distinctiveness is presently lacking. As with 
exit, this will not always be an available or attractive 
option. First, if one's group is presently securely 
negatively distinct (i.e. if no cognitive alternatives to in-
group inferiority exist) there is probably nothing to be 
gained, and potentially much to be lost, by discriminating 
against the presently superior group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 
45). Antagonizing a group with superior powers of retaliation 
is not a sensible way to try and overcome inferiority. 
Second, intergroup discrimination may not be perceived as a 
legitimate method of trying to achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness: it may conflict with values important to the 
in-group (and to the acceptable self-image of in-group 
members) . Third, alternative methods of rectifying 
unsatisfactory self-esteem may seem safer and/or more 
attractive (e.g. where there are few prohibitions to exit) . 
The second main type of voice is called social creativity. 
This is another social strategy where numbers of group members 
remain in their presently unsatisfactory group and employ 
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strategies aimed at making it more satisfactory, but this time 
without engaging in full-scale direct social competition. 
This is done by "redefining or altering the elements of the 
comparative situation" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 43) using one 
or more of various methods, including: (i) choosing new 
dimensions upon which to compare the in-group with out-groups; 
(ii) reversing the values attached to comparison dimensions, 
so that previously negative in-group attributes are now 
claimed to be positive; (iii) choosing new out-groups to 
compare the in-group with; or (iv) refusing to engage in 
between-group comparisons at all (Tajfel, 1978b: 13). 
Social creativity is often the least attractive of the options 
by which unsatisfactory social identity can be countered. 
This is because it essentially involves attempts to ignore or 
circumvent situations which have already been acknowledged to 
result in unsatisfactory group membership and which still 
exist. That is, social creati vi ty is a compensatory acti vi ty, 
a type of "denial", accompanied by all the difficulties 
associated with such a strategy (Tajfel, 1978b: 17). Not only 
will the situation which led to unsatisfactory in-group 
membership still exist, the strategies attempted to minimize 
the negative effects of that situation may in themselves make 
the situation worse, e.g. by antagonizing a dominant out-group 
in seeming both to reject its dominance and to claim 
superiority to it in other ways (Tajfel, 1978b: 18). 
This exposition of Tajfel's social identity theory is 
obviously more complex than the one offered at the beginning 
of this chapter. The diagrams below illustrate "how the 
theory works" when individuals come to perceive that a group 
to which they belong is either superior (Diagram 1.1) or 
inferior (Diagram 1.2) to some comparison group. 
As mentioned above, if the in-group is not salient (Box 2 in 
each diagram), if the dimension of superiority or inferiority 
is not valued by in-group members (Box 3 in each diagram), or 
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if the comparison group is not considered relevant (Box 4 in 
each diagram), there will be no effect on in-group evaluation, 
social identity or self-esteem (Box 5 in each diagram).5 Only 
when the in-group is salient, the comparison dimension is 
valued, and the comparison group is relevant, will in-group 
superiority or inferiority result in posi tive (Box 6 in 
Diagram 1.1) or negative (Box 6 in Diagram 1.2) in-group 
distinctiveness, respectively. This suggests that members of 
in-groups with "irrelevant" superiority may be motivated, if 
the need arises, to make that superiority relevant (Box 5 of 
Diagram 1.1); by making the presently non-salient in-group 
salient, by valuing the presently unvalued dimension of in-
group superiority, and/or by making the presently irrelevant 
out-group relevant. Unless such a need arises, however, 
members of irrelevantly superior groups will not be motivated 
to take any action. Members of in-groups with "irrelevant" 
inferiority, however, will be motivated to keep that 
inferiority irrelevant (Box 5 of Diagram 1.2); by continuing 
to see the in-group as non-salient, by continuing not to value 
the dimension of inferiority, and/or by continuing to see the 
out-group as irrelevant. 
Before predicting the effects of valued distinctiveness, 
social identity theory needs to consider whether that 
distinctiveness is perceived to be legitimate (Box 7 in each 
diagram) and stable (Box 8 in each diagram). Only when the 
distinctiveness is perceived to be both legitimate and stable 
can it be predicted to make positive (Box 9 in Diagram 1.1) or 
negative (Box 9 in Diagram 1. 2) contributions to in-group 
evaluations, social identity and self-esteem. 
If positive in-group distinctiveness is perceived to be 
illegitimate and/or unstable then the positive effects of that 
5 In the case of the "in-group" not being salient it is 
probably more correct to say that evaluation of the inferior 
or superior group may be affected by the comparison, but it 
will not be an in-group. 
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distinctiveness on in-group evaluation, social identity and 
self-esteem will be threatened (Box 10 of Diagram 1.1). In 
the case of perceived illegitimacy this is because the 
conflict of values which accompanies or results from the 
positive in-group distinctiveness will contribute negatively 
to in-group evaluations, social identity and self-esteem. In 
the case of instability this is because that instability makes 
for insecure positive contributions to in-group evaluations, 
social identity and self-esteem from the positive in-group 
distinctiveness. 
Similarly, if negative in-group distinctiveness is perceived 
to be illegitimate and/or unstable then the negative effects 
of that distinctiveness on in-group evaluation, social 
identity and self-esteem will be unstable (Box 10 of Diagram 
1.2). In the case of perceived illegitimacy this is because 
that illegitimacy may be accompanied by "discounting" of the 
in-group inferiority, which may negate or reverse the "usual" 
effects of negative in-group distinctiveness on contributions 
to in-group evaluations, social identity and self-esteem. In 
the case of instability this is because that instability 
allows for the possibility of action which will reduce, or 
even reverse, the negative in-group distinctiveness. 
When the contributions from valued in-group distinctiveness on 
in-group evaluation, social identity and self-esteem are 
either threatened or insecure, in-group members will attempt 
to employ social competition, social mobility and/or social 
creativity to achieve satisfactory (i.e. legitimate, secure, 
and positive) self·esteem. Which of these actions they will 
take depends on both the source of the dissatisfaction and the 
options available to them. 
If social mobility is possible (i.e. if there are no objective 
or psychological barriers to leaving the in-group), so that a 
person can easily leave an unsatisfactory group in order 
obtain or operate in terms of an alternative, more 
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satisfactory (social or personal) identity (Box 11 in each 
diagram), this will be the most attractive option (Tajfel, 
1978a: 64, 67). Until such time as social mobility is 
successfully employed, however, contributions to in-group 
evaluations, social identity and self-esteem from the current 
threatened positive (Diagram 1.1) or insecure negative 
(Diagram 1.2) in-group distinctiveness will themselves be 
positive but threatened (Box 12 of Diagram 1.1) or negative 
but unstable (Box 12 of Diagram 1.2) . 
If social mobility is not possible, and social competition in 
and of itself is deemed likely to make membership of the 
present in-group satisfactory (i. e. by achieving perceived 
legitimate and secure positive in-group distinctiveness), then 
this will be the most attractive option (because of the 
difficulties associated with social creativity which were 
outlined above) (Box 13 of each diagram). Until such time as 
social competition is successfully employed, however, 
contributions to in-group evaluations, social identity and 
self-esteem from the current threatened positive or insecure 
negative in-group distinctiveness will themselves be positive 
but threatened (Box 14 of Diagram 1.1) or negative but 
unstable (Box 14 of Diagram 1.2) . 
Finally, if social mobility is not possible, and social 
competition alone is perceived as unlikely to make membership 
of the present group satisfactory, then social creativity will 
be employed, either in conjunction with social competition or 
in place of it (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 44). Until such time 
as social creativity is successfully employed, however, (with 
or without social competition), contributions to in-group 
evaluations, social identity and self-esteem from the current 
threatened positive or insecure negative in-group 
distinctiveness will themselves be positive but threatened 
(Box 15 of Diagram 1.1) or negative but unstable (Box 15 of 
Diagram 1.2) . 
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THE "SUFFICIENCY CONDITION" WITHIN SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
One central issue with respect to social identity theory is 
its relationship with Sherif's "realistic conflict theory". 
Taj fel claims that one reason why the former theory needs 
supplementing by the latter is that negative interdependence 
of group goals is not a necessary condition for the emergence 
of intergroup conflict. Specifically, group members' 
awareness that they are members of one group but not members 
of another (or others) may in and of itself be a sufficient 
condition to generate intergroup discrimination, even when 
there is no perceived interdependence between group goals. 
Thus, what might be termed the "sufficiency condition" within 
social identity theory states "that the mere perception of 
belonging to two distinct groups that is, social 
categorization per se - is sufficient to trigger intergroup 
discrimination favouring the in-group" (Taj fel & Turner, 1979: 
38). This is an important assertion, central to several of 
the arguments to be made later in this thesis. Thus, it is as 
well to be clear that the "sufficiency condition" is widely 
adhered to, and also to be clear as to the exact claim being 
made by that condition. 
Several connnentators report that social categorization (which, 
as the term is used, involves at least two groups of which any 
individual is a member of only one) is sufficient to give rise 
to certain forms of intergroup discriminatory behaviour. 
Thus, Turner (1983a: 351) refers to the "well replicated 
finding that social categorization is alone sufficient for 
intergroup discrimination" (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Wilder (1986: 311) refers to an "exhaustive literature [which] 
indicates that the mere categorization of persons into an 
ingroup and an outgroup is sufficient to foster bias (i.e. 
ingroup favouritism at the expense of the outgroup) (emphasis 
added). Turner repeats that "imposing social categorizations 
upon people even on an explicitly random basis ... produces 
29 
discriminatory intergroup behaviour" (Turner et al., 1987: 27-
28) (emphasis added). Hogg & Abrams (1988: 51) agree that 
"social categorization - the discontinuous classification of 
individuals into two distinct groups is sufficient to 
generate intergroup discrimination". Bagby & Rector (1992: 
398) also concur in stating that "the mere categorization of 
individuals is all that is necessary to create ingroup 
favouritism" (emphasis added). And Espinoza & Garza (1985: 
381) cite Tajfel (1978) to argue that "[a]ny social 
categorization which creates identifiable, distinct social 
groups (e.g., ethnicity, gender, Democrat/Republican) can be 
sufficient to evoke spontaneous biases in perception, 
attitude, and behaviour favouring one's group (Tajfel, 1978)" 
(emphasis added). 
Billig & Tajfel (1973: 28-29) are perhaps more careful than 
the above commentators in that they clearly argue, consistent 
with the exposition of social identity theory given above, 
that it is not so much (multigroup) social categorization per 
se which is referred to by the "sufficiency condition" (as it 
is possible for external imposition of social categorization 
without those categorized even being aware of such 
categorization), but that it is "an individual's act of 
categorizing his social world into distinct social groups, 
into 'them' and 'us', [which] can be, at least in our 
societies, a sufficient condition for introducing in his 
behaviour certain forms of ingroup favouritism and of 
discrimination against the out-group" (emphasis altered). 
Thus, it is not (multigroup) social categorization per se 
which is held to be sufficient for the emergence of intergroup 
discrimination, it is the recognition of such social 
categorization by the individual (s) categorized (i.e. 
multigroup social categorization plus self-categorization into 
one of those groups on the part of those categorized) which 
can be sufficient to promote intergroup discriminatory 
behaviour on the part the categorized individual(s). 
(Although it is, in fact, a robust finding that externally 
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imposed multigroup social categorization regularly results in 
mean intergroup discriminatory behaviour on the part of those 
categorized. ) 6 
It is also important to be clear, despite possible appearances 
to the contrary in some of the quotes above, that the claim of 
the "sufficiency condition" is not that (recognized, 
multigroup) social categorization is generally or universally 
sufficient to promote intergroup discrimination (i. e. that 
social categorization will always result in intergroup 
discrimination) : it is that "mere" social categorization (i.e. 
social categorization "per se", "alone", or "in isolation") is 
sufficient (when accompanied by self-categorization into those 
categories by the people categorized) to promote intergroup 
discrimination. The exposition above makes it clear that many 
other factors (e.g. the availability of cognitive 
alternatives, a lack of opportunities for social mobility, 
etc.) are held to be necessary by social identity theory 
before intergroup discrimination can be confidently predicted 
to follow "non-mere" social categorization. Further, the 
phenomenon of out-group favouritism (i.e. the opposite to 
intergroup discrimination in favour of the in-group) - which 
itself requires recognized multigroup social categorization -
was cited by Tajfel as another of the reasons why Sherif's 
"realistic conflict theory" was in need of supplementation. 
Thus, social categorization (however conceived) is not held by 
social identity theory to be universally sufficient for 
intergroup discrimination in the sense that whenever social 
categorization occurs intergroup discrimination will follow. 
Rather, the claim is that (recognized, multigroup) social 
6 For further references to the "sufficiency condition" 
see, among many others, Allen & Wilder (1975: 971, 1979: 74); 
Bornstein et al. (1983: 321); Brown (1986: 544); Brown (1988: 
254) ; Lemyre & Smith (1985: 660) ; Locksley et al. (1980: 774); 
Mummendey et al. (1992: 125); Oakes & Turner (1980: 295); 
Platow et al. (1990: 222) ; Sachdev & Bourhis (1984: 36, 1985: 
415, 1987: 278); St. Claire & Turner (1982: 307); Turner 
(1975: 5); Turner (1980: 131); Turner (1981b: 75); Worchell & 
Norvell (1980: 764). 
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categorization "alone" (i.e. in the absence of any other 
relevant psychological stimuli) is sufficient to promote 
intergroup discrimination. (Although if the "sufficiency 
condition" proves to be true there would perhaps be some 
reason to suppose that social categorization does, in fact, 
always promote intergroup discrimination, but that other 
factors can attenuate, cancel, reverse, or indeed accentuate, 
such an effect.) 
Now that the form of the "sufficiency condition" held within 
social identity theory has been spelled out, the crucial 
question is, of course, is it true? Is it in fact the case 
that mere (recognized, multigroup) social categorization is 
sufficient to promote intergroup discrimination and, if so, to 
what extent is it true, and what may we conclude from such a 
truth? 
There can be no denying that it is a very robust finding (see 
Mullen et ai, 1992 for a review, including some exceptions) 
that the nearest thing possible to "mere" social 
categorization' does in fact lead to mean attitudinal and/or 
behavioural in-group favouritism on the part of the 
individuals categorized. Such in-group favouritism takes at 
least two forms: on average subjects allocate more "goods" to 
in-group members than to out-group members, and, again on 
average, subjects also sacrifice possible "goods" for in-group 
members when doing so aChieves a certain degree of superiority 
for the in-group (and/or its members) over the out-group 
(and/or its members) with respect to the "goods" received by 
each. Thus, there can be no doubt that the average behaviour 
which follows mere social categorization is discriminatory 
between in-group and out-group in favour of the former. To 
, i.e. arbitrary or random categorization into one or 
the other of two novel categories with: anonymity of category 
membership; no direct interaction or communication between 
those categorized; and no obvious rational or instrumental 
link between the social categorization and possible subsequent 
behaviour. 
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the extent therefore that this average individual behaviour is 
construed as intergroup behaviour, social identity theory's 
"sufficiency condition" must be taken to be valid: mere 
(recognized, multigroup) social categorization must be 
accepted as a sufficient cause of intergroup discrimination 
(with the implication that non-mere social categorization is 
also likely promote a tendency toward intergroup 
discrimination) . 
Social identity theory does, of course, accept that the 
behaviour following mere social categorization should be 
construed as intergroup discrimination, and in doing so finds 
justification for the "sufficiency condition". That is, it 
accepts such findings as support for its claim that social 
categorization per se (understood as group members' 
perceptions that they are members of one group and not of 
another) is sufficient to promote intergroup discrimination 
(thereby also justifying the claim that social identity theory 
is a necessary supplement to Sherif's "realistic conflict 
theory") . 
What is more, social identity theory offers an account of how 
mere social categorization promotes intergroup discrimination, 
which runs roughly as follows. Individuals become aware of 
their membership of a group. To the extent that they do this 
their social identity as group members becomes salient and 
their self-esteem becomes dependent upon their evaluation of 
their in-group. And, as in-groups are held to be evaluated 
positively to the extent that they are perceived as positively 
distinct from out-groups (and negatively to the extent that 
they are perceived as negatively distinct from out-groups), 
group members therefore try to perceive the in-group from 
which their social identity is derived as positively distinct. 
In the situation of social categorization per se, the only 
route to positive in-group distinctiveness (and away from 
negative in-group distinctiveness) is to favour the in-group 
..... 
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over the out-group. 8 Mere social categorization promotes 
intergroup discrimination, therefore, because: (i) individuals 
strive for satisfactory self -esteem; (ii) social 
categorization entails that individuals' social identities are 
salient (and therefore their self-esteem is dependent upon 
their evaluation of the in-group, which is in turn dependent 
on perceptions of positive in-group distinctiveness); and, in 
the situation of social categorization per se, (iii) 
intergroup discrimination in favour of the in-group is the 
only available route to positive in-group distinctiveness and 
positive in-group evaluation, which alone will satisfy their 
social identity and self-esteem needs. 
An important implication of social identity theory's 
interpretation of the effects of social categorization per se 
is that to the extent that individuals perceive they are 
members of one social category and not of another (i.e. to the 
extent that they recognize the mere multigroup social 
categorization), each and every individual will be predicted 
to engage in in-group preference. This is because recognizing 
the multigroup social categorization will result in 
individuals' social identities becoming salient, and the only 
means available to them for satisfying their resultant social 
identity contingent self-esteem needs will be to employ in-
group preference in an attempt to obtain positive in-group 
distinctiveness and thereby positive evaluations of their in-
groups and of themselves as in-group members. This is a 
straightforward consequence of social identity theory's 
account of why mere social categorization is sufficient to 
promote intergroup discrimination. Therefore, any instance of 
an individual not employing in-group preference following mere 
8 It can also be noted that in the "standard" minimal 
group paradigm (i.e. in which social categorization per se is 
investigated), there is: only one salient in-group, only one 
comparison dimension, only one out-group, an unstable between-
group situation (i.e. the possibility of cognitive 
alternatives), no in-group norms to potentially provide a 
conflict of values when engaging in in-group favouritism, and 
no possibility of exit . 
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social categorization has to be "explained away" by social 
identity theory. Further, apart from having to "explain away" 
any behaviour following mere social categorization which is 
non-discriminatory, social identity theory cannot give any 
explanation of (i.e. is "silent" about) such behaviour. It is 
clearly the case that social identity theory should be 
"allowed" to "explain away" a certain amount of non-
discriminatory behaviour following mere social categorization, 
(e.g. by claiming that the non-discriminating individuals were 
not aware of the social categorization), but, equally clearly, 
threats to social identity theory's "sufficiency condition" 
increase proportionally to the extent of such behaviour. If 
there is "too much" non-discriminatory behaviour following 
mere social categorization, especially if there is evidence 
that the categorized but non-discriminatory subj ects are aware 
of their categorization, then: (i) social identity theory's 
claim that mere (recognized, multigroup) social categorization 
is sufficient to engender intergroup discrimination is 
threatened; and, (ii) social identity theory's adequacy as an 
account of the behaviour following from mere social 
categorization will be in doubt. 
It is important to emphasise that the description above is of 
social identity theory'S account of the effects of mere social 
categorization. When social categorization is "non-mere" 
social identity theory still holds that: (i) individuals 
strive for satisfactory self-esteem; and, (ii) to the extent 
that social identities are salient individuals' self-esteem 
will be (in part) determined by their evaluations of their in-
groups, which in turn depends on their perceptions of valued 
in-group distinctiveness. However, as already noted, social 
identity theory does not hold that social categorization will 
generally or universally promote intergroup discrimination, as 
when such categorization does not occur "in isolation" it will 
not be the case that showing favouritism towards a particular 
in-group relative to a particular out-group on a specific 
dimension is the one and only route to satisfying self-esteem 
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and social ident i t y needs. One reason that such 
discrimination will not be the only route to satisfying such 
needs is that alternative strategies may be available (e.g. 
exit, social creativity). Further, such discrimination may 
not even be an available, attractive, or indeed a necessary 
possibility (e.g. because an in-group is already securely and 
legitimately positively distinct, because an inferior in-group 
lacks cognitive alternatives, or because intergroup 
discrimination would entail a conflict of values, etc.). 
Similarly, although social identity theory predicts that the 
extent of in-group membership salience will positively 
correlate with the extent of in-group favouritism shown 
following mere social categorization (as increasing in-group 
salience increases the extent to which self-esteem is 
determined by social identity, in-group evaluation, and 
positive in-group distinctiveness, and in-group favouritism is 
the only route to such things when social categorization is 
mere), it does not predict such a correlation when social 
categorization is non-mere (as there will be a variety of 
strategies available for satisfying social identity and self-
esteem needs, of which any single given possible instance of 
in-group favouritism - if available - may be only one) .9 
In this section it has been argued that social identity theory 
holds that mere (multigroup) social categorization is 
sufficient to result in each and every individual who 
recognizes the categorization engaging in in-group preference, 
and that the more salient the mere social categorization, the 
stronger the discrimination. However, consistent with the 
exposition given in the previous section, social identity 
9 See, among others, Brown et al. (1986: 275), Hinkle & 
Brown (1990: 62), and Kelly & Kelly (1994: 64) for examples 
where social identity theorists at least seem to interpret 
that theory as saying that there will be a correlation between 
(non-mere) in-group salience and in-group favouritism, and 
Turner (1987: 30) for a denial of that interpretation, similar 
to the one made here. 
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theory is clear that when social categorization does not occur 
in isolation a whole host of considerations other than the 
social categorization (in and of itself) need to be taken into 
account in order to predict the behaviour of the socially 
categorized individuals. 
IS SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY INDIVIDUALISTIC? 
One of the central arguments developed in this thesis is that 
social identity theory does not fully live up to its claim of 
being a "genuinely social" social psychological theory, and so 
it is as well to "flag up" this line of argument now. This 
argument is based on a claim that a genuinely social theory of 
group and intergroup behaviour must include a 
conceptualization of group-level phenomena (by which 
individuals must be guided for their behaviour to be 
considered as "genuine" group behaviour) . 
Without going too far into in-depth ontological musings, it is 
possible to consider groups as entities "in their own right", 
with their own "goals", "aims", etc .. To give a relatively 
simple example, a group-level "goal" of certain feminist 
groups is to overcome biases in society in order to achieve 
equality of opportunity for people of both sexes/genders. 
Similarly, a group-level goal of the Anti-Apartheid movement 
is to end apartheid. 
Groups may be considered as "entities in their own right", but 
most thinkers now accept that individuals are the only 
entities with genuine powers of thought, volition, and action. 
Thus, groups cannot "act on their own behalf": they have to 
have individuals act on their behalf. 
At an individual-level of analysis it is possible to 
distinguish between behaviour people engage in "purely for 
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themselves" and behaviour they engage in "on behalf of" 
someone or something else (whether or not the latter behaviour 
also satisfies individual desires and/or needs). An example 
of the latter sort of behaviour is when individuals do things 
"on behalf of" particular in-groups, e.g. when people go to 
war to fight "for" their country. 
Importantly, to the extent that individuals (be they in-group 
members or not) wish to genuinely act "on behalf of" a 
particular group, they have to know what acting on behalf of 
that group entails. They can, to be sure, engage in action 
which they believe will benefit the group, but genuinely 
acting on behalf of the group (i.e. doing what the group -
were it a sentient being - would "want" them to do) requires 
that they know what the group's "needs", "aims", "desires", 
"prescriptions", "goals", etc. are .10 
At the individual-level of analysis, therefore, people's 
behaviour can be considered as (at least attempted) 11 group 
behaviour if those people are trying to do what they perceive 
the group "wants" or "expects" them, as group members, to do 
(as revealed by, for example, the group's manifesto, code of 
conduct, raison d'etre, or whatever). Group behaviour is thus 
motivated by individuals' desires to act on behalf of a group: 
10 An analogous example of this distinction at the inter-
individual level might be where a parent does something to 
benefit their child, regardless of what the child wants 
themself (e. g. disciplines them), as compared to where a 
parent does something "on behalf of" their child, perhaps even 
when the parent believes that this will not "benefit" the 
child (e . g . where they buy the child something the parent 
disapproves of but the child desires) . 
11 Possible indications of the veracity of such an 
analysis are found whenever spokesmen or women (speaking on 
behalf of a group, irrespective of what they personally 
believe) deny that the actions of particular individuals are 
in fact on behalf of the group the spokesperson represents, 
such as when representatives of the British army or government 
claimed that any British soldiers serving in Northern Ireland 
adopting a "shoot to kill" policy were not acting on behalf of 
the British army/government. 
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the motivating desires being individual variables (i.e. 
individuals wanting to act on behalf of the group), while the 
means by which their behaviour is "guided" or "steered" is a 
social or a group-level variable (i.e. one or more individuals 
doing what the group "wants"). 
Social identity theory conceives of (certain forms of) group 
behaviour as motivated by individuals striving to achieve or 
maintain positive in-group distinctiveness in order to 
ultimately achieve or maintain satisfactory self-esteem. 
Here, as in the account sketched just above, the fundamental 
motivation for group behaviour is an individual desire. But 
whereas such individual motivation was directed at achieving 
group ends in the account offered above (as well as individual 
ends: i.e. wanting to achieve group ends), for social identity 
theory the motivation is exclusively individual. That is, for 
social identity theory, there is no sense in which individuals 
discriminate (or whatever) because the group "wants" them to 
(i.e. they do not discriminate "on behalf of" the group) : they 
discriminate solely because they want to (i. e. wholly "for 
themselves") . 
To put the same point in a slightly different way, social 
identity theory does not conceive of individuals 
discriminating (or whatever) because positive in-group 
distinctiveness is a group-goal, they discriminate because 
such distinctiveness is a goal each group-member has: positive 
in-group distinctiveness is a widespread individual goal (i.e. 
among members of the group), rather than a goal which 
genuinely exists at a group-level. Social identity theory is 
clearly social to the extent that positive in-group 
distinctiveness is held to be a goal which group members will 
share because of common group membership, and is also social 
to the extent that such common goals are held to lead to 
uniformities of behaviour by group members. It is argued here 
however that this is not genuine group behaviour because group 
members are acting solely for themselves: they are not acting 
39 
"on behalf" of anyone or anything else (i.e. the group "as a 
whole" and/ or other group members) .l:l 
If this analysis is accepted, one implication of it is that 
genuine group behaviour (including intergroup discrimination) 
is simply not possible in the situation of social 
categorization per se. Wi thout a history, minimal groups 
cannot have established or pre-existing group-level goals, 
norms, etc., to "guide" or "direct" the behaviour of in-group 
members.13 And, without intragroup interaction, minimal group 
members cannot generate goals, norms, etc. for the group, so 
again the mere group membership does not allow group members 
to ascertain how they might act "on behalf of" their in-
groups. Even if they want to act on behalf of their in-
groups, therefore, in-group members have no clues as to what 
the in-group "wants" or "expects" them to do. 
Tajfel's original interpretation of minimal group behaviour 
attempted to solve this problem by postulating that there were 
"generic norms" in society, such that group members (qua group 
members) displayed both intergroup fairness and in-group 
solidarity (i.e. in-group preference, leading to intergroup 
discrimination) because that is what they believed society 
1:l It may be illustrative to speculate what happens 
according to each account when individuals strive to achieve 
positive in-group distinctiveness, but fail. According to 
social identity theory group members will care about this 
failure only because it means that they personally are not 
deriving positive social identity from the situation: the 
"suffering" of in-group others or the group itself will be 
simply an irrelevant adjunct to what they themselves feel. 
According to the account being developed here, in contrast, 
individual group members will suffer precisely because the in-
group and/or other in-group members suffer. 
13 The one possible exception to this will occur if it 
proves to be the case that all groups have particular goals 
(such as positive in-group distinctiveness), simply by dint of 
being groups. This will make social identity theory a 
particular instance of a generic norm theory (see below), and, 
to be accepted, will require that empirical evidence be 
obtained that it is indeed the case that such generic norms 
exist. 
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wanted or expected of them. Such a generic norm 
interpretation was later abandoned, however, because it seemed 
to open up the possibility of explaining any behaviour post 
hoc, simply by claiming that such behaviour was conforming to 
some previously unidentified generic norm. 
Tajfel turned instead to social identity theory, which 
substituted intra-individual needs for societal norms as the 
steering force behind intergroup behaviour. According to the 
argument being developed here, each of these accounts focuses 
primarily on the wrong level of analysis to best understand 
group behaviour: generic norm theory on the societal level and 
social identity theory on the intra-individual level, whereas 
the present argument suggests that the "privileged" level of 
analysis for group and intergroup behaviour is the group 
level. 14 
The implication of this line of reasoning for interpretation 
of "standard" minimal group behaviour is as follows. It is 
true that at an individual level social categorization per se 
does result in minimal group subjects on average 
discriminating between in-group and out-group in favour of the 
in-group. This is clearly "intergroup discrimination" in the 
sense that, on average, subj ects discriminate between the 
groups (in favour of the in-group). This is, however, a mean 
of (relatively widespread) individual behaviour. It is not 
the case that the "groups" are discriminating against each 
other, or rather, that the individuals are discriminating 
between the groups "on behalf of" their own groups. For 
individual behaviour (such as in-group preference) to be 
considered as an instance of group behaviour (such as 
14 Which is not to deny that societies and individuals 
can greatly influence the goals and norms of particular 
groups. It should also be noted that the argument sketched in 
this section (and developed a little more fully in the final 
chapter of this thesis) does not entail or require that social 
identity theory and/or generic norm theory are wrong. It 
simply means that neither is well suited to form the basis of 
an adequate theory of group and intergroup behaviour. 
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intergroup discrimination), it is necessary for the 
individuals concerned to be acting "on behalf of" groups, so 
that it can legitimately be claimed at a group level of 
analysis that it is the groups "themselves" that are behaving 
in a certain way (such as discriminating against each other) . 
However, to be able to legitimately talk of group behaviour, 
it is necessary also to be able to talk about group-level 
goals (or whatever) which "guide" or "steer" the behaviour of 
individuals acting "on their behalf" (as opposed to merely 
taking the mean of group members' indi vidual behaviour or 
motivation and calling this group behaviour or motivation) .15 
IDENTIFICATION "AS" AND IDENTIFICATION "WITH" 
In some of the arguments to follow it will be useful to 
distinguish between identity and identification "as" on the 
one hand, and identity and identification "wi th" on the other. 
As has already been mentioned, social identity theory defines 
social identity as "those aspects of an individual's self-
image that derive from the social categories to which he 
perceives himself as belonging" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). 
Thus, social identity as used within social identity theory 
concerns individuals identifying themselves "as" members of 
one or more particular social categories or groups (and 
15 This distinction is illustrated by the difference 
between the statements that "Britain declared war on Germany" 
and "Over half of British people went to Germany on holiday 
this year". It can be noted that the former statement can be 
true even when only one individual in-group member with 
appropriate authority acts. It can also be noted that 
although it is possible to rephrase the latter statement as 
"Britain went to Germany on holiday this year", such a 
rephrasing, properly understood, still refers to the behaviour 
of (British) in-group members, not to the behaviour of the 
group as such. Thus, Chamberlain indulged in group behaviour 
because he acted "on behalf of" Britain (and the British), but 
British people are not usually acting "on behalf of" Britain 
when they go on holiday, no matter how much uniformity of 
behaviour they show, (al though they may of course be percei ved 
to be acting on behalf of their country) . 
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evaluating that membership). That is, social identity is 
simply self-categorization as a member of one or more groups, 
together with the evaluative and emotional appraisals of such 
self-categorizations. 
This can be differentiated from a sense of identity in which 
people identify "with" someone or something else. This sense 
of the term refers to people "caring" about others to the 
extent that they want for those others what the others are 
perceived to want for themselves. Thus, social identity in 
this sense refers to individuals "caring" about the groups 
identified "with": to the phenomenon of individuals wanting 
for the identified-with groups and/or group-members what they 
perceive the groups and/or group members (as group members) 
want for themselves. 
To return to the main topic of the previous section, social 
identity theory conceives of group members indulging in 
certain forms of intergroup discrimination because they 
identify themsel ves as group members, and therefore 
discriminate in order to satisfy the evaluative aspects of 
those self-categorizations (i.e. to satisfy their self-esteem 
needs as group members). In contrast, the bare-bones of the 
group theory sketched above suggests that it is individuals 
identifying with groups which is most important in predicting 
and explaining group behaviour, to a degree regardless of 
whether or not the identifying individuals identify themselves 
as in-group members (although identifying oneself as an in-
group member may well incline one to identify with the group) . 
THE CONTENTS OF THIS THESIS 
Social identity theory relies heavily on the "sufficiency 
condition" . If it is not the case that mere (recognized, 
multigroup) social categorization is sufficient to promote 
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intergroup discrimination then the claim that social identity 
theory is needed as a supplement to Sherif's "realistic 
confl ict theory" is seriously undermined. 16 Further, to the 
extent that mere (multigroup) social categorization does not 
result in individuals engaging in in-group preference, there 
will be a threat to social identity theory's claim that 
individuals with salient social identities necessarily search 
and strive for positive in-group distinctiveness because this 
is the only means by which they may satisfy their social 
identity and self-esteem needs. And, to the extent there are 
instances of mere (multigroup) social categorization not 
leading to in-group favouritism, especially when the 
individuals concerned recognize the social categorization, 
this also threatens social identity theory's explanation of 
such in-group favouritism: if salient social identity does not 
reliably result in in-group preference following social 
categorization per se, a postulated motivation to achieve 
satisfactory social identity cannot easily provide an a.dequate 
explanation of such in-group favouritism when it does occur. 
Because of its centrality to social 
of the studies reported in this 
"sufficiency condition" of social 
minimal group paradigm (i . e . the 
identity theory, several 
thesis investigate the 
identi ty theory. The 
situation in which the 
nearest thing possible to social categorization per se takes 
place) therefore forms the starting point for empirical 
investigations reported in this thesis. 
16 NB: For ease of exposition, and in line with the vast 
majority of literature within social identity theory, the 
terms "in-group preference", "in-group favouritism", and 
"intergroup discrimination (in favour of the in-group)" will 
be used interchangeably throughout this thesis unless 
specified to the contrary. In line with the arguments 
outlined above, however, it should be realised that 
"intergroup discrimination" at an individual level (i.e. in 
the sense of individuals showing in-group preference) is not 
considered in this thesis as necessarily an instance of group 
or intergroup behaviour, although it is clearly an instance of 
group members discriminating between their in-group and an 
out-group. 
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Chapter 2 describes a minimal group experiment in which 
subjects were asked to 
allocations to in-group 
"think aloud" whilst making their 
and out-group members. If the 
thinkaloud procedure does not interfere with processes which 
usually occur within the minimal group paradigm, then we would 
expect from social identity theory that the social 
categorization "per se" would result in all or at least the 
majority of socially categorized subjects engaging in in-group 
favouritism via a sequence of social categorization, social 
identity (i.e. identification "as" an in-group member), 
between-group social comparison, and an attempt to obtain 
positive in-group distinctiveness via in-group favouritism. 
The thinkaloud procedure was included primarily to see if any 
evidence could be found for why subjects behave as they do 
following mere social categorization. 
Unfortunately, but nevertheless interestingly, the addition of 
the "thinkaloud" procedure to the standard minimal group 
paradigm resulted in subjects failing to employ the mean in-
group favouritism usually obtained following mere social 
categorization. Unless the thinkaloud either prevented the 
subjects from being aware of the social categorization (i.e. 
failing to perceive two groups of which they were individually 
members of only one), or made available to subjects some means 
other than intergroup discrimination for meeting their social 
identity contingent self-esteem needs, this seems to suggest 
social categorization per se is not, in fact, sufficient to 
cause individuals to engage in in-group favouritism. 
Further, there was very little evidence from subjects' 
protocols for social identity theory's hypothesized sequence 
from social categorization to intergroup behaviour. Despite 
the fact that every subject was aware that they were socially 
categorized, not one subject showed any evidence of having 
attempted to predict or affect the between-group outcome of 
everybody's allocations, or of having been motivated by social 
identity contingent self-esteem needs. However, it should 
45 
also be noted that - where there was any at all - there was 
also very limited, or at best mixed, empirical support for 
alternative theoretical explanations of minimal group 
behaviour, such as provided by generic norm theory 
(Branthwaite et al., 1979 i Taj fel, 1970 i Taj fel & Billig, 
1974; Tajfel et al., 1971; Wetherell, 1982), equity theory 
(Ng, 1981, 1986), the behavioural interaction model (Rabbie et 
al., 1989), intergroup accentuation theory (Doise & Sinclair, 
1973), self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), or 
the demand characteristics explanation (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). 
There was some evidence, however, that where in-group 
favouritism did occur it was accompanied by subjects 
identifying wi th their imposed in-groups (in the sense of 
caring about their in-groups and/or their fellow in-group 
members, rather than in the sense of recognizing or 
identifying themselves as members of their in-groups), 
although not all subjects who identified with their imposed 
in-groups engaged in in-group preference. This suggests that 
while (recognized, multigroup) social categorization may not 
be sufficient to engender in-group favouritism, social 
identification with an in-group may be a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition of such discrimination (although the 
possibility that the discrimination caused the social 
identification with the in-group cannot be ruled out). 
Nevertheless, the sheer diversity of the behaviours adopted by 
the subjects in this study, and also of the explanations the 
subjects gave of those behaviours, suggests that the most 
sensible conclusion to reach may be simply that it is not 
possible to make any confident predictions' concerning the 
effects of social categorization per se on subsequent group 
and intergroup behaviour, other than to make some bland 
comment that people behave in such a way as to try to make 
sense of their situation. Such a comment is relatively 
uninteresting because of the wide variety of possible means 
available to do this {of which in-group identification and in-
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group favouritism in order to obtain positive in-group 
distinctiveness is only one) . 
Chapter 3 examines the effects of mere social categorization 
on subsequent behaviour from another angle. Specifically, the 
question was asked: what sort of intergroup discrimination (if 
any) does social categorization per se engender? In the same 
year that the classic exposition of social identity theory was 
published (i.e. Tajfel & Turner, 1979) , Brewer (1979) reported 
that the intergroup discrimination exhibited by subjects in 
the minimal group paradigm typically takes the form of in-
group preference rather than out-group derogation. That is, 
following mere social categorization subjects tend on average 
to favour the in-group over the out-group, but do not actually 
derogate the out-group whilst doing so. Thus, the sort of 
intergroup discrimination which social categorization results 
in seems to be of a rather benign sort. To adopt and adapt a 
rather outdated slogan, minimal group subjects tend to say 
"you're OK, 
rubbish" . 
we're better" rather than "we're OK, you're 
This is clearly a different level of intergroup 
discrimination to that dealt with by empirical investigations 
of Sherif's realistic conflict theory (where out-group members 
were often verbally, and sometimes physically, abused). 
Further, several commentators have claimed that even the 
intergroup discrimination which does typically occur in the 
minimal group paradigm may be merely an artifact of the 
procedures employed within that paradigm (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; 
Schiffmann & Wicklund, 1992). That is, rather than employing 
in-group favouritism in an attempt to obtain positive in-group 
distinctiveness and thereby satisfactory in-group evaluation, 
social identity and self-esteem, subjects employ in-group 
preference simply because it seems the only meaningful 
behaviour available to them, especially when presented with 
allocation matrices which may "suggest" that this form of 
intergroup discrimination is expected or appropriate (Locksley 
et al., 1980: 776). 
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Part of the difficulty in trying to decide between these 
alternative possibilities stems from the "Byzantine 
complexity" of the Tajfel matrices which are typically used to 
measure intergroup behaviour and/or attitudes in the minimal 
group paradigm (Bornstein et al., 1983b: 376). Regardless of 
whether or not these matrices suggest, invite or force in-
group favouritism, the design and scoring of them has been 
regularly criticised for making interpretation of subjects' 
allocation strategies extremely difficult (e.g. Aschenbrenner 
& Schafer, 1980; Bornstein et aI, 1983a; Brewer & Silver, 
1978; Hyland, 1979; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983, 1984a). 
The study reported in this chapter compared subjects' minimal 
group behaviour as indicated by the Tajfel matrices with that 
indicated by a new measure of social behaviour (termed 
"allocation grids") inspired by McClintock's (1988) social 
value vectors. These grids are argued to have a number of 
advantages over Tajfel matrices, only two of which will be 
mentioned here. First, they allow allocations of "bads" as 
well as or instead of "goods". Second, to a great extent they 
avoid constraining allocations such that a particular 
allocation to one member of a recipient pair does not entail 
a particular allocation to the other member of that pair (as 
is the case with the Tajfel matrices). Use of such a measure 
enables investigation of whether subjects in the minimal group 
paradigm employ in-group preference and/or out-group 
derogation when given a relatively free choice. 
Results from this study were consistent with those usually 
obtained from minimal group studies in that significant mean 
in-group favouritism was indicated by the Tajfel matrix 
scores. However, examination of the grid scores revealed that 
only a sub-set of the minimal group subjects engaged in 
discrimination in favour of the in-group. Other subj ects 
employed predominately fair or random allocation strategies. 
This result again suggests that mere social categorization is 
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not sufficient to engender discrimination in favour of the in-
group, at least at an individual level. 
Further, where in-group favouritism was employed by subjects, 
two distinct forms of such discrimination were discernable. 
"Strong" in-group favouritism involved subjects obtaining 
maximum in-group superiority by combining maximum in-group 
profit with maximum out-group derogation, but "weak" in-group 
favouritism involved subjects employing in-group profit and 
in-group superiority without out-group derogation. Therefore 
it appears that minimal group subjects do not always employ 
in-group favouritism following social categorization, but a 
proportion of those who do tend to do so "with a vengeance". 
The challenge for social identity theory is to identify which 
form of in-group favouritism (if any) will be employed in 
which circumstances. Clearly, social categorization per se is 
not a sufficient explanation either of in-group favouritism or 
of minimal group behaviour more generally. 
Chapter 4 presents a study which attempts to go some way 
toward meeting the aforementioned challenge. A crucial 
implication from each of the previous studies is that social 
categorization per se (even when recognized) is not sufficient 
to engender any form of group (or intergroup) behaviour, let 
alone intergroup discrimination. This is because, as 
identified by the full exposition of social identity theory, 
"genuine" group behaviour requires much more than simple 
(recognized, multigroup) social categorization. It requires, 
at a minimum, that "a collection of individuals who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category ... share 
some emotional involvement in this common definition of 
themselves, and achieve some degree of consensus about the 
evaluation of their group and of their membership of it" 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). It might be added that a further 
requirement is achievement of some sort of consensus 
concerning how to go about achieving such evaluation 
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(remembering that intergroup discrimination is a social, that 
is a collective, strategy). 
The study reported in Chapter 4 deliberately violated one of 
the procedural criteria of the minimal group paradigm, namely 
the one prohibiting intragroup communication. In the absence 
of existing group norms, it is difficult to see how consensus 
can be achieved concerning appropriate in-group behaviour 
without such intragroup communication. It is particularly 
difficult to understand how social categorization per se could 
bring about such consensus, a consensus which seems to be a 
necessary requirement for genuine group behaviour. 
Drawing heavily on classic studies within social psychology 
which demonstrate the effects of group membership on group 
members' behaviour (e.g. Sherif's norm studies and the group 
polarization paradigm), the study reported in Chapter 4 made 
the standard minimal group paradigm the first of three within-
subject conditions. In the second condition subjects were 
asked to make a second set of allocations to in-group and out-
group others, but this time collectively in "sub-groups" of 
three members of the same (previously) minimal groups. 
Subjects were tape-recorded whilst reaching their allocation 
decisions in this condition. The subjects were then asked in 
the third condition to individually make a final set of 
allocations to in-group and out-group others (not including 
fellow members of their "sub-groups"). 
In condition 1 subjects employed significant mean in-group 
favouritism and significant mean intergroup fairness, thereby 
replicating "standard" minimal group paradigm results. 
Further, mean in-group favouritism polarized and mean 
intergroup fairness depolarized from condition 1 to conditions 
2 and 3. Thus, it appears that social categorization combined 
with intragroup communication accentuates in-group favouritism 
and attenuates intergroup fairness. However, these sample-
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mean results conceal considerable variation at the sub-group 
and the individual levels of intergroup behaviour. 
As in the previous two studies, substantial numbers of minimal 
group subjects did not employ in-group favouritism in 
condition 1. Several other individual strategies were 
adopted, including fairness and randomness. Once again, the 
conclusion must be that social categorization per se is 
insufficient to engender in-group favouritism, at least at an 
individual level. 17 
More interestingly, in-group favouritism did not polarize from 
condition 1 to conditions 2 and 3 in all of the eight sub-
groups, and not all sub-groups engaged in significant in-group 
favouritism in these two latter conditions. Thus, social 
categorization plus intragroup communication was not 
sufficient to engender in-group favouritism, either at the 
individual or the sub-group levels, any more than social 
categorization per se was. Indeed, it is argued in the 
discussion section of Chapter 4 that the best account that can 
be given of (individual, sub-group and sample) behaviour in 
conditions 2 and 3 is a normative one. Thus, rather than 
attempting to explain group behaviour in these latter 
conditions in terms of the "structural variables" of social 
categorization and intragroup communication per se, it is 
argued that the content and the processes of that 
communication need to be examined to ascertain (i) whether 
sub-group norms were consensually agreed and adopted, and (ii) 
what those sub-group norms were. 
The argument that is beginning to be developed is clearly 
moving some way away from the simplicity of Tajfel's social 
identity theory, in as much as it is claimed that to 
understand, explain and predict genuine group behaviour 
17 The same is true at a sub-group level, as particular 
sub-groups in condition 1 also did not employ significant mean 
in-group favouritism. 
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(including intergroup discrimination) it is necessary to 
consider much more than a simple desire to attain satisfactory 
self-esteem via positive in-group distinctiveness following 
social categorization. In Chapter 5 it is nevertheless 
claimed that social identity theory's motivational hypothesis 
has been both misrepresented and inadequately tested. Before 
rejecting that "self-esteem hypothesis" in favour of an 
alternative one, then, it behoves us to determine and test the 
best version of that hypothesis possible. 
Abrams & Hogg (1988: 320) identify two corollaries of social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis. The first is that 
"successful intergroup discrimination ... elevates self -esteem" 
and the second is that "depressed or threatened self-esteem 
promotes intergroup discrimination" (Hogg & Abrams, 1990: 33). 
It is argued in this thesis that there are two primary faults 
with such a formulation. The first has already been 
implicitly dealt with in the full exposition of Tajfel's 
social identity theory above. This is that successful in-
group favouritism will only elevate self-esteem under very 
specific conditions (e.g. when in-group favouritism is 
successfully used to obtain or enhance, rather than to 
maintain or protect, secure and legitimate positive in-group 
distinctiveness), and, similarly, self-esteem needs will only 
motivate in-group favouritism under certain circumstances 
(e.g. when such discrimination is perceived as likely to 
achieve secure and legitimate positive in-group 
distinctiveness and more attractive means of meeting self-
esteem needs are unavailable). These issues are more fully 
explored in Chapter 7 below. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with addressing the second main problem 
with Abrams & Hoggls formulation of the corollaries of the 
self-esteem hypothesis. This is that they do not adequately 
specify that it is not self-esteem per se which motivates and 
is affected by in-group favouritism: it is social identi ty 
contingent self-esteem. Self-esteem, as the term is usually 
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employed, operationalized and measured, refers to an 
individual and global psychological trait. That is, 
individuals are held to have unique and relatively stable 
levels of self-esteem which is derived from their "overall" 
evaluation of themselves, and such self-esteem levels vary 
across individuals. However, this "general" "trait" self-
esteem is not the sort of self-esteem which social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis refers to. 
The self-esteem hypothesis within Tajfel' s social identity 
theory is concerned with "state" self-esteem derived from 
"specific" 
situations. 
group membership in particular intergroup 
In-group favouritism which is successful in 
achieving or increasing (or making more salient) secure and 
legitimate positive in-group distinctiveness is predicted to 
elevate that part of in-group members' self-esteem which is at 
that moment (commonly) determined by membership of the 
successfully discriminating in-group. Similarly, self-esteem 
which is threatened or depressed because of membership of a 
particular in-group which is momentarily not securely and 
legitimately positively distinct is predicted to promote in-
group favouritism (under certain circumstances) because of a 
need to make that (common) aspect of in-group members' self-
esteem more satisfactory. 
Chapter 5 reports a study in which Rosenberg's (1965) self-
esteem scale was modified to produce four measures of 
different "types" of self-esteem: one measuring "general 
trait" self-esteem, one measuring "general state" self-esteem; 
one measuring "trait" self-esteem derived from a particular 
(national) group membership (i.e. a "specific trait" self-
esteem measure) ; and one measuring "state" self-esteem derived 
from that particular (national) group membership at a 
particular moment (i.e. a "specific state" self-esteem 
measure) . It was predicted that only the last of these 
measures would be sufficiently sensitive to capture changes in 
self-esteem resulting from making positive or negative aspects 
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of a particular group membership more salient than they had 
been a few moments before. This hypothesis was supported. It 
was also predicted that there would be a positive correlation 
between subjects' level of identification with the particular 
in-group of interest (their self-defined national group) and 
the change in self-esteem resulting from the experimental 
manipulation. This hypothesis was not supported. The main 
conclusion drawn in this chapter was that the most appropriate 
measure for testing the self-esteem hypothesis within social 
identity theory is a "state" and "specific" one which measures 
self-esteem derived from a particular group membership at a 
particular moment (i.e. an SSSE measure), and that because no 
studies to date appear to have employed such a measure social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis has not yet been 
adequately tested. 
Chapter 6 reports a study which compares predictions derived 
from social identity theory with predictions derived from 
Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model (Pleban & Tesser, 
1981; Tesser, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1980, 
1982, 1983; Tesser & Collins, 1988; Tesser & Paulus, 1983; 
Tesser & Smith, 1980; Tesser et aI, 1984, 1988) concerning the 
effects of between-individual and between-group social 
comparison outcomes. 
Social identity theory claims that when social identity is 
salient social comparison outcomes which reveal new or 
enhanced (legitimate and secure) positive in-group 
distinctiveness will raise self-esteem, and social comparison 
outcomes which reveal new or "enhanced" (legitimate and 
secure) negative in-group distinctiveness will lower self-
esteem. It also makes the "dynamic" predictions that when 
social identity is salient subjects will: (i) wish to aid the 
performance of in-group others; (ii) become increasingly close 
to in-group others when the in-group is (legitimately and 
securely) positively distinct, but will distance themselves 
from in-group others when the in-group (legitimately and 
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securely) negatively distinct; and, (iii) increase the 
relevance of comparison dimensions when the in-group is 
(legitimately and securely) positively distinct on those 
dimensions, but will decrease the relevance of comparison 
dimensions when the in-group is (legitimately and securely) 
negatively distinct on those dimensions. Social identity 
theory, as an explicitly intergroup theory, is relatively 
"silent" about the effects of between-individual social 
comparison outcomes. 
The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts that personal 
inferiority to another on a self -relevant dimension will 
deflate self-esteem while personal inferiority to another on 
a self-irrelevant dimension will elevate self-esteem, and that 
the closer one is to the comparison other, the greater the 
changes in self -esteem will be. The model also makes the 
"dynamic" predictions that following upward social comparisons 
on self-relevant dimensions individuals will wish to: (i) 
avoid increasing the performance differential in the other's 
favour; (ii) distance themselves from the superior other; and, 
(iii) reduce the self-relevance of the comparison dimension. 
The model is relatively silent about: (i) the effects of 
downward individual social comparisons; (ii) the "dynamic" 
consequences of upward social comparisons on self-irrelevant 
dimensions (apart from wishing to increase closeness to the 
superior other); and, as an explicitly interpersonal theory, 
(iii) the effects of between-group social comparison outcomes. 
Unadulterated, social identity theory received considerably 
more support than the self-evaluation maintenance model from 
the study reported in this chapter. Not only are social 
identity theory's predictions more exhaustive than the self-
evaluation maintenance model's, most of the effects of social 
comparison outcomes (ostensibly between-individual as well as 
explicitly between-group) could be explained in terms of 
between-group status differentials. 
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It was nevertheless argued that social identity theory could 
be profitably modified to explicitly incorporate predictions 
about: (i) the effects of between-individual social 
comparisons; and, particularly, (ii) the interactive effects 
of between-individual and between-group social comparison 
outcomes. 
Chapter 7 reports the results of a questionnaire designed to 
re-examine some of the issues raised above and to "mop up" a 
few outstanding ones. The issue of different "sorts" of in-
group favouritism was the first to be examined, in conjunction 
with an argument that social identity theory also needs to 
differentiate different "sorts" of out-group. It was argued 
that the term "out-group" should be restricted to those groups 
against which in-groups have a particular interest in 
employing "strong" discrimination, either because of an in-
group "culture" of such out-group derogation, or because of 
situational factors which promote such an in-group attitude. 
Groups against whom in-groups have no such orientation should 
be referred to simply as "non-in-groups". Against these 
groups it was predicted that in-group members would employ 
only "weak" discrimination (i.e. in-group preference without 
out-group derogation). Each of these predictions was 
supported, suggesting that (recognized, multigroup) social 
categorization may lead only to in-group preference without 
out-group derogation, and that "something else" needs to be 
added to the equation before "strong" intergroup 
discrimination/social competition can be predicted; this 
"something else" being an in-group norm dictating such 
behaviour. 
The next issue to be addressed was the relationship between 
positive or negative in-group distinctiveness and in-group 
evaluation, social identity and self-esteem. Social identity 
theory claims that the mere fact of in-group superiority or 
inferiority more or less determines these factors, but it was 
argued in this chapter that this is far too simplistic. In 
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particular it was argued: (i) that in-groups (and membership 
of them) can be, and often are, evaluated by means other than 
direct social comparisons with other. groups, such as via 
comparing the in-group against "objective" or temporal 
criteria; and, (ii) that progress toward or away from desired 
in-group states (of which superiority to other groups is only 
one) affect in-group evaluations, social identity and social 
identity contingent self-esteem, as well as the mere 
attainment or non-attainment of such in-group goals. These 
propositions received empirical support, suggesting that 
social identity theory needs to incorporate a more 
sophisticated account of the determinants of in-group 
evaluation, social identity and self-esteem. 
The self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory was 
the final main issue examined, this time from the standpoint 
that current formulations and tests of that hypothesis are 
inadequate because they neglect the importance of the 
stability and legitimacy of valued in-group distinctiveness. 
With respect to corollary 1 of that hypothesis it was argued 
that it is not intergroup discrimination per se (or even 
"successful" intergroup discrimination) which elevates self-
esteem, it is new or enhanced legitimate and stable positive 
in-group distinctiveness, however such in-group 
distinctiveness is brought about. This proposition received 
considerable empirical support. 
With respect to corollary 2 of the self-esteem hypothesis it 
is argued that it is not depressed or threatened self-esteem 
per se which promotes intergroup discrimination, it is 
depressed or threatened social identity contingent self-
esteem, and then only when the proposed intergroup 
discrimination is perceived as an available and attractive 
route to secure and legitimate positive in-group 
distinctiveness. This proposition received mixed and largely 
post hoc support. It was argued that this was because the 
notion of legitimate intergroup discrimination was not 
57 
adequately incorporated into the questionnaire's design. As 
in Chapter 5, it was concluded that to date social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis has not been adequately 
formulated or tested. 
The final chapter begins with a summary of the main empirical 
results reported earlier in the thesis, and of the principal 
conclusions drawn from those results. The implications of 
those results and conclusions for social identity theory are 
considered, as are the potential theoretical and 
methodological limitations associated with them. Some attempt 
is then made to sketch a "modified" version of social identity 
theory which is consistent with contemporary research 
(including that presented in this thesis), much of which seems 
to present challenges to various aspects of the original 
theory. The main similarities and differences between the 
"modified" and the "original" versions of social identity 
theory are then highlighted, and the chapter ends with 
suggestions for future research in this area. 
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guwnm 2; STUDY 1 - THINKALOUD IN THE MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter reports a study in which a "thinkaloud" procedure 
(ct. Ericsson & Simon, 1984) was employed within the minimal 
group paradigm (cf. Tajfel et al., 1971). Subjects who were 
categorized into one or the other of two novel and explicitly 
arbitrary categories were instructed to make point allocations 
to in-group and out-group others whilst being tape-recorded 
verbalizing their thoughts and feelings. 
Unlike in most minimal group studies, subjects in the present 
study did not engage in mean sample-level in-group 
favouritism. Indeed, subjects in the present study employed 
a wide variety of individual allocation strategies, with only 
3 (of 22) subjects engaging in significant amounts of in-group 
preference. Unless the thinkaloud procedure interfered in an 
important way with processes which usually occur in the 
minimal group paradigm (a possibility rejected in this 
chapter), this suggests that mere social categorization is not 
sufficient to promote intergroup discrimination. 
Neither did all socially categorized subjects in the present 
study indicate that they identified with their imposed minimal 
groups once they had identified themselves as group members. 
This suggests that mere social categorization (including 
awareness of group membership) may also be insufficient to 
promote identification with in-groups. 
Finally, because a wide variety of strategies were employed in 
the present study, both across individuals and within 
individuals across allocations, it is suggested that no 
current theory purporting to explain minimal group behaviour 
is sufficiently broad and flexible to do so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The "sufficiency condition" within social identity theory (see 
Chapter 1) states "that the mere perception of belonging to 
two distinct groups - that is social categorization per se -
is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favouring 
the in-group" (Taj fel & Turner, 1979: 38). Justification for 
this claim comes from the results of experiments within the 
minimal group paradigm (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; 
Tajfel 1970; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1971). In 
this paradigm explicitly arbitrary or random criteria are used 
to privately assign each experimental subject to one of two 
(or more) novel categories and then subj ects are asked to 
individually distribute "goods" (e.g. points, money or 
evaluations) to pairs of other people about whom they know 
nothing except their group membership. Results typically show 
that, on average, subjects allocate more goods to in-group 
than to out-group members and that, again on average, subjects 
have a preference for in-group members receiving more goods 
than out-group members, as opposed to in-group members 
receiving the maximum possible goods. That is, mere social 
categorization seems sufficient to promote intergroup 
discrimination, just as claimed by the "sufficiency condition" 
within social identity theory. 
Prior to this experimental discovery, the dominant social-
psychological theory of intergroup conflict came from Sherif, 
who hypothesized that intergroup conflict stems from group 
members' perceptions of negatively interdependent group goals 
(e.g. Sherif et al, 1961).1 If, as seems reasonable, social 
categorization per se does not entail perceptions of 
negatively interdependent group goals, then mere social 
categorization being sufficient to promote intergroup 
discrimination means that perceived negatively interdependent 
Two groups' goals are negatively interdependent if 
movement by one group toward its goals necessarily puts the 
other group's goals further out of its reach. 
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group goals cannot be a necessary precondition of intergroup 
conflict. 
A simplified account of Tajfel's social identity theory 
explains subjects' minimal group behaviour as follows. 
Subjects recognize the imposed social categorization and their 
individual positions as members of only one of the two 
resultant social categories. Subjects' self-esteem then 
becomes dependent on their evaluation of their own social 
category (i.e. their "in-group") and their evaluation of 
themselves as members of that social category (i.e. their 
II social identity"). Groups are evaluated in comparison to 
other groups, with superior groups being evaluated positively 
and inferior groups negatively. Subjects in the minimal group 
paradigm therefore indulge in intergroup discrimination in an 
attempt to achieve in-group superiority, positive evaluation 
of the in-group and its members, and thus positive social 
identity and self-esteem (and/or to avoid in-group 
inferiority, negative evaluation of the in-group and its 
members, and thus negative social identity and self-esteem) . 
Competing accounts of minimal intergroup behaviour come from 
generic norm theory, equity theory, the behavioural 
interaction model, the intergroup accentuation hypothesis, 
self-categorization theory, and a demand characteristics 
explanation. 
Generic norm theory (e.g. Branthwaite et al., 1979; Tajfel, 
1970; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel et aI, 1971; Wetherell, 
1982) holds that within all societies there are "generic" 
norms which members of those societies learn, internalize, and 
act upon in appropriate circumstances. Conunon to most 
societies are generic norms of "fairness" and of "groupness". 
A societal norm of fairness means that (when appropriate) 
society members should distribute goods equally among all 
(equally deserving) recipients and a societal norm of 
groupness means that (when appropriate) group members should 
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favour in-group members over out-group members. Both norms 
are said by generic norm theory to be activated within the 
minimal group paradigm: the former because goods are being 
distributed among people who equally deserve (or do not 
deserve) goods, and the latter because they are being 
distributed between in-group and out-group members. Thus, 
mere social categorization results in intergroup 
discrimination because it activates the groupness norm, but 
discrimination is rarely maximal as the task of distributing 
goods among "equal" others simultaneously activates the 
fairness norm. This means that generic norms of fairness and 
groupness are simultaneously working in opposite directions 
within the minimal group paradigm, so that the resultant 
behaviour is best understood as a "compromise" between 
fairness and in-group favouritism. 
Equity theory asserts simply that people desire equitable 
outcomes whenever goods are distributed. An equity theory 
explanation of minimal group behaviour (e.g. Ng, 1981, 1986) 
rests on the proposition that subjects display in-group 
favouritism in an attempt to compensate for similar 
discrimination by out-group members so that an equitable 
outcome is achieved overall. 
The behavioural interaction model (e.g. Rabbie, 1992; Rabbie 
et al., 1989) asserts that subjects in minimal intergroup 
situations are ultimately motivated by "economic" self-
interest, striving to obtain maximum possible "goods" for 
themselves (as individuals) via instrumental intragroup 
cooperation and instrumental intergroup competition. Subjects 
in the minimal group paradigm aim to further the goals of in-
group members rather than out-group members in the hope and 
belief that in-group members will be more likely than out-
group members to reciprocate in order to further their own 
selfish economic interests. This belief is held because the 
social categorization results in more perceived "conunon fate" 
with in-group than with out-group members, which in turn leads 
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subjects to feel more positive interdependence with the former 
rather than the latter. (Two individuals are positively 
interdependent if each can only move toward or away from their 
own goal if the other does likewise.> In-group favouritism is 
not maximal, however, because subjects realise that their 
self-interest can be furthered by out-group members' 
allocations as well as in-group members', even if out-group 
members are deemed less likely than in-group members to engage 
in reciprocal goal satisfaction. 
The intergroup accentuation hypothesis holds that whenever 
social categories are superimposed on people who were 
considered previously only as individuals there will be a 
tendency for those people to accentuate inter-category 
differences (and also, perhaps, intra-category similarities) . 
Applied to the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Doise & Sinclair, 
1973) this hypothesis suggests that social categorization has 
the effect of making subjects wish to behaviourally accentuate 
intergroup differences, which they do via intergroup 
discrimination. 
Self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner et al., 1987) claims 
that people's actions as group members are guided by a desire 
to be as similar as possible to a "prototypical" in-group 
member. The prototypical in-group member is one who maximizes 
the ratio of difference to out-group members over similarity 
to other in-group members. Applied to the minimal group 
paradigm, self-categorization theory suggests that subjects 
imitate the expected non-maximal in-group favouritism of the 
prototypical in-group member. 
Finally, the demand characteristics explanation of minimal 
intergroup discrimination (e.g. Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; 
Schiffmann & Wicklund, 1992) argues that characteristics of 
the minimal group situation virtually demand intergroup 
discrimination. Minimal group subjects are held to have 
nothing to base their allocation decisions on except their 
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group memberships and it is supposed that it seems obvious to 
them that they should favour the in-group, otherwise why would 
the experimenter bother to put them into one of the groups? 
Numerous experimental studies have been conducted to try and 
substantiate and/or undermine the theoretical positions above, 
but very little, if anything, has been done in the way of 
obtaining subj ects' accounts of their behaviour in the minimal 
group paradigm. The study reported here attempts to remedy 
this. Subj ects took part in a standard minimal group paradigm 
experiment with one major modification: subjects were asked to 
"think aloud" throughout and were tape-recorded doing so. 
Ericsson & Simon (1980, 1984) suggest that verbalizing thought 
affects cognitive processes (and therefore, presumably, 
behaviour) only if the thoughts verbalized would not have been 
attended to if they were not verbalized. That is, subjects 
who think aloud will think and act in exactly the same way as 
subjects who do not think aloud, unless the thinking aloud 
itself causes subjects to attend to thoughts which they would 
not have attended to were they not thinking aloud. 
If it can be assumed that thinking aloud in the minimal group 
situation does not cause subjects to attend to thoughts they 
would not otherwise have attended to, such a procedure offers 
a useful research device for investigating why subjects act as 
they do within the minimal group paradigm.2 Each theoretical 
explanation of minimal group behaviour suggests that various 
motives, means and ends might be accessible to consciousness 
by subjects during the allocation of goods. According to all 
of the theories, for example, subjects should be aware of the 
social categorization and should in some way accept their 
2 This is an assumption, however, and there is also some 
debate as to the adequacy of the thinkaloud method generally. 
See Nisbett & Bellows, 1977; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977: Vesonder 
& Voss, 1985. Nevertheless, given the present state of 
understanding about minimal group behaviour, the method 
certainly seems worth trying. 
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membership of one group and their non-membership of the 
other(s). Beyond this, of course, each theory would lead one 
to expect subjects to vocalize somewhat different thoughts. 
If social identity theory is valid, for example, one might 
expect subjects, as well as identifying themselves as members 
of one of the minimal groups but not of the other, to 
demonstrate some sort of identification with the in-group and 
its members which would lead them express a concern that 
members of the in-group should end up receiving more goods 
than members of the out-group.3 Whether or not subjects would 
be aware of the direct and indirect instrumental reason for 
this desired in-group superiority (i.e. positive evaluation of 
the in-group and positive self-esteem, respectively) is less 
certain. 
According to generic norm theory we might expect subjects to 
be aware of a "conflict" between a desire to be fair and 
another desire to be loyal to the in-group. Again, it is less 
clear whether or not subj ects would be aware that these 
desires stemmed from internalized societal expectations. 
Equity theory suggests that subjects thinking aloud during a 
minimal group paradigm experiment would express a desire for 
an equitable outcome, as well as a belief that this required 
intergroup discrimination in order to compensate for expected 
in-group favouritism by out-group members. 
There seems no reason to suppose that subj ects would be 
unaware of their primary motive according to the behavioural 
interaction model. This model suggests that subjects will be 
quite clear that they are acting as they are - that is, 
cooperating with in-group members and competing with out-group 
members - purely for indirect personal economic gain. We can 
also expect that subjects will express a belief that in-group 
. 3 See Chapter 1, pp. 41-21, for the distinction between 
~dentity with and identity as. 
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members will be more likely to cooperate with them than will 
out-group members. 
Doise's intergroup accentuation hypothesis is that minimal 
group subjects discriminate in an attempt to behaviourally 
differentiate between the social categories. It is perhaps 
more reasonable to assume that subjects will be conscious of 
this than to assume that subjects will have no idea how they 
are acting or why they are doing so. 
Self-categorization theory is more problematic. It is not 
clear according to that theory whether people attend to their 
cognitive determination, and behavioral emulation, of the 
prototypical in-group member. It seems unlikely that they 
would. (Under what situation would one expect an account of 
a social action to include a reference to prototypical in-
group members, by whatever name?) However, even under a self-
categorization theory explanation one might still expect some 
sort of declaration of similarity to in-group members and 
difference to out-group members and/or an expression of a 
desire to act like an in-group member and not like an out-
group member. 
If the demand characteristics explanation is correct, it might 
be predicted that minimal group subjects would feel that in-
group favouritism was pretty much the only option they had 
and/ or was expected of them (forced upon them?) by the 
experimenter and/or the experimental situation. 
Obtaining minimal group subjects' accounts of their behaviour 
has another potential benefit, quite apart from potentially 
distinguishing between the validity of the various theoretical 
positions expounded above. This is to investigate claims that 
the principal dependent measures used in the minimal group 
paradigm, i.e. the Tajfel matrices, are susceptible to some of 
the more potentially damaging criticisms that have been made 
of them. 
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The first criticism come from Aschenbrenner & Schaefer (1980: 
396) who suggest that the pull-scores derived from the Tajfel 
matrices may not "provide a representative description of the 
subjects' behaviour."· So, for example, if on a particular 
occasion a subject chooses to allocate 15 points to an in-
group member and 17 points to an out-group member (on matrix 
type 2 in Appendix 1), this will contribute +4 (from a 
possible range of 0-12) to a pull score of MD on MIP+MJP 
(Maximum Difference in favour of the in-group on Maximum In-
group Profit+Maximum Joint Profit, the emphasis should be 
noted). It is difficult to see how giving more points to an 
out-group member than to an in-group one can justifiably 
contribute so positively to such a score. Nevertheless, 
obtaining subj ects' accounts may throw some light on how 
subjects themselves construe such a choice. 
Mummendey et al. (1992) unusually asked subjects to use Tajfel 
matrices to distribute "bads" rather than "goods" and found no 
significant in-group favouritism. This suggests that the 
Tajfel matrices may lack content validity,S such that subjects 
are forced into making choices from a relatively narrow range 
of possibilities. As Tajfel himself notes, giving less goods 
to out-group members than to in-group members may have a very 
different psychological significance than actively taking away 
goods from (and/or giving "bads" to) out-group members (Tajfel 
et aI, 1971: 174). Subjects' accounts may reveal whether 
subjects are simply being "nicer" to in-group than to out-
group members (as the behavioural interaction model might 
suggest) or are being as "nasty" as they can to out-group 
members within the limited range of behaviours available to 
• See Appendix 1 for the Tajfel matrices most often used 
in the minimal group paradigm, and also for how pull-scores 
are derived from them. 
S "Content validity refers to the degree to which a 
measure covers the range of meanings included wi thin the 
concept" (Babbie, 1989: 125), the concept being, in this case, 
intergroup behaviour. 
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them (as the intergroup accentuation hypothesis might 
suggest) . 
Bornstein et al. (1983a: 342) note that some strategies are 
structurally mutually inhibitory using the Tajfel matrices, 
while others are operationally entailed. If a subject wishes 
to maximize the overall goods obtained by recipients on a 
matrix which measures MIP+MD on MJP (Maximum In-group 
Profit+Maximum Difference in favour of the in-group on Maximum 
Joint Profit), for example, they are forced to be as 
inequitable as it is possible to be on that particular 
allocation. It is possible that subjects may wish to pursue 
some strategies but do not wish to do so at any cost. Thus a 
'pull' toward MIP+MD from MJP may be an artefact of subjects 
wishing to pursue both MJP and fairness. Subjects' accounts 
should throw some light on such matters. 
A related criticism by Bornstein et al. (1980: 342) is that 
subjects may be forced into 'second-choice' strategies by the 
constraints imposed by the design of the Tajfel matrices. On 
one matrix type (i.e. Type 3), for example, all possible 
allocations "maximize" (and/or "minimize") the joint goods 
obtained by the recipient pair. What does a subject do if 
they are attempting to maximize joint profit in such a 
situation, and does it affect their subsequent actions? 
Again, subjects' accounts should be illuminating. 
Overall then there seems to be a strong case for obtaining 
subjects' accounts of what they think they are doing in the 
minimal group paradigm, what they hope to achieve by acting as 
they do, problems they encounter, and what they do about such 
problems. Specifically, such accounts should enable each of 
several theoretical explanations of minimal group behaviour to 
be examined from the subjects' points of view, and they may 
also suggest whether or not certain key criticisms of Tajfel-
matrix dependent measures are valid. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
26 second-year psychology students from Keele University 
volunteered to be subjects in a study which was introduced as 
"A qualitative examination of decision-making." 4 subjects 
were excluded from the analysis: one because they showed signs 
of being familiar with the minimal group paradigm, two because 
their aUdio-tapes were blank (see below), and one because 
their aUdio-tape could not be located. Of the remaining 22 
subj ects 7 were male and 15 female. Ages ranged from 19 to 30 
years of age, with a mean average of 21.5 years (mode = 20 
years, median = 20.5 years). 
procedure 
Experimental sessions of 2-4 subjects were conducted over four 
consecutive days according to a time-table filled out at the 
time of volunteering. Upon arri ving at an experimental 
session (except in the first session) subjects were 
immediately asked whether they had heard anything about the 
study from others who had already taken part. No-one claimed 
to have heard about the study, and several said that previous 
participants had refused to talk about the study, even when 
asked about it. 
Subjects were then told that each of them would soon be given 
a unique code number and would be randomly categorized into 
one of two groups, Group W or Group X. All subjects allocated 
to Group W would have a code number in the 40s and all 
subjects allocated to Group X would have a code number in the 
70s. Allocation to groups, the subjects were told, would be 
carried out by the experimenter selecting at random one 
envelope for each subject from a collection of such envelopes, 
each one of which contained a unique code number and social 
category membership information. At this stage one subject 
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checked that the envelopes did indeed contain different code 
numbers and the possibility of being assigned to either group. 
Another subject then "shuffled" the envelopes. 
Next, subjects were informed that the nature of the decision-
making task they would be required to perform involved 
allocating points to pairs of other people about whom they 
would know nothing except their individual code number and 
their group membership. It was stressed that they would not 
know who was in which group and that each subject would make 
their allocations individually in separate rooms. It was 
particularly noted that subjects were seen in separate 
sessions only because of limited availability of rooms and 
that there was no more likelihood of people in their session 
being in the same group as them (or in the other group) than 
there was of people in other sessions being in their group (or 
in the other group) . 
Subjects were told that they would never be allocating points 
to themselves, but that points allocated to them by others 
would be recorded (hence the need for individual code numbers) 
and that money they received for participating would be 
directly proportional to the number of points that they 
accrued. Although no direct points/money exchange rate was 
mentioned it was made clear that the more points a person had 
allocated to them, the more money they would receive at the 
end of the week. 
Subjects were told that the main purpose of the study was to 
discover the basis upon which they made their decisions. To 
this end consent was gained from subjects for them to be tape-
recorded whilst giving a running commentary on everything they 
were thinking throughout the procedure, no matter how 
seemingly trivial or unimportant. (No subject withheld their 
consent. ) It was emphasized that the experimenter had no pre-
conceptions concerning how people would make their decisions, 
but that he was genuinely interested in finding out. He was 
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particularly interested, they were told, in what they were 
trying to do, why, any problems they encountered, what they 
did about any such problems, and what they thought the outcome 
of their decisions might be. Nevertheless, it was stressed 
that the experimenter was interested in anything and 
everything subjects were thinking. 
Use of the Tajfel matrices was demonstrated and all questions 
were answered to the best of the experimenter's ability. The 
experimenter then 're-shuffled' the envelopes and randomly 
selected one envelope for each subject. 
Upon receiving their envelopes subj ects were directed to 
individual rooms where they were instructed to open their own 
envelope and follow the instructions contained within. Inside 
each envelope was a booklet containing (as well as a unique 
code number and group membership information) a repeat of most 
of the verbal instructions the subjects had received 
including worked examples of how to use the Tajfel matrices, 
a set of 18 Taj fel matrices, a short demographics 
questionnaire, and a blank page inviting written comments.' 
Three matrix types were used, copies of which can be found in 
Appendix 1. Each matrix type was presented six times; twice 
with two in-group recipients, twice with two out-group 
recipients, and twice with one recipient from each group. For 
each recipient-pair on each matrix type one recipient appeared 
on the top-row on the first presentation and on the bottom row 
for the second presentation. Each matrix appeared on a 
separate page. In an attempt to minimize or avoid possible 
, Following the Taj fel matrices were a number of 
"allocation grids" the use of which had also been explained to 
the subjects. These were included merely as a pilot for a 
later study (see next chapter) and they will not be discussed 
further. An example of the response booklets subjects 
rece i ved (showing, for reasons of space, onl y one of the 
eighteen allocation matrices, and none of the allocation 
grids) can be found in Appendix 2. 
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order-effects, matrix types and recipient-pair patterns were 
presented in a different sequence for each subject. 
Tape-recorders were switched on by subjects in accordance with 
printed instructions to do so. The instructions also stressed 
the need to think aloud as much as possible, an exhortation 
that was repeated on each page of the response booklet. In 
addition, subjects were occasionally instructed to read 
printed matter aloud. The first such instruction was for 
subj ects to read aloud their unique code number and group 
membership. 
After completing all eighteen matrices subjects were invited 
to make any comments (written or spoken) they wished 
concerning the experiment they had just taken part in, and 
were then instructed to turn off the tape-recorder and return 
their response booklets and aUdio-tapes to the experimenter. 
He then answered any questions they had (within the limits of 
the experimental procedure, i.e. that did not involve 
explanation of possible or expected results); told them they 
would be fully debriefed and paid at the end of the week, and 
extracted a promise from them not to tell anyone yet to do the 
study anything about what they had been asked to do (except in 
the final session). (No subject declined to make such a 
promise. ) At the end of the week the experimenter fully 
debriefed the subjects (in a class given by him) i fully 
answered any questions; and gave each subject £2, regardless 
of points allocated to them in the experiment. Subjects were 
also invited to make any complaints they might have to anyone 
of several people (e.g. their personal tutor). No such 
complaints were made to the experimenter's knowledge. 
Overall, the design of the study was that of a 'standard' 
minimal group paradigm experiment, with the main modification 
of a think aloud procedure. In line with Billig & Taj fel 
(1973) social categorization was explicitly (and genuinely) 
random in order to investigate the effects of social 
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categorization per se on subsequent intergroup behaviour, 
unconfounded by any possible perceptions of similarity 
subjects might have perceived they had with in-group others 
(other than that resul ting from social categorization, see 
Farsides, 1993a). Social categorization was also carried out 
in such a way that subjects could not possibly feel they had 
any control over it (see Langer, 1975). 
Analysis 
Tajfel matrices were used to calculate pull-scores and 
indirect in-group favouritism scores (see Appendix 1 for 
details). Seven of the audio-tapes were then transcribed in 
full. Subjects were selected to have their tape transcribed 
in full if (i) they obtained relatively high pull-scores on 
one or more strategy and (ii) their tapes were particularly 
clear and therefore could be accurately transcribed with ease. 
The rest of the audio-tapes to be used (15) were carefully 
listened to by the experimenter and all material deemed by him 
to be relevant to the task in hand was also transcribed. All 
transcribed material can be found in Appendix 3. 
A coding frame was designed and the qualitative data was 
subjected to a series of content analyses. The first sections 
of the coding frame each used a single matrix presentation as 
the coding unit. A third section involved the experimenter 
giving a short qualitative precis of each subject's "overall" 
behaviour and then using each such summary as a single coding 
unit. The coding frame is reproduced in Appendix 4. In the 
first part (Section A: "allocation intentions") eleven primary 
categories were generated from the relevant research 
literature (see introduction) and each subject's expressed aim 
during each allocation was assigned to the appropriate 
category. If a subject's account of their behaviour seemed to 
significantly invoke two or more categories a new 
combinational category was generated and incorporated into the 
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coding frame. The primary categories were:- personal profit 
(subject claims reason for allocation is to obtain personal 
goods); personal status (subject claims reason for allocation 
is to obtain more goods than other subjects); in-group profit 
(subject claims reason for allocation is to obtain goods for 
the in-group and/or its members); in-group status (subject 
claims reason for allocation is to obtain superiori ty for 
ingroup and/or its members over the out-group and/or its 
members); joint profit (subject claims reason for allocation 
is to obtain goods for all recipients); fairness (subject 
claims reason for allocation is to be fair, just and/or 
equitable); intergroup accentuation (subject claims reason for 
allocation is to emphasize, exaggerate or extend intergroup 
differences and/or intragroup similarities); prototypicality 
(subject claims reason for allocation is to mimic an in-group 
prototype); none or arbitrary (subject explicitly states that 
there is no rational or teleological reason for allocation); 
other (subject gives a specific reason or rationale for 
allocation other than those contained in other categories); 
and, absent (subject gives no explanation for their 
allocation) . 
The second principal part of the content analysis (Section B: 
"operative factors") involved marking the presence or absence 
of a subject's reference to one or more of eleven factors 
which the various theories considered in the introduction to 
this chapter might suggest would be at work during the minimal 
group paradigm.' These factors were:- personality (subject 
claims allocation motivated or determined by dispositional 
characteristic); experimenter expectation (subject claims 
allocation made because it was expected by the experimenter) ; 
norm(s) (subject claims that allocation is in line with one or 
more norms appropriate to the situation); reciprocity (subject 
claims they are making their allocation in the hope and/or 
Thus, Section A concerned what subjects reported they 
were trying to do on each allocation, and Section B concerned 
the reasons subjects gave for dOing it. 
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expectation that others will reciprocate); in-group identity 
(subject identify with the group in expressing a commitment to 
and/or a concern about the fate of the in-group and/or its 
members); alternation (subject claims that the allocation is 
made in part to redress earlier actions and thereby pursue a 
single coherent 'overall' strategy); consideration of others' 
actions (subj ect wonders about and/or predicts other subj ects' 
behaviour); overall outcome (subject considers likely outcome 
of all the subjects' allocations, e.g., how many goods the in-
group will receive relative to the out-group); structural 
'restriction' (subject indicates that they type of allocation 
they choose is directly affected by the matrix type or a 
change in matrix type); self-esteem (subject claims that a 
motivation for their choice is psychological well-being) ; and, 
personal gain (subject expresses a belief that their behaviour 
is consonant with a strategy whereby they will personally gain 
economically from their participation in the experimental 
procedure) . 
The third aspect of the content analysis (Section C: "overall 
strategy") involved the experimenter writing a qualitative 
summary of each subject's "overall" behaviour and then 
deciding which of the eleven categories (plus any 
combinational categories generated from them) used in the 
"subject's intentions" section would be most suitable as a 
single categorical sununary of each subject's "overall" 
strategy. The experimenter's qualitative summaries are shown 
in full in Appendix 5. 
... 
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RESULTS 
Sample pull and indirect in-group favouritism sCOreS 
Average pull-scores and indirect in-group favouritism scores 
for the 22 subjects included in the analysis were as follows:-
Matrix- scores Mean (SO) 
MIP+MJP on MD S.S91 (S.738)" 
F on FAV 4.273 {S.742}" 
MJP on FAV 2.000 (6.133) 
FAV on F 0.909 {S.089} 
MD on MIP+MJP -0.136 (4.223) 
FAV on MJP -0.636 (S.892) 
IndFAV1 1.2S0 (2.939) 
IndFAV2 1.114 (4.149) 
N _ 22. Alteriaked ite.s are lignificantly different fro. zero (p < 0.005) by two-tailed one lampl. 
t-t •• t. 
Table 2. 1 : Mean pull and indirect in -group favouri tism scores 
The present study did not replicate the usual minimal group 
paradigm experiment in that social categorization did not lead 
here to any significant mean sample-level in-group 
favouritism. Only two scores were significantly different 
from zero: the pull of MIP+MJP on MD and the pull of F on FAV. 
8 See Appendix 1 for scoring rules. 
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Reliability coefficients for the content analysis 
Once the coding frame had been produced two coders used it 
separately to content analyze the qualitative material. 
Differences between the coders were noted and returned to 
them. Coders then re-examined the material to see if they had 
made a simple mistake which they wished to correct (without 
knowing how the other coder had coded each particular item) . 
Once this had been done inter-rater reliability checks were 
conducted using Krippendorff's (1980: 138-140) agreement 
coefficient. This measure provides a "uniform measure that is 
comparable across numerous situations" as (i) it "corrects for 
small sample sizes" and (ii) the percentage of expected 
agreement between raters "is computed from the proportion with 
which a category is used, both coders taken together" (p. 
138) . The agreement coefficient (when multiplied by 100) 
shows the percentage by which observed agreements between 
coders are above chance. 
For the first part of the content analysis (i.e. Section A: 
the "allocation intentions" section) the agreement coefficient 
was 0.896. That is, agreement between the two coders was 
almost 90% above that which would be expected by chance. The 
second part of the content analysis (i .e. Section B: the 
"operative factors" section) required a separate agreement 
coefficient to be calculated for each factor considered. 
These are shown below. 
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Factor Agreement 
coefficient 
Personality 0.564 
Experimenter 
expectation 0.004 
Norm(s) 0.665 
Reciprocity 0.856 
In-group identity 0.816 
Alternation 0.805 
Consideration of 
other's actions 0.831 
Overall outcome 0.005 
Structural 
restriction 0.706 
Self-esteem 0.005 
Personal gain 0.419 
Table 2.2: Interrater agreement coefficients 
Agreement coefficients were high for most factors, less good 
for factors concerning personality and personal gain, and poor 
for experimenter expectation and self-esteem. 9 
No agreement coefficient was calculated for the third section 
of the content analysis (i.e. "overall behaviour"), as only 
the experimenter completed and coded qualitative summaries of 
each subject's behaviour overall. 
It can be noted that, generally speaking, the fewer 
the instances of an operative factor in the present study, the 
worse the agreement coefficient. Thus, experimenter 
expectation and self-esteem were cited as operative factors 
very seldom by subjects in the present study. 
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Once reliability had been checked coders discussed how to 
revolve any remaining differences. On the very few occasions 
when agreement could not be reached the experimenter decided 
on the appropriate coding for reporting the results below. 
Content analysis Concerning allocation intentions 
Nineteen categories were used to represent allocation 
intentions, eleven 'primary' and eight 'combinational.' The 
number of subjects claiming those allocation intentions, and 
the number of allocations claimed by subjects to have been 
motivated by each intention, are shown in the table below 
(continued, with a key, overleaf), broken down by matrix type 
and recipient pattern. In the table the top number in each 
cell represents the number of that type of allocations made 
and the bottom number represents the number of subjects 
involved in making those allocations. Cells left blank 
indicate that no allocations were made following that 
strategy. 
Matrix Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Recipient ii 00 io/ ii 00 io/ ii 00 io/ 
Pattern oi oi oi 
Strategy 
1 Personal 1. 
Profit 1 
2 Personal 
Status 
3 In-group 3 3 3 2 
Profit 2 2 2 2 
4 In-group 1 2 1 1 3 
Status 1 2 1. 1. 3 
5 Joint 5 5 4 7 5 6 
Profit 4 4 4 6 3 5 
6 Fairness 9 5 10 5 5 4 12 12 3 
8 4 8 3 5 3 8 9 2 
7 Intergroup 1 2 
Accentuation 1 2 
8 Proto-
typicality 
9 Random/ 10 14 10 12 13 13 17 15 13 
None 7 11 9 9 10 10 11 13 11 
10 Other 4 2 4 2 2 1 
Strategy 4 2 4 2 2 1 
11 Absent 15 13 14 10 13 11 14 14 18 
Reason 11 8 12 6 10 8 10 13 14 
12 1 & 3 1 
1 
13 1 & 7 1 
1 
14 3 & 6 1 
1 
15 4 & 7 1 
1 
16 5 & 6 1 2 1 2 1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 1 
17 5 & 7 1 1 
1 1 
18 5 & 8 1 
1 
19 6 & 7 3 1 2 1 
3 1 2 1 
Xay:- i1. two in-group recipient.; 00. two out-group recipient.; 10/01. one recipient from .ach 
group; Type 1 • matrix meaauring pull of FAV on MJP and vice veraa; Type 2 • matrix meaauring pull 
of MD on MIP+MJP and vice verea; and Type 3 • matrix meaauring pull of PAVon P and vice veraa 'a.e 
App.ndix 1 for detaila). For intention.:- 1 • Peraonal profit; 2. Peraonal atatua; 3. In-group 
profit; ... In-group statu.; 5. Joint profit: 6 _ Pairn ••• ; 7· Intergroup accentuation; 8. 
prototypicality; 9. Random, arbitrary or none; 10. Other intention; 11. Abaent reaaon. Other 
intention numbera ara combinationa of thee. (Se. Appendix 4 for detaila). 
Table 2.3: Subjects' self-reported allocation intentions 
No reason was given for almost a third of all allocations, 
with most subjects making at least one allocation without 
verbalizing what they were doing or why. 
For another third of allocations subjects were clearly making 
random or arbitrary decisions or explicitly claimed not to 
have any reason for the allocation they made. A vast majority 
of subjects made at least one such 'intentionless' allocation. 
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An identical majority of subjects made at least one allocation 
which they said was motivated by fairness. 16% of all 
allocations were so motivated: the most common of all stated 
"rational" intentions. Fairness was however the most variable 
intention across matrix types and recipient patterns, with 
fairness far more common on intergroup allocations on matrix 
type 1 (10 allocations, 8 subjects) than on matrix type 2 (4 
allocations, 3 subjects) or matrix type 3 (3 allocations, 2 
subjects) during intergroup allocations. For same-group 
allocations, on the other hand, subjects were more likely to 
report pursuing fairness during allocations on matrix type 3 
(24 allocations, 17 subjects) than on matrix types 1 (14 
allocations, 12 subjects) or 2 (10 allocations, 8 subjects) . 
Half the subjects made at least one allocation which they said 
was motivated by joint profit, although only 8% of all 
allocations were explained with reference to such a motive. 
Bearing in mind that all possible allocations on matrix type 
3 yield the same overall total, it is perhaps not surprising 
that attempts to maximize joint profit were restricted to 
matrix types 1 and 2 (Type 1: 14 allocations, 9 subjects; Type 
2: 18 allocations, 8 subjects; Type 3, no allocations) . 
Half of the subjects also claimed that at least one of their 
allocations was motivated by an intention not covered by the 
coding frame, although a mere 4\ of all responses were 
motivated by such "other" considerations. These "other" 
intentions were varied and included giving the recipient with 
the highest code number the highest points (1:10-11)10; 
minimum joint profit (1:16, 13:9); minimum (4:11) or 
restricted (5:18) out-group profit; giving the bottom-row 
recipient high numbers (10:7); biggest point difference 
(14:13); giving similar points to similar code numbers (15:9) 
10 The first number in these brackets refers to the 
subject, the other to the particular allocations of interest 
made by the subject. See Appendix 3 for details. 
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and dissimilar points to dissimilar code numbers (15:11); and 
not upsetting recipients (22:17). 
11 allocations were explained by subjects as being motivated 
by in-group profit intentions, although only 4 subjects 
reported using such a strategy. In-group profit intentions 
were, moreover, far more common on intergroup allocations (8 
allocations, 6 subjects) than they were on in-group 
allocations (3 allocations, 2 subjects), with no such 
intentions being expressed during out-group allocations. 
5 subjects reported being motivated by intentions to achieve 
in-group status, but only for a total 8 allocations. An 
intention to strive for in-group status was never claimed 
during in-group allocations and such claims were at least 
twice as common during intergroup allocations (6 allocations, 
4 subjects) as during out-group allocations (2 allocations, 2 
subjects) . 
A combined strategy of maximum joint profit and fairness was 
cited by 3 subjects over 8 allocations and a combined strategy 
of fairness and arbitrariness was reported by 5 subjects over 
7 allocations. No other intention was mentioned by more than 
2 subjects or was reported as operative during more than 3 
allocations. Intentions of striving for individual status 
and/or attempting to mimic an in-group prototype were not 
mentioned by any subjects. 
OVerall then the first part of the content analysis suggests 
that the predominant "rational" strategies subjects used in 
the present study were (in descending order of importance):-
fairness, joint profit, "other", in-group profit, and in-group 
status. In-group profit and in-group status were more 
commonly reported on intergroup allocations than on same-group 
ones, while fairness was more common on matrix type 1 than on 
types 2 and 3 for intergroup allocations and more popular on 
.. 
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matrix type 3 than on types 1 and 2 for same-group 
allocations. 
Content analysis concerning QPerative factors 
The frequency with which the factors in Section B of the 
content analysis were operative during the present study are 
shown in the table below, broken down by matrix type and 
recipient pattern. 
Matrix Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Recipient ii 00 io/ ii 00 io/ ii 00 io/ 
Pattern oi oi oi 
Personality 2 1 1 2 1 
Expt. Expec. 
Norm 3 1 
Reciprocity 1 2 
Identity 1 1 3 S 3 4 S 
Alternation 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Others' Beh. 2 1 1 2 
Outcome 
Restriction 6 4 2 2 6 3 4 
Self-esteem 1 1 1 
Self Gain 1 1 1 1 3 1 
key: 11 - Two in-group recipient., 00 • TWo out-group recipient8, 10 • In-group recipient on top-row 
of matrix and out-group member. On bottom-row of matrix, 01 _ out-group member on top-row ot matrix and 
in-group member on bottom-row of matrix (.ee Appendix 1 for detail.). 
Table 2.4: Subjects' self-reported allocation motivations 
personality/disposition was given as a reason for 7 
allocations. The dispositions referred to were superstition 
(1:1+7, 4:10), fairness {13:1, IS:I}, generosity (2:S), and 
insane greediness (14:S) 
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A couple of subjects wondered if discriminating on behalf of 
the in-group might be what was expected in the present study 
(5:7, 11:13). Several more subjects expressed feelings that 
perhaps they ought to show such discrimination (2:2, 11:11, 
21:4, 22:10), while others believed that they should behave 
fairly (7:3, 10:1). In all of these cases, however, it either 
was not clear that subjects had actually decided to behave as 
they thought they "ought", or it was not clear that the 
"ought" expressed by the subject did indeed stem from a 
perceived experimenter expectation (as opposed to being 
expected by the in-group, a norm or whatever). Thus no 
allocations were considered by the coders to be unambiguously 
motivated by subjects conforming to perceived experimenter 
expectations. 
Four allocations were explained with reference to conformity 
to norms. Two norms were rooted in non-minimal in-groups; one 
suggesting that students should obtain "the most money 
possible" for "other students" and another that law students 
should be fair (4:1). One norm revolved around the belief 
that all members of a minimal in-group would allocate maximum 
possible points to other in-group members (21: 18) and the 
final norm prescribed that minimal in-group members "should 
show some loyal ty" (4: 3) . 
Reciprocity was only explicitly attempted on three occasions. 
One subject attempted to be fair to others in the hope that 
others would be fair to her (12:8), another subject maximized 
group profit in the hope that others would do the same 
(14:12), and third maximized in-group profit, again with the 
hope that others would do likewise with the same hope (21: 18) . 
Other subjects expressed a belief or hope that others would 
act as they did, but did not forward this as a reason for 
their own actions (e.g. 4:5, 14:1). 
Identification wi th minimal in-groups was indicated by 6 
subjects during a combined total of 22 allocations. On 
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intergroup allocations identification with minimal in-groups 
was indicated 12 times, 3 times on matrix type 1 (5:11, 21:7, 
21:17), 4 times on matrix type 2 (4:3, 21:13+18, 22:9), and 5 
times on matrix type 3 (5:4, 10:9, 21:4+10, 22:18). 
Identification with minimal in-groups was expressed during in-
group allocations 6 times, once on matrix type 1 (21:6), 5 
times on matrix type 2 (4:13+16, 5:17, 10:10, 21:15), and not 
at all on matrix type 3. On out-group allocations 
identification with minimal in-groups was indicated only 4 
times, once on matrix type 1 (22:10), and 3 times on matrix 
type 2 (2:13, 4:11. 5:12). 
Use of alternation was reported on 17 occasions by 7 subjects. 
One subject was responsible for almost half of these reported 
uses of alternation, employing as she did a rather indirect 
route to fairness: making a random allocation on the first 
presentation of a particular recipient pair and then trying to 
even out any inequalities on the pair's second presentation 
(12:8,10,12,13 and 15-18). A more common use of alternation 
was to compensate for inequalities structurally entailed by 
the subj ect pursuing a primary strategy of maximum joint 
profit (2:6, 11:11+12, 19:9+10, see also 4:4). One subject, 
however, used alternation to compensate for intergroup (10:12) 
and interindividual (10:13) inequalities he imposed himself 
during earlier allocations (see also 14:6) . 
Subjects reported considering others' behavioural strategies 
on 6 occasions. One subj ect hoped both that others were 
acting as fairly as she was (4: 5) and that other in-group 
members were doing the same as her in trying to maximize in-
group profit (4:13). Another subject similarly hoped that 
others were engaging in maximum joint profit as he was 
(14:1+12). A third subject hoped that others were allocating 
him more than he was allocating to them (17:14) and a fourth 
believed that other in-group members would be allocating 
maximum possible points to all other in-group members, 
including herself (21:18). 
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The overall between-group outcome of everybody's allocations 
was never considered by any subject. 
10 subj ects felt" restricted" in their allocation behaviour at 
least once during the study. 11 On intergroup allocations 
restriction was felt 8 times, twice on matrix type 1 
(11:1+11), twice on matrix type 2 (1:11, 21:13), and four 
times on matrix type 3 (8:8, 10:9, 14:3, 21:10). On in-group 
allocations restriction was claimed 12 times, six times on 
matrix type 1 (1:7, 2:4, 4:2, 12:4+8, 14:1), six times on 
matrix type 3 (1:9, 2:8, 8:5, 10:6, 14:10, 19:12), and not at 
all on matrix type 2. Similarly, on out-group allocations 
subjects reported restriction 7 times, four times on matrix 
type 1 (4:10+14, 10:7, 11:8), three times on matrix type 3 
(11:10, 14:15+18), and not at all on matrix type 2. 
Of the restrictions reported 3 were due to superstition, 
avoiding "unlucky" allocations which gave 13 points to one or 
both recipients (1:7, 4:2,10+14). Two further instances of 
restriction occurred where subjects wanted to make particular 
allocations to particular individual recipients and were 
thereby "forced" to make unintentional allocations to the 
second recipients (10:9, 21:13). More seriously, many 
subjects felt that their preferred strategies were 
structurally frustrated by the design of the matrices. On 8 
occasions subjects attempting to maximize joint profit were 
unable to do so because of the design of matrix type 3 (2:8, 
8:5+8, 11:10, 14:10,15+18, 19:12). On matrix type I, on the 
other hand, at least two subjects felt unable to select 
desired allocations which would maximize joint profit because 
to do so would entail unacceptable inequality between the two 
recipients, as maximum joint profit and fairness are 
structurally negatively interdependent along half the matrix 
11 It should be remembered that "structural restriction" 
is a short-hand label for subjects claiming that their 
behaviour was affected (i.e. restricted, modified, or 
whatever) by a matrix design and/or a change in matrix types. 
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(11:1,8+11, 14:1). Similar strategy frustrations were 
suffered on at least a further 5 occasions (1:9+11, 10:6, 
12:4+8, 21:10). Finally, subjects amended old strategies or 
adopted new ones as a result of changing matrix types on at 
least three occasions (2:4, 10:7, 14:3). 
Only two subjects claimed that they were making or avoiding 
particular allocations for the sake of their psychological 
well-being. One subject twice insisted that he was 
"desperately wanting to be fair" (14: 1-2), his desperation 
suggesting that he would be distressed were he to make unfair 
allocations. On the other hand another subject, a member of 
Group W, reported that he did "definitely prefer giving more 
points to the members ... of Group W as opposed to Group X" 
(10:10), although he does go on to say that he is "not really 
bothered whether Group X gets more than Group W but I just 
think it adds ... something interesting to the experiment ... a 
bit of spice" (10:10-11). One subject, however, reported 
feeling "pretty, pretty horrible" about having displayed in-
group favouritism in some of her allocations (21:18). 
Six subjects reported over 8 occasions that their allocations 
were direct or indirect attempts toward personal economic 
gain. One gave one recipient the maximum possible number of 
individual points in case he was that recipient, even though 
he immediately reminded himself that subjects never made 
allocations to themselves (1 :4) . A second subject was 
concerned not to allocate too many points to others in case 
this had the consequence of depriving themself of possible 
money (5:17). A third used the fact that he was "skint" to 
justify a strategy of maximum joint profit (8:4,6+7). A 
fourth employed maximum joint profit in the hope that others 
would reciprocate (14:12) and a fifth employed maximum in-
group profit for the same reason (21:18). A sixth subject 
allocated "average" points to others in the hope they would 
allocate more than average points to him (17:14). It should 
also be noted that several other subjects were concerned with 
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the personal economic consequences of their own and others' 
allocations, although they did not explicitly claim that such 
concerns motivated or explained their own allocation behaviour 
(1:3, 2:3, 12:8?, 13:5, 17:3, 19:15, 22:18). 
Structural restriction was then the most common of the 
operative factors considered in Section B of the content 
analysis, with subjects being unable to follow favoured 
strategies being the most frequently voiced complaint. 
Largely in response to this, reported alternation was also 
relatively common. In-group identity was relatively frequent 
too, especially during intergroup allocations. Relatively few 
allocations were explained in terms of subjects attempting to 
make money for themselves or by referring to subjects' 
personalities. Others' behaviour was rarely considered by 
subjects and no subject ever wondered what the overall 
between-group outcome of everyone's allocations would be. 
Very few allocations were explained by subjects in terms of 
them conforming to norms or experimenter expectations, and few 
subjects attempted to enter implicit mutually advantageous 
reciprocal relationships with other subjects. 
Content analysis of sUbjects' overall strategies 
Qualitative summaries of each subject'S overall account of 
their behaviour (see Appendix 5) were each coded into a single 
category, using the same coding frame as used in the 
"allocation intentions" section of the analysis reported 
above. Individuals' overall behaviour codes are shown in the 
table below alongside each subject's individual contribution 
to each pull score. 
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Sub. FAV MD on FAV MJP MIP+ F on Overall 
No. on MIP+ on F on MJP FAV Behaviour 
MJP MJP FAV on MD Code 
1 0 0 4 -12 12 - 2 9 
2 0 0 0 12 12 12 1/5/6 
3 - 5 - 1 2 3 9 2 9 
4 12 5 0 0 7 12 1/4 
5 - 4 5 8 - 4 3 4 1/3 
6 - 5 - 8 - 6 5 4 4 9 
7 0 6 0 0 6 12 5/6/9 
8 - 6 - 6 0 6 6 12 5/6/9 
9 -10 - 1 - 3 2 11 - 3 9 
10 - 7 - 5 12 5 - 7 0 9 
11 - 6 0 0 6 12 12 5/6 
12 0 0 0 0 6 8 6 
13 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 6 6 9 
14 - 9 0 0 3 12 4 1/5/6 
15 4 - 6 1 8 6 - 1 9 
16 0 0 3 0 0 3 6/9 
11 1 - 1 - 6 1 - 1 4 1/6 
18 4 - 1 5 2 7 3 9 
19 0 6 - 5 12 6 7 5/6/9 
20 - 3 6 - 3 - 9 2 5 9 
21 12 0 12 0 12 0 3/9 
22 2 4 2 10 - 8 -10 9 
Mean -0.636 -0.136 0.909 2.000 5.591 4.273 
SD 5.892 4.223 5.089 6.133 5.738 5.742 
Overall tha pull score. of MIP+MJP on MD and P on PAY are .ignificantly different from zaro Ct21 • 4.57, 
two-tailed p < 0.001 • t21 • 3.49, two-tailed p < 0.005, raspectivaly). 
Key:- MIP. Maximum In-group Profit; MD. Maximum Difference in favour of the in-group. MIP + MD; 
FAV • In-group PAVouritiam; MJP. Maximum Joint Profit; P _ p.trn.... For overall behaviour cod •• 
1 • Per.onal profit; 2 - Personal atatua; 3. In-group profit; ... In-group atatue; 5. Joint 
profit; 6. pairness; 7. Intergroup accentuation; 8. prototypicality; 9. Random, arbitrary or 
none; 10. Other intention; 11 - Ab.ent rea.on. Other overall behaviour cod •• are combination. of 
the •• C.a. Appandix 4 for datails). 
Table 2.5: Subjects' overall strategies 
and individual pull-scores 
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Ten subjects (1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 18, 20 and 22) employed 
a random or arbitrary strategy overall, or employed no overall 
strategy at all. Although many of these subjects made large 
individual contributions to one or more pull scores these 
tended to cancel each other out. That is, no pull score was 
significant at the 5% level for the ten subjects considered as 
a sub-sample. 
Five more subjects (7, 8, 16, 19, 21) did employ overall 
strategies but appeared to do so arbitrarily, merely to be 
able to apply a decision rule to their allocations (e. g. 
7:8+16, 8:4, 16:6, 19:16, 21:7, see also 9:2+18). These 
subjects' individual contributions to pull scores were more or 
less in line with their instrumentally adopted strategies. 
A further five subjects (2, 4, 5, 14, 17) similarly employed 
overall strategies instrumentally, this time seemingly 
motivated by economic self-interest (e.g. 2:3+14, 4:5+13, 
5:15+17, 14:12, 17:3+14). These subjects' individual 
contributions to overall pull scores were less obviously in 
line with their instrumental strategies. Considered as a sub-
sample these five subjects made small contributions to most 
pull scores, but made a mean contribution of 6.6 (SD = 5.683) 
to the pull of MIP+MJP on MD and a mean contribution of 7.2 
(SD = 4.382) to the pull of F on FAV. 
One subject (12) adopted an overall fairness strategy and 
another (11) adopted a combined overall strategy of maximum 
joint profit plus fairness. These subjects gave no indication 
that these strategies were being followed instrumentally and 
their individual contributions to pull scores were consistent 
with the strategies they were pursuing. 
The most popular overall strategies for subj ects in the 
present study then were random, arbitrary or explicitly absent 
strategies. Even when "rational" strategies were adopted 
these were usually pursued instrumentally, either to provide 
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some sort of decision-making guide when making allocations or 
to try and indirectly obtain personal profit, the second most 
popular overall strategy. On the whole overall behaviour 
codes and individual contributions to pull scores were 
consistent. 
DISCUSSION 
Non-discrimination 
The most striking result from the present study is the almost 
complete lack of in-group favouritism as evidenced by the pull 
scores, indirect in-group favouritism scores, subjects' 
declared allocation intentions, and subj ects' overall 
behaviour codes. Thus the present study does not support the 
"sufficiency condition" of social identity theory which it was 
set up to examine, i.e. that mere (recognized, multigroup) 
social categorization is sufficient to engender intergroup 
discrimination. 
One explanation for this might be that the thinkaloud 
procedure brought to consciousness thoughts not usually 
attended to by minimal group subjects and that this resulted 
in a different pattern of behaviour from that which would 
usually follow social categorization per se. An obvious 
example of such thought processes would be those connected 
with evaluation apprehension (although subjects showed little 
sign of caring what the experimenter thought of them, even 
those who did indulge in in-group favouritism, and evaluation 
apprehension would surely have lead to strategies other than 
arbitrariness and/or economic self-interest). This is not the 
first study in which social categorization has failed to 
result in significant mean in-group favouritism, however, and 
in most minimal group paradigm experiments a significant 
minority of subjects do not employ such in-group favouritism 
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anyway. There seerns little need to conclude, then, that 
subjects in the present study attended to thoughts other than 
those usually attended to by minimal group subjects. 
A second possibility is that social categorization did lead to 
in-group favouritism but such discrimination was not detected 
by the dependent measures used. Necessarily there is no 
evidence for such a claim, but it is in any case somewhat 
unlikely bearing in mind the fact that subjects were audio-
taped from before they rnade their first allocation until after 
they had made their last and were given explicit 
instructions to verbalize any and all thoughts they had 
throughout. 
A third possibility, consistent with social identity theory, 
is not so easily dismissed. This is that social 
categorization did not lead to rnean in-group favouritisrn in 
the present study because the thinkaloud procedure al tered the 
usual salience of the between-group situation (i.e. the social 
categorization). There are two possible ways of making such 
a claim. The first is simply that the thinkaloud attenuated 
the salience of subjects' in-group rnembership and of the 
between-group social categorization. This may be argued to 
have occurred because concentrating on their own thought 
processes and speaking them aloud (to the experimenter, as it 
were) made subjects' personal identities more salient than is 
usual in the minimal group paradigm, and because personal and 
social identities may be functionally mutually antagonistic 
(Turner, 1987: 49), this increase in personal identity 
entailed a decrease in the salience of subject's social 
identities and of the between-group social categorization more 
generally. Thus, the subjects in this study engaged in less 
in-group favouritism than is usual in the minimal group 
paradigm because their identities and their self-esteem needs 
were not as bound up in their minimal group memberships or in 
between-group social comparison outcomes as they would have 
been had the thinkaloud not been used. 
... 
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The second way in which the thinkaloud procedure may have 
altered the salience of in-group membership and social 
categorization concerns the possibility that in "speaking to" 
the experimenter, subjects re-categorized the situation from 
a between- (minimal) groups one to a situation in which the 
subjects compared themselves (individually or as "the 
subjects") with the experimenter. To the extent that subjects 
did this, it would again be expected that discrimination by 
subj ects between the minimal groups would be less than in 
"standard" minimal group experiments, or perhaps even non-
existent. 
These two explanations of the present study's results are not 
mutually exclusive. Subjects may have had their personal 
identities made more salient and/or may have recategorized the 
situation, either as an interpersonal one between themselves 
and the experimenter, or as an individual-group one between 
the experimenter and a group comprising of all of the subjects 
together. Nor do either of these possibilities exclude the 
further possibility that for other subjects the thinkaloud did 
not affect the salience of their minimal group memberships or 
of the between-group situation. Thus, it could be argued that 
the absence of mean sample-level in-group favouritism was not 
surprising: different identities and different social 
situations were salient for different subjects and therefore 
each subject tried to meet their identity and self-esteem 
needs in different ways, hence the variability of intergroup 
behaviour obtained. 
There is in fact some evidence supporting such an 
interpretation. Almost half of the subjects (subjects 3, 8, 
9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20) made little or no reference in 
their decision making to the fact that there were two groups. 
Other subjects showed awareness of the between-group social 
categorization but made no reference to the fact that they 
were members of one group and not of the other (e.g. 1:4, 
6:10, 7:7, 12:2, 18:10). At least two more subjects had to 
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remind themselves of their group membership (e.g. 13:5, 
22:14). And still more subjects demonstrated confusion as to 
which group they were members of (e.g. 1:4, 5:4+11). Finally, 
the subjects who did individually employ in-group favouritism 
(4, 5 and 21) all also indicated identification with their in-
groups. Thus, it seems that there is considerable evidence 
supporting the claim, consistent with social identity theory's 
"sufficiency condition" I that where in-groups and the between-
group situation were salient (as indicated by identification 
with in-groups), in-group favouritism was indeed the result, 
but where such salience was absent, so too was in-group 
favouritism. 
There are however several obstacles to accepting such an 
interpretation. Least telling, perhaps, is that the 
interpretation requires explaining the heterogeneity of 
behaviour obtained in the present study via individual 
differences in the subjects' reactions to the situation 
experienced by all of them (i.e. social categorization plus 
thinkaloud) . But relying on individual difference 
explanations is exactly what social identity theory tries to 
get away from (Tajfel 1978a: 27-28), and allowing too heavy a 
reliance on them gives the theory an air of unfalsifiability 
(Abrams, 1992: 62-63). 
Further, there is very little evidence from their protocols 
(see Appendix 3) that any subject categorized their situation 
as an individual-group one between the experimenter and 
themselves (i.e. the subjects, individually or collectively). 
Even if subjects did so categorize, it is far from clear what 
sort of behaviour this might promote: how might subjects 
achieve positive distinctiveness from an experimenter? 
Maximum joint profit (and therefore maximum "loss" by the 
experimenter) is perhaps the most likely candidate, but as has 
already been mentioned in the results section, on only 8% of 
all allocations did subjects report using such a strategy. 
'J ~ 
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Most importantly, great efforts were made to ensure that 
subjects would be aware of the (between-groups) social 
categorization and of their social identities as minimal in-
group members,12 and at least some subjects (who did not 
engage in in-group favouritism) were indeed quite clear about 
both the social categorization and their place within it (e.g. 
2:2, 4:2, 10:9, 11:5, 21:3). To the extent that this strongly 
suggests that subjects' minimal group social identities were 
salient (even if other identities were also salient, which is 
nearly always the case, both inside and outside the minimal 
group paradigm -see Tajfel, 1978a: 38-45), then social 
identity theory suggests that the subjects would be motivated 
to engage in in-group favouritism in order to ensure that 
these salient aspects of their identities would be positively 
evaluated (or at least would not make negative contributions 
to their self-esteem, which would be likely to occur if the 
subjects did not discriminate but out-group members did) .13 
Finally, although it is true that the three subjects (4, 5 and 
21) who employed significant amounts of in-group favouritism 
also indicated identification wi th the group (as well as 
identification as in-group members), an equal number of 
subjects (2, 10 and 22) expressed such identification with the 
12 The front covers of subjects' response booklets 
contained only infbrmation about the particular subject's code 
number and group membership; subjects were required to read 
aloud a sentence which repeated information about their code 
number and group membership; subjects were required to read 
out the code number and group membership of each recipient 
before every allocation; and after eve~ allocation subjects 
had to complete a sentence saying how many points they had 
allocated to each recipient - identified by their code number 
and group membership. 
13 Remembering that when minimal group memberships are 
salient in the minimal group paradigm in-group favouritism is 
the only route to positive in-group distinctiveness, in-group 
evaluation, social identity, and self-esteem (see Chapter 1) . 
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group but did not engage in in-group preference. 14 Thus, it 
again appears not to be the case that mere (recognized, 
multigroup) social categorization is sufficient to promote in-
group favouritism, even when accompanied by identification 
with one's in-group. 
How the various theories fare in the Present study 
Social identity theory suggests that mere social 
categorization results in intergroup discrimination because of 
each subject's need to perceive their minimal in-group as 
superior to the out-group in order to obtain positive 
evaluations of the in-group and of their social identity 
derived from it (i.e. a positive social identity as an in-
group member). The first problem with this account is clear 
and has been extensively considered above: mere (recognized, 
multigroup) social categorization did not result in in-group 
favouritism (either at the mean sample level or reliably at 
the individual level). 
The second problem (also briefly touched on above) is that 
social categorization (accompanied by identification as an in-
group member) did not prove sufficient to engender social 
identification wi th in-groups either. Most socially 
categorized subjects did not report or indicate any 
identification with their minimal in-group membership. Only 
six subjects (e.g. 2:13, 4:3, 5:4, 10:9, 21:6 and 22:18) 
indicated identifying with the in-group at some point during 
their allocations, and five of them were at some stage 
confused about, abandoned, or even actively refused to make 
such identifications (e.g. 2:2, 5:11, 10:12, 21:11, 22:14). 
U Also, two of the subjects who each identified with 
their in-groups and engaged in in-group preference claimed to 
be following the strategies they did primarily as an indirect 
means of obtaining personal profit. This is clearly 
inconsistent with social identity theory. 
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Of these six subjects who expressed identification with their 
in-groups, three (subjects 4, 5 and 21) accounted for 16 out 
of the total of 22 expressions of such identity. These three 
were the only subjects who received overall behaviour ratings 
which included in-group favouritism as a component and 
together they obtained high mean intergroup discrimination 
pull scores (FAV on MJP = 6.67 (9.24), MD on MIP+MJP = 3.33 
(2.89), FAV on F = 6.67 (6.11), MJP on FAV = -1.33 (2.31), 
MIP+MJP on MD = 7.33 (4.51), F on FAV = 5.33 (6.11» .15 This 
suggests that, consistent with social identity theory, 
identifying with one's in-group may be necessary (but not 
sufficient) to engender intergroup discrimination (e.g. 
4:11+16, 5:4, 21:4, see also 10:9, 22:10), even if social 
categorization is clearly not in itself sufficient to engender 
either identification with in-groups or in-group 
favouritism. 16 
Social identity theory considers social identity as an in-
group member to be a cause of intergroup discrimination 
because when people identify themselves as in-group members 
their self-esteem becomes dependent upon how that in-group is 
evaluated. Such people therefore discriminate in order to 
achieve or protect positive in-group distinctiveness so that 
the in-group can be positively evaluated and they can enjoy 
positive self-esteem. In this study, however, no subject 
wondered what the overall between-group outcome of everybody's 
allocations would be, not even the subjects who did engage in 
in-group favouritism. Additionally, no subject expressed 
satisfaction at engaging in discrimination, but one who did 
15 For the six subj ects who expressed any identification 
with minimal in-groups the mean pull scores were as follows:-
FAV on MJP = 2.5 (7.994), MD on MIP+MJP = 1.5 (3.937), FAVon 
F = 5.67 (5.715), MJP on FAV = 3.83 (6.274), MIP+MJP on MD = 
3.17 (8.93), F on FAV = 3.00 (8.367). 
16 The claim can only be that identification with in-
groups may be necessary to promote in-group favouritism as 
there is a possibility that the direction of causality is the 
other way around, i.e. that in-group favouritism results in 
identification with in-groups. 
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discriminate said that she felt "pretty, pretty horrible about 
doing that" (21:18) which is in direct opposition to 
motivational predictions from social identity theory (see 
Abrams & Hogg, 1988) .17 
Finally, all three of the subjects who discriminated received 
"overall behaviour" codings which suggested that their 
discrimination was instrumental not toward positive in-group 
distinctiveness, social identity and self-esteem, but was 
rather instrumental either toward economic self-interest 
(subjects 4 and 5) or so that the subject concerned had some 
sort of decision-rule to guide their allocations (subject 21) . 
Overall then social identity theory receives little support 
from the present study. Social categorization proved 
sufficient neither for identification with in-groups nor for 
intergroup discrimination. Further, although social identity 
may have been necessary for in-group favouritism, it was not 
sufficient, and the discrimination employed did not seem to 
either be motivated by, or necessarily result in, positive 
self-esteem. Additionally, no subjects considered or wondered 
whether their behaviour (discriminatory or otherwise) might 
contribute to positive or negative in-group distinctiveness. 
Generic norm theory claims that subjects in the minimal group 
paradigm are trying to balance competing demands of conforming 
to a generic norm of in-group preference and conforming to 
another generic norm of fairness. On only four occasions 
during the present study were norms evoked by subj ects as 
explanations of their allocation behaviours. Two could 
conceivably be considered instances of a generic norm of 
groupness (4:3, 21:18), but the other two stem from particular 
(non-minimal) groups subjects belonged to: law students (4:1) 
17 One expressed pleasure at having at being able to use 
in-group favouritism as a decision-making guide, but she made 
it clear that positive in-group distinctiveness was not her 
goal (10:10). 
" :j-
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and students in general (14 : 12) . The vast majority of 
subjects made no reference to norms as explanatory entities 
and none ever claimed to be trying to balance the competing 
demands of a norm of fairness and another norm demanding 
intergroup discrimination. 
It is of course possible that generic norms were operative 
without subjects being aware of that fact. The real problem 
for generic norm theory is the variety of strategies followed, 
both across subjects and by individual subjects during their 
own series of allocations. The theory would need to 
incorporate many more norms than simply fairness and 
discrimination, and it would then need to specify why 
different subjects conformed to different norms, and also why 
the same subjects conformed to different norms at different 
stages during their allocations. It is doubtful that all or 
any such norms could legitimately be called generic. The 
present study therefore counts rather more against than in 
favour of generic norm theory. 
Equity theory suggests that intergroup discrimination occurs 
in the minimal group paradigm because subjects are trying to 
counter anticipated in-group 
group members in order to 
overall. Subjects in the 
favouritism on the part of out-
achieve an equitable outcome 
present study rarely consider 
others' actions, however, and even when they do they do not 
show any signs of expecting out-group members to display in-
group favouritism (absolutely or relative to other in-group 
members), still less of letting such expectations dictate 
their own behaviour. It is more common for subjects to hope 
or believe that other subjects are acting in the same way as 
themselves (4:5+13, 14:1+12, 17:14, 21:18). Also, although 
most subjects showed a concern for equality or parity (i.e. 
"fairness") at some point, only two showed signs of being 
motivated by a concern for equity (12:1+9,21:11), one of whom 
certainly did not let such concerns dictate her behaviour 
(21 :12+14) . Third, as already noted, subjects showed no 
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interest in the overall between-group outcome of everybody's 
allocations. Equity theory therefore also receives little 
support from the present study. 
The behavioural interaction model claims that minimal group 
subjects pursue economic self-interests via instrumental 
cooperation with in-group members and instrumental competition 
against out-group members because they perceive more positive 
interdependence with the former than with the latter as a 
resul t of social categorization making subj ects feel more 
common fate with in-group than with out-group members. 
The motivational basis for the model is supported by the 
present study in so far as many subjects are fairly clearly 
motivated by economic self-interest in their allocations 
and/or consider the economic consequences to themselves of 
their own and others' allocations (e.g. 1:3-4, 4:13, 5:15+17, 
8:4, 13:5, 14:12, 17:3+14, 19:15, 21:2, 22:18), with at least 
one subject (temporarily) feeling that without the opportunity 
of allocating to himself there is no reason to prefer any 
allocation strategy to any other (2:3). 
A variety of perceived interdependencies were evident in the 
present study and although these were not all predicted by the 
behavioural interaction model, the model can provide a 
reasonable post-hoc explanation of both these 
interdependencies and of the various strategies employed by 
the subjects. 
It has already been noted that the imposed social 
categorization in the present study did not have uniform 
effects. Some subjects perceived more positive 
interdependence with in-group than with out-group members, as 
is usual in the minimal group paradigm. These subjects would 
be expected to perceive more common fate and identify more 
with in-group than with out-group members and they would also 
be expected to pursue instrumental cooperation with the former 
, ' L .. 
and instrumental competition with the 
4:3,11,13,15+16 and 21:4,6,7,10,15,17+18). 
latter 
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(e.g. 
If for some reason a subject thought that there was only a 
finite amount of money available to be shared between in-group 
and out-group, however, and similarly only a finite amount of 
money to be shared between in-group members, such a subject 
would be expected to perceive negative interdependence between 
both the in-group and the out-group and between himself and 
other in-group members. S/he would then be expected to 
perceive more common fate, and identify more, with in-group 
members than with out-group members, but to employ both 
instrumental in-group favouritism and instrumental intragroup 
discrimination in favour of him or herself (e.g. 
5 :4,15,17+18) . 
If on the other hand the emphasis on the randomness of the 
social categorization caused subjects to perceive more or less 
equal positive interdependence with all other subjects, these 
subjects would be expected to perceive common fate, and to 
identify with, in-group and out-group members alike, and 
therefore to employ instrumental cooperative strategies with 
everyone, regardless of group membership (e.g. 7:7, 11:8, 
14:all, 17:14). 
Finally, if the randomness of the social categorization 
instead caused subjects to perceive no interdependence 
relationship with any other subjects, these subjects would be 
expected to perceive no common fate and identify with no-one, 
and they would consequently be expected to employ random 
and/or arbitrary allocation strategies (e.g. 1:4, 3:16, 8:1+2, 
9:2, 13:2, 20:1, 22:1,2). 
While this explanation of the results of the present study is 
perhaps superior to any which could be gleaned from the other 
theories considered here, difficulties remain for the 
behaviourial interaction model. First, the explanation 
• 
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offered is post-hoc and suffers from not being able to account 
for the fact that the social categorization resulted in 
differing perceptions of interdependence in the first place. 
Second, as has already been noted, few subjects considered the 
likely actions of others and fewer considered the likelihood 
of others engaging in mutually beneficial reciprocity 
strategies when deciding how to act themselves, both of which 
would be expected if subj ects were truly concerned with 
exploiting perceived interdependencies. Third, and perhaps 
most damaging, the behavioural interaction model cannot 
explain why a substantial minority of subjects seemed to adopt 
strategies not as indirect methods of satisfying economic 
self-interest but rather as guides to decision-making. The 
behavioural interaction model offers only a post-hoc and 
incomplete account of the present study's findings, therefore, 
and the results of the present study offer rather mixed 
support for the model. 
Intergroup accentuation theory clearly receives very little 
support from the present study. Two subjects each made one 
allocation based on accentuating or reflecting intergroup 
differences (6:10, 22:18), one of whom also made a single 
allocation based on accentuating or reflecting intragroup 
similarity (6:8). Both of these subjects, however, received 
random overall behaviour ratings, suggesting that each of the 
aforementioned allocations were simply one of a range of 
arbitrary strategies used by the subjects. None of the other 
20 subjects, several of whom pursued consistent and meaningful 
strategies, mentioned intergroup accentuation. 
Self-categorization theory received absolutely no support from 
the present study. No subjects considered an in-group 
prototype when deciding how to make decisions. Nor did they 
seem concerned with trying to act as much like in-group 
members and/or as little like out-group members as possible. 
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Several subjects considered the pO$sibility that they were 
"meant" to display in-group favouritism in their allocation 
decisions. Three subjects wondered if discriminating in 
favour of the in-group was "part of the experiment" (e.g. 5:7, 
11:13, 22:10). Two more felt that they "ought" to display in-
group favouritism (2:2, 21:4), while one simply asked "how am 
I meant to do this?" (13:6). Such expressions would provide 
fairly strong evidence of an experimenter expectation 
explanation of minimal group discrimination were it not for 
two things. First, subj ects rarely followed their 
speculations of how they "ought" to act with consistent in-
group favouritism in order to please the experimenter (e.g. 
2:2, 5:15, 11:16, 13:7, 21:11, 22:14). Second, much of the 
possible support for an experimenter expectation/demand 
characteristics explanation is equally consistent with other 
theoretical positions. A subject might claim that she 
"should" behave in a certain way, for example, in order to (i) 
achieve positive in-group distinctiveness, (ii) conform with 
a generic norm, (iii) achieve an equitable out-come, (iv) 
reciprocate with similar acting others, (v) accentuate 
intergroup differences, or (vi) act prototypically, as well as 
to (vii) conform to demand characteristics. As absolutely no 
subjects explained their behaviour by saying that the 
experiment or experimenter "forced" them to act in that way, 
the present study offers no unambiguous support for an 
explanation of minimal group behaviour in terms of demand 
characteristics. 
To recap, the results of this study offer little support for 
generic norm theory, equity theory, intergroup accentuation 
theory, self -categorization theory or a demand characteristics 
explanation of minimal group behaviour. Social identity 
theory suffers badly from the fact that social categorization 
failed to result in widespread in-group favouritism or even 
identification with in-groups. It also suffers from the lack 
of evidence that those subjects who discriminated did so in 
order to obtain positive in-group distinctiveness, social 
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identity and self-esteem. Indeed, one discriminating 
subject's self-esteem seemed to diminish as a result of her 
actions. The behavioural interaction model perhaps receives 
the most support of the theories considered. Many subjects 
showed an interest in furthering economic self-interest and 
many subjects' strategies were consistent with the particular 
pat tern of interdependence they can be expected to have 
percei ved. The model cannot explain why social categorization 
resulted in several different perceptions of interdependence, 
however, and cannot explain why some subjects seemed more 
concerned with finding and using a decision-making rule than 
they were with furthering their economic self-interest. 
Overall, then, all of the theories considered suffered from 
the sheer variety of behaviours displayed in the present study 
and the number of differing explanations offered by subjects 
to account for their actions. 
Limitations of the Tajfel matrices 
There was little evidence in the present study for the claim 
that the Tajfel matrices do not represent subjects' 
behaviours. Individual contributions to pull scores may be 
misleading when considered in isolation, particularly those of 
subjects who followed random overall strategies, but such 
anomalies tend to cancel each other out when mean pull scores 
are calculated. Moreover, the individual contributions to 
pull scores of those subj ects who did follow "meaningful" 
overall strategies were remarkably consistent with those 
overall strategies. 
Nor did the present study provide any evidence that the Tajfel 
matrices lack content validity in not permitting the 
allocation of negative gains (i.e. losses, penalties, etc.). 
No subjects complained about such a restriction, even when 
engaging in in-group favouritism. 
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A lack in content validity was suggested, however, by some of 
the restrictions that subjects felt were imposed upon them by 
the structure of the matrices. For example, several subjects 
were distressed that maximum joint profit and fairness were 
negatively interdependent along half of matrix type 1. These 
subjects wished to pursue a policy of maximum joint profit, 
but were unwilling to do so when it entailed considerable 
unfairness - both in that one recipient would receive much 
less than the other recipient and that the same recipient 
would receive less points than they would have were the point 
of maximum fairness selected. This was why pursuing maximum 
joint profit was more acceptable on matrix type 2 than it was 
on matrix type 1: in the fanner case maximum joint profit 
meant that the recipient who received the least points still 
received more than they would have had the point of maximum 
fairness been chosen. This suggests that the pull score of 
MJP on FAV may be artificially depressed because of a pull of 
"F" (i.e. joint profit without unacceptable individual loss) 
on "MJP" (i.e. maximum joint profit combined with unacceptable 
individual loss). Similarly, the pull of FAV on F may be 
artificially elevated by a pull of "F" on "MJP". At the very 
least the Tajfel matrices employed in this study lack content 
validity in that they do not pennit easy pursuit or 
measurement of a strategy attempting to maximize both joint 
profit and fairness.18 
Another difficulty subjects had with the Tajfel matrices 
occurred when the subjects had decided on particular 
strategies to follow, but were then confronted with a matrix 
which either did not permit pursuit of that strategy and/or 
meant that all possible options satisfied the strategy 
equally. Matrix type 3 was the main problem here. Several 
18 Turner (1983a: 352-353) claims that confounds can be 
disentangled by comparisons across matrix types. Even if true 
it is rarely if ever done and indeed would be a complicated 
and difficult affair using real as opposed to "ideal" scores. 
Anyway, it probably is not true, as I will argue later in the 
thesis. 
ill 
105 
subjects adopted a strategy of maximizing joint profit and 
then found that their preferred strategy offered no guidance 
as to how to make allocations on matrix type 3. Some subjects 
continued with their overall strategy and simply made 
arbitrary decisions on this particular matrix. Other 
subjects, however, adopted a secondary strategy of fairness-
on-this-type-of-matrix and/or modified their simple MJP 
strategy to one of MJP+F. This is, of course, an example of 
the design of the Taj fel matrices acting as a confounding 
variable in the study of the effects of social categorization 
on allocation behaviour. 
A similar problem occurred occasionally with changing matrix 
types. Subject 2, for example, effectively follows an overall 
strategy of maximizing fairness for his first three 
allocations (although he claims to be allocating randomly), 
all of which happened to be type 3 matrices. A new matrix 
type was presented for the fourth allocation and the subject 
suddenly adopted an overall strategy of maximizing joint 
profit (with a secondary strategy of fairness on matrix type 
3) . Again allocation behaviour is being affected by 
measurement of the dependent variable, rather than by the 
independent variable of social categorization. 
Pull scores derived from Tajfel matrices do therefore seem to 
be valid representations of certain aspects of minimal group 
subjects' behaviour, but they also seem both to prevent 
expression of certain behaviours and to encourage other 
behaviours which do not strictly result from social 
categorization per se. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusion of the present study has to be that social 
categorization is sufficient for neither identification with 
in-groups nor intergroup discrimination. The former 
consideration means that category membership (i.e. 
identification as a member of a social category) is not, as is 
sometimes suggested within the social identity theory 
literature, the same thing as social identification wi th a 
social category or group (nor even necessarily promotes it). 
The latter consideration means that social identity theory's 
"sufficiency condition" is not supported, thus potentially 
undermining the claim that the theory provides a necessary 
modification of Sherif's theory of intergroup conflict (as the 
minimal group paradigm does not provide proof that negative 
interdependence of group goals is unnecessary as a 
precondition for intergroup conflict) . 
Further, if identification as an in-group member is not the 
same thing as identification with an in-group, and the former 
does not necessarily promote the latter, the question has to 
be asked: when do people identify with the social categories 
and groups of which they perceive themselves as members? 
Also, if (accepted, multigroup) social categorization does not 
necessarily lead to intergroup discrimination, what does? The 
behavioural interaction model claims that identification with 
in-groups occurs when members perceive themselves to be 
positively interdependent with each other, and accepts 
Sherif's contention that intergroup discrimination results 
from perceived negative interdependence of group goals. Each 
of these claims will be examined and rejected later in this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the main conclusion of this chapter 
stands: (recognized, multigroup) social categorization 
(including self-categorization as a member of one group and 
not of others) is a sufficient cause of neither identification 
with in-groups nor intergroup discrimination. 
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Another main conclusion is that there is far more going on in 
the minimal group paradigm than straightforward in-group 
favouritism. A whole range of strategies are pursued, 
sometimes by single subj ects. None of the theories considered 
so far are currently sufficiently broad or flexible to account 
for all of the behaviour displayed in the present study. The 
behavioural interaction model perhaps came closest, but only 
with a post-hoc explanation which could not account either for 
the various perceived interdependencies stemming from social 
categorization or for the strategies of subjects who seemed 
more concerned with being able to make consistent, coherent or 
meaningful allocation decisions than they were with economic 
self-interest. Clearly any of the theories considered so far 
which wishes to explain minimal group behaviour will need 
considerable modification; particularly perhaps social 
identity theory, which is widely regarded as relying heavily 
on the results of that paradigm. 
The final conclusion reached here is that although pull scores 
derived from allocations made on Tajfel matrices are 
reasonably consistent with subjects' stated intentions, the 
matrices themsel ves are: (i) somewhat restricti ve in 
structurally inhibiting some strategies and structurally 
confounding others; and, (ii) potentially corrupting in the 
minimal group paradigm in as much as their use seems to 
promote behaviour which might not manifest itself as a result 
of social categorization alone. Characteristics of pull 
scores derived from allocations on Tajfel matrices - and the 
nature of the behaviour they measure - is the topic of the 
next chapter. 
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QIAPTBR 3; S]lIDX 2 - THE NATURE OF INTERGROtlP DISCKIMINATIQN 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter reports a minimal group study {cf. Tajfel et al., 
1971} which employed two different measures of social 
behaviour. These were pull- scores , derived from "Taj fel-
matrices", and scores derived from "allocation grids", 
inspired by McClintock's {1988} social value vectors. 
It is argued that allocation grid scores have a number of 
advantages over pull-scores derived from Tajfel-matrices. 
These include: clearly being of interval scale with equal 
or1g1n and unit; superior clarity, transparency, and 
reliability; less susceptibility to structural confounds; and, 
because "bads" as well as or instead of "goods" can be 
allocated by subjects using allocation grids, superior 
construct validity, and a superior ability to distinguish 
between different forms of discrimination across groups. 
Mean sample-level in-group favouritism was employed by 
subjects in this study. At an individual level, however, a 
large proportion of subjects employed {a variety of} dominant 
strategies other than in-group favouritism. Contrary to 
social identity theory's "sufficiency condition" {see Chapter 
1}, this suggests that mere social categorization is 
insufficient to promote individuals to engage in 
discrimination in favour of the in-group. 
Where subjects did employ dominant strategies of in-group 
favouritism, two distinct forms could be identified. Both 
involved in-group preference, but one also involved out-group 
derogation, whereas the other did not. This suggests that 
where social categorization is followed by in-group 
favouritism, something other than social categorization 
determines the form that such discrimination takes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter it was noted that several 
methodological criticisms have been levelled at the Taj fel 
matrices and the behavioural scores derived from them. It has 
been suggested that "pull scores" derived from the matrices 
may not "provide a representative description of the subj ects' 
behaviour" (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980: 396); that the 
matrices may lack content validity in usually excluding the 
possibility of allocating negative gains to recipients 
(Mummendey et al., 1992); that matrices are structurally 
mutually inhibitory of some strategies whilst structurally 
mutually entailing others (Bornstein et aI, 1983a: 342); and 
that subjects may be forced into 'second-choice' strategies by 
the constraints imposed by the matrix design (Bornstein et aI, 
1980: 342). These criticisms contribute to a long running 
debate about the suitability of the Tajfel matrices to measure 
social behaviour (see Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980; 
Bornstein et al. 1983a,b; Branthwaite et al., 1979; Brewer, 
1979; Brewer & Silver, 1978; Brown et al., 1980; Hyland, 1979; 
Locksley et al., 1980; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983; Mummendey 
et al., 1992; Ng, 1981; Platow et al., 1990; Turner, 1980, 
1983a, b) . Other aspects of that debate include arguments 
about the level of measurement, external validity, clarity and 
the reliability of pull scores. 
Aschenbrenner & Schaefer (1980: 395) argue that pull scores 
cannot be assumed to be of "interval scale with equal origin 
and unit". Such characteristics are imperative if pull scores 
obtained on different matrices are to be meaningfully compared 
with each other. Brown et ale (1980: 405-406) reply that 
there are "two possible views on this" depending on whether 
pull scores are considered "spatially" (i.e. as some kind of 
rating scale with two opposed poles) or "numerically" (i.e. as 
reflecting the value of the points distributed). If they are 
considered numerically then Brown et ale (1980: 407) admit 
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that pull scores of FAV on MJP and MIP+MJP on MD are not even 
ordinal in parts, "since not only does a given 'pull' not 
uniquely describe a reward outcome, but it is also possible 
that a 'pull' of x + 1 could represent less discrimination 
than a 'pull' of x". If they are considered spatially, 
however, all of the pull scores are interval level data and 
pull scores derived from different matrices can be 
meaningfully compared. 
A spatial consideration of pull scores requires an assumption 
that the difference between the numerical values of adjacent 
points on a matrix does not affect the level of measurement of 
pull scores derived from that matrix as long as the 
"progression" from one extreme of the scale to the other is 
observed. Thus each of the following adjacent points on a 
type 1 matrix are equivalent: 1 (i) 14/11, 13/13; (ii) 14000/0, 
13/13 ; ( iii) - 11/ - 14 , 13/13 ; ( i v) 14/ -11 , 13/13 ; and (v) 
14000/ -14000 I 13/13. Brown et al. (1980: 408) say that 
nei ther evidence nor argument has appeared to make this 
assumption psychologically untenable. This is an odd claim to 
make as Tajfel himself (one of the co-authors of the Brown et 
al. paper) said that "taking away from the outgroup ... may well 
have a very different [psychological] significance from simply 
giving less to the outgroup than the ingroup" (Taj fel et al., 
1971: 174, original emphasis), a claim now empirically 
supported by Mummendey et al. (1992). 
Pull scores lack external validity in the sense that they are 
essentially relative entities - they reflect the "pull" of one 
distributive strategy upon another. Obtaining a high value 
for a pull of FAV on F in the minimal group paradigm, for 
example, does not in itself legitimize the standard claim that 
mere social categorization is sufficient for intergroup 
discrimination. If anything, it entails only that social 
categorization is sufficient for in-group favouritism when the 
1 See Appendix 1 for the matrices and derivation of 
pull-scores from them. 
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choice is between in-group favouri tism and fairness. It tells 
us little or nothing about what would happen if the same 
sample were offered the choice between ingroup favouritism and 
maximum joint profit following mere social categorization. 
Pull scores are not indicative of "absolute" or "unfettered" 
tendencies: they are essentially relative. All that can be 
claimed from minimal group experiments employing the Tajfel 
matrices is that social categorization is sufficient for in-
group favouritism rather than particular other distributive 
strategies which such discrimination has been measured in 
opposition to. Justification of the standard claim that 
social categorization is sufficient for intergroup 
discrimination (as indicated by FAV and/or its constituent 
parts, MIP and MO) would require that intergroup 
discrimination had exerted a significant pull on every other 
possible distribution strategy. This would require use of 
considerably more matrix types than shown in Appendix 1. 
Theoretically, a separate matrix would be needed to measure 
the pull of every possible distribution strategy on every 
other possible distribution strategy. 
The reliability of pull scores is also open to debate. Each 
pull score is essentially a "single-shot" measure, comprised 
of the outcome of mathematic combination of scores on two 
intergroup matrices, each of which is only presented once. In 
the study reported in the previous chapter there was evidence 
that some subjects needed to make a few allocations before 
they worked out which strategy they were trying to pursue and 
how to pursue it, particularly in view of some of the 
difficulties imposed by the structure and sequence of the 
grids. Similarly, some subjects showed signs of getting bored 
and impatient towards the end of their allocation sequence 
because of the effort and attention involved in trying to 
maximize their favoured strategy, which sometimes resulted in 
them adopting a different and more simplistic strategy. The 
single-shot nature of pull scores means that if either of the 
matrices which contribute to a particular pull-score are 
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positioned early or late in the allocation sequence, the pull 
score in question may be quite seriously distorted. 
Pull scores have also been charged with lacking clarity, as 
some particular values of pull scores do not uniquely describe 
reward outcomes. For example, an MJP on FAV pull score of 6 
will result if a subject allocates 13/13 on an i/o 
presentation of matrix 1 and 7/25 on the o/i presentation of 
that matrix; or 7/25 on the i/o presentation and 13/13 on the 
o/i one; or any of five other allocation patterns. (This is 
the worst case scenario: the more extreme the pull score, the 
fewer the reward outcomes it can represent.) This is again 
because pull scores represent the strength of one distribution 
strategy relative to the strength of another rather than the 
"absolute" strengths of one or more strategies.~ 
In sum, the Tajfel matrices and the pulls derived from them 
have then been accused of not providing a representati ve 
measure of subjects' behaviour, lacking content validity, 
structurally inhibiting some strategies and structurally 
entailing others, forcing subjects to pursue second-choice 
strategies, providing an inadequate level of measurement, 
lacking external validity, lacking reliability and lacking 
clarity. Defenders of pull scores have strenuously rejected 
all of these criticisms but there seems to be a case 
nevertheless for trying to develop a measure of social 
behaviour (as indicated by distributions of goods) which is at 
least more transparently immune from criticisms such as these 
than are the Tajfel measures. 
Before considering what form such a measure might take it is 
worth thinking about the nature of the social behaviour(s) the 
measure is to represent. The most important of these, with 
respect to social identity theory's "sufficiency condition" 
2 This is "absolute" in the sense of being relatively 
independent of the strength of other strategies, not in the 
sense of being constant across situations. 
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(see Chapter 1),3 is intergroup discrimination. The Tajfel 
matrices measure two forms of discrimination in favour of the 
in-group: maximum in-group profit and maximum difference in 
favour of the in-group, which together are termed in-group 
favouritism. The former of these involves providing in-group 
members with as many goods as possible regardless of the 
consequences for out-group members and the latter involves 
trying to ensure that in-group members receive on average more 
goods than out-group members. The first might be called an 
"absolute" or "independent" in-group bias in the sense that 
in-group benefits are pursued with little or no regard as to 
how the out-group fares, while the latter might be called 
"relative" or "interdependent" in-group bias in the sense that 
pursuing in-group benefits entails a restriction of out-group 
benefits. 
Such distinctions can be illustrated with reference to 
Sherif's classic 1954 "bean collection" task conducted during 
one of his "summer camp studies" (Sherif & Sherif, 1967). 
Sherif had beans strewn allover a piece of land and then had 
members of two groups collect as many beans as possible during 
a limited period. The group members were then shown 
projections ostensibly of the number of beans each individual 
had collected. !n fact the same amount of beans was projected 
for each individual, just in different spatial arrangements. 
Sherif found that "each group, on the average, overestimated 
the number of beans collected by fellow members, and made much 
lower estimates of the detested out-group's performance. The 
tendency to overestimate was much greater for the group that 
had won the tournament of games just concluded. The losers 
overestimated their own performance and underestimated that of 
their rivals on this task" (Sherif & Sherif, 1967: 83, 
emphasis added). In fact, (rounded up to the nearest bean), 
i. e. "that the mere perception of belonging to two 
distinct groups - that is, social categorization per se - is 
sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favouring the 
in-group" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 38). 
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the winning group overestimated in-group members' performances 
by an average of 12 beans and out-group members' performances 
by an average of 5 beans, while the losing group overestimated 
in-group members' performances by an average of only 4 beans 
and were in fact accurate, on average, about the number of 
beans collected by out-group members (see Sherif & Sherif, 
1967: 84: Figure 5.2) . 
It is possible, indeed almost certain, that intergroup 
processes were responsible for the biases shown in the bean 
collection task. It is nevertheless also possible to 
consider the biases themselves as having two aspects, absolute 
and relative. Winning group members showed an absolute bias 
in favour of their own group because they overestimated in-
group members' performances by an average of 12 beans, and 
losing group members demonstrated a lesser absolute bias in 
favour of their in-group because they overestimated the 
performances of in-group members by "only" 4 beans. Winning 
group members also showed an absolute bias in favour of the 
out-group in that they overestimated the average performance 
of out-group members by 5 beans, whereas the losing group 
showed no absolute bias in favour of or against the out-group 
because they accurately reported mean out-group members' 
perf ormance . 4 
The combined effect of these biases was that the winning group 
showed a relative bias in favour of the in-group in that they 
overestimated absolute in-group members' performances by an 
average of 7 beans more than they overestimated absolute out-
group members' performances. The losing group also showed a 
relative bias in favour of the in-group, albeit a lesser one, 
in as much as they overestimated absolute in-group members' 
4 "In favour of" and "against" refer to the truth/claim 
difference where in the former case the claim is "better" than 
the truth and in the latter case it is "worse". It does not 
refer to the intention behind the bias (e.g. trying to do good 
for the recipient) or to how the recipients of the bias feel 
about the claim that is made (e.g. disappointed). 
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performances by an average of 4 beans but they did not 
overestimate absolute out-group members' performances at all, 
on average. Thus the winning group showed more relative in-
group bias than did the losing group. 
The distinction between absolute and relative biases is 
important because al though both may resul t from intergroup 
processes neither necessarily does so. With respect to 
absolute bias, it is quite possible for a group to over- or 
under-estimate its members relative to an "absolute" standard 
without considering out-group members at all, and/or to 
absolutely over- or under-estimate the performance of out-
group members without reference to the in-group or its 
members. Consequently, while relative biases can and probably 
usually do result from intergroup processes, they can also 
occur "unintentionally" as a result of imbalanced absolute 
biases. If a group over-estimates an in-group performance 
(i.e. makes an absolute bias in favour of the in-group) but 
accurately estimates an out-group performance (i.e. makes no 
absolute bias either in favour of or against the out-group) 
there is a resultant relative bias without any comparative 
intergroup processes ever having necessarily taken place. 
Returning to the distributi ve strategies examined in the 
minimal group paradigm, maximum in-group profit is perhaps 
best thought of as an absolute bias in favour of the in-group, 
while maximum difference in favour of the in-group is perhaps 
best thought of as a relative bias. Maximum in-group profit 
is an absolute bias because it is a concern with the in-group 
regardless of what happens to the out-group. Although this is 
intergroup in the sense that subjects cognitively and 
behaviourally differentiate between in-group and out-group, it 
is not intergroup to the extent that subj ects are 
(theoretically) unconcerned about the overall relative bias in 
favour of or against the in-group. On matrix type 1, for 
example, maximum in-group profit will result in a relative 
bias in favour of the in-group, but on matrix type 2 the same 
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strategy will result in no relative bias. It is also 
structurally possible for maximum joint profit to result in a 
relative bias in favour of the out-group (as occurs at least 
temporarily when subjects pursue MIP on i/o presentations of 
matrix type 2) . 
Maximum difference in favour of the in-group is a relative 
bias because it is (theoretically) the difference between in-
group and out-group which subjects are interested in: they are 
unconcerned about the extent of absolute bias in favour of or 
against the in-group (as long as long as the absolute bias in 
favour of the in-group is greater than the absolute bias in 
favour of the out-group). Maximum difference in favour of the 
in-group maximizes the absolute bias in favour of both the in-
group and the out-group on matrix type 1, for example, while 
it minimizes absolute bias in favour of both the in-group and 
the out-group on matrix type 2. Various other patterns of 
absolute bias are compatible with a relative bias in favour of 
the in-group, as we shall see below. 
Thus in-group favouritism as measured by the Tajfel matrices 
may be measuring two conceptually different types of in-group 
bias, comprising as it does of both maximum in-group profit 
and maximum difference in favour of the in-group. Both can be 
considered instances of intergroup discrimination in the sense 
that subjects have noticed a difference between the groups and 
are treating them differently, but whereas maximum difference 
in favour of the in-group is obviously a concern for the in-
group relative to the out-group, maximum in-group profit is a 
concern for the in-group with no concern for the out-group. 
Tajfel matrices can be viewed as limited, therefore, in that 
these potentially different types of discrimination cannot 
easily be disentangled. In other words, the Tajfel matrices 
may be confounding different types of discrimination, which 
must be considered a serious defect in view of the importance 
the notion of intergroup discrimination has in both the 
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minimal group paradigm and within social identity theory 
itself. 
The possibility of a measure of social behaviour which avoids 
many of the problems associated with the Tajfel matrices (and 
many of their suggested replacements) is suggested by 
McClintock's (1988) use of vectors to diagrammatically 
represent "social values" as shown below. 
MARTYRDOM 
MASOCHISM 
-5 -4 
-3 
-2 
SADO-MASOCHISM 
OTHER'S 
OUTCOJ.\1:IE 
ALTRUISM 
+5 
+4 
+3 
+2 
+1 
-1 +1 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
-5 
AGGRESSION 
+2 
COOPERATION 
INDIVIDUALISM 
+3 +4 +5 
OWN" 
OUTCOJ.\1:IE 
COMPETITION 
Diagram 3.1: McClintock's (1988) social value vectors 
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Horizontal movement to the right anywhere on the diagram 
represents obtaining increasing gains for the self and 
horizontal movement to the left anywhere on the diagram 
represents obtaining increasing losses (i.e. negative gains) 
for the self. Similarly, upward vertical movement anywhere on 
the diagram represents obtaining increasing gains for another 
and downward vertical movement anywhere on the diagram 
represents obtaining increasing losses for another. 
Crucially, movement in one plane does not entail movement in 
the other, although movement in both planes is of course 
possible simultaneously. 
As can be seen on the diagram, McClintock labels eight equally 
spaced vectors emanating from the or1g1n, the origin 
representing obtaining no gains (positive or negative) for 
either the self or another. Obtaining gains for the self and 
neither gains nor losses for another is termed individualism; 
obtaining gains for both the self and another is called 
cooperation; and so on. 
McClintock's social value vectors concern individual and 
interindividual behaviour but can readily be adapted to 
represent group and intergroup behaviour, as shown in the 
diagram below. 
OUT-GROUP'S 
OUTCO~E 
OUT-GROUP PROFIT (OP) 
+10 
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IN-GROUP INFERIORITY JOINT PROFIT (JP) 
IN-GROUP LOSS (IL) 
-10 -8 -6 -4 
JOINT LOSS (JL) 
+8 
+6 
+4 
+2 
-2 
-2 
-4 
-6 
-8 
-10 
+2 
IN-GROUP PROFIT (IP) 
+4 +6 +8 +10 
IXV-GROUP'S 
OUTCOM'E 
IN-GROUP SUPERIORITY 
OUT-GROUP LOSS (OL) 
Diagram 3.2: Group and intergroup behaviour vectors 
In this diagram horizontal movement to the right anywhere on 
the diagram represents obtaining increasing gains for the in-
group or its members and horizontal movement to the left 
anywhere on the diagram represents obtaining increasing losses 
for the in-group or its members. Upward vertical movement 
anywhere on the diagram represents obtaining increasing gains 
for the out-group or its members and downward vertical 
movement anywhere on the diagram represents obtaining 
increasing losses for the out-group 
more crucially than before, movement 
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or its members. And, 
in one plane does not 
entail movement in the other, although simultaneous movement 
in both planes is of course possible. 
The origin of the diagram represents obtaining neither gains 
nor losses for either in-group (members) or out-group 
(members).5 Vectors moving right and left from the origin are 
labelled in-group profit and in-group loss, respectively, as 
movement along these vectors will obtain increasing gains or 
losses for the in-group or its members but will obtain neither 
gain nor loss for the out-group or its members. Similarly, 
vectors moving up or down from the origin are labelled out-
group profit and out-group loss, respectively, as movement 
along them will obtain gains or losses for the out-group or 
its members but will obtain neither gains nor losses for the 
in-group or its members. 
The vector moving up from and to the right of the or~g~n is 
labelled joint profit and the vector moving down from and to 
the left of origin is labelled joint loss. Movement along 
these vectors will obtain gains and losses, respectively, for 
both the in-group and the out -group or their members, but will 
not obtain either positive or negative in-group or out-group 
distinctiveness. Finally, the vector moving down from and to 
the right of origin is labelled in-group superiority and the 
vector moving up from and to the left of origin is labelled 
in-group inferiority. Movement along these vectors will 
clearly obtain in-group superiority over the out-group (and 
out-group inferiority to the in-group) and in-group 
5 Note that deviations from the or~g~n represent gains 
or losses from what the recipients "deserve to" or "should" 
receive. This means that the value of the origin can be set, 
and set differently for each recipient if need be. If, for 
example, one recipient scored 20 on a test and the other 
scored 10, these are the values that the origin would be set 
at, as it is deviations from these "objectively deserved" 
values which represents bias. 
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inferiority to the out-group (and out-group superiority over 
the in-group), respectively. 
The design of a new dependent measure of intergroup behaviour 
follows easily and obviously from the previous diagram. All 
that is needed is to present subjects with a series of 
"allocation grids" based on the diagram with various patterns 
of in-group and out-group recipients identified on each axis. 6 
Subj ects would then make a single mark somewhere on the 
diagram indicating how many gains or losses they wanted each 
recipient to obtain. The mean response could then be 
presented either diagrammatically or simply as a pair of 
figures reflecting mean allocations made to the in-group and 
to the out-group. 
These figures, representing in-group profit/loss and out-group 
profit/loss, can, if desired, be used to calculate joint 
profit/loss (i.e. the two figures added together and divided 
by two) and in-group superiority/inferiority (i.e. in-group 
profit minus out-group profit and then divided by two). This 
provides scores for each axis of the diagram above, and the 
sign of the scores reveals which side of origin subj ects ' 
responses are on those axes. 
simply by subtracting the 
A fairness score is obtainable 
actual absolute 
inferiority/superiority score from the maximum 
absolute in-group inferiority/superiority score. 
in-group 
possible 
A score for in-group favouritism, as conceptualized on the 
Taj fel matrices, is also obtainable, simply by taking the 
6 With two same-group recipients the allocation is of 
course intra-group and the labels on each vector need to be 
amended. With member X as the vertical axis recipient and 
same-group member Y as recipient on the horizontal axis the 
vectors will be labelled as follows, running clockwise from 
the 12 o'clock position:- X-profit, joint profit, Y-profit, Y-
superiority, X-loss, joint loss, X-loss, and X-superiority. 
Unless stated otherwise all further discussion will concern 
intergroup grids. 
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greater positive (or least negative) value of the scores of 
in-group profit and in-group superiority. It is not 
considered that such a score would usually be calculated, 
however, as it conflates the two types of bias considered 
earlier. Absolute bias in favour of the in-group is given by 
the in-group profit score and absolute bias against the in-
group is given by the in-group loss score, just as absolute 
bias in favour of the out-group is given by the out-group 
profit score and absolute bias against the out-group is given 
by the out-group loss score. Relative bias in favour of the 
in-group (and against the out-group) is given by the in-group 
superiority score, while relative bias against the in-group 
(and in favour of the out-group) is given by the in-group 
inferiority score. 7 Because absolute and relative biases in 
favour of the in-group might be two conceptually distinct 
forms of discrimination, it is thought that an in-group 
favouritism measure might be more confusing than it is 
enlightening. 
The allocation grids would appear to have a number of 
advantages over the Tajfel matrices. First, the allocation 
grids yield measures which are undoubtably of interval scale 
wi th equal origin and uni t . Comparisons across studies 
therefore requires at most a conversion of scale. There is 
only one type of grid so comparisons across grid "types" does 
not arise. 
Second, and relatedly, the main dependent measure is a single 
pair of scores (representing in-group and out-group gain or 
loss) from which a number of other scores can be calculated if 
required. This is in stark contrast with the Tajfel matrices 
which provide any number of scores according to which "pulls" 
are being investigated. 
7 It is also possible to conceptualise joint profit as 
a "relative" bias in favour of both groups and jOint loss as 
a "relative" bias against both groups. Although valid this 
conceptualization is simply too complex and potentially 
confusing to sensibly adopt. 
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Third, and again because there is only one grid type, any 
strategy which subjects can pursue on one grid they can pursue 
on all grids with the same recipient pattern, as any 
structural restrictions present on one grid will be present on 
them all. Subj ects will therefore never be forced into 
second-choice strategies. 
Fourth, because all measures can be obtained from a single 
presentation of a grid it is practically possible to 
administer several grids with the same recipient pattern, thus 
avoiding single-shot measures and improving the reliability of 
the social behaviour scores obtained. 
Fifth, the primary dependent measure (i.e. the pair of scores 
reflecting in-group and out-group loss) has unique values for 
every possible position on the grid, thereby allowing greater 
clarity than provided by the Tajfel matrix pull scores. 
Sixth, there is no need to make a "numerical assumption" as 
the dependent measure directly represents the allocations made 
to in-group and out-group, again maximizing clarity. 
Seventh, the only structural restrictions placed on subjects 
are ones unlikely to present them with problems. Subjects 
cannot pursue a strategy of maximum joint profit combined with 
maximum unfairness, maximum in-group inferiority and minimum 
individual profit for one of the recipients, for example. 
Although pursuit of such a strategy is occasionally possible 
on the Tajfel matrices (i.e. on i/o presentations of matrix 
type 1 - see Appendix 1), it is assumed here that if someone 
wishes to maximize joint profit they are unlikely to also wish 
to actively pursue maximum unfairness, in-group inferiority 
and/or individual loss. It is also assumed that the eight 
vectors represent all strategies (simple or complex) that 
subjects are likely to wish to pursue. 
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Eighth, the grids allow negative as well as positive 
allocations, thus enhancing content validity. Content 
validity is further enhanced by the fact that subjects' scores 
on the grids can be generalized more easily than can subjects 
pull scores derived from the Tajfel matrices. As mentioned 
above, pull scores, as their name suggests, are scores of the 
"pull" of one strategy on another when those strategies are in 
opposition. If a subject obtains a high F on FAV score one 
cannot conclude that the subject "is" fair (i.e. that will 
tend to act fairly in situations similar to the one they were 
in when the pull score was taken). All that can be concluded 
is that the subject will prefer fairness to in-group 
favouritism in those situations. It cannot be concluded that 
the subject will prefer fairness when it is placed in 
opposition to other strategies (such as maximum in-group 
profit), or when the subject is free to pursue any strategy. 
with the grid measures, however, subjects are free to follow 
any of a range of strategies and therefore any strategy they 
chose is likely to be relatively generalizable. 
Finally, possible allocation of loss as well as profit allows 
investigation of the "sort" of in-group favouritism subjects 
engage in during minimal group experiments. Do subjects 
attempt to maximize in-group profit regardless of how the out-
group fares, do they engage in absolute bias in favour of both 
in-group and out-group combined with relative bias in favour 
of the in-group, or do they obtain their relative bias in 
favour of the in-group in combination with absolute bias 
against the out-group? It seems reasonable to claim that 
relative bias in favour of the in-group is a far more serious 
affair when combined with absolute out-group derogation than 
it is when combined with absolute out-group enhancement only 
slightly less than the absolute in-group enhancement. 
In the study reported in this chapter both measures of social 
behaviour were employed in the minimal group paradigm in order 
to investigate the nature of minimal group behaviour indicated 
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by each. Of particular interest is the nature of absolute 
bias(es) accompanying the relative bias of positive in-group 
distinctiveness. 
METHOD' 
Participants 
33 first-year psychology undergraduates from Keele University 
volunteered to be subjects in a study in partial fulfilment of 
research participation requirements. The study was introduced 
as "A study of decision making in group situations." The 
sample was predominantly female (M = 3, F = 33) and ages 
ranged from 18 to 46 years old, with a mean of 24.3 years. 
Procedure 
Subjects were seen in two sessions, one of 16 and one of 17 
subjects. The second session was immediately after the first. 
In each session it was explained that each person present 
would be randomly allocated as a member of one or the other of 
two groups and would then make a series of point allocations 
to pairs of other people about whom they would know nothing 
except their unique code number and their group membership. 
Subjects were told that no-one would ever be able to make an 
allocation to themself, but that a record of points allocated 
to them by others would be kept and added to or taken away 
from a 400 point collection each subject started with.' It 
was emphasized that the points would not be exchanged for 
Farsides (1994) was based on selected results from 
this study. 
, 400 points were "given" to each subject so that early 
allocations of out-group loss would not be thought by them to 
necessarily result in out-group "debt" to the experimenter. 
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anything else (e.g. money), but that the experimenter would 
let them know each individual's and each group's total at the 
end of the week. It was also emphasized that making 
particular allocations to others would not affect subjects' 
own point collections. 10 Both the Tajfel allocation matrices 
and the new allocation grids were explained and demonstrated 
to subjects, and any questions they had were answered. 
Subjects were then categorized by the experimenter randomly 
pulling envelopes containing response booklets from a bag and 
giving one envelope to each subject. Each subject then moved 
to a private part of the (large) room and completed their task 
individually. When the task was complete the experimenter 
collected all the response booklets, fully debriefed the 
subjects and answered any questions they had. Subjects were 
then thanked for their participation and dismissed. 
Materials 
Each envelope contained a response booklet with information 
about the subj ect 's unique code number and minimal group 
membership shown in large letters on the front cover. This 
information was repeated in bold in the bottom right hand 
corner of every page of the booklet. The first few pages of 
the booklets repeated in writing the main task instructions 
and gave further worked examples of how to use the allocation 
matrices and grids. 
Each response booklet contained blocks of 12 allocation 
matrices and 12 allocation grids. The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced. Three matrix types were used (see Appendix 
1), each of which was presented once with each of the 
10 This was necessary because a pilot study revealed that 
some subjects refrained from giving others points because they 
worried that the points allocated would corne out of their own 
stock. 
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following recipient patterns:- i/o, o/i, i/i and 0/0. 11 The 
single grid type was presented twelve times, three times with 
each of the aforementioned recipient patterns. (An i/o 
recipient pattern on an allocation grid is one in which in-
group profit and loss occurs in the horizontal plane and out-
group profit and loss occurs in the vertical plane, while the 
reverse is true for o/i presentations.) Grid and matrix 
orders were randomized within their respective blocks. An 
example allocation grid is shown in Appendix 6. 
Following the allocation measures each booklet contained a 
short questionnaire with open-ended questions asking subjects 
to give an account of their thoughts and feelings during the 
study, in particular in terms of what they were trying to do, 
any difficulties they had and what they did about them, 
whether and why they changed their strategy during the study, 
whether they thought about how others might be behaving, and 
what they thought the outcome of the scoring might be. 
Scoring 
Pull scores and indirect in-group favouritism scores were 
calculated for the Taj fel matrices in the usual way (see 
Appendix 1 for details) . 
Grid scores were calculated as follows:-
IP (i.e. total in-group profit) = mean allocation to in-
group members across all grids; 
OP (i.e. total out-group profit) = mean allocation to 
out-group members across all grids; 
IS (i.e. total in-group superiority) = {IP - OP)/2; 
JP (i.e. total joint profit) = (IP + OP)/2; 
11 i = in-group member, 0 = out-group member. 
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F (i.e. ~otal intergroup fairness) = maximum possible 
score - (I IP - Opl); and, 
FAV (i.e. total in-group favouritism) = greatest positive 
value of IP or IS. 
In order to maximize comparability between grid and pull 
scores the former were all converted to range from -12 to +12, 
except F grid scores which were converted to range from 0-
12.12 
Analysis of the post-task QUestionnaire 
Subjects' answers to the open-ended questions of the post-task 
questionnaire (which can be seen in full in Appendix 7) were 
subjected to a very basic quantitative content analysis by the 
experimenter. Legible and seemingly unambiguous answers to 
questions asking whether or not subjects experienced 
difficulties, altered their strategies or considered others' 
behaviour whilst making their allocations were coded either in 
the affirmative or the negative. For all other answers 
categories were generated from the data, with a new category 
being generated every time a subject's answer did not seem to 
easily and cleanly fall into a previously generated category. 
12 Minus F scores have no meaning on the grids, whereas 
minus scores for other strategies (except FAV, which is not 
usually calculated) indicate positive scores for the 
strategies represented by the opposite vector. E.g. -IP = 
+IL. 
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RESULTS 
Qrder effects 
Matrix/grid versus grid/matrix order effects were investigated 
using the MANOVA procedure of SPSS, with the following 
dependent measures as within-subject factors:- the six pull 
scores, the two indirect in-group favouritism scores, IP and 
OP (remembering that all other grid scores are merely 
transformations of IP and OP and are therefore not independent 
of them). No significant order effects were found and this 
variable was collapsed for all subsequent analyses. 
Grid score reliability 
IP and OP grid scores are means of multiple allocations to in-
group and out-group members, respectively. In the present 
study these scores are the means of 12 allocations to members 
of each group. Of these 12 allocations 6 occurred on 
intergroup grids and 6 on same-group grids. 
Reliability of IP and OP was calculated twice. When all 
allocations to in-group or out-group members were considered 
as individual items Cronbach's alpha was 0.86 for IP and 0.92 
for OP. Separate scales were then calculated for intergroup 
and for same-group grid presentations. This produced alphas 
of 0.71 and 0.86 for IP and OP respectively on the intergroup 
presentations and 0 . 82 and 0 .83 on the same-group 
presentations. Reliabilities were then calculated for the 
"total" IP and OP scales using these sub-scales as separate 
items. When this was done, alpha for IP was 0.82 and for OP 
it was 0.96. 
IP and OP grid scores therefore had very acceptable internal 
reliability. 
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Sample pull and indirect in-group favouritism scores 
Mean pull and indirect in-group favouritism scores are shown 
below.13 
Measure X eSP) 
FAV on MJP 3.485 (6.695)" 
MD on MIP+MJP 2.242 (6.633) 
FAV on F 3.909 (6.222)" 
MJP on FAV 
-0.152 (3.817) 
MIP+MJP on MD 0.364 (5.225) 
F on FAV 1.242 (6.586) 
IndFAV1 0.636 (4.568) 
IndFAV2 2.970 (6.136)' 
": p s 0.005; *: p s 0.01; +: p s 0.05, all two-tailed. 
Table 3.3: Mean pull and indirect in-group favouri tism scores 
These results show that the pulls of FAV on F and FAV on MJP 
were significantly greater than zero, as was the matrix type 
2 indirect in-group favouritism score. 
Grid scores 
In-group and out-group profit grid scores were calculated, as 
were other grid scores derived from these measures in order to 
maximize comparability with the matrix pull scores. All these 
grid scores are shown below" 
13 See Appendix 1 for how these scores are derived. 
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Measure X (SP) 
IP 4.730 (3.903)· 
OP -1. 649 (5.482) 
IS 3.189 (4.327)· 
JP 1.541 (1.980)· 
F 8.420 (3.999)· 
FAV 4.905 (3.710)· 
.: p s 0.005; t. P s 0.01; +: p s 0.05, all two-tailed. 
Table 3.4: Mean grid scores 
All grid scores except the one for out-group profit were 
significantly different from zero. These scores reveal that 
subjects showed mean absolute bias in favour of the in-group 
but showed no significant mean absolute bias toward the out-
group. This resulted in significant mean in-group superiority 
(i.e. relative bias in favour of the in-group). Mean absolute 
bias in favour of the in-group exceeded the non-significant 
mean absolute bias against the out-group, so there was 
significant mean joint profit. Subjects' mean relative bias 
in favour of the in-group was not even half of what it could 
have been and as a result subjects' allocations were 
considerably more fair than they were discriminatory.14 
The two methods of measuring social behaviour yield similar 
but not identical results. Both suggest that subjects made 
allocations which resulted in in-group profit and in-group 
14 The F score and the absolute value of the IS score do 
not add up to the maximum possible score (i.e. +12) because 
some in-group inferiority allocations were made. When the F 
scores and the absolute values of the IS scores of individual 
subjects are examined, they always add up to +12. Had the 
mean absolute in-group superiority/inferiority score been 
calculated instead of the in-group superiority score, this 
would also have made a combined total of +12 when added to the 
mean F score. 
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superiority, but whereas the pull scores showed that fairness 
exerted no significant pull on discriminatory tendencies, the 
grid scores indicated that subjects' allocations were more 
fair than they were discriminatory. The grid scores also 
revealed slight but significant joint profit, although such a 
strategy did not exert a significant pull against in-group 
favouritism on the Tajfel matrices. 
Presenting subjects' responses diagrammatically 
One of the great advantages of using grids to derive 
allocation scores is that subjects' responses can be presented 
diagrammatically. This is done below with IP/IL on the 
horizontal axis and OP/OL on the vertical axis. The numbers 
in the diagram represent subjects' respondent numbers. The 
"X" shows the approximate overall mean response as obtained 
above. 
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Diagram 3.5: Diagrammatic representation of subjects' 
alloca tions I by subj ect numbers 
This diagram reveals that subjects engaged in a range of 
behaviours, very few of which are adequately represented by 
the overall mean IP and OP scores. Responses fell almost 
exclusively into two quadrants: either the one which obtains 
in-group superiority or the one which obtains joint profit. 
Within those quadrants certain responses seem to fall into 
clusters:- one collection of subjects (subjects 5, 14, 20, 27, 
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28, 30 and 31) appears to maximize or nearly maximize both in-
group profit and out-group loss, another (subjects 13, 15, 22 
and 23) appears to obtain relatively moderate in-group profit 
and less pronounced out-group loss, and so on. 
Cluster analysis of subjects' IP and OP Scores 
A cluster analysis was carried out to see whether subjects 
could be clustered according to their IP and OP grid scores. 
The dendogram (using average linkage between groups) below was 
the result. 
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Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
CAS E 0 5 10 15 20 25 
Label seq~I------~I------~I--------I~ ______ rl ______ -T1 
Respondent 
Number 
5 
20 
28 
31 
14 
27 
30 
13 
15 
33 
22 
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29 
2 
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24 
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25 
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10 
11 
12 
16 
32 
4 
Diagram 3.6: Dendogram showing clusters by 
IP and OP grid scores 
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This dendogram closely reflects the grid above. 15 Behaviours 
fall into two main clusters: one represented by in-group 
superiority (subjects 5 down to 22 on the dendogram) and the 
other represented by joint profit (subjects 7 down to 32 on 
the dendogram). Subj ect 4 is in a category of their own: 
joint loss. 
Within the first cluster there are two main sub-clusters. One 
(subjects 5, 14, 20, 27, 28, 30 and 31) can be characterized 
as "strong ethnocentrism", with subjects maximizing in-group 
superiority by maximizing or nearly maximizing both in-group 
profit and out-group loss. The other (subjects 13, 15, 22 and 
33) can be thought of as "moderate ethnocentrism", with 
subjects obtaining both moderate in-group profit and less 
pronounced out-group loss. (It is possible to further sub-
divide the first of these sub-clusters, with subjects 14, 27 
and 30 being thought of as the strong ethnocentrics , while 
subjects 5, 20, 28 and 31 can be thought of as "extreme" 
ethnocentrics.) 
The second cluster sub-divides a little less cleanly. One 
sub-cluster of subjects (25 down to 32 on the dendogram) can 
be thought of perhaps as subjects who made slight but roughly 
equal joint profit allocations. A second sub-cluster of 
subjects (2 down to 21 on the dendogram) are perhaps more 
concerned with obtaining slight but positive in-group profit 
whilst keeping out-group profit and loss negligible. A small 
number of subjects (19, 23 and 29) might be thought of as 
having made non-allocations, obtaining neither profit nor loss 
for either in-group or out-group. Two subjects (7 and 17) 
allocate relatively equally to in-group and out-group and 
obtain moderate to strong joint profit. 
15 This was to be expected as cluster analysis with two 
variables (i.e. IP and OP) clusters items according to their 
distance in two-dimensional space. 
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Cluster analysis of subjects' pull- and indirect in-group 
favouritism scores 
If IP and OP suggest that a variety of characterizable minimal 
group behaviours obtain in the present study it is important 
to see if the scores obtained from the Tajfel matrices suggest 
the same thing. Unlike the grid scores, pull-scores cannot be 
presented diagrammatically. They can however be entered into 
a cluster analysis, the resultant dendogram of which is shown 
below. 
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Diagram 3.7: Dendogram showing clusters ~ matrix scores 
Again two main clusters are derived, but it is rather hard to 
determine where the cut-off point for sub-clusters should be 
(bearing in mind that we should not be using the IP/OP diagram 
to help us). To interpret the dendogram we need to calculate 
the mean pull- and indirect in-group favouritism scores of 
each set of clusters considered. When this is done for the 
two main clusters it is quite clear that the first cluster 
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(subjects 14 down to 2 on the dendogram above) can be labelled 
"in-group favouritism" while the second cluster can be 
characterized as "fair" or perhaps simply as "the absence of 
discrimination" (cluster 1: FAV on MJP = 9.1 (4.3), MD on 
MIP+MJP = 6.3 (7.0), FAVon F = 8.5 (4.4), MJP on FAV = 1.9 
(3.5), MIP+MJP on MD = 1.3 (3.6), F on FAV = -2.5 (4.5), 
IndFAV1 = 2.4 (4.1), IndFAV2 = 7.6 (4.3); cluster 2: FAVon 
MJP = -0.7 (4.8), MD on MIP+MJP = -0.7 (4.6), FAVon F = 0.5 
(5.1), MJP on FAV = -1.6 (3.4), MIP+MJP on MD = -0.3 (6.2), F 
on FAV = 4.0 (6.4), IndFAV1 = -0.6 (4.6), IndFAV2 = -0.4 
(5.0» .16 
Two main sub-clusters exist within the in-group favouritism 
cluster, one consisting of subjects 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 
27, 30 and 31, and the other of subjects 2, 22, 26 and 28. 
Three main clusters exist within the main "fairness" cluster, 
the first consisting of subjects 17, 25 and 32; the second of 
subjects 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 24, 29 and 33; and the 
third of subjects 4, 9, 19 and 23, with subject 1 not falling 
into any of these sub-clusters. To interpret these sub-
clusters it is again necessary to examine the mean pull- and 
indirect in-group favouritism scores for each. These are 
shown below (along with the corresponding IP and OP scores) . 
16 Examining the IP and OP scores for these clusters 
supports such an interpretation. Cluster 1: IP = 7.7 (3.2), 
OP = -6.2 (5.0). Cluster 2: IP = 2.5 (2.8), OP = 1.7 (2.7). 
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Cluster In-group Fairness 
Favouritism 
Sub-
Cluster 1 2 1 2 3 4 
n 10 4 3 11 4 1 
FAV on 11.5 3.3 -1. 0 -0.4 -4.5 12.0 
MJP (1. 6) (2.6) (3.5) (3.4) (4.4) (0.0) 
MD on 9.9 -2.8 1.0 1.5 -6.3 -8.0 
MIP+MJP (3.3) (5.0) (1.7) (3.0) (3 .8) (0.0) 
FAV 9.1 7.0 -0.3 3.5 -5.3 -6.0 
on F (4.7) (3.8) (2.5) (4.2) (2.1 ) (0.0) 
MJP on 0.5 5.3 -1. 0 -1.5 -3.0 0.0 
FAV (1. 6) (4.9) (3.5) (3.0) (5.4) (0.0 ) 
MIP+MJP 1.5 0.8 9.0 -2.9 1.5 -2.0 
on FAV (2.8) (5.8 ) (3.0 ) (5.5) (2.8) (0.0 ) 
F on -1.7 -4.5 9.7 4.9 -3.3 6.0 
FAV (5.3) (3.4 ) (2.5 ) (6.1) (3.5) (0.0) 
IndFAV1 2.7 1.5 -3.3 0.6 -3.0 3.0 
(4.9) (1.3) (6.7) (3 .6) (5.1) (0.0) 
IndFAV2 7.9 6.8 5.3 -3.6 3.3 3.0 
(4.7) (3.9) (2.1) (3.7) (2.6) (0.0 
IP 8.5 5.9 4.3 3.0 -0.6 3.7 
(2.6) (4.2) (0.7) (2.1) (3.7) (0.0) 
OP -7.3 -3.5 4.3 1.6 -0.1 2.5 
(4.1) (6.4) (3.4) (2.5) (2.1) (0.0) 
Table 3.8: Mean matrix and (selected) grid scores by 
clusters shown in illustration 3.7 
From these figures it is clear that the first in-group 
favouritism sub-cluster has considerably stronger FAV on MJP 
and MD on MIP+MJP pull scores and slightly stronger FAV on F 
and the indirect in-group favouritism scores than the second 
sub-cluster. The second in-group favouritism sub-cluster 
seems to have a stronger MJP on FAV pull than the first, 
although the former's small number of subjects and relatively 
large standard deviation make this a tentative difference. 
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The first in-group favouritism sub-cluster, then, shows a 
stronger and a more general tendency toward in-group 
favouritism than the second sub-cluster. It can be seen that 
the IP and OP grid scores are consistent with such an 
interpretation. 
The first "fairness" sub-cluster has stronger MIP+MJP on MD 
and F on FAV pull scores than do the other two sub-clusters; 
the second "fairness" sub-cluster seems to deviate very little 
from zero on any of the measures; and the third "fairness" 
sub-cluster obtains relatively strong negative scores on the 
three direct discrimination pull scores (although once again 
small subject numbers and relatively large standard deviations 
make any interpretation of this sub-cluster tentative). These 
"fairness" sub-clusters might be labelled then as "extreme 
fairness", "no strategy" and "moderate out-group favouritism" 
respectively. The IP and OP scores are not especially 
consistent with these interpretations. According to these 
scores the first "fairness" sub-cluster would be labelled 
"extreme fairness plus moderate joint profit", the second 
would be labelled "mild fairness, mild joint profit and 
possible mild in-group superiority", and the third would be 
labelled "extreme fairness accompanied by neither joint loss 
nor joint profit". 
The pattern of the matrix-derived scores for subject 1 suggest 
an arbitrary allocation strategy. The IP and OP scores for 
this subject suggest instead strong fairness plus slight joint 
profit. 
Subjects' self-reported strategies 
Subjects were, it should be remembered, asked how they had 
made their allocations during the post-task questionnaire. 
Eighteen distinguishable strategies were employed. Subjects' 
reports were therefore re-categorized into "dominant" 
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strategies, according to which single strategy seemed to be 
the most important to them. Five dominant strategies were 
derived from subjects' self-reports: fairness (8 subjects), 
maximum in-group profit (1 subject), in-group superiority (5 
subjects), strong ethnocentrism (8 subjects) and random (11 
subjects) . 
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I 1 1 I 
I.~ 
FAV on 
MJP 
MD on 
MIP+MJP 
FAV 
on F 
MJP on 
FAV 
MIP+MJP 
on MD 
F on 
FAV 
IndFAV1 
IndFAV2 
IP 
OP 
IS 
JP 
F 
FAV 
Dominant self-reported strategy 
F MIP IS Ethno 
n = 8 n = 1 n = 5 n = 8 
0.8 12.0 2.2 11.3 
(5.0) (0.0) (7.3) (2.1) 
-2.1 12.0 1.2 9.0 
(4.8) (0.0) (7.3) (5.0) 
-2.1 9.0 8.4 8.8 
(3.3) (0.0) (5.0) (5.2) 
-1.3 0.0 0.2 0.8 
(2.7) (0.0) (4.9) (2.1 ) 
2.1 0.0 -3.2 1.3 
(5.1 ) (0.0) (6.3) (2.8) 
8.6 3.0 -l.6 -2.5 
(4.9) (0.0) (l. 8) (5.7) 
0.3 6.0 2.0 l.6 
(2.4) (0.0) (3.7) (5.2) 
-l.1 12.0 3.2 8.4 
(5.7) (0.0) (5.7) (4.1 ) 
2.8 7.8 4.7 10.0 
(2.3) (0.0) (1.9) (l. 7) 
3.0 -5.6 -1.3 -9.6 
(2.7) (0.0) (2.9) (2.8) 
-0.1 6.7 3.0 9.8 
(0.9) (0.0) (2.3) (2.2) 
2.9 1.1 1.7 0.2 
(2.4) (0.0) (1.0) (0.8) 
11.4 5.3 8.8 2.2 
(0.6) (0.0) (1.8) (2.2) 
2.8 7.8 4.7 10.2 
(2.3) (0.0) (1.9) (1.8) 
Table 3.9: Mean matrix and grid scores by 
dominant self-reported strategies 
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Random 
n = 11 
-0.4 
(4.8) 
0.1 
4.4) 
2.3 
(4.7) 
-0.2 
(5.2) 
0.1 
(6.2) 
-0.3 
(6.1) 
-0.9 
(5.6) 
l.1 
(4.9) 
2.1 
(2.8) 
1.0 
(2.1) 
0.6 
(1.2) 
1.5 
(2 .2) 
10.9 
(0.6) 
2.5 
(l. 9) 
Pull-, indirect in-group favouritism and grid scores were 
calculated for each category and are shown above (with 
standard deviations in brackets) . 
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Scores derived from the Tajfel matrices did rather well at 
reflecting subjects' dominant self-reported strategies. 
Subjects whose dominant strategy was random obtained 
negligible scores for all pull and indirect in-group 
favouritism scores. Subjects whose dominant strategy was 
fairness obtained negligible scores for all these scores 
except for the pull of F on FAV, where they obtained a higher 
mean score than all the other categories of subjects. Both 
the subjects interested in in-group superiority and the 
subjects interested in strong ethnocentrism obtained 
negligible scores on the three non-discriminatory pull scores 
(and also on IndFAV1) and obtained high but equal scores on 
the FAVon F measure. The ethnocentric subjects, in addition, 
obtained much higher mean scores on the pulls of FAV on MJP 
and MD on MIP+MJP, and also on IndFAV2. The scores obtained 
by the single subject with the dominant self-reported strategy 
of maximum in-group profit suggest that he was motivated 
rather more by ethnocentrism than simple in-group profit 
(especially as the maximum MD on MIP+MJP score required the 
subject to chose allocations which minimized in-group profit 
and the maximum IndFAv2 score required the subject to minimize 
out-group profit with no attendant effect on in-group profit) . 
The grid scores of IP and OP (and the scores derived from 
them) distinguished well between subjects whose dominant 
strategy was in-group superiority and subjects whose dominant 
strategy was strong ethnocentrism. The latter subjects 
allocated more to the in-group than did the former subjects 
and also obtained considerable out-group loss, which the in-
group superiority subjects did not do. Again the pattern of 
scores obtained by the "maximum in-group profit" subject 
suggests that they were more closely aligned to the strong 
ethnocentrics than to the subjects pursuing only in-group 
superiority. 
The subjects whose dominant self-reported strategy was 
fairness obtained almost the maximum possible mean fairness 
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grid score, but so did the subj ects whose dominant self-
reported strategy was randomness. Indeed, the only 
differences between these two categories of subject are the 
out-group profit and joint profit scores each obtained, and 
these differences are slight. This suggests either that the 
grid scores are deficient in not being able to distinguish 
between strategies of fairness and of randomness or that the 
subjects whose dominant self-reported strategies were 
randomness or fairness were not actually acting as 
dissimilarly as those two labels would suggest. 
The diagram below again shows IP and OP scores for each 
subject, but this time the subjects are identified by their 
dominant strategies instead of their respondent numbers. (F 
= Fairness, M = Maximum in-group profit, S = In-group 
Superiority, E = Ethnocentrism, and R = Random.) 
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Diagram 3.10: Diagrammatic representation of subjects' 
allocations, by dominant strategies 
The first thing to notice is that the random subjects almost 
all fallon or very close to the plane of maximum fairness. 
If they did in fact make random allocation decisions it is 
quite clear that they did so in a way which allocated equal 
points to in-group and out-group members. Indeed, many of 
them ensured that both in-group and out-group members would 
receive equal and positive points {i.e. fallon or near the 
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plane of maximum fairness within the joint profit quadrant) . 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the grid scores of these 
subjects are almost indistinguishable from subjects explicitly 
pursuing fairness. 
The second thing to note is that subjects I self-reported 
strategies match very closely the interpretation of the 
clusters obtained when IP and OP scores were cluster analyzed. 
The 11 subjects in the "discrimination" cluster include all 8 
of the subjects with an ethnocentric dominant self-reported 
strategy, along with the single subject with a dominant self-
reported strategy of maximum in-group profit and two of the 
subjects whose dominant self-reported strategy was in-group 
superiority. Further, all 4 of the subjects in the extreme 
ethnocentrism sub-cluster and all three of the subjects in the 
strong ethnocentrism sub-cluster had dominant self-reported 
strategies of ethnocentrism. The moderate ethnocentrism sub-
cluster contained one subject with a dominant self-reported 
strategy of ethnocentrism, two subjects with a dominant self-
reported strategy of in-group superiority, and the single 
subject with the dominant self-reported strategy of maximum 
in-group profit. 
Only three subjects with discriminatory dominant self-reported 
strategies were not included in the discrimination cluster. 
Of these one (subject 8) claimed that although they were 
trying to allocate more points to their group they did 
experience some difficulties with the system of point 
allocation on the grids (see Appendix 7). Another (subject 
21) said that they hoped they were allocating more points to 
their own group but "then would relent and give more points 
to" the other group. The third subj ect (subj ect 16) did claim 
to be giving more points to their own group, but actually 
ended up giving approximately the same amount of points to 
both groups. 
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All other subjects had dominant self-reported strategies of 
either fairness or randomness. All except one of these 
(subject 4, with a random dominant strategy) fell within the 
"fairness" cluster. 
A discriminant function analysis revealed that 66.67% of 
subjects could be correctly classified into dominant self-
reported strategy categories by discriminant functions based 
on their IP and OP scores. Most of the error came from 
"fairness" subjects being incorrectly classified as "random" 
subjects (3 from 8 cases) or vice versa (4 from 11 cases). 
When another discriminant function analysis was carried out 
with "random" subjects excluded from the sample, 86.36% of 
subjects were correctly classified into their dominant self-
reported strategy categories. The remaining error came from 
one "in-group superiority" subject being incorrectly assigned 
as a "fairness" subject; another "in-group superiority" 
subject being incorrectly categorized as a "maximum in-group 
profit" subject; and an "ethnocentric" subject also being 
incorrectly classified as a "maximum in-group profit" subject. 
From diagrams 3.5 and 3.10 above it can be seen that these are 
likely to be subjects 16, 22 and 15, respectively. 
The clusters obtained from analysis of the Taj fel matrix 
measures also fare very well in reflecting subjects' dominant 
self-reported strategies. All eight of the "ethnocentric" 
subjects fell within the "in-group favouritism" cluster, as 
did three "in-group superiority" subj ects, the single "maximum 
in-group profit" subject, and two "random" subjects. Seven of 
the eight self -proclaimed ethnocentrics fell within the strong 
in-group favouritism sub-cluster, alon$ with two subjects 
pursuing in-group superiority and the subject claiming to be 
maximizing in-group profit. The weaker in-group favouritism 
sub-cluster contained the final ethnocentric, one subject 
pursuing in-group superiority and two subjects allocating 
randomly. 
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Only two subjects claiming to pursue in-group superiority did 
not fall within the discrimination cluster. One was the 
subject who claimed to be trying to allocate more points to 
their own group than to the out-group but who ended up 
allocating equal points to both according to the grid measures 
(subject 16). The other (subject 33) started making 
allocations favouring the in-group only after starting by 
making random allocations, and even then "did not wish to 
appear too greedy so did not award" their in-group 
"excessively high points" (see Appendix 7) . 
All other subjects had dominant strategies of either fairness 
or randomness and all fell within the "fairness" cluster. 
A second discriminant function analysis was carried out to see 
how well the subjects could be classified according to their 
dominant self-reported strategies by discriminant functions 
based on the six pull- and two indirect in-group favouritism 
scores derived from the Tajfel matrices. 81.82\ of subjects 
were correctly classified, whether or not random subjects were 
included in the analysis. When all subjects were included 
error derived from two "in-group superiority" subjects being 
incorrectly classified, one as an "ethnocentrism" subject and 
another as a "random" subject; two "ethnocentrism" subjects 
being incorrectly classified, one as a "maximum in-group 
profit" subject and the other as an "in-group superiority" 
subject; and two "random" subjects being incorrectly 
classified, one as a "fairness" subject and the other as an 
"in-group superiority" subject. With random subjects excluded 
from the analysis errors came from two "in-group superiority" 
subjects being classified as "ethnocentric" and from two 
"ethnocentric" subjects being misclassified, one as a "maximum 
in-group profit" subject and the other as an "in-group 
superiority" subject. Finding out which subjects were 
misclassified would require a comparison of each subject's 
eight scores compared with the means of those scores obtained 
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within each cluster and sub-cluster obtained from the cluster 
analysis above. 
Both forms of dependent measure, then, discriminated well 
between subj ects I dominant strategies when random subj ects 
were excluded from the analysis, but the Tajfel matrix scores 
did considerably better than the grid scores when all subjects 
were included in the analysis. 
Other post-task gyestionoaire results 
Six subjects reported that they had encountered difficulties 
when making their allocations. Three subj ects (subj ects 8, 11 
and 26) complained that the allocation grids were difficult to 
use. 17 In one case this was because a subject (11) did not 
want to allocate negative points and was not sure how to avoid 
doing so. Subject 12 said it was difficult to justify giving 
anyone a negative score, although he seemed to know how to 
make such allocations. Another subject (28) experienced 
difficulties with the task itself as she felt that she had no 
reason to give or take points from anyone. The other subject 
who experienced a problem (25) simply had difficulty keeping 
track of which group she had allocated most points to. 
A full third of the sample (i.e. 11 subjects) reported having 
changed strategies at least once during their allocation task. 
Only one subject (11) changed strategies because of 
encountering difficulties when making her allocations. Two 
subjects (9 and 24) did so to stop themselves becoming bored. 
Another two subjects (13 and 33) changed to strategies biased 
in favour of the in-group as the task progressed and they 
began to think in terms of their group membership. One 
subject (14) merely modified her strong ethnocentrism to a 
weaker one to be fairer and to ensure that other individuals 
17 Also, subject 22 expressed the belief that other 
subjects would find the grids difficult. 
151 
did not receive more points than she did herself. Two 
subjects (2 and 28) altered their strategies both to keep 
themselves interested and because of a growing awareness of 
in-group membership. Subject 29 changed strategy several 
times for different reasons. Subject 17 changed from making 
random allocations within the joint profit quadrant of the 
grids to trying to achieve fairness and group profit on the 
matrices. Subject 19 gave no reasons for her self-professed 
strategy changes. 
13 subjects thought about how other subjects might be making 
their allocation decisions whilst making their own, but came 
up with a variety of conclusions. Two subjects (IS and 24) 
correctly identified that other subjects would use a variety 
of strategies. Six subjects believed others would make 
allocations using the same strategies that they themselves 
used, namely fairness and/or in-group preference (subject 1), 
in-group superiority (8), maximum in-group profit (13), 
ethnocentrism (5 and 20), or randomness with in-group 
preference (18). One subject who made random allocations (4) 
wondered whether others would allocate points to their in-
group, while another randomly allocating subject (23) thought 
that others would pursue "group-based" strategies. A subject 
who pursued fairness (7) wondered whether other subj ects would 
be ethnocentric, while another who pursued in-group 
superiority (33) thought that others would allocate randomly. 
Almost two thirds of the sample (19 subjects) reported 
wondering what the overall outcome of all the allocations 
might be. Ten subjects (i.e. approximately a third of all 
subjects) thought that everybody would show in-group 
preference. Of these two (5 and 27) were ethnocentric 
themselves, another two (8 and 22) pursued in-group 
superiority, one (13) claimed to be maximizing in-group 
profit, another (25) was fair, and four (2, 9, 18 and 32) made 
predominantly random allocations. The implication of these 
subjects' beliefs is presumably that the overall outcome would 
;,. 
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be equal between the groups. Five subjects explicitly thought 
that an equal outcome was likely, two (I and 24) who pursued 
fairness, two (23 and 26) who allocated randomly and one {33} 
whose dominant strategy was in-group superiority. Only two 
subjects explicitly thought or hoped that their group would 
achieve superiority over the out-group, one of whom (21) 
pursued such in-group superiority and the other of whom (14) 
was a self-proclaimed ethnocentric. One randomly allocating 
subject (3) thought that the outcome would be random and one 
fair subject (17) thought that the overall outcome would be 
one which maximized joint profit and fairness. 14 subjects 
failed to report any thoughts about the overall outcome of the 
allocation task. 
DISCUSSION 
Social categorization and intergroqg discrimination 
Both types of dependent measure used in the present study 
indicated that social categorization resulted in significant 
sample-level in-group favouritism. At the level of the 
individual, however, social categorization was not sufficient 
to trigger in-group favouritism. Subjects adopted a variety 
of allocation strategies including fairness and randomness as 
well as (two forms of) in-group favouritism. As in the 
previous study the main conclusion has to be that mere social 
categorization is not sufficient to promote individuals to 
engage in discrimination in favour of the in-group. 
The nature of minimal intergroup discrimination 
Two types of discrimination were pursued by subjects in the 
present study. One involved subjects obtaining a relative 
bias in favour of the in-group (i.e. in-group superiority) via 
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a moderate to strong absolute bias in favour of the in-group 
and little or no absolute bias against the out-group. The 
other involved subjects obtaining the maximum possible 
relative bias in favour of the in-group via maximum absolute 
biases in favour of the in-group and against the out-group. 
The matrix measures revealed that the latter type of 
discrimination, termed "strong ethnocentrism", was primarily 
aimed at obtaining the maximum possible relative bias in 
favour of the in-group, with the absolute biases being merely 
means to that end. Subj ects pursuing this strategy were 
willing to forego both in-group profit (i.e. on i/o 
presentations of matrix type 2) and out-group loss (i.e. on 
o/i presentations of matrix type 2) in order to maximize in-
group superiority. 
Subjects pursuing the other type of discrimination, termed 
"in-group superiority" strove to achieve the maximum possible 
absolute bias in favour of the in-group which could be 
obtained in conjunction with a relative bias in favour of the 
in-group. These subjects were not interested in sacrificing ,. 
in-group gain or maximizing out-group loss in order to 
maximize in-group superiority: their desire was to maximize 
in-group profit once in-group superiority was assured. 
An evaluation of the grid SCOreS 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, grid scores 
have a number of advantages over the matrix scores. These 
stem from allowing relatively unconstrained independent 
allocations of positive or negative goods to in-group and out-
group members using multiple presentations of a single-format 
grid with equal interval and origin. This results in a clear, 
conceptually simple yet comprehensive measure (i.e. the IP/OP 
pair) with good internal reliability and with good content and 
external validity which can be presented diagrammatically and 
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which can be straightforwardly compared across studies. 
Importantly, it also allows different "sub-types" of the same 
"types" of behaviour to be distinguished one from the other. 
The present study reveals three weaknesses the grids may have 
relative to the matrices. The first is the difficulty a small 
minority of subjects had in using them. This is relatively 
easily remedied. As well as improving instruction prior to 
use of the grids, the grids themselves can be made easier to 
use. One possibility is simply making the grids smaller, with 
possible allocations being restricted to a range of -5 to +5. 
Another is to computerize the grids so that movement within 
the grid is automatically accompanied by a simple readout 
showing how many points each recipient will receive if a 
particular choice is made. 18 
The second potential weakness the grids have compared to 
Tajfel matrices is that the latter make it easier to compare 
the strength of one particular strategy relative to another. 
Use of the Tajfel matrices in the present study, for example, 
allowed us to determine that ethnocentric subjects were 
willing to sacrifice both in-group profit and out-group loss 
in order to maximize in-group superiority. As the grids do 
not force subjects to make such choices it would have been 
very difficult, if not impossible, to determine this from grid 
scores alone. The matrices' superiority in this respect comes 
from them structurally restricting the strategies which 
subjects can follow, while the grids' weakness comes from them 
allowing more or less free expression of any strategy or 
combination of strategies. This contradicts the earlier claim 
that the grids were superior to the matrices for exactly the 
same reasons. Whether structural restriction of strategies is 
a strength or a weakness is clearly determined by the nature 
of the task. If the aim of a study is to determine the 
relative strength of particular strategies then it is sensible 
18 This has subsequently been done by the author, with 
promising results. 
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to use a measure suited to this, i.e. one which structurally 
contrasts the two strategies of interest, e.g. the appropriate 
Taj fel matrix. If the task is rather to determine which 
strategy or strategies people "freely" use in a particular 
social situation, it is probably preferable to use a measure 
which allows unfettered expression of as many likely 
behaviours as possible. It is argued here that the grids are 
superior to the matrices in this respect. No measure is 
perfect in all respects and use of one does not of course 
preclude use of another. 
The third potential inferiority of the grid scores relative to 
the matrix scores is that the former were much less able in 
the present study to reliably distinguish between subj ects 
pursuing random strategies and those pursuing fairness. This 
is by far the most serious weakness the grid measures have. 
On the grids fairness must co-occur with either joint profit 
or joint loss, or with an absence of absolute biases in favour 
of or against either group. Truly random behaviour will (when 
averaged) co-occur with an absence of mean absolute biases for 
or against either group. Truly random behaviour can be 
differentiated from a strategy of maximum fairness plus no 
absolute bias in favour or against either group by the 
former's greater IP, OP and F grid score standard deviations. 
It is also possible to be randomly fair: to choose points at 
random from along the plane of maximum fairness. This will 
also result in maximum fairness and no absolute bias toward 
either group. This can be differentiated from true randomness 
by its smaller fairness score standard deviation, and from 
fairness combined with a strategy of no absolute biases by its 
greater IP and OP score standard deviations. 
In the present study the IP, OP and F grid scores of "fair" 
and "random" subjects were very similar and the standard 
deviations of those scores were also similar. The evidence is 
that on average both sets of subjects were making randomly 
.. \ 
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fair allocations. That is, "fair" subjects were making their 
fair allocations randomly along the plane of maximum fairness 
and "random" subjects were making their random allocations 
fairly, with both showing a preference for the quadrant of 
maximum profit. 
Subj ects' accounts of their behaviour corroborate such an 
interpretation {see Appendix 7}. All eight "fair" subjects 
reported employing randomness {subjects 1, 12, 19, 24, 25 and 
29} and/or joint profit (subjects 7 and 17) along with their 
fairness, and almost half of the "random" subjects expressed 
a commitment to either fairness (subjects 2, 9 and II) and/or 
joint profit (subjects 6 and 26) in addition to "randomness". 
The reason that "random" and "fair" subjects could not be 
differentiated by the discriminant function analysis carried 
out on the grid scores was therefore that each set of subjects 
essentially made much the same type of response on the 
allocation grids, i.e. randomly fair with slight joint profit. 
It is not surprising that subjects primarily interested in 
fairness should make relatively random allocations along the 
plane of maximum fairness on the allocation grids, nor that 
these subjects should prefer fairness to in-group favouritism 
on matrix type 3. Neither is it surprising that "random" 
subjects should make random allocations on that matrix. What 
needs to be explained is "random" subjects' fairness on the 
allocation grids, no matter how random that fairness. 
A simple and likely answer is that at least some of the 
subjects allocating randomly were not very engaged with the 
task and were therefore chOOSing allocations which made it 
quick and easy to work out how many points each recipient 
would be awarded, i.e. equal allocations (cf. the accounts of 
subjects 6, 9 and 11 in Appendix 7). Such subjects' "random" 
allocations would therefore be "random but easy", i. e. "random 
but fair". Thus" fair" subj ects chose randomly along the 
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plane of fairness because they were interested in being fair 
but less interested in the form that such fairness took, and 
random subjects made allocations in exactly the same way 
because it saved them the time and effort involved in making 
more truly random choices. 
This clearly points to a serious deficiency on the part of the 
grids in that they make it difficult to distinguish between 
randomly fair subjects and "lazy" random subjects, and it also 
elevates the sample fairness mean. possible remedies are the 
same as those mentioned above. Making the grids easier to use 
may make random subjects more willing to be genuinely random, 
particularly if the grids are computerized and accompanied 
with a read-out informing subjects how many points each 
recipient will be awarded if particular allocations are 
chosen. Alternatively or additionally, the grids can be used 
in conjunction with other measures which will more reliably 
discriminate between randomly fair and" lazy" random subj ects. 
This could be Tajfel matrices, or it could be something as 
simple as asking the subjects how they made their allocations. 
Considering the main thrust of this chapter and the previous 
one, it would seem that there is a strong case for obtaining 
such accounts in minimal and near-minimal group studies 
anyway. 
Comparing the grid meaSUreS with other meaSUreS of social 
pehaviour 
Many of the critics of Tajfel matrices have themselves 
developed alternative or supplementary measures of social 
behaviour. These fall into two broad categories. 
The first (e.g. Bornstein et al. 1983; Brewer & Silver, 1978) 
are essentially revised allocation matrices which try and 
remove the structural confounds inherent in the Tajfel 
matrices. Whether or not they succeeded in this aim is a moot 
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point (see Turner, 1983a,b) , but in forcing subjects to select 
one option from a set of allocations which determine both in-
group and out-group (positive) awards, the revised measures 
are as vulnerable as the Tajfel matrix measures 
of lacking content and external validity, 
clarity, an appropriate level of measurement, 
to criticisms 
reliability, 
and full and 
meaningful comparability of scores across studies. 
The second type of social behaviour measures give subjects 
freedom to make any allocations they wish within certain 
imposed maximums. Mumrnendey & Schreiber (1983) consider three 
such measures, only two of which need concern us here. The 
first, "complementary allocations",u involves subjects freely 
distributing a fixed number of points between in-group and 
out-group (see also Ng, 1981). The second, "separate 
allocations", involves subjects allocating as many points as 
they wish (up to a maximum) to the in-group and also 
separately allocating as many points as they wish (up to an 
identical maximum) to the out-group (see also Locksley et al., 
1980) .20 
Each of these measures overcome many of the criticisms 
levelled at the Taj fel matrices. Additionally, all three 
could improve their reliability by repeated presentations of 
the relevant measure, and also improve their content validity 
by including the possibility of making negative allocations 
(although this would make the complementary allocation measure 
slightly more difficult for subjects to comprehend and use 
19 The measures are actually referred to by Mumrnendey & 
Schreiber (1983) in terms "assessments" rather than 
"allocations" as they were interested in intergroup 
evaluations as opposed to more physical intergroup behaviour. 
The arguments explored in this chapter apply equally to each, 
and the terms "assessments" and "allocations" can be used as 
appropriate to the situation of interest. 
20 The third measure, "choice of dimension", involves 
giving subjects the option of choosing different dimensions to 
separately and independently award in-group and out-group up 
to a certain amount of points on. 
... 
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than at present). Moreover, each measure has certain 
advantages over the grid measures introduced in this chapter. 
Taking the complementary allocation measure first, this 
involves structural restrictions in as much as joint profit is 
constant and in-group and out-group receipts are negatively 
interdependent: giving to one group entails depriving the 
other of rewards it would otherwise have received. This 
closely represents many "real-life" situations. People or 
organizations are often responsible for distributing set 
amounts of goods (or "bads") between a fixed number of 
potential recipients in situations in which giving to one 
recipient entails others going without. That is, many "world" 
situations involve exactly the same sort of structural 
restrictions inherent in the complementary allocations measure 
of social behaviour. When such situations are modelled 
experimentally, the complementary allocations measure clearly 
has better external validity than measures which allow 
independent allocations to each potential recipient. 
With minor modifications of multiple presentations and 
extended ranges to make negative allocations possible, the 
separate allocations and grid measures are almost identical. 
The main difference between them is that the separate 
allocations measure involves subjects allocating first to one 
group and then to the other, while the grid measure involves 
subjects making allocations to in-group and out-group 
simultaneously on intergroup grid presentations and separately 
on same-group grid presentations. 
It might be felt that the separate allocation measure and 
same-group grid presentations are superior to intergroup grid 
presentations as the latter make intergroup processes if not 
inevitable then at least very difficult to avoid. The 
between-group implications of responses on intergroup grids 
are clear to (graph-literate) subjects, whereas such 
implications might never occur to subjects making allocations 
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to in-group and out-group separately. 21 Locksley et al. 
(1980: 776) suggest that the Tajfel matrices "visibly present 
the possibility of in-group favouritism" but far more worrying 
is that they and the intergroup grids probably force subjects 
to make intergroup social comparisons they may not make when 
allocations to in-group and out-group are made separately. 
In response, it might be felt that in the minimal group 
paradigm this argument is probably invalid. This is because 
even if allocations to in-group and out-group were made 
separately, the existence of the distinct two groups is so 
salient, and the allocations to the groups are so temporally 
and procedurally adjacent, that the allocations must be seen 
as so close to being simultaneous as to be functionally 
equivalent to simultaneous allocation. 
The minimal group study reported in this study suggests that 
this may not be correct, however. Many subj ects employed 
fairness within recipient-pairs but not between them. When 
faced with two recipients on the same grid subjects often made 
efforts to allocate them an identical number of points. 
Subjects very rarely attempted to award identical points to 
members of different recipient-pairs, however, separated as 
they were by presentations on different allocation grids. 
That is, inter-individual social comparison and fairness 
occurred during simultaneous measurement but not during 
separate measurement. 
Whether simultaneous allocation promotes social processes that 
separate allocation does not is a matter for empirical 
investigation. 32 However, until such research has been 
21 An analogy is provided by the debate over whether exam 
scripts are or should be marked in comparison with 
contemporary scripts or in relation to an "absolute" standard. 
22 This would require matched groups making allocations 
to in-group and out-group others using only same-group or 
intergroup grid measures. 
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conducted it would be sensible to adopt whichever means of 
measurement is most likely to reflect the processes under 
investigation. In situations which have the potential for 
social comparison, "built-in" simultaneous evaluation/ 
assessment measures are probably appropriate, such as when a 
person is asked to evaluate each of two individuals with a 
view to discovering which is the most suitable for promotion. 
Similarly, separate allocation/assessment measures are 
probably most appropriate when investigating situations in 
which social comparison is less "inevitable", such as when the 
same two individuals are separately assessed in order to 
calculate their respective performance-related bonuses. 
As well as avoiding possible promotion or exaggeration of 
particular social comparisons (and of any social processes 
stemming from such social comparisons) Mummendey & Schreiber's 
separate allocation measure has a distinct advantage over the 
grid measures: its ease of use. All subjects have to do when 
using such a measure is write down any number between the 
stated minimum and maximum which indicates how many points 
they wish to allocate to the allocation target of the moment. 
This is much easier than working out the position on a graph 
(i.e. grid) which corresponds to the allocations one wishes to 
make to each of two recipients. Because of this ease of use 
it is likely that few subjects would encounter problems when 
asked to use the separate allocation measure. It also seems 
possible that subjects who wished to respond randomly would be 
able to do so with as much ease as they could when responding 
fairly. There would be much less incentive than on the grids 
for subjects to chose maximally fair allocations simply 
because they were the easiest to make: any allocation is as 
easy as any other using the separate allocations procedure. 
Once the separate allocations had been determined the results 
could be presented diagrammatically in exactly the same way 
that grid scores can be. If these steps were taken the 
separate allocations measure would have all of the advantages 
of the grid measures while: (i) avoiding their possible 
" 
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promotion or exaggeration of specific social comparisons; (ii) 
being easier to use; and, (iii) potentially discriminating 
more effectively between "randomly fair" and "lazily random" 
subjects. 
Theories of minimal group bebayiour 
Sample-level in-group favouritism was found in the present 
study due to almost half of the subjects employing 
discriminatory dominant strategies. It is sensible therefore 
to consider how well these subj ects' behaviour and their 
accounts of that behaviour support the various theories of 
minimal intergroup behaviour considered in the previous 
chapter. 
There was little or no support for equity theory, intergroup 
accentuation theory or self-categorization theory. No 
subjects expressed a belief that out-group members would be 
more discriminatory than in-group members, nor did any claim 
to be engaging in in-group favouritism to counter such an 
anticipated bias in order to ensure an equitable outcome. No 
subject stated that they were trying to behaviourally 
accentuate intergroup differences simply for the sake of 
intergroup differentiation. No subject claimed to be trying 
to ascertain and emulate the prototypical in-group position or 
stated that they were trying to act as much like in-group 
members and as little like out-group members as possible. One 
subject (14) did express a commitment to both in-group 
superiority and individual superiority of the self from other 
in-group members, however, and this is consistent with self-
categorization theory. 
There is weak support from the present study for a demand 
characteristics explanation of minimal group behaviour. One 
subject (12) "didn't think similar reactions every time was 
the answer" but found difficulty "justifying giving anybody a 
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negative score". Another (22) "kept wondering if" giving more 
points to the in-group than the out-group "was the right thing 
to do, and considered returning to a random selection process 
but felt that I should be 'loyal' to my own group." Against 
this, the two subjects (24 and 29) who showed some previous 
knowledge of intergroup discrimination studies made every 
effort not to conform behaviour they thought might be expected 
by the experimenter. 
The behavioural interaction model also receives very little 
support from the present study. Not surprisingly, considering 
subjects were explicitly told that points would not be 
exchanged for money, no subjects reported being motivated by 
economic self-interest. More surprisingly, perhaps (see 
Turner, 1975), is that only one subject (14) seemed concerned 
about how many points she would personally receive as a result 
of participation in the study. Also, although many subjects 
expected participants to favour in-group members relative to 
out-group members, this subject was the only one who reduced 
in-group profit because she felt that other in-group members 
might not reciprocate her initial attempts at instrumental 
cooperation with them. 
Evidence for generic norm theory is mixed. A majority of 
subjects reported at least considering the possibility of 
others discriminating in favour of their in-groups, which 
might be thought indicative of a generic norm of in-group 
favouritism. However, many of these subjects only explicitly 
wondered about the possibility that others might discriminate 
when specifically asked about others' behaviour (as opposed to 
doing so prior to or concurrent with actually making their own 
allocations), and so it is likely that few subjects' 
strategies could actually have been determined by such a norm. 
A number of subj ects made comments consistent with being 
influenced by a generic norm of "groupness" (especially 
subjects 5 and 22) or by what they thought everybody else 
would do (especially subjects 20 and 30), but a large 
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proportion of these comments are just as consistent with one 
or more other theories of minimal group behaviour as they are 
with generic norm theory. A few subjects (e.g. 1, 14, 21, 30, 
33) also seemed to be trying to balance competing desires to 
be discriminatory and fair. No subj ects explained their 
allocations by saying they were attempting to conform to 
norms. 
Evidence for social identity theory is also mixed. On the 
plus side all but 6 of the subjects (6, 10, 11, 17, 19 and 26) 
gave responses to the post-task questionnaire which revealed 
that they were aware both of the social categorization and of 
their group membership within it. Second, as mentioned above, 
subjects who discriminated seemed concerned with group rather 
than with individual outcomes. Third, subjects who 
discriminated were primarily interested in the relative group 
goal of obtaining in-group superiority, even if there were two 
distinct aims once this was achieved (i.e. maximizing that in-
group superiority or maximizing in-group profit consistent 
with in-group superiority). On the minus side, only two 
subjects (14 and 21, both of whom discriminated) hoped or 
thought that the outcome of all allocations would be in-group 
superiority: many more implicitly or explicitly thought that 
the outcome would be roughly equal between the groups. Also, 
no subject claimed that using in-group favouritism raised 
their self-esteem: indeed three subjects (14, 21 and 30) 
seemed to feel rather worried about their discriminatory 
behaviour. 
As with the study reported in the previous chapter, however, 
the biggest difficulty faced by all these theoretical accounts 
of minimal group behaviour is in accounting for the wide 
variety of strategies adopted by subjects following social 
categorization. Some subj ects seemed to adopt particular 
strategies such as fairness or in-group preference with barely 
a thought. Many more seemed simply to be struggling to make 
some sort of sense of the task they have been asked to do. 
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Some subjects could not seem to make such sense, and 
explicitly adopted a random allocation strategy which seemed 
(and is) as rational as any other in the situation they found 
themselves in. Others hopped from one strategy to another and 
back again until they found one that seemed more "right" than 
the others. It is particularly interesting that several 
subjects stumbled upon and then adopted group membership-based 
strategies in this way. Even some of those who immediately 
adopted a "rational" strategy seemed to do so simply to be 
able to make their allocations in a consistent and structured 
way. Some quotes will illustrate the gist of this point: 
Chose at random trying to select from all corners of the 
grid. Then awarded equal marks to both parties. Then 
one person scored high, the other low. On the actual 
tables [i. e. matrices] I was more inclined to take 
accoun t of wha t group the person was in. On some of the 
tables I tried to give my own group higher marks. I kept 
changing my strategy to make it more interesting. Later 
in the experiment I became more conscious of the fact I 
was in a group and so a t the end thi s then became a 
consideration. (Subject 2) 
Allocated equal points on all occasions - no basis for 
choosing to give one person points and not the other. No 
reason to give or take away points, so always gave points 
and where possible of equal value for each task. No [did 
not change strategy]. I think much about it [others' 
strategies], although I did wonder if anyone chose to 
allocate points on the basis of group membership - ie, 
give to own group, take away from other group. Not 
knowing who is in which group removes any reason to 
decide point allocation in this way, and there is no 
motivation to score your own group highly. (Subject 7) 
At first I made totally random choices and then I started 
to favour my own group and gave them a higher score 
(usually positive) than the other group. I kept 
wondering if this was the right thing to do, and 
considered returning to a random selection process but 
felt that I should be "loyal" to my own group. (Subject 
22) 
I found it difficult to allocate points at first when I 
had no reason or basis for giving or taking away. For 
that reason I began by giving equal points. Then I 
changed my strategy and decided to allocate more to 
people in my group (X) than to those in the other group. 
This was simply to make it more interesting for myself as 
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well as trying to give the most points to my own group 
whether that meant winning or not. (Subject 28) 
Despite the fact that all subjects ended-up behaving in ways 
which could be categorized into a limited number of "dominant" 
strategies, the "full" strategies subj ects adopted were almost 
unique to each individual. As Tajfel noted in the same year 
that the classic exposition of social identity theory (i.e. 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was published: 
The construction of a social system in terms of sharply 
drawn social categories and the capacity to categorize 
and compare oneself with others in certain ways and for 
certain purposes are the necessary conditions for the 
appearance of certain forms of intergroup behaviour; they 
are not sufficient conditions. (Tajfel, 1979, cited in 
Tajfel, 1981: 48, original emphasis) 
If the aim of truly social-psychological intergroup theories 
is to discover uniformities of intergroup behaviour, as Tajfel 
repeatedly claimed, then the minimal group paradigm does not 
seem to be the place where the fundamental principles of such 
theories are to be discovered. Merely finding that one shares 
a social category with others does not seem to be sufficient 
to make one behave in the same way as they do, even toward 
members of a specific out-group. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As in the last chapter the main conclusion must be that mere 
social categorization is not sufficient to promote individuals 
to be discriminatory in favour of in-groups. Significant in-
group favouritism was found at sample-level, however, and this 
is not to be dismissed. Outside the laboratory the knowledge 
that one's group is (on average) being discriminated against 
by members of another group is likely to make one prejudiced 
against that out-group in turn, even if no member of the other 
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group discriminates against one personally, either as an 
individual or as a member of one's in-group. In the next 
chapter this distinction between individual and group levels 
of discrimination will be explored further. 
The second main conclusion, again as in the previous chapter, 
is that minimally socially categorized subjects engage in a 
bewildering array of social behaviours, far too many for 
current theories of minimal group behaviour to adequately 
account for. An adequate theory of minimal group behaviour 
will need to explain both why so many allocation strategies 
are adopted and why these strategies can be clustered into a 
handful of "dominant" strategies. More importantly, the 
theory will need to explain and predict the emergence of more 
widespread and consensual intergroup behaviour, particularly 
intergroup discrimination of various kinds. Again this is 
addressed in the following chapter. 
The third main conclusion is that at least two types of 
discrimination seem to occur within the minimal group 
paradigm. In line with social identity theory both seem to 
require that in-group superiority be attained but beyond that 
one form requires that the in-group superiority is maximized 
by maximizing both in-group enhancement and out-group 
derogation, whereas the other requires in-group enhancement 
without either out-group enhancement or significant out-group 
derogation. The first of these forms of discrimination links 
very closely to the notion of maximum difference in favour of 
the in-group and the second bears strong similarities to the 
notion of maximum in-group profit, both of which are often 
conflated both methodologically and conceptually (e. g. as 
"FAV") . 23 A theory such as social identity theory, which aims 
to explain intergroup discrimination stemming from intergroup 
23 The second form of discrimination is not identical to 
maximum in-group profit, as there is a caveat to the strategy 
- subj ects pursuing this form of discrimination desire maximum 
in-group profit as long as and once in-group superiority has 
been achieved. 
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comparison, really needs to distinguish between and explain 
the difference between these two manifestations of the search 
for positive social identity and self-esteem, and also needs 
to predict who will adopt which, and when. 
Finally, it has been argued that the allocation grids employed 
in this study have a number of advantages over the Taj fel 
matrices. The two which need reiterating here are (i) the 
ability to differentiate between the two aforementioned 
"types" of relative bias in favour of the in-group, and (ii) 
the ease and confidence with which grid scores can be compared 
across studies. The latter of these is important because 
meaningful comparison of pull- and indirect in-group 
favouritism scores are so hazardous as to be extremely rare. 
Most reviews of matrix use restrict themselves to mentions of 
whether or not particular pull scores were significantly 
different from zero or, at very most, acknowledgement of which 
pull score was the greatest of those measured. This is not 
surprising considering the criticisms which have been levelled 
at the matrix measures, but it is a tremendous waste of 
research effort. This is not to say that the grid measures 
are universally superior to the matrix measures, that the 
matrices do not have their uses, or that the allocation grids 
provide the best possible measure of social behaviour. Any 
such claim would be manifestly false. Mummendey & Schreiber's 
(1983) "separate allocation/assessment" measure of social 
behaviour seems in particular to share all of the allocation 
grid measures' advantages over the Tajfel matrix measures and 
to additionally have a number of advantages over the 
allocation grid measures. H Which measure is most appropriate 
will, as always, be best determined by the purpose the measure 
is to serve. 
~4 particularly when amended to: (i) include repeated 
presentations of the measure; (ii) include the possibility of 
negative as well as positive gains; and, (iii) present the 
outcomes diagrammatically. 
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CHAPTER 4; STUpY 3 - PEVELOPING NOBMS OF ImRGROyp BEHAYIOUR 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter reports a study with three within-subject 
conditions. The first condition was similar to a standard 
minimal group paradigm study (cf. Tajfel et al., 1971). The 
second condition involved sub-groups of three subjects drawn 
from the same social categories being tape-recorded whilst 
collectively making a second set of allocations to in-group 
and out-group others. The third condition involved subjects 
individually making a third set of allocations to in-group and 
out-group others (but not to those in the same sub-groups as 
themselves) . 
In the first condition subjects employed both mean sample-
level in-group favouritism and mean fairness across the 
groups. Mean sample-level in-group favouritism polarized from 
condition 1 to conditions 2 and 3. Mean sample-level fairness 
across the groups depolarized (to zero) from condition 1 to 
conditions 2 and 3. 
Despite these gross sample-level results being consistent with 
an interpretation derived from social identity theory, it is 
argued that a normative interpretation is preferable. 
In all three conditions a wide variety of strategies were 
employed, both across individuals and across sub-groups. 
Explanations in terms of social categorization per se are not 
sufficient to explain this variety of behaviour. However, an 
interpretation which considers the development or non-
development of sub-group norms in condition 2, and also sub-
group members' commitment to any norms developed, can be used 
to explain all condition 2 and condition 3 (individual, sub-
group and sample) behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971) 
subjects are arbitrarily or randomly allocated into one or the 
other of two novel social categories (i.e. "minimal groups") 
and asked to make decisions about how to behave toward and/or 
evaluate anonymous members of each group. The paradigm has a 
number of strict procedural criteria, the first of which is 
that there "should be no face-to-face interaction" between any 
of the subjects (Tajfel et al., 1971: 154), either within or 
across groups. 
The results of the "standard" minimal group paradigm are well 
documented. On average minimal group subjects display in-
group favouritism, both by allocating more "goods" (material 
or evaluative> to the in-group than to the out-group and by 
attempting to obtain in-group superiority over the out-group. 
What has yet to be explicitly investigated is what happens 
when the first procedural criterion of the minimal group 
paradigm is violated. Specifically, what happens when within-
group face-to-face interaction is permitted? There are at 
least two reasons to think that this is a question of some 
importance. 
The first is theoretical. In the "standard" form it is 
difficult to see how the minimal group paradigm could produce 
anything other than an individualistic account of "group" and 
"intergroup" phenomena (see also Chapter 1, pp. 36-41). As 
subjects are forced to make their decisions individually -
with no prior or contemporaneous intragroup communication -
the resultant "group" and "intergroup" behaviour cannot be 
anything other than the mean of individual behaviour. At best 
it can be claimed that all subjects react to the same stimulus 
(i.e. group membership within a mUlti-group structure) with 
more or less identical responses (i.e. in-group preference) . 
Indeed, this is the so-called "central tenet" of social 
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identity (see Chapter 1). Social identity theory, in other 
words, offers an individualistic theory of group and 
intergroup behaviour: it claims that people will individually 
respond in predictable ways to the "social" stimulus of group 
membership in a mUlti-group situation. 
The second reason why it is sensible to ask what happens when 
intragroup cormnunication is allowed in the minimal group 
paradigm concerns the generalizability, or lack of it, of the 
results of experiments within that paradigm. Even if it 
accepted that the minimal group paradigm reveals the 
intergroup behavioural consequences of "mere" social 
categorization, this tells us little or nothing about the 
intergroup behavioural consequences of "non-mere" social 
categorization. Most if not all non-experimental group and 
intergroup behaviour follows or occurs simultaneously with 
intragroup cormnunication. It therefore behoves social 
psychologists to examine the consequences of social 
categorization plus intragroup cormnunication. 
These points can be illustrated with reference to Sherif's 
(1936) studies of group norms. Sherif's studies utilized the 
phenomenon known as the autokinetic effect. This is where a 
stationary point of light in a darkened room appears to move. 
There are considerable differences in how far subjects 
individually estimate the light moves, but all or most 
subjects unfamiliar with the autokinetic effect think that it 
does. The first stage in Sherif's studies was to establish 
that repeated trials led to individuals developing their own 
norms. That is, subjects who were asked to estimate the 
light'S movement several times tended to base their later 
estimates on their own earlier ones. Put another way, all or 
most subjects responded to the stimulus (i.e. the stationary 
light) in similar ways (i.e. by estimating that it did move), 
but there were individual differences, both in subjects' 
initial responses and in the personal norms they developed 
over repeated trials. 
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The second stage of Sherif's studies involved two conditions. 
In the first, subjects made one estimation alone and were then 
repeatedly asked to estimate the light's movement in the 
presence of others (who had also made one solo estimation) . 
The initial solo estimations showed the usual individual 
variation but on subsequent estimations made in the presence 
of others the estimations converged across individuals. That 
is, rather than subsequent estimations converging on a 
personal norm (i.e. on subjects' own earlier estimations), 
those estimations converged on a social or group norm. 
Importantly, the group norm that developed was not always 
identical to the mean of the initial individual estimations. 1 
In the other second stage condition subjects were first asked 
to make a series of estimations in the presence of other 
estimating subjects (before any had made solo estimations) and 
were then asked to a solo estimation. In this condition 
initial estimations showed very little variation across 
subjects: subjects made very similar estimations to each 
other. Furthermore, these subjects' subsequent solo 
estimations were also very similar to the group norm that had 
been established and were, therefore, also very similar to 
each others' . 
Sherif's studies of group norms reveal the individualistic 
perspective endemic in both the minimal group paradigm and 
within social identity theory. The minimal group paradigm is 
analogous to the situation in which subjects make an initial 
individual estimation of the light's movement. In the Sherif 
studies subjects responded in more or less the same way to an 
identical stimulus (i.e. the light: subjects estimated that it 
moved), but there were considerable individual differences 
(i.e. the estimations of movement varied across individuals) . 
Similarly, in the minimal group paradigm it is claimed that 
1 Nor was it uniformly more extreme on the same side of 
zero than that mean, as might be expected from the group 
polarization phenomenon (see below) . 
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subjects respond in more or less the same way to an identical 
stimulus (i. e. group membership wi thin a mul ti -group 
situation: subjects show in-group preference), but there are 
considerable individual differences (i.e. the extent of in-
group preference varies across individuals). 2 But whereas 
Sherif was clear that this was a (relatively) non-social, i.e. 
individualistic, phenomenon, social identity theory claims 
that it is a social one. In fact, all that is "social" is the 
stimulus (in the sense that subjects share category 
membership) . Further, where Sherif thought of his solo 
situation as a starting point, social identity theorists have 
tended to treat their's as the end product. 
The same points can be illustrated with reference to the group 
polarization paradigm (see Isenberg, 1986 and Turner, 1991 for 
reviews). One variant of this paradigm has three repeated-
measures conditions: an individual one followed by a group one 
and then a second individual one. In each condition subjects 
are asked to respond to some stimulus, e.g. to express their 
attitudes on some contentious issue. Group polarization is 
the term used to describe the robust phenomenon that mean 
responses by or within a group (i.e. in condition 2) are more 
extreme on the same side of zero or neutral as the mean of the 
individual responses in condition 1. The addition of 
condition 3 demonstrates that the mean of individual responses 
in this third condition are less than or equal to those shown 
in condition 2, but are reliably still more extreme on the 
same side of zero as the mean of the individual responses in 
condition 1. 
The group polarization phenomenon again suggests that 
intragroup interaction can be predicted to result in behaviour 
which is different from behaviour which results when 
2 In fact the studies reported in the previous two 
chapters reveal that the analogy fails to a certain extent at 
this point, as subjects do not respond in "more or less the 
same way" to group membership in an intergroup context: at 
least some subjects show no in-group preference. 
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intragroup interaction is not permitted. As with the Sherif 
studies, the minimal group paradigm is analogous to the first 
individual condition of the group polarization paradigm. 
Subjects are merely examined as to how they individually 
respond to a stimulus (i.e. group membership within a multi-
group structure) and the mean of their individual responses is 
called "group" (and/or "intergroup") behaviour. 
It might be objected that the comparisons between the minimal 
group paradigm and both Sherif's and the polarization paradigm 
are illegitimate. After all, the subjects in the latter 
paradigms are not explicitly members of a group whereas they 
are in the minimal group paradigm. There are two counters to 
such an objection. The first is that social identity theory 
has been developed in such a way as to claim that subjects in 
both the Sherif and the polarization paradigms are members of 
a group and in fact perceive themselves as such, i.e. they are 
a group of people confronted with a common stimulus or 
situation and can be expected to respond in similar ways (e.g. 
Abrams et al., 1990; Mackie, 1986; McGarthy et al., 1992). 
The second response is simply to make the as yet 
unsubstantiated claim that if subjects in the first conditions 
of the Sherif and the polarization paradigms were explicitly 
told that they were members of a group the differences across 
conditions typically found in those paradigms would still be 
obtained. 
The thoughts expressed above provided the motivation for the 
experiment reported in this chapter. The experiment is 
essentially a combination of the minimal group and the group 
polarization paradigms and, as such, might be termed the 
minimal intergroup polarization paradigm. Condition 1 more or 
less followed the standard minimal group paradigm format: each 
subject was categorized into one or the other of two novel 
social categories according to explicitly random criteria and 
were then asked to make a series of point allocations to pairs 
of other subjects identified only by their unique code numbers 
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(known only to themselves) and by their minimal group 
memberships. In condition 2 the same subjects met with one or 
two other subjects from the same minimal in-group and were 
asked, as a "sub-group", to collectively decide how to make a 
second set of point allocations to pairs of other in-group and 
out-group members. Finally, in condition 3, the same subjects 
were asked to individually make a third set of point 
allocations to in-group and out-group others (not including 
those in their own condition 2 sub-group). The hypotheses, 
derived from the minimal group, Sherif and polarization 
paradigms, were as follows. 
From the minimal group paradigm it can be predicted that:-
HI. Sample-level in-group favouritism will be significantly 
greater than zero in condition 1. 
H2. Sample-level fairness across groups will be significantly 
greater than zero in condition 1. 
From Sherif's paradigm it can be predicted that:-
H3. Intergroup behaviour will show significantly greater 
variation within sub-groups in condition 1 than in 
condition 3. 
From the group polarization paradigm it can be predicted 
that:-
H4. within sub-groups, mean in-group favouritism will be 
significantly more extreme in condition 3 than in 
condition 1, on the same side of zero. 
H5. Within sub-groups, mean fairness across groups will be 
significantly more extreme in condition 3 than in 
condition 1, on the same side of zero. 
Combining hypotheses 1 and 4 suggests that:-
H6. Sample-level in-group favouritism will be significantly 
greater in condition 3 than in condition 1. 
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Combining hypotheses 2 and 5 suggests that:-
H7. Sample-level fairness across groups will be significantly 
greater in condition 3 than in condition 1. 
MBTHOIY 
Subjects 
24 British second-year psychology undergraduates from the 
University of Keele volunteered to take place in a "study of 
decision-making." One did not turn up. Of those who did, 17 
were female and 6 were male. Ages ranged from 19 to 47 years, 
with a mean of 26.65 (median = 22, mode = 21). 
Procedure 
Over the space of one week subj ects were seen in eight 
experimental sessions of 3 subjects each, except for one 
session in which only two subjects attended. After initial 
greetings subjects were told that they were being seen three 
at a time simply "for the sake of efficiency and [that] more 
would be seen at once if more rooms were available." In all 
but the first session subjects were asked if they had heard 
anything about the study from previous participants. All 
denied that they had. Subjects were then told that they would 
be taking part in three tasks and would be told the nature of 
each task immediately prior to doing it. 
The first task was a "standard" minimal group paradigm (cf. 
Tajfel et al., 1971) with the following minor amendments: (i) 
social categorization was ostensibly explicitly random as 
3 Farsides (1993b) was based on selected results from 
this study. 
177 
opposed to being based on arbitrary similarities of taste or 
skill (cf. Billig & Tajfel, 1973), but was in fact rigged so 
that all same-session subjects were in the same minimal 
category; (ii) in addition to (knowingly) not being able to 
allocate directly to the self, subjects also (unknowingly) 
could not allocate to others in the same session; (iii) 
subjects were told that they would be informed later of the 
allocation decisions, but were not explicitly told that they 
would be informed of how many points others had allocated to 
them personally; (iv) subjects were told that the points were 
"just points" and would not be changed for money or for 
anything else at a later time; and (v) subjects knew that they 
would be taking part in two further unspecified tasks upon 
completion of the first. 
In the first condition the experimenter explained that all of 
the subjects across all of the sessions would be allocated at 
random into either "Group K" or "Group J", by the experimenter 
picking one envelope per subject from a large pile of such 
envelopes which any or all of the subjects in each session 
could "shuffle" if they so wished. Each envelope contained 
categorization information, as well a code number unique and 
known only to each subject, and a response booklet for the 
first task. In fact, the pile of available envelopes was 
different in each session so that all same-session subjects 
were allocated to the same category. Subjects were also told 
that all members of Group K would have code numbers between 1 
and 49 and that all members of Group J would have code numbers 
between 51 and 99. Categorization was ostensibly random to 
ensure that any allocation behavioural effects obtained from 
the social categorization were not confounded by perceptions 
of within-category similarities and/or between-category 
differences in addition to those entailed by the social 
categorization itself (cf. Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Farsides, 
1993a). Allocation to the same category within sessions was 
necessary so that same-group communication was possible in the 
second condition (see below). Subjects were prevented from 
178 
allocating to others within the same session to ensure that in 
subsequent conditions subjects could not feel that they had 
individually favoured or discriminated against their fellow 
subjects or that their fellow subjects had individually 
favoured or discriminated against them. Subjects were not 
told that they would be informed about the allocations that 
had been made to them personally by others in an attempt to 
avoid biasing subjects toward an individual-level or a group-
level focus in their allocation behaviour. Subj ects were told 
that the points were "just points" (i) in order to minimize 
possible strategies of economic self-interest, (ii) because 
funds available to the experimenter were limited, and (iii) 
because Turner (1975) found that the effects of social 
categorization were as strong if not stronger when points were 
allocated as when money was. 
Subjects were told that the nature of the first task was to 
allocate points to pairs of other people who would be 
identified only by their group membership and by their unique 
code number. This would be done using "Tajfel matrices" (see 
Appendix 1) which were explained and demonstrated to the 
subjects by the experimenter. It was stressed that there was 
no way of knowing whether or not they would be allocating to 
others in the same session as this would depend on the 
"random" categorization. In fact subjects never allocated to 
others in the same session (see above). When subjects were 
satisfied about the nature of their task the experimenter 
"randomly" selected each of them an envelope (see above) which 
they were told not to open until they had been shown to 
separate rooms. Once seated in those rooms they were told to 
open the envelopes to discover which of the groups they had 
been allocated to and what their unique code number was. 
Instructions hoW to use the matrices, with examples, were 
repeated at the front of the response booklets. The subjects 
were instructed to report back to the experimenter when they 
had finished this first task. 
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When all the subjects within a session reported back to the 
experimenter the second condition was initiated. Subjects 
were led to a previously unused room where they were seated 
around a table. On the table was a tape-recorder and a single 
response booklet. The subj ects were told that the second task 
involved them collectively making a second set of allocation 
decisions to pairs of other people identified as before. It 
was stressed that no-one in the room would be a recipient of 
any of the allocations made by the sub-group during this 
second task. Subjects were asked if they minded their 
decision-making discussions being tape-recorded as the 
experimenter "was particularly interested in how group 
decisions were made and would like to be able to listen to the 
tape later." No-one refused so the experimenter turned on the 
tape-recorder and left the room after requesting that the 
subjects should report back to him when this second task was 
complete. 
upon completion of the second task subjects were led back to 
their individual rooms and were asked to individually make a 
third set of allocations decisions. This time (as compared to 
the first condition) subjects were explicitly told that others 
within their session would not be the recipients of any of 
their allocations, and neither would they themselves. 
When all of the subjects had completed the third stage and 
reported back to the experimenter they 
they had heard anything about the 
participants. Again none admitted to 
knowledge of the experimental procedure. 
were again asked if 
task from previous 
having had any pre-
Subjects were then 
asked to promise not to discuss the procedure with anyone yet 
to take part. Finally, subjects were told when and how they 
could find out about the experiment and its results, were 
thanked, and were given the opportunity to make any comments 
about their experience within the session. 
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To recap: there were three conditions in the present study. 
The first simply followed the standard minimal group paradigm. 
Subj ects were randomly socially categorized and asked to 
individually allocate points to in-group and to out-group 
members. In the second condition subjects were placed in a 
room with one or two other in-group members and each "sub-
group" of subjects were asked to collectively make a second 
set of allocations to in-group and out-group others. In the 
third condition subjects were separated again and asked to 
individually make a final set of allocations to in-group and 
out-group others (excluding other sub-group members) . 
Materials 
Eighteen "Taj fel matrices" were included in each response 
booklet; six of each of the three types shown in Appendix 1. 
For each type of matrix there were three recipient patterns: 
two in-group members (2 matrices), two out-group members (2 
matrices) and one in-group and one out-group recipient (2 
matrices, one with the in-group member as the top-row 
recipient and one with the out-group member as the top-row 
recipient) . In the first condition each subject received 
their matrices in a different random order from each of the 
other subjects in their session. The booklet in the second 
condition contained matrices in a fourth random order. In the 
third condition each subject's matrices were in a random order 
other than the one used in their own previous individual 
condition. Also in the third condition the response booklet 
finished with a short questionnaire asking subjects their age, 
sex and nationality, followed by a page on which subjects were 
invited to make comments about the experiment they had just 
participated in. 
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RESULTS 
Sample pull-scores 
Mean sample pull-scores were calculated within each condition 
and are shown in the table below. In condition 1 - the 
"standard" minimal group paradigm condition - the three in-
group preference pull-scores (i.e. FAV on MJP, MD on MIP+MJP 
and FAV on F) were all significantly above zero by one-tailed 
one-sample t-tests, as was the pull of F on FAV (p s 0.005 in 
all cases). Thus hypotheses H1 and H2 were supported. 
Neither of the other pull-scores (i.e. MIP+MJP on MD and MJP 
on FAV) were significantly different from zero (p > 0.05 in 
each case) . 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
FAV on MJP 3.739 (5.57) 6.522 (5.88) 6.043 (7.22) 
MD on MIP+MJP 2.609 (5.20) 5.304 (6.10) 3.739 (6.59) 
FAV on F 4.609 (5.53) 9.652 (3.04) 7.130 (7.13) 
MJP on FAV -0.435 (5.04) -0.348 (1.15) -0.043 (1.94) 
MIP+MJP on MD 0.696 (5.09) 3.304 (4.19 ) 3.739 (4.69) 
F on FAV 3.391 (5.38) -1.565 (2.43) 0.783 (4.78) 
Table 4.1: Mean pull-scores by condition 
A MANOVA with the six pull-scores and the three conditions as 
within-subjects factors revealed a significant multivariate 
main effect of strategy (p < 0.001). Averaged across the 
three conditions the three in-group preference pull-scores 
were strongest (FAVon F = 7.130; FAV on MJP = 5.435; MD on 
MIP+MJP = 3.884), followed by the pull of MIP+MJP on MD 
(2.580), with the other pull-scores being non-significantly 
different to zero (F on FAV = 0.870; MJP on FAV = -0.275). 
There was also a significant main-effect of condition (F I2 • H ) 
= 3.93, P < 0.05). However, averaging the six pull-scores is 
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a meaningless exercise and so this result is of no concern. 
More interestingly, there was a significant effect for the 
interaction of strategy x condition (F(1o.22o) = 5.04, P < 
0.001). Inspection of the means in the table above suggest 
that investigation of this interaction can be simplified in 
two ways. First, as the pull of MJP on FAV was consistently 
non-significantly different to zero in each of the three 
conditions, this score can be dropped from the analysis. 
Second, as the three in-group preference pull-scores are 
conceptually similar and also have similar patterns across the 
three conditions, a composite "in-group preference" (InPref) 
pull-score can be obtained simply by taking the means of those 
three pull-scores. 
A second MANOVA with the three pull-scores of interest and the 
three conditions as within-subjects factors revealed a main 
effect of strategy (F C2 .44) = 8.56, P < 0.005), with the mean 
InPref score across conditions being greatest at 5.483 (with 
means of MIP+MJP on MD and F on FAV being 2.580 and 0.870, 
respectively, as reported above). The main effect of 
condition was insignificant for this MANOVA. The interaction, 
however, remained significant (F C4 • BB ) = 10.16, P < 0.001). The 
means of interest are shown in the table below. 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
InPref 3.652 (4.59) 7.159 (4.39) 5.638 (6.01) 
F on FAV 3.391 (5.53 ) -1.565 (3.04) 0.783 (7.13) 
MIP+MJP on MD 0.696 (5.09) 3.304 (4.19) 3.739 (4.69) 
Table 4.2: Mean F an FAV and KCP+MJP an MD pull-scores, 
and mean InPrer scores, by condi tion 
Inspection of the mean pull-scores within each condition shows 
that InPref was considerably greater in condition 2 than in 
condition 1, with the condition 3 mean falling between those 
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two values. The condition 3 InPref mean was significantly 
greater than the condition 1 mean by a one-tailed related t-
test (t(22) = -2.43, P = 0.012), thus supporting H6: sample-
level mean in-group favouritism was significantly greater in 
condition 3 than in condition 1. For F on FAV the condition 
2 mean was considerably less than the condition 1 mean, and 
indeed was significantly less than zero. Here again the 
condition 3 mean (which was not significantly different to 
zero) fell between the means in the previous two conditions. 
The condition 3 F on FAV mean was significantly different from 
its condition 1 mean by a one-tailed related t-test (T(w = 
2.28, P = 0.033), but the condition 3 mean was less than the 
condition 1 mean, thus failing to support hypothesis H7: 
sample-level mean fairness across groups was not significantly 
greater in condition 3 than in condition 1. MIP+MJP on MD 
followed a third pattern, with the condition 2 mean being 
higher than the condition 1 mean, while the condition 3 mean 
remained at its condition 2 level. The condition 3 mean of 
MIP+MJP on MD was significantly greater than its condition 1 
mean, as indicated by a two-tailed related t-test (t(W = -
2.99, P = 0.014). 
Pull-score polarization within sub-groups 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 predict that intergroup strategies will 
polarize within sub-groups. The table below allows these 
hypotheses to be examined. The numbers contained within the 
cells of the main body of the table represent the absolute 
differences between the condition 3 and condition 1 sub-group 
means for each strategy. The sign of each of these numbers 
represents whether or not the condition 3 means were more 
extreme than but on the same side of zero as the condition 1 
means, i.e. whether polarization occurred for each strategy 
within each sub-group. Positive values indicate that 
polarization did occur and a negative ones that 
"depolarization" occurred (i.e. that the condition 3 mean was 
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less extreme than or on the other side of zero to the 
condition 1 mean). Row means therefore represent the mean 
polarization between conditions 1 and 3 for each sub-group, 
averaged across all six pull-scores, and column means 
represent the mean polarization between conditions 1 and 3 for 
each pull-score, averaged across all eight sub-groups. The 
overall table mean, shown in the lower-right cell of the 
table, represents the mean overall within sub-group 
polarization of intergroup behaviour between conditions 1 and 
3, averaged across all eight sub-groups and all six pull-
scores. 
FAV on MD on FAV on MJP on MIP+MJP F on X 
MJP MIP+MJP F FAV on FAV FAV 
1 -2.00 -3.66 1.66 -2.66 1.00 -1. 00 -1.11 
2 2.67 -1.00 3.66 -0.66 -0.33 -0.33 0.67 
3 5.00 4.00 5.33 -0.33 0.00 -2.67 1. 89 
4 -4.00 -1.34 4.00 -0.66 -5.33 -8.00 -2.56 
5 0.67 5.33 -1.66 0.00 -7.33 2.34 -0.11 
6 0.00 -1.00 -7.00 -1.00 2.00 3.00 -0.67 
7 6.67 -1.00 5.00 -4.67 4.00 -5.00 0.83 
8 4.67 -1.33 6.00 0.67 4.67 -4.00 1. 78 
X 1. 71 0.00 2.12 -1.16 -0.17 -1.96 0.09 
Table 4.3: Polarization by strategy and sub-group 
Averaging across the eight sub-groups and the six pull-scores, 
no significant polarization (or depolarization) of intergroup 
behaviour occurred between conditions 1 and 3 of the present 
study. The condition 3 mean of intergroup behaviour (i.e. 
averaged across all six pull-scores) was less than a tenth of 
a scale-point more extreme than and in the same direction as 
the condition 1 mean, when averaged across the eight sub-
groups. 
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The column totals suggest that there were differences across 
intergroup strategies, with the pull-scores of FAV on MJP and 
FAV on F showing polarization (averaged across the eight sub-
groups) of 1.71 and 2.12 scale-points, respectively, and the 
corresponding "reverse" pulls of MJP on FAV and F on FAV 
showing depolarization (averaged over the sub-groups) of 1.16 
and 1.96 scale-points, respectively. The mean pull-scores of 
MD on MIP+MJP and MIP+MJP on MD showed little difference 
across conditions 1 and 3 (averaged across the sub-groups). 
However, none of the pull-scores (averaged over sub-groups) 
indicated significant polarization or polarization between 
conditions 1 and 3. 4 No support is found for hypotheses H4 
or H5, therefore, as neither strategies of in-group 
favouritism nor strategies of fairness across groups polarized 
within sub-groups between conditions 1 and 3. 
Similarly, although the row means in the table above suggest 
differences in intergroup behaviour (i.e. averaged across the 
six pull-scores) across sub-groups, with, for example, sub-
groups 3 and 8 showing polarization and sub-group 4 showing 
depolarization, none of the sub-group's polarization (or 
depolarization) was significantly different from zero change 
across conditions 1 and 3. 
Before leaving the table above, however, it is worth noting 
that there is strong suggestive evidence that polarization and 
depolarization did occur on particular strategies for 
individual sub-groups. Thus, for example, sub-groups 3, 7 and 
8 showed considerable polarization on the strategies of FAV on 
MJP and FAV on F, while sub-groups 4, 7 and 8 showed 
substantial depolarization on the strategy of F on FAV. 
4 By one-sample t-tests with n = 8 (i.e. the sub-groups) 
comparing the extent of polarization with zero difference 
between condition 1 and condition 3 means. 
.': 
J 
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variance within sub-groups across conditions 1 and 3 
Hypothesis H3 predicts that subjects' intergroup behaviour 
will show greater variation around sub-group means in 
condition 1 than in condition 3. The table below shows the 
difference between the sub-group variances in conditions 1 and 
3, with positive numbers indicating less variance in condition 
3 than in condition 1 and negative numbers indicating greater 
variance in condition 3 than in condition 1. 
FAV on MD on FAV on MJP on MIP+MJP F on X 
MJP MIP+MJP F FAV on FAV FAV 
1 3.464 1.732 -2.887 0.000 -1. 732 -1.732 -0.193 
2 -2.506 -0.435 -1.425 1.939 -0.143 3.204 0.106 
3 6.083 3.141 5.508 0.577 0.000 7.371 3.780 
4 -6.553 -4.707 -0.956 6.351 4.483 -1.732 -0.519 
5 0.309 2.887 -4.989 1.000 2.044 -3.136 -0.314 
6 -2.828 -9.900 -1.414 1.414 -1.414 -1.414 -2.593 
7 1.155 -1. 782 5.533 3.691 -4.423 5.533 1.618 
8 2.646 3.215 6.557 6.602 4.509 6.083 4.935 
X 0.221 -0.731 0.741 2.697 0.415 1.772 0.853 
Table 4.4: Differences in sub-group behavioural variation in 
condi tions 1 and 3 by strategy and sub-group 
The overall table mean indicates that (averaged across the 
eight sub-groups and the six pull-scores) variance around sub-
group means was only slightly (and non-significantly) less in 
condition 3 than in condition 1. Overall, then, no support is 
provided for hypothesis H3: variance of intergroup behaviour 
within sub-groups was not significantly greater in condition 
1 than in condition 3. Column totals suggest, however, that 
variance reduction from condition 1 to condition 3 was greater 
for some intergroup strategies than for others, particularly 
for the strategies of MJP on FAV and F on FAV (averaged over 
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sub-groups). One-sample t-tests with sub-groups as the unit 
of analysis revealed significant within sub-group variance 
reduction from condition 1 to condition 3 only for MJP on FAV 
(t l7l = 2.96, P < 0.05). 
Similarly, row totals suggest that variance reduction across 
the conditions of interest was greater for some sub-groups 
(i.e. sub-groups 3 and 8) than for others, while at least one 
sub-group (sub-group 6) seemed to show more within sub-group 
variance in condition 3 than in condition 1 (averaged across 
the six pull-scores in each case). One-tailed one-sample t-
tests with the six pull-scores as the unit of analysis 
revealed that sub-groups 3 (t(5) = 3.047, P < 0.05) and 8 (t(5) 
= 6.954, P < 0.001) each showed significant decreases in 
within sub-group variance from condition 1 to condition 3, 
while the changes in variance across these two conditions were 
insignificantly different from zero for all other sub-groups. 
Qualitative data 
Sub-group discussions in condition 2 of the present experiment 
were transcribed in full (see Appendix 8). In this sub-
section some attempt will be made to pr~cis or summarize the 
decision-making processes that occurred within each sub-group. 
Sub-group 1 began condition 2 with each sub-group member 
explaining how they had made their allocations in condition 1. 
Two subjects reported trying to give equal points to each 
recipient on each allocation (despite at least one of those 
subjects considering the possibility, advisability and/or the 
expectation of in-group preference) while the third subject 
reported adopting a random strategy, as "i t didn't seem to 
make any difference who you allocate what to anyway . . . because 
it doesn't apply to any of us and it doesn't invol ve any money 
anyway". A suggestion from the random allocator to make their 
"group" decisions by turn-taking was accepted fairly quickly 
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and all subsequent allocations followed the pattern of two 
maximally fair decisions followed by one random or arbitrary 
one. Thus, no attempt was made to reach a consensual 
"general" allocation strategy and the only "sub-group" norm 
which emerged was one of turn-taking. 
This interpretation is fully consistent with the available 
quantitative data (see especially Appendix 9, in which tables 
and graphs are provided of each subjects' allocations in each 
of the three conditions, organized by pull-scores and sub-
group memberships). In conditions 1 and 3 two subjects (66 
and 81) made maximally fair intergroup allocations and the 
third (40) made random intergroup allocations. In condition 
2 intergroup allocations were maximally fair for FAV on MJP, 
MD on MIP+MJP, MJP on FAV and MIP+MJP on MD, but were not 
maximally fair for F on FAVor FAV on F. This was clearly 
because on intergroup allocations involving matrix types 1 and 
2 the "fair" subjects made the "group" choices, while the 
"random" subject made the two matrix type 3 "group" choices 
(see Appendix 8). In condition 3 the two "fair" subjects (66 
and 81) again made maximally fair intergroup allocations 
throughout, while the third subject's (40) condition 3 
allocations are consistent with allocating randomly. 
Sub-group 2 began condition 2 with each of the subjects making 
suggestions for particular allocations. The male subj ect 
flitted between various strategies, such as fairness ("Even 
Stevens?"), randomness ("Haven't got a reason for it") and in-
group preference (" I feel a close affini ty to members of K") . 
He was also interested in the rationale for decisions that 
others made or suggested. After he asks "Why are we actually 
doing it like this?" it seems as though the tape-recorder was 
turned off, to be turned on again to general laughter. The 
subsequent decision-making suggests that some attempt was made 
during this hiatus to reach a consensus about how to make 
subsequent allocations, i.e. to develop one or more 
operational sub-group norms. These seem to have been (i) to 
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maximize in-group profit and/or in-group superiority (it is 
not clear what the norm was for deciding between these two 
options when they clashed, i.e. on matrix type 2) on 
intergroup allocations, (ii) to give equal points on 
allocations with two in-group recipients, and (iii) to make 
allocations involving two out-group recipients arbitrarily. 
Trouble arises when one of the females violates the main (i.e. 
intergroup) norm by making a "fair" allocation. The male asks 
for an explanation: "Hang on. Why didn't you just give them 
all to K ... How about keeping in the true spirit of ... fellow 
group members ... ". Perhaps she did not want to comply with 
the suggested sub-group norm(s) or perhaps she was trying to 
cover up for mistakenly violating it (or them), but the female 
concerned justifies her decision by claiming an affinity for 
the number 13. The main sub-group norm (if it indeed exists) 
is violated again later, again by a female making a seemingly 
arbitrary choice, and the male again objects ("I'm not being 
over-ruled"). If sub-group norms were decided it seems that 
at least one female member of the sub-group was not committed 
to them by the end of condition 2, but was instead responding 
randomly and/or arbitrarily. 
The allocations made by these sub-group members across the 
three conditions are again consistent with such an 
interpretation (see Appendix 9). Two subjects' (08 and 34) 
choices were much more similar to each other's in condition 3 
than in condition 1 on matrix type 1 and 3 intergroup 
allocations. That is, these subj ects responded differently to 
each other in condition 1 but by condition 3 were displaying 
maximal preference for FAV over both MJP and F (and 
correspondingly were showing no preference for MJP or F over 
FAV) . The third subject (24) did not conform to these 
strategies in condition 3. Indeed, an allocation made by this 
"random" subject was responsible for the condition 2 FAV on F 
score not reflecting the "sub-group" norm adhered to by the 
other two (see Appendices 8 and 9). This sub-group's 
allocations over the three conditions also suggests that no 
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sub-group norm at all was developed for intergroup allocations 
on matrix type 2, where maximum in-group (and joint) profit is 
opposed by maximum in-group superiority, i.e. each subject 
returned to whatever strategy they had individually employed 
in condition 1. 
Sub-group 3 began condition 2 by explaining their condition 1 
individual strategies in some detail. The male reported 
trying to give each member of each recipient-pair equal points 
("you don't really know any of them so, why not, especially if 
it was for money . .. when you hope they'd do the same for you") . 
Both females reported trying to obtain in-group superiority on 
intergroup decisions and each chose maximum joint (i.e. in-
group) profit on allocations involving two in-group members, 
but whereas one chose "fairness" on allocations involving two 
out-group members the other adopted a strategy of minimum out-
group profit. A set of sub-group norms quickly develops: (i) 
maximize in-group superiority on intergroup allocations 
wherever possible, (ii) on intergroup allocations where this 
is not possible (i.e. on oli presentations of matrix type 3), 
opt for "fairness" (where "fairness" also maximizes in-group 
profit and minimizes out-group profit, and additionally avoids 
in-group inferiority), (iii) minimize joint (i.e. out-group) 
profit on allocations involving two out-group members, with 
random or arbitrary allocation permissible where this is not 
possible (i.e. on matrix type 3), (iv) maximize joint (i.e. 
in-group) profit for in-group recipient pairs except where 
this means that one member would receive less than they would 
have were the point of maximum fairness selected (i. e. on 
matrix type 1). Commitment to these sub-group norms (and the 
task) is high, with the male (previously a "fair" man) at 
least as keen as the females to comply to them ("No, 7 and 1 ' s 
got a bigger difference") . 
This sub-groupls allocations across the three conditions is 
once again consistent with such an interpretation (see 
Appendix 9). For matrix types 1 and 3 a variety of responses 
" 
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is evident in condition 1 intergroup allocations. By 
condition 3, however, all the sub-group members act in exactly 
the same way as each other and as they did in condition 2, 
i.e. they maximally prefer FAV over both MJP and F (and 
therefore neither MJP nor F exert any pullover FAV). The 
only deviation from this comes during intergroup allocations 
involving matrix type 2. Two of the subjects (06 and 21) 
again act identically to each other and to the "sub-group" 
norm (i.e. maximally preferring MD over MIP+MJP and minimally 
preferring MIP+MJP over MD), but the third subject (35) acts 
slightly differently. This subject showed no preference for 
either MD over MIP+MJP or for MIP+MJP over MD in condition 1 
(and in fact opted for the point of maximal fairness for both 
condition 1 matrix type 2 intergroup allocations) and although 
he did move toward the sub-group norm by condition 3, he did 
not conform to it totally by maximally preferring MD over 
MIP+MJP. The reason for this cannot be ascertained. It is 
noteworthy however that he did choose the point of maximum in-
group profit and in-group superiority on the oli presentation 
of matrix type 2 (in line with the others and with the sub-
group norm) but did not maximize in-group superiority at the 
cost of in-group profit on the oli matrix presentation. 
Instead he chose the allocation which maximized in-group 
profit whilst ensuring in-group superiority (i.e. 12 points to 
the in-group member and 11 to the out-group member). Had he 
allocated any more points to the in-group member then he would 
not have achieved in-group superiority. Similarly, had he 
obtained any more in-group superiority then he would have 
sacrificed in-group profit. This is clearly in the "spirit" 
of the sub-group norm, but can perhaps be considered a 
somewhat more sophisticated modification of it. 
Sub-group 4 began condition 2 with one of its members assuming 
a leadership role and allocating (lesser) tasks to the other 
sub-group members. A procedural protocol was arranged so that 
each sub-group member took it in turns to make "collective" 
decisions. The rationales for individual decisions were vague 
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and sparse to begin with, although early allocations seemed to 
be based on choosing the allocation on or near the scale mid-
point ("we're actually visually averaging it as opposed to 
ari thmetically averaging it"), with the slight deviations 
being determined by the subjects' seating positions ("we're 
choosing them relative to our position ... with respect to the 
table"). After about 6 allocations the subjects began to go 
into some detail about how they had made their individual 
decisions in condition 1. The" leader" seemed to adopt 
fairness modified by slight in-group superiority on intergroup 
decisions, maximum joint (i.e. in-group) profit on in-group 
decisions, and fairness on out -group decisions. A second 
subject (who explicitly explained her individual strategy to 
the experimenter at the end of the experiment) allocated 
points so that the recipient of each pair with the higher code 
number got the lower points, regardless of whether the 
allocation was an intergroup or a same-group one (a strategy 
which incidentally would have resulted in in-group superiority 
on all intergroup allocations because of this subject's Group 
K membership and the relationship between category membership 
and individual code numbers). The third subject's individual 
strategy is difficult to ascertain. No explicit sub-group 
norms seemed to be established in condition 2, although there 
did seem to be increasing convergence on or compliance to the 
self -appointed leader's strategy (" Wha t do you think about 
that one?"; "Shall we go for the one .. . "). There was, 
however, little evidence of strong commitment to this "sub-
group norm". 
A glance at this sub-group's allocations across the conditions 
(see Appendix 9) confirms the absence of any efficacious sub-
group norms. In condition 3 each of the subjects chose quite 
different intergroup strategies, both to each other and, at 
least on matrix type 3, to their condition 1 strategies. 
Sub-group 5 began their condition 2 session by explaining 
their individual condition 1 strategies in response to the 
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early question, "What are we going to base the decision on?". 
The male seemed to have made arbitrary decisions, based on 
"The number 7". One female had the general strategy of giving 
in-group members high marks and out-group members low ones. 
The second female seemed to have used fairness. The subjects 
then discovered their shared minimal group membership and 
quickly adopted a general sub-group norm of in-group 
favouritism, despite one female being a little dubious ("This 
seems a bit petty doesn't it, just because somebody's not in 
your group gi ving them low marks") . "Supplementary" norms 
were generated and adopted as the need arose. In the end the 
sub-group norms, to which there appears to have been high 
corranitment, were: (i) maximum in-group superiority must be 
taken when available, (ii) when it is not (Le. on oli 
presentations of matrix type 3), choose "fairness" (which is 
also maximum in-group profit and minimum out-group profit, and 
additionally avoids in-group inferiority), (iii) maximize 
joint (i.e. in-group) profit on in-group allocations, where 
possible, (iv) where no position on in-group allocations 
maximizes joint (i.e. in-group profit) choose "fairness", (v) 
on out-group allocations minimize joint (Le. out-group) 
profit, and (vi) where this is not possible choose "fairness". 
Looking at this sub-group' s allocations across the three 
conditions (see Appendix 9) it becomes clear that two of the 
subjects {52 and as} were highly influenced by the sub-group 
norms. In the third condition these subjects' responses are 
identical to each other and to the condition 2 allocations 
{Le. the sub-group norms}, even though their condition 1 
responses were quite divergent, especially on matrix type 2 
intergroup allocations (i.e. the pulls of MD on MIP+MJP and 
MIP+MJP on MD). As in the third sub-group, however, one 
subject's (SO) responses are more problematic. This subject's 
condition 3 intergroup allocations were substantially 
different to the allocations made by the other subjects and 
furthermore bore no stable relation to her condition 1 
responses. It is impossible to ascertain why this is 80, and 
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almost as difficult to guess. It can be noted, however, that 
after the first four of her condition 3 allocations this 
subject's responses all fall within one place of the position 
of maximum fairness, across all matrix types and recipient-
patterns. Whether this reflects an explicit rejection of the 
sub-group norms in favour of an individually preferred one of 
fairness, or is simply the result of the subject losing 
interest in the task generally and adopting a "quick and easy" 
response pattern in order finish the experiment as soon as 
possible cannot be determined. 
Sub-group 6 had only two members. In condition 2 the male 
admitted straight away that the whole task "seems totally 
meaningless" to him (" This is absolutely nonsensical"). There 
developed an element of turn-taking in condition 2, but the 
male made the majority of decisions, always arbitrarily. The 
female showed some inclination to opt for "fairness", almost 
by default, but became increasingly happy to divert from it 
and emulate the male's arbitrariness ("I think we should have 
tha t one because it's my birthday"). Thus the only "sub-group 
norm" that developed was one of randomness, and commitment to 
the task as a whole was low. 
This sub-group's responses across the three conditions (see 
Appendix 9) is consistent with an interpretation that both 
subjects were responding more or less arbitrarily throughout 
the experiment. 
Sub-group 7 attempted from the start of condition 2 to reach 
consensus for any decision that was made ("Yes? Everyone?"). 
Although they did not make their individual allocation 
decisions in condition 1 known to each other, they did tell 
the experimenter after the whole experimental session was 
over. One subject (58) simply strove to obtain more points 
for in-group members than for out-group members. A second 
(79) had the same aim, but modified it by trying to give more 
points to those with code numbers close to her own. The third 
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(96) allocated randomly at first but developed a preference to 
give more points to people with similar code numbers to his 
own. (It is worth remembering that adopting a strategy of 
giving more points to people with code numbers similar to 
one's own would result in in-group preference on intergroup 
allocations.) In condition 2 the subjects in Sub-group 7 
began by taking it in turns to make suggestions which were 
then approved by the others before the selections were finally 
made ("So equal?"). Following an the intergroup allocation 
during which the in-group was favoured they each revealed 
their minimal group memberships and discovered their shared 
minimal group membership. Although no sub-group norms were 
made explicit it is clear that they developed ("We've elected 
this strategy that we're sticking to rigidly now", "We have. 
Yes. I know"). These norms were, roughly, (i) wherever 
possible maximize in-group superiority, (ii) on all other 
occasions, choose maximum "fairness". Commitment to the first 
norm was high, but one subject seemed unhappy that the second 
norm was not partisan enough ("what we should probably have 
gone ... for isn't two 13s ... It's probably 8 and the 3, or the 
7 and the 1 .. . as the two aggregate points are lower than 
that") . The subjects in this sub-group also told the 
experimenter their condition 3 strategies. The subject (96) 
who had employed randomness then a code number strategy in 
condition 1 pursued a condition 3 strategy of allocating more 
to the in-group than to the out-group. The subject (79) who 
had modified in-group bias with a code-number strategy in 
condition 1 abandoned that modification in condition 3, 
following instead the simple sub-group norm of in-group bias. 
And the subject (58) who had employed simple in-group bias in 
condition 1 adopted a strategy of minimizing out-group profit 
where possible in condition 3 (which has an outcome identical 
to one resulting from a strategy of maximizing in-group 
superiority on the Tajfel matrix types used in this study). 
These subjects' responses over the three conditions (see 
Appendix 9) supports this interpretation, but perhaps not as 
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strongly as might be expected. On intergroup allocations 
involving matrix type 3 (i.e. FAVon F and F on FAV) all three 
subjects' responses are nearly identical to each other and to 
the condition 2 allocations, despite wide divergence across 
subjects in their equivalent condition 1 allocations. 
Similarly, on intergroup allocations involving matrix type 1 
(FAV on MJP and MJP on FAV) two of the subjects (58 and 79) 
make condition 3 choices identical to each other and to the 
condition 2 choices, despite their condition 1 responses being 
different to each other and to the condition 2 choices. The 
third subject's (96) choices on these matrices are slightly 
different in as much as his condition 3 FAV on MJP score was 
closer to his equivalent condition 1 score than to the group 
norm/others' FAV on MJP scores, and his condition 3 MJP on FAV 
score is less than both his condition 1 MJP on FAV score and 
the group norm/others' MJP on FAV scores (the latter two of 
which are identical), although these differences are slight. 
As with sub-groups 3 and 5 above, however, the main 
interpretive problems are caused by responses on matrix type 
2 (MD on MIP+MJP and MIP+MJP on MD). Here the subj ects' 
condi tion 3 scores bear no discernable relation to ei ther 
their condition 1 scores or to the "sub-group norm"/condition 
2 scores. By "breaking down" the two relevant pull-scores 
into their constituent parts it becomes clear that in 
condition 3 the three subjects made near-identical allocations 
on the oli presentation of matrix type 2. Two subjects chose 
19/25 (i.e. the point of maximum in-group profit and 
superiority, and the same allocation as was chosen in the 
group condition), and the third (96) chose 18/23 (i.e. one 
scale-place away from this point). The difference between the 
subjects' pull-scores from matrix-type 2 therefore came 
predominantly from their different choices on the i/o 
presentation of this matrix. One subj ect (96) chose the point 
of maximum difference, which was the point "collectively" 
chosen in condition 2. Another (subject 79) chose the 
opposite end of the scale, i.e. the point of maximum in-group 
(and joint) profit. The third subject (58) chose 12/11, i.e. 
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the point of maximum in-group profit possible whilst 
simultaneously achieving in-group superiority. None of the 
subjects' i/o matrix 2 choices in condition 3 were the same as 
the choices those subjects made in condition 1. As suggested 
in relation to sub-group 3 above, this is consistent with an 
interpretation that all three subjects were attempting to 
follow a strategy of in-group favouritism (i.e. the sub-group 
norm), but were unclear as to the appropriate form that such 
in-group favouritism should take on i/o presentations of 
matrix type 2 (e.g. MD, MIP, or MIP whilst ensuring MD). It 
is worth mentioning that the equivalent choice in condition 2 
was the one which generated the greatest amount of in-group 
discussion as to the appropriate allocation ("Are we going for 
difference or greater number?" - see Appendix 8), although it 
should additionally be noted that this was also the first 
allocation after the subjects' made their minimal category 
memberships known to each other. 
Sub-group 8 began condition 2 with each of the subjects 
revealing their minimal group memberships, although they do 
not explicitly tell each other how they had made their 
individual allocations in condition 1. This sub-group made 
herculean efforts to reach consensus on each decision although 
a consensual strategy proved hard to come by, largely because 
the subjects seemed to misunderstand what each other wanted to 
do. With time, experience and effort, though, a main 
intergroup allocation norm of maximum in-group profit emerges 
("the maximum number of K, it doesn't matter if we give them 
a higher number, does it ... ' cos wha tever they get doesn't 
affect us so all we're interested in is maximizing our own"; 
"The whole point is to maximize ... our group scores, isn't 
it ... ?" "Yeah"). 
Once again this interpretation is corroborated by looking at 
the subjects' 
Appendix 9) . 
allocations over all three conditions {see 
In condition 3 subjects unanimously opted for a 
strategy of MIP on matrix types 2 and 3, just as they had in 
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condition 2, despite wide variation in their previous 
individual (i.e. condition 1) allocations. That is, in 
condition 3, as in condition 2, pulls of MD on MIP+MJP and F 
on FAV were zero and pulls of MIP+MJP on MD and FAV on F were 
maximal. This time the fly in the interpretive ointment is 
found for matrix-type 1 allocations. Two of the subjects (14 
and 48) make identical allocations to each other but not to 
the equivalent condition 2 choice. The reason for this 
difference, however, is that the "final" sub-group norm had 
not been established by the time the relevant type 1 matrices 
were completed in condition 2 (they were completed whilst the 
female was pushing for a "compromise" sub-group norm of 
fairness). These subjects' condition 3 allocations are, in 
fact, consistent with the "final" sub-group norm (of maximum 
in-group profit), even though the condition 2 allocation was 
not! The reason for the third subject's (48) deviation from 
this norm is not clear, although it may be relevant that this 
deviation stems from a single "fair" allocation on a i/o 
presentation of a type 1 matrix (the o/i presentation obtained 
maximum in-group profit, as did all the other intergroup 
allocations) and that this was the very first allocation 
subject 48 made during condition 3. 
To summarize the qualitative data, four sub-groups developed 
and tended to adhere to strong primary sub-group norms, three 
of which were ethnocentric (sub-groups 3, 5 and 7), while the 
fourth was one of maximum in-group profit (sub-group 8). A 
fifth sub-group (2) may have developed a primary sub-group 
norm of in-group preference, but if so commitment to the norm 
was weak. A sixth sub-group (6) may have developed a Single 
"in-group norm" of arbitrariness. The remaining two sub-
groups (1 and 4) developed no sub-group norms. 
It should be stressed that where sub-groups developed and 
adhered to norms, those norms operated at two levels. The 
primary norms just referred to can be thought of as general 
(i.e. superordinate) norms, reflecting the "overall stance" 
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sub-groups wanted to take in the minimal group situation as a 
whole (e.g. discriminatory, profiteering). In particular 
situations, however, several sub-groups employed a number of 
different specific norms, so that, for example, different 
norms would be activated for different recipient patterns and 
for different matrix types. Often these specific norms were 
simply subordinate (i.e. lower-level) manifestations of the 
sub-groups' primary (higher-level) superordinate norms: merely 
dictating how the general norms should be best applied in 
various particular circumstances. Sometimes, however, these 
specific norms were supplementary I in the sense that the 
general norm did not apply (made no sense, could not be 
followed) in particular circumstances, and so additional 
specific norms were sometimes developed to guide group 
behaviour in such situations. Employing these terms it is 
clear that it has been argued above that several sub-groups 
developed and adhered to general norms I but variations in 
these sub-group members' individual allocation decisions arose 
because of those members' disagreement or confusion about, or 
rejection of, subordinate or supplementary specific norms. 
DISCUSSION 
Condition 1 of the present study replicated the "typical" 
minimal group paradigm result of significant sample-level in-
group favouritism and fairness across groups, thus supporting 
hypotheses H1 and H2. Sample-level in-group favouritism (as 
indicated by a composite measure of FAV on MJP, MD on MIP+MJP 
and FAV on F) polarized from condition 1 to condition 3, but 
sample-level fairness across groups (i.e. F on FAV) 
depolarized. Thus hypothesis H6 received support but 
hypothesis H7 did not. The pull score of MIP+MJP on MD also 
polarized from condition 1 to condition 3. Intergroup 
behaviour within sub-groups did not polarize from condition 1 
to condition 3, either "overall" or when particular intergroup 
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strategies were considered separately. Thus no support was 
obtained for hypotheses H4 or HS. Similarly, variance of 
intergroup behaviour within sub-groups was not significantly 
less in condition 3 than in condition 1, so support was not 
found for hypothesis H3. 
The first main result of the present study is clearly that 
intragroup communication resulted in greater sample mean in-
group favouritism and less sample mean fairness across groups 
than intergroup behaviour without intragroup communication. 
Thus, while mere social categorization may be sufficient to 
promote intergroup discrimination, social categorization 
accompanied by intragroup communication appears to exacerbate 
that intergroup discrimination, whilst simultaneously 
decreasing intergroup fairness. This supports generalization 
of social identity theory's "sufficiency condition" beyond the 
minimal group paradigm: it appears that social categorization 
per se promotes intergroup discrimination, and the stronger or 
more salient that categorization, brought about here by 
intragroup communication, the stronger the subsequent 
discrimination in favour of the in-group. 
The second main result obtained in the present study is that 
intra sub-group behaviour was not less variable in condition 
3 than in condition 1. This suggests that contrary to 
expectations intragroup communication did not lead to the 
development of and adherence to in-group norms. 
In direct opposition to these conclusions it is possible to 
argue that the results of the present study are best 
understood in terms of the development of in-group norms. 
Such an argument consists of three main claims. First, that 
no current theory of minimal group behaviour can account for 
the variety of behaviour typically found in the minimal group 
paradigm. Second, that social category or group membership 
can only serve as an explanatory (and predictive) variable for 
behaviour when one or more norms exist Which are associated 
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with that group membership. Third, that the best social 
psychological explanation which can be given for behaviour 
subsequent to intragroup interaction is one which considers 
whether or not that behaviour conforms to in-group norms 
determined or subscribed to during that interaction. 
Condition 1 of the present study yielded the typical minimal 
group paradigm result of significant sample mean in-group 
favouritism. As in previous studies, however, not all 
subjects discriminated following social categorization. 
Further, some subjects not only did not discriminate, they 
actively pursued particular non-discriminatory strategies such 
as fairness, randomness, arbitrariness, strategies based on 
recipients' code numbers, etc .. No current theory of minimal 
group behaviour can account for such variety of behaviour, 
still less predict which particular subj ects will pursue which 
particular allocation strategies following social 
categorization. This is because all current theories of 
minimal group behaviour posit single explanations for that 
behaviour. Thus, any non-predicted behaviour has to be 
"explained away" by such theories as exceptional cases. 
To take social identity theory as an example, this theory 
explains minimal group behaviour by hypothesizing that mere 
social categorization results in subjects identifying with 
their imposed "in-groups" which they then need to perceive as 
positively distinct from relevant "out-groups" in order to 
serve social identity and self-esteem needs. Thus, subjects 
are held to engage in intergroup discrimination in order to 
bring about such perceptions of in-group superiority. That 
is, mean in-group favouritism in the minimal group paradigm is 
claimed to result from individuals engaging in intergroup 
discrimination following mere social categorization in order 
to serve individual self-esteem needs. Social identity theory 
therefore has to "explain away" any instances of individuals 
not engaging in in-group favouritism following mere social 
categorization. It does this by claiming that those who do 
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not discriminate fail to do so either because they do not 
identify with their imposed in-group and/or because they serve 
their self-esteem needs in other ways (e.g. through salient 
personal identity or alternative salient social identities). 
This is unsatisfactory because any and all non-discriminatory 
behaviour following social categorization can be "explained 
away" in such a fashion (making social identity theory both 
rather weak as a predicti ve theory and potentially 
unfalsifiable see Abrams, 1992: 62). It is also 
unsatisfactory because the theory can offer no explanation for 
non-discriminatory strategic behaviour following social 
categorization (e.g. fairness).5 
The sheer variety of behaviours resulting from mere social 
categorization in the minimal group paradigm suggests that 
something other than the social categorization itself is 
needed to give a full and satisfactory explanation of minimal 
group behaviour. Unless and until that "something else" can 
be specified, minimal group behaviour must be considered to be 
largely determined by "individual differences" within the 
subject population. 
The second strand of the argument being presented here is that 
social category or group membership can only serve as an 
explanatory (and predictive) variable for behaviour when one 
or more norms have been identified which are associated with 
that group membership. No such norms are associated with 
minimal group membership because of the strict procedural 
criteria applied within the minimal group paradigm. Minimal 
groups have no history and so new members of those groups 
cannot refer to previously established in-group norms. Also, 
because no intragroup communication is allowed in the minimal 
group paradigm, minimal group members cannot establish in-
group norms themselves. Upon finding themselves in the 
minimal group paradigm subjects can, if they feel so inclined, 
5 Similar remarks can be directed toward other posited 
explanations of minimal group behaviour (see below) . 
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infer what appropriate in-group behaviour might be, perhaps on 
the basis of "clues" from the experimenter or the experimental 
situation, or perhaps on the basis of norms associated with 
other groups subjects are members of. Alternatively subjects 
can act in accordance with personal norms or personally 
subscribed to ideologies. Alternatively again, subjects can 
simply dismiss the task as pointless and adopt random or 
arbitrary behavioural guidelines. 
Intragroup interaction makes the development of in-group norms 
possible. Such norms are potentially functional in that they 
can either provide guidelines for appropriate behaviour and/or 
they can validate previously adopted individual behaviour as 
appropriate. Each of these functions are likely to be 
attractive to subjects in the unfamiliar situation of the 
minimal group paradigm. If subjects are unclear about what 
appropriate behaviour might be within the minimal group 
paradigm then one option open to them in condition 2 of the 
present study is to look to others in an identical situation 
for guidance and/or verification. When this occurs then in-
group norms may develop. 
The development of in-group norms is clearly not inevitable 
during intragroup interaction, however. First, if people 
believe that they already know how to behave appropriately 
then they will have no need to look to others for guidance or 
verification (although an awareness that other group members 
are following alternative strategies may make such people 
examine whether the reasons for their own strategies are 
legitimate). Second, if no suggested behaviour seems any more 
appropriate than any other then there will be little 
motivation to modify behaviour already adopted. Third, if a 
variety of behaviours different to one's own are suggested as 
superior to one's own, but no reasons exist to believe that 
they actually are superior (e . g . when none of the other 
suggestions come to be adopted by others in similar 
circumstances), then again there will be no reason to adopt 
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alternative strategies in preference to one's own. In 
summary, if one is given no reason to suppose that one's own 
behaviour is less appropriate than available alternatives then 
one will not feel the need to turn to others for guidance or 
for verification of one's own behaviour, and in-group norms 
will not develop. 
In the present study subjects in condition 2 had already made 
a series of individual allocation decisions. If those 
subjects decided upon a strategy that seemed appropriate to 
the situation, and were not presented with reasons to think 
that alternative strategies were more appropriate, then the 
subjects would feel no compunction to develop or adhere to in-
group norms. In sub-group I, for example, two subjects had 
individually decided that fairness was an appropriate strategy 
but the third had decided that randomness was appropriate (in 
the absence of any reason to adopt a more specific strategy) . 
The fair subjects provided the random subject with no reason 
to believe her strategy inappropriate and the random subject 
provided the fair subjects with no reason to think their 
strategy inappropriate. (The fair subj ects did however verify 
each other's strategy as appropriate.) Adopting a condition 
2 allocation strategy of turn-taking meant that each subject 
could pursue her own individually preferred strategy and no 
in-group norm was necessary or desirable. A similar analYSis 
can be made with respect to sub-group 4. 
An implication of such reasoning is that in-group norms would 
probably have been more commonly adopted in the present study 
had subjects not made a series of individual decisions before 
being placed in the sub-group situation. A future study might 
sensibly investigate this. 
When people are unsure what constitutes appropriate behaviour 
there are two main methods by which they can be convinced that 
a particular behaviour is appropriate. They can be presented 
with persuasive (rational or rhetorical) arguments and/or they 
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can be presented with evidence that others in similar 
circumstances are more or less consensually behaving in a 
particular manner. In sub-group 3, for example, the male 
subject had adopted a fairness strategy in condition 1 but 
discovered in condition 2 that each of his fellow sub-group 
members had adopted strategies of in-group preference. This 
subject clearly had no specific commitment to his previous 
strategy ("you don't know any of them so why not?") and in the 
face of others in a similar situation to himself behaving in 
a consistent manner he brought his behaviour into line with 
their's, and a sub-group norm of in-group preference 
developed. A similar analysis can be given with respect to 
sub-group 7. 6 
A defining characteristic of the minimal group paradigm is 
minimal group membership. It is to be expected that 
strategies which take such membership into account would be 
more persuasive (i.e. would seem more appropriate) than 
strategies which do not, particularly if subjects discover 
that others who have adopted group-relevant strategies are in 
the same minimal group as themselves. This is illustrated by 
the development of an in-group norm for sub-group 5. The 
members of this sub-group each employed different condition 1 
(i.e. individual) strategies: one random, one (probably) fair, 
and one in-group preferential. Upon discovering in condition 
2 both that different individual strategies had been employed 
by other in-group members and that all three subjects shared 
the same minimal group membership it was the group-relevant 
(i.e. in-group preferential) strategy which became adopted as 
, It can also be argued that the female member of sub-
group 6 was persuaded by the male member that arbitrariness 
was the most appropriate behaviour in the minimal group 
situation and that an in-group norm of arbitrariness 
developed. Similarly, it can be argued that the other members 
of sub-group 2 (particularly the male member) failed to 
convince the third member that in-group favouritism was the 
most appropriate strategy in the situation and that this was 
the reason for this sub-group's failure to develop a 
consensual in-group norm. 
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the sub-group norm. Similarly, when the members of sub-group 
8 discovered that they shared minimal group membership 
strenuous efforts were made to adopt behaviour which took 
account of that shared minimal group membership, in this case 
maximum in-group profit. Again, in sub-group 7 in-group 
preference became adopted as the main in-group norm, despite 
the fact that 2 of the three sub-group members had adopted 
similar non group-related allocation strategies in condition 
1 (i.e. ones based on subjects' unique code numbers) . 
To summarize the arguments being made with respect to the 
development of in-group norms, it is claimed that intragroup 
communication will lead to the development of in-group norms 
to the extent that group members feel a need for guidance 
toward or verification of appropriate behaviour. Such a need 
will be inversely proportional to members' beliefs that they 
have already discovered appropriate behaviour. Discovering 
that other group members have adopted behaviour dissimilar to 
their own may cause group members to re-examine the 
appropriateness of their own behaviour, but unless reasons are 
provided to make them believe that such alternatives actually 
are more appropriate they will not modify or abandon their own 
preferred strategies. Strategies will tend to be deemed 
appropriate to the extent that they are adopted by people in 
similar circumstances and to the extent that they take shared 
salient characteristics into account. Thus, discovering that 
others in the same situation as oneself have adopted 
behaviours similar to one I s own is likely to lead to the 
development of a group norm reflecting those similarities. 
Much of this is speculative. No doubt a more thorough account 
can and should be developed of the conditions in which in-
group norms will or will not arise and/or be adhered to. 
Similarly, a more rigorous account needs to be developed to 
explain and predict the content of in-group norms which do 
develop. Future research could attempt to do both of these 
things. The important point here is that in-group norms did 
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develop for some sub-groups and that the behaviour of those 
sub-groups (i.e. in condition 2) is best understood in terms 
of those norms, rather than in terms of (awareness of) sub-
group or minimal group membership per se. 7 When in-group 
norms did not develop, sub-group (i.e. condition 2) behaviour 
is best understood in terms of the sub-group members' 
individual (i.e. condition 1) allocation strategies and the 
decision-making processes employed in condition 2 (e.g. turn-
taking), again rather than in terms of (awareness of) sub-
group or minimal group membership per se. 
Once in-group norms have been established they can be used by 
group members even when acting alone. Whether or not they are 
used will depend on many things, including the salience of in-
group membership, the appropriateness of the in-group norms to 
the current situation, the compatibility of those norms with 
personally desired behaviours or outcomes, etc.. Few of these 
considerations are relevant in the present study, however, and 
by and large we should expect condition 3 behaviour to reflect 
in-group norms when such norms have been adopted. And, by and 
large, it does. Even when it does not, a reasonable 
explanation can usually be provided for why it does not (e.g., 
because of confusion as to how best to implement a primary in-
group norm in particular circumstances, see the qualitative 
analysis in the results section above). When in-group norms 
were not developed by sub-groups in condition 2, the condition 
3 behaviour of those sub-groups' members is best understood in 
terms of their individually adopted condition 1 strategies. 
Because intragroup interaction does not inevitably lead to the 
development of or adherence to in-group norms the lack of a 
7 An exception is provided by sub-group 8's minimal FAV 
on MJP score. Had this group been pursuing its strategy of 
maximum in-group profit this score should have been maximal. 
This exception is accounted for when it is realised that the 
relevant condition 2 allocations were made before the sub-
group norm was e~tablished (see the qualitative analYSis in 
the results sect10n above) . 
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decrease in behavioural variability within sub-groups from 
condition 1 to condition 3 does not negate an explanation of 
the present study's results in terms of in-group norms. A 
number of sub-groups did not develop in-group norms, at least 
one sub-group appeared to develop an in-group norm of 
arbitrariness, some primary in-group norms were sufficiently 
vague to allow a variety of norm-consistent behaviours in 
specific situations, and the development of in-group norms 
does not (usually) preclude the possibility of individual 
deviations from those norms. All of these considerations mean 
that the lack of a general decrease in behavioural variability 
within sub-groups across conditions 1 and 3 was to be 
expected. If a future study encouraged development of and 
adherence to non-random in-group norms then such a general 
decrease in behavioural variation within sub-groups would be 
expected. Also, if those norms were non-discriminatory then 
it would be predicted that condition 3 behaviour would be less 
discriminatory than condition 1 behaviour, as well as being 
more homogeneous. 
The argument being developed here also implies that in-group 
norm formation will not reliably result in polarization of 
within sub-group behaviour. In-group norms may reflect 
individual behaviour already consensually adopted by in-group 
members, or they may preclude the use of previously adopted 
individual strategies. In either case the strategies 
considered will not polarize. Polarization will also not be 
expected when no in-group norm formation takes place. 
Explaining subjects' condition 3 behaviour in terms of 
adherence or non-adherence to in-group norms is clearly a 
social psychological explanation. The claim is that in 
certain circumstances in-group members' behaviour will conform 
to norms associated with the in-groups they are members of. 
Knowledge of those norms allows (in certain circumstances) 
prediction of group members' behaviour. Particularly, 
knowledge of in-group norms (and knowledge that group members 
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are committed to those norms) allows explanation and 
prediction of uniformities of (group and) intergroup 
behaviour, an ability identified by Tajfel "the aim of a 
theory of intergroup behaviour" (Tajfel, 1981a: 46, emphasis 
added). Such an account is clearly non-reductionist in that 
it relies on considering groups as "entities in their own 
right" (as opposed to considering them as mere aggregates of 
individuals), with "group-level" norms associated with them 
which mayor may not accord with the personal norms of in-
group members. 
It might reasonably be argued that the normative explanation 
being developed here is unacceptably post-hoc. The main claim 
being made in this chapter is that (awareness of) group 
membership can only serve as an explanatory and predictive 
variable when at least one norm can be identified which is 
associated with the group membership of interest. Such norm 
identification could not occur in advance in the present 
study, either for the minimal groups or for the sub-groups 
comprising of members of previously minimal groups. This was 
for the simple reason that such norms did not exist in advance 
of the present study. Because minimal group members are not 
offered the opportunity of generating or adopting common in-
group norms, no satisfactory social psychological explanation 
of their behaviour can be offered at all. Similarly, because 
in the present study sub-groups had to generate their own in-
group norms (as opposed to accepting previously established 
ones), explanation of sub-group members' behaviour had to be 
post-hoc. 
Normative explanations are not necessarily post-hoc, however. 
Where shared norms of group behaviour can be identified it is 
possible to predict that group behaviour will (in some 
circumstances) conform to such norms. If, for example, 
minimal groups are comprised of people who all subscribe to a 
particular salient ideology (e.g. egalitarianism) then it is 
possible to predict that their minimal group behaviour would 
conform to such ideological norms. 
were then permitted intragroup 
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Further, if such people 
communication it can be 
predicted that the in-group norms would be solidified and more 
consistently adhered to. This suggests that the best way of 
predicting the behaviour of group members (as group members) 
is to identify (or manufacture) the norms, stereotypes, or 
social representations associated with in-group membership. 
Put like this the present argument seems perhaps a little less 
contentious. 
It should also be acknowledged that although it was not done, 
it would have been perfectly possible to predict with an 
impressive degree of accuracy the condition 3 behaviour of 
subjects in the present study given information about (i) 
their behaviour in condition 1,8 (ii) whether or not in-group 
norms were established in condition 2, and, if so, (iii) what 
they were. 9 Such prediction would not be post-hoc if done 
before the results of the third condition were known. 
Importantly, using such a method it would have been possible 
to predict both mean behaviour for particular sub-groups and 
the behaviour of particular sub-group members, as well as mean 
behaviour for the sample overall. This is in stark contrast 
to the seemingly more parsimonious and a priori explanation 
offered by social identity theory. 
Before reaching conclusions from the present study the 
normative argument being developed should be more explicitly 
compared against other potential explanations of the present 
study's results, such as provided by social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), generic norm theory (Branthwaite et 
al., 1979), equity theory (Ng, 1986), the behavioural 
8 This information would be needed to predict the 
behaviour of subjects in sub-groups in which no in-group norms 
were adopted, i.e. for which no social psychological 
explanation could be offered. 
9 Note that the actual behaviour in condition 2 need not 
be known (and might actually be misleading) . 
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interaction model (Rabbie et al. , 1989) , intergroup 
accentuation theory (Doise & Sinclair, 1973) , self-
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), or the demand 
characteristics explanation (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). To do this 
it is necessary to be clear about what is and what is not 
being argued. It is not being argued that the normative 
account being developed can explain minimal group behaviour. 
Nor are any strong claims being made about when norms will 
arise or be adhered to. What is being claimed is that no 
satisfactory social psychological explanation can be offered 
for minimal group behaviour, 
psychological explanation of 
and that any genuine social 
group behaviour has to be 
restricted to instances in which group norms exist or are 
developed. 
In this thesis it has now been repeated argued, and 
demonstrated, that social categorization (accompanied by 
recognition that one is a member of one group but not of 
another) is not sufficient to promote intergroup 
discrimination. In the study reported in this chapter, as 
wi th the studies reported in the two preceding chapters, 
social categorization was followed by subjects employing a 
variety of allocation strategies, both across individuals and 
across allocations for the same individuals. None of the 
present explanations of minimal group behaviour, relying as 
they do on single explanatory variables, can provide 
satisfactory accounts of such diversity. In the present study 
it has also been seen that even when social categorization is 
accompanied by intragroup communication, a variety of 
indi vidual and sub-group behaviours are still adopted by 
subjects. Thus, explanations of such behaviour still cannot 
be given in terms of social categorization per se, or in terms 
of social categorization plus the mere fact of intragroup 
communication. It cannot be feasibly argued, for example, 
that intragroup communication merely makes more salient the 
single explanatory variable each of the above accounts relies 
upon, e.g. social identity contingent self-esteem, generic 
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norms, expected in-group favouritism on the part of out-group 
members, greater positive interdependence with in-group than 
with out-group members, in-group membership in a multi-group 
context, in-group prototypes, or demand characteristics. Such 
a move would still require the "explaining away" of much if 
not most of the behaviour exhibited by subjects in conditions 
2 and 3. 10 
Neither is it the case that explanations of group 
polarization, such as provided by persuasive arguments theory 
(Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978) or social comparison theory (Myers 
& Lamm, 1976), are sufficient to explain the results of the 
present study. Al though each of these theories have something 
to say about when and why group norms will develop and be 
adhered to, and about what the content of such norms will be, 
each are explicitly explanations of group polarization, and it 
is claimed (and found) here that intragroup communication is 
not sufficient to provoke such polarization. Thus, as with 
the explanations provided by theories of minimal group 
behaviour, much if not most of the present study's results 
must be "explained away" by theories of group polarization. 
The strongest alternative to a normative account of the 
present study's findings comes from Turner's (1981) referent 
informational influence model which (i) combines aspects of 
both normative and informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955), and (ii) provides the basis for Turner's development of 
Tajfel's social identity theory which resulted in self-
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Referent 
informational influence is held by Turner (1981: 108) to take 
place in three stages:-
10 Although such variables were not explicitly examined 
in the content analysis conducted on sub-group members' 
decision making processes in condition 2, a brief examination 
of the transcripts of those processes (see Appendix 9) reveals 
that concern for such variables was far from being universal. 
This again this severely calls into question explanatory 
accounts simply in terms of such variables. 
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1 . the individual def ines himself as a member of a 
distinct social category; 
2. the individual forms or learns the stereotypic norms 
of that category. He or she ascertains that certain 
ways of behaving are criterial attributes of 
category membership. Certain appropriate, expected 
or desirable behaviours are used to define the 
category as different from other categories; 
3. the individual assigns these norms to himself in the 
same way that he assigns other stereotypic 
characteristics of the category to himself when his 
category membership becomes psychologically salient. 
Thus his behaviour becomes more normative 
(conformist) as his category membership becomes 
salient. 
The normative account being developed here has considerable 
similarities to referent informational influence, and so the 
two need not been seen, in general, to be in competition. 
There are differences between the two, however, only the main 
one of which will be dealt with here (but see also Chapter 8) . 
The referent informational influence model sees in-group norms 
as developing via in-group members conforming to in-group 
prototypes whose main characteristic is that they maximize or 
reflect a ratio of similarities between in-group members and 
differences between in-group members and out-group members: 
norms are prototypical to the extent that they "are used to 
define the category as different from other categories". The 
normative account being developed here, however, explicitly 
rejects that (i) in-group norms are necessarily developed and 
adhered to via a process of reflecting or accentuating within-
group similarities and between-group differences, and (ii) 
that accentuating within-group similarities and between-group 
differences is a necessary function of in-group norms. That 
is, although some norms are clearly "intergroup", both in 
origin and focus, not all are. It is quite possible, and 
indeed common, for groups to develop norms which simply 
reflect in-group characteristics, serve in-group needs, and 
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prescribe in-group behaviour (broadly conceived), with no 
other group, conceived as a group, necessarily involved.ll 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that despite the fact 
that the "main" results of the present study seem at first 
glance to support a social identity theory explanation of 
minimal group behaviour, and also to support the 
generalization of that theory beyond the minimal group 
paradigm, the best interpretation of the present study IS 
results is a normative one. Although complex and largely (in 
the present study) post-hoc, such an explanation is genuinely 
social psychological in that it can potentially predict and 
explain uniformities (and variations) of group and intergroup 
behaviour at both the group and the group member levels of 
analysis. Explanations in terms of social categorization per 
se cannot do this, relying as they do on universal 
individualistic motivational accounts. At best such accounts 
can only explain (often barely representative) mean behaviour 
and must "explain away" all deviations from such behaviour. 
A second conclusion has to be that much more work needs to be 
done to specify when group norms will or will not be adopted 
and adhered to, and what the content of those norms will be 
when they are. This point is returned to in Chapter 8, where 
it is suggested that Moscovici' s social representations theory 
(e.g. Farr & Moscovici, 1984) and Turner's referent 
11 An example is offered by the primary in-group norm for 
sub-group 8: maximum in-group profit without regard to the 
consequences of this for (i) out-group profit or loss, or (ii) 
in-group distinctiveness from the out-group - "i t doesn't 
matter if we give them a higher nwnber, does it ... 'cos 
whatever they get doesn't affect us so all we're interested in 
is maximizing our own". 
215 
informational influence model (e.g. Turner, 1981) will be of 
particular use when addressing such issues. 
Central to the normative explanation developed here is the 
claim that group behaviour is better explained and predicted 
by group norms than by the individual social identity 
contingent self-esteem needs of in-group members (or by any 
other postulated universal individual motivation) . 
Ironically, many social identity theorists are themselves now 
coming to doubt this motivational aspect of social identity 
theory (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Nevertheless, in the next 
chapter it will be argued that social identity theory's self-
esteem hypothesis has been widely misunderstood and has never 
been adequately tested. Before a normative explanation of 
intergroup behaviour can be properly pitted against social 
identity theory'S self-esteem hypothesis it is critical that 
the clearest and most persuasive form of that hypothesis 
should be identified. Additionally, in a later chapter it 
will be argued that even the best form of the self-esteem 
hypothesis fails to do full justice to Tajfel's theoretical 
explanation of the motivation for particular forms of group 
and intergroup behaviour. Finally, it will be argued that the 
normative account being developed here is consistent with 
Tajfel's "intended" account of motivation within social 
identity theory. 
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CHAPTER 5; ST(]DY 4 - THE NATURE OF SELF-ESTEEM 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The study reported in this chapter employed four different 
measures of self-esteem. The first was a "general trait" 
measure (i.e. self-esteem from all aspects of self over time) . 
The second was a "general state" measure (i. e. self -esteem 
from all aspects of self at a particular moment). The third 
was a "specific trait" measure (i.e. self-esteem derived from 
a subject's national group over time). The fourth was a 
"specific state" measure (i.e. self-esteem derived from a 
subject's national group at a particular moment). In 
addition, a "general state" in-group evaluation measure was 
employed (i.e. measuring evaluation of a subject's national 
group at a particular moment) . 
An argument is presented that the self -esteem hypothesis 
within social identity theory is best tested with a "specific 
(to a particular in-group) state" self-esteem measure. It was 
therefore hypothesized that of all the self-esteem measures, 
this would be the one most sensitive to changes in self-esteem 
as a result of manipulations intended to make subjects feel 
either more positive or more negative about their national 
group than they had moments earlier. 
As predicted, the two trait self-esteem measures detected no 
significant change in self-esteem as a result of either the 
positive or the negative manipulation. Both state self -esteem 
measures detected a significant rise in self -esteem as a 
result of the positive manipulation, but only the one specific 
to national group membership detected a significant fall in 
self-esteem as a result of the negative manipulation. 
It was concluded that a "specific state" self-esteem measure 
is most appropriate when testing the self-esteem hypothesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social identity theory says that at least some intergroup 
discrimination is motivated by individuals' self-esteem needs 
and that intergroup discrimination can sometimes satisfy such 
needs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Abrams & Hogg (1988; Hogg & 
Abrams, 1990) identify two corollaries of this self-esteem 
hypothesis:-
1. Successful intergroup discrimination enhances social 
identity and thus elevates self-esteem. Self-esteem 
is a dependent variable, a product of specific forms 
of intergroup behaviour. 
2. Depressed or threatened self -esteem promotes 
intergroup discrimination because of a need for 
self-esteem. Self-esteem is an independent 
variable, a motivating force for specific forms of 
intergroup behaviour. 
Hogg & Abrams (1990: 33)1 
Empirical tests of corollary 1 of social identity theory's 
self-esteem hypothesis have investigated whether or not in-
group favouritism raises self-esteem. Oakes & Turner (1980) 
found that following social categorization subjects who 
engaged in in-group favouritism had higher post-task self-
esteem than subjects who merely read a newspaper. Lemyre & 
Smith (1985) found that social categorization lowered self-
esteem from its pre-categorization levels and that in-group 
favouritism restored self -esteem to its pre-categorization 
levels (but that fair allocations across groups did not, and 
neither did allocations solely to in-group members or solely 
to out-group members). Wagner et al. (1986) found no 
correlation between levels of in-group favouritism and 
subsequent increases in self-esteem relative to pre-
discrimination levels. Similarly, Hogg & Sunderland (1991: 
58) found that "greater intergroup discrimination was not 
1 See also Abrams & Hogg (1988: 320) 
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associated with higher post-test levels and/or significant 
increase in" self-esteem. Finally, Vickers, Abrams & Hogg 
(1985, cited in Hogg & Abrams, 1990: 34; 1988, cited in Abrams 
& Hogg, 1988: 320) found that in-group favouritism lowered 
self -esteem when a "local norm of cooperation was salient" 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988: 320, see also Diehl, 1989). 
While it is interesting and important whether or not 
intergroup discrimination (however conceived) per se affects 
self-esteem, this does not test Abrams & Hogg's formulation of 
corollary 1 which clearly states that it is successful 
intergroup discrimination which is predicted by social 
identity theory to raise self-esteem. Although Abrams & Hogg 
do not specify what constitutes successful intergroup 
discrimination, none of the studies reviewed by them 
investigated whether or not subjects who discriminated 
believed their discrimination to have been (or likely to have 
been) successful (e.g. in achieving or maintaining secure and 
legitimate positive in-group distinctiveness). If they did 
not, then corollary 1 of social identity theory'S self-esteem 
hypothesis, as formulated by Abrams & Hogg, has simply not 
been tested by these studies. 
The principal method by which corollary 2 of social identity 
theory'S self-esteem hypothesis has been tested has been to 
investigate whether subjects with (or assumed to have) low 
self-esteem show more in-group favouritism than subjects with 
(or assumed to have) high self-esteem. Wagner et al. (1986) 
found that members of low-status groups displayed more out-
group derogation than members of high-status groups. Hogg & 
Sunderland found that following social categorization subj ects 
with relatively low self-esteem discriminated in favour of 
their in-group more than subjects with relatively high self-
esteem. Crocker & Schwartz (1985) found that subjects with 
relatively low self-esteem engaged in greater subsequent out-
group derogation than subjects with relatively high levels of 
self-esteem while Crocker et al. (1987) found that subjects 
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with relatively low self-esteem engaged in greater out-group 
and in-group derogation than subjects with relatively high 
levels of self-esteem. Subjects with relatively low self-
esteem in these two studies did not, however, display more 
preference for the in-group over the out-group than subjects 
with relatively high self-esteem. Finchilescu (1986) found 
that members of low status groups discriminated more in favour 
of their in-group than members of high-status groups.2 
Sachdev & Bourhis (1984) found that minority group members 
displayed similar amounts of in-group favouritism as displayed 
by majority group members. 3 Abrams (1982, 1983, cited in 
Abrams & Hogg, 1988: 320-321) found that levels of self-esteem 
were positively correlated with subsequent in-group 
favouritism. Sachdev & Bourhis (1985) found that members of 
equal, high and total power groups indulged in greater levels 
of in-group favouritism than subjects in low or no power 
groups. Sachdev & Bourhis (1987) similarly found that members 
of equal and high status groups indulged in greater levels of 
in-group favouritism than subjects in low status groups.4 
This result is confounded by the fact that some 
members of high and low status groups felt that they "should" 
really belong to the other group and had been miscategorized. 
Overall, subjects who thought that they were "really" members 
of the low-status group discriminated more than subjects who 
thought that they were "really" members of the high-status 
groups, whether or not subjects had actually been categorized 
into their "proper" groups. It is a moot point, however, 
whether subj ects who think that they "should" belong to an 
ostensibly low-status group personally evaluate that group as 
low-status. 
3 Simon & Brown (1987: 708) found that minority group 
members in their study "identified more strongly with their 
in-group than did subjects allegedly belonging to a 
nonminority", thereby providing suggestive evidence against 
Sachdev & Bourhis' s (1984) assumption that minority group 
membership automatically confers less self-esteem than 
majority group membership. 
4 Similarly, Long et al. (1994) found that subjects with 
relatively high (personal) self-esteem engaged in greater in-
group favouritism than subjects with relatively low (personal) 
self-esteem. 
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As before, while it is interesting and important whether or 
not subjects with low self-esteem subsequently discriminate in 
favour of in-groups more (or less) than subjects with high 
self-esteem, this does not test Abrams & Hogg's formulation of 
the second corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis within 
social identity theory. That formulation clearly states that 
intergroup discrimination can be promoted by low or threatened 
self-esteem. None of the studies reviewed by Abrams & Hogg 
seem to have investigated whether or not the subjects with (or 
assumed to have) high self-esteem felt that their self-esteem 
was secure. If they did not, then corollary 2 of social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis, as formulated by 
Abrams & Hogg, has simply not been tested by these studies. 
A second difficulty with empirical tests of Abrams & Hogg's 
second corollary of social identity theory's self-esteem 
hypothesis concerns the operationalization of "low" or 
"depressed" self-esteem. In some studies (e.g. Crocker & 
Schwartz, 1985; Crocker et al., 1987; Long, et al., 1994) 
subjects have been differentiated into categories of "low" and 
"high" self-esteem on the basis of median or tripartite splits 
on self -esteem scores. That is, self -esteem scores were taken 
for all subjects and those with relatively high self-esteem 
have been deemed "high" self-esteem subjects and subjects with 
relatively low self-esteem have been deemed "low" self-esteem 
subjects, even though the mean self-esteem for "low" self-
esteem subj ects was above the scale mid-point. Thus" low" 
self-esteem subjects have not had low self-esteem in the sense 
of being "negative" or worse than neutral; their self-esteem 
was "positive". These studies have therefore tested whether 
levels of self-esteem are negatively correlated with 
subsequent levels of in-group favouritism, regardless of 
whether or not the prior levels of self-esteem are "low" or 
"depressed" in the sense of being "negative" or "lower than 
neutral". Social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis is 
not that the lower the self-esteem the greater the subsequent 
in-group favouritism, however, even as identified by Abrams & 
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Hogg. It is that subjects with "negative" self-esteem will 
discriminate more than subjects with (secure) "positive" self-
esteem. Studies that compare the levels of discrimination 
shown by subjects with varying levels of "positive" self-
esteem do not therefore test Abrams & Hogg's second corollary 
of social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis. 5 
Abrams & Hogg' s formulations of the corollaries of social 
identity theory's self -esteem hypothesis are in any case 
inadequate, in that social identity theory does not claim 
either that (i) "successful intergroup discrimination 
... elevates self-esteem", or that (ii) "depressed or 
threatened self-esteem ... promotes intergroup discrimination. 
Social identity theory rather claims: (i) that successful 
intergroup discrimination is one route to making self-esteem 
more positive or more secure; and, (ii) that depressed or 
threatened self-esteem will promote intergroup discrimination 
under certain condi tions. More accurate social identity 
theory self-esteem hypothesis corollaries would run something 
like this (see Chapter 1) . 
5 It should be noted that another difficulty associated 
with examining self-esteem in this way is that the sort of 
self-esteem examined is not derived from particular group 
memberships. As such, a purely individual link is assumed 
between self-esteem and in-group favouritism, rather than a 
link between self-esteem derived from particular group 
memberships and discrimination by those group members. This 
entails understanding social identity theory as providing an 
individualistic explanation of the conditions for and 
consequences of intergroup discrimination: which is 
diametrically opposite to Tajfel's explicit intentions 
(Billig, 1976; Long & Spears, forthcoming; Tajfel, 1972, 
1979) . 
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1. Intergroup discrimination which achieves or enhances 
positive in-group distinctiveness from one or more 
relevant out -groups on comparison dimensions of 
value to in-group members will make a positive 
contribution to the magnitude of in-group members' 
social identity and self-esteem, provided that the 
discrimination is neither accompanied by nor results 
in a conflict of values. Intergroup discrimination 
which protects or maintains positive in-group 
distinctiveness from one or more relevant out-groups 
on comparison dimensions of value to in-group 
members will make a positive contribution to the 
security of in-group members' social identity and 
self -esteem, provided that the discrimination is 
neither accompanied by nor results in a conflict of 
values. 
2. Depressed or threatened self-esteem will promote 
intergroup discrimination when: (i) the in-group is 
salient; (ii) the discrimination will occur against 
one or more relevant out-groups; (iii) the 
discrimination occurs on dimensions of value to in-
group members: (iv) the discrimination is perceived 
as a viable route to secure and legitimate positive 
in-group distinctiveness; and, (v) discrimination is 
perceived as compatible with or more attractive than 
alternative available methods of elevating or 
securing positive self-esteem. 
These corollaries have some obvious disadvantages as compared 
to the ones identified by Abrams & Hogg. Primarily, they are 
far longer, more complex and difficult to operationalize. 
Nevertheless, they more accurately reflect social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis and they have important 
consequences when that hypothesis is empirically tested. 
Abrams & Hogg's first corollary claims that "successful 
intergroup discrimination ... elevates self-esteem." In fact, 
within social identity theory intergroup discrimination is not 
predicted to elevate self-esteem when that discrimination is 
pursued in order to make in-group superiority more secure. 
Nor is intergroup discrimination predicted by social identity 
theory to necessarily elevate self-esteem when it is 
accompanied by or results in a conflict of values for in-group 
members, for example when intergroup discrimination is 
perceived as an illegitimate route to in-group superiority. 
Neither is intergroup discrimination predicted by social 
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identity theory to elevate self-esteem when the social 
identity of interest is not salient for in-group members, when 
the intergroup discrimination occurs on dimensions of no 
interest or value to in-group members, or when the out-group 
discriminated against is not perceived as a relevant 
comparison group for the in-group. The "reformulated" 
corollary 1 above makes clear that social identity theory 
predicts that intergroup discrimination will only elevate 
self-esteem when it obtains or increases the positive in-group 
distinctiveness of a salient in-group from a relevant out-
group on dimensions of importance to the in-group, and when 
the positive in-group distinctiveness is not accompanied by a 
conflict of values. Intergroup discrimination will therefore 
not reliably elevate self-esteem if: (i) the in-group is not 
salient; (ii) the dimension on which intergroup discrimination 
occurs is unimportant to in-group members; (iii) the out-group 
is not perceived as a relevant comparison group; (iv) the 
intergroup discrimination is indulged in to enhance the 
security of in-group superiority; or, (v) the intergroup 
discrimination is accompanied by a conflict of values. 
Abrams & Hogg's second corollary claims that depressed or 
threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination. In 
fact, social identity theory predicts that depressed or 
threatened self-esteem will promote intergroup discrimination 
when such intergroup discrimination is perceived as an 
available route to elevated or more secure self-esteem. 
Depressed or threatened self-esteem is not predicted to 
promote intergroup discrimination when in-group membership is 
not salient, for example. Nor will depressed or threatened 
self-esteem promote intergroup discrimination when alternative 
means to elevated or more secure self-esteem are perceived to 
be more attractive and/or available (e.g. by becoming a member 
of group that already has positive in-group distinctiveness, 
or by psychologically dissociating oneself from a negatively 
distinct group when one's personal identity is positive). 
Again, depressed or threatened self-esteem will not promote 
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intergroup discrimination when such intergroup discrimination 
is perceived as unlikely to bring about the desired effects on 
self-esteem (e.g. when the intergroup discrimination is 
perceived as unlikely to result in positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values: in the jargon of 
social identity theory, when cognitive alternatives are 
unavailable). The "reformulated" corollary 2 makes it clear 
that depressed or threatened self -esteem will only promote 
intergroup discrimination when it is perceived as a viable and 
attractive method of meeting those self-esteem needs, i.e. 
when it will result in positive in-group distinctiveness from 
a relevant out-group on a dimension of value to in-group 
members without a conflict of values, and when such 
discrimination does not preclude apparently "easier", "safer" 
or more "reliable" methods of elevating or securing self-
esteem needs. 
The importance of one aspect of these reformulated corollaries 
can be highlighted by re-examining Sachdev & Bourhis' (1985) 
"test" of corollary 2. Hogg & Abrams (1990: 35) report that 
"Sachdev & Bourhis found that greater power ... was associated 
with greater discrimination" and reason that "Corollary 2 of 
the self-esteem hypothesis might well predict the opposite: 
the lower the power ... the lower the social identity contingent 
self-esteem and thus the greater the discrimination". Such 
reasoning completely ignores the interaction between levels of 
self-esteem and the availability of intergroup discrimination 
to meet self-esteem needs (i.e. power: cf. Ellemers et al., 
1990, 1992; Ng, 1982; Reicher, 1987; Reicher & Levine, 1994). 
In Sachdev & Bourhis' (1985) study the subjects with (or 
assumed to have) the lowest self-esteem (and therefore the 
most to gain by successful intergroup discrimination) also had 
no power to address their self -esteem needs via in-group 
favouritism as such discrimination could not be successful: 
all it could do would be to antagonize the all-powerful out-
group. That is, these subjects had no "cognitive 
alternatives" to their inferior position and although their 
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social identity contingent self-esteem was low, social 
identity theory predicts that they would not engage in 
intergroup discrimination. At the other extreme, subjects in 
Sachdev & Bourhis (1985) with (or assumed to have) the highest 
self-esteem also had total power. They therefore needed to 
engage in only slight in-group favouritism in order to obtain 
positive and secure in-group distinctiveness on the dimension 
of that discrimination (i.e. points) and thereby positive 
contributions to social identity contingent self-esteem. 
Social identity theory therefore predicts that such subjects 
would display some in-group favouritism (as they were not yet 
positively distinct in terms of the dimension of comparison) 
but also that they would display less discrimination than 
subjects whose guarantee of obtaining positive in-group 
distinctiveness was less assured (i.e subjects with only equal 
or high power). And they did. In between these two extremes 
were subjects with low, equal or high power. Social identity 
theory predicts that all of these subjects would have social 
identity contingent self-esteem needs (as their in-groups were 
not yet positively distinct on the dimension of value, i.e. 
points) and that they would address those needs via in-group 
favouritism to the extent that they perceived such 
discrimination as likely to succeed. Thus, social identity 
theory predicts that the greater the non-total power (with 
equal self-esteem needs) the greater the discrimination, as 
the greater the non-total power the greater the likelihood 
that the discrimination would be successful (i.e. in achieving 
positive in-group distinctiveness on a dimension of value to 
the in-group without antagonizing a more powerful out-group) . 
This is exactly what Sachdev & Bourhis found. Sachdev & 
Bourhis' (1985) study therefore provides support for corollary 
2 of social identity theory'S self-esteem hypothesis (in its 
reformulated form) rather than disconfirming it as argued by 
Abrams & Hogg. 
A final problem with tests of social identity theory's self-
esteem hypothesis concerns the nature of the self -esteem 
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measures used. Self-esteem is the result of personally 
evaluating the contents of one's self-concept. The self-
concept can be thought of a list of self-descriptions which 
are salient within a given period of time. Self-descriptions, 
or "identities", can be "personal" (e.g. My name is Tom) or 
"social" (e.g. I am male). Thus, an individual's self-esteem 
at any given moment will be the overall result of them 
evaluating each salient particular identity within their self-
concept. So, for example, a person who had just come first in 
a running-race but whose team had lost might feel good about 
the former (positive personal identity of oneself as a runner) 
but bad about the latter (negative social identity of oneself 
as a member of a lOSing team) immediately after the race, and 
thus might have neutral or ambivalent "overall" self-esteem at 
that moment. The important point being that particular social 
identities only make contributions to "overall" individual 
self-esteem. At any given time the contributions particular 
social identities make to an individuals' self-esteem will 
depend on: (i) how "much" of their self-concept is taken up by 
those particular social identities (i.e. as a proportion of 
the "overall" active self-concept); and, (ii) how "salient" 
the particular social identities are within the "overall" 
self-concept (i.e. how distinctive and/or important those 
identities are in relation to other salient identities). 
These considerations have direct and crucial implications for 
measuring self-esteem when empirically testing social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis. To see this it is useful to 
conceptualize self-esteem measures in terms of (i) the time 
period they measure self-esteem over, and (ii) the specificity 
of the self-esteem measured. 
Self-esteem measures can be measures of "trait" or "state" 
self-esteem (cf. Fleming & Courtney, 1984: Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991). The latter measure self-esteem at a given 
moment whereas the former attempt to measure relatively stable 
"average" or "typical" self-esteem over a period of time. 
___ ~ __ ,__ m ___ "" 
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Self-esteem measures can also measure "general" or "specific" 
self-esteem (cf. Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). The latter 
measure the self-esteem associated with a particular identity 
or self-at·tribute (e.g. oneself as a woman, oneself in terms 
of one's physical appearance) whereas the former attempt to 
measure "overall" self-esteem (i.e. the esteem resulting from 
evaluation of all aspects of oneself, that is, one's salient 
self-concept as a whole). These distinctions allow individual 
self-esteem measures to be categorized as being of one of four 
types: General Trait Self-Esteem measures (GTSE, i.e. measures 
of individuals' typical or average overall evaluations of 
themselves over time); General State Self-Esteem measures 
(GSSE, i.e. measures of individuals' overall evaluations of 
themselves at particular times); Specific Trait Self-Esteem 
measures (STSE, i.e. measures of individuals' typical or 
average evaluations of particular aspects of themselves over 
time); or Specific State Self-Esteem measures (SSSE, i.e. 
measures of individuals' evaluations of particular aspects of 
themselves at particular times) . 
Most available measures of self-esteem are "trait" measures, 
either of "general" self -esteem (e.g. Julian et al., 1966; 
Rosenberg, 1965) or of self-esteem specific to particular 
facets of the self (e.g. Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker et 
al., 1993; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991, 1992). "Trait" self-
esteem measures are identifiable mainly by their emphasis on 
the stability over those measures over time (e.g. as indicated 
by test-retest reliability). On the face of it, such measures 
are of no use at all when testing social identity theory's 
self-esteem hypothesis. Corollary 1 (either Abrams & Hogg's 
"traditional" formulation or the "reformulated" version above) 
posits changes in the level of self-esteem across time (i.e. 
before and after certain instances of intergroup 
discrimination), and self-esteem measures which have as a 
principal strength their relative invariance across time and 
situations are unlikely to detect such changes. 
< .: • 4 
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"Trait" self-esteem measures have recently been adapted for 
use as "state" measures simply by asking respondents to 
"answer in terms of how you feel at the moment" (or such-
like), either before the measure is administered or before 
each individual item on the measure. The validity of such 
adapted measures has not been thoroughly investigated but is 
likely to be problematic (Abrams & Hogg, 1988: 319). In large 
part this is simply because the wording of the items on such 
measureS so often suggests "trait" measurement. Items on the 
Rosenberg (1965) scale, for example, ask respondents about 
their self-esteem "All in all ... ", "On the whole" and "At 
times". It is not clear whether respondents answering such 
questions in terms of how they are feel ing "at the moment" 
would be giving a true "state" response or an instantaneous 
"trait ll one. 
To my knowledge no "state" self-esteem measures exist for 
measuring self-esteem at a given time derived from specific 
group-memberships. That is, there appear to be no SSSE 
measures which measure the self-esteem individuals derive from 
particular social identities at particular points in time. 
This is important because such measures seem on the face of it 
to be the most suited to investigating social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis. Corollary 1 of that 
hypothesis suggests that in certain situations intergroup 
discrimination will raise that part of self-esteem which is 
determined by membership of the discriminating in-group. As 
particular social identities are rarely likely to fully 
determine "overall" self-esteem, IIglobal" measures of self-
esteem, even "state" ones, are likely to be less sensitive to 
predicted changes in social identity contingent self-esteem 
than ones which attempt to directly measure that part of state 
self-esteem determined by the particular social identity of 
interest. A person may suffer depressed self-esteem as a 
result of their experimental group failing to beat another 
experimental group at some relatively trivial task, for 
example, but unless that person's overall self-concept is 
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totally or largely determined by their experimental group 
membership, "general" measures of self-esteem are unlikely to 
detect such changes. The depressed self-esteem seems far more 
likely to be captured by a measure which concentrates on that 
part of "overall" self -esteem which is determined by the 
experimental group membership at particular times. 
Similar ideas apply to corollary 2 of social identity theory's 
self-esteem hypothesis. In-group favouritism is one response 
to low or threatened self-esteem derived from membership of 
inferior or insecurely superior groups. The discrimination is 
used in the hope that it will achieve in-group superiority or 
more secure in-group superiority. In the former instance 
successful in-group favouritism (i. e. that which achieves 
valued superiority for a salient in-group from a relevant out-
group without a conflict of values) is predicted to elevate 
that part of self-esteem which is dependent on or determined 
by membership of the in-group. As with corollary 1, "state" 
"general" measures of self-esteem are only likely to detect 
such change (i.e. self-esteem elevation) when the particular 
social identity of interest totally or predominantly occupies 
group members' self-concepts. The elevated self-esteem seems 
more likely to be captured by a "state" measure which focuses 
directly on that part of "overall" self -esteem which is 
dependent upon the particular social identity of interest. 
To summarize so far, Abrams & Hogg's formulations of the 
corollaries of social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis 
have not yet been adequately tested. For corollary 1 this is 
in large part because the link between in-group favouritism 
and subsequent self-esteem has been investigated rather than 
the link between successful intergroup discrimination and 
subsequent self-esteem. For corollary 2 this is in large part 
because the link between low self-esteem and subsequent in-
group favouritism has been investigated rather than the link 
between low or threatened self-esteem and subsequent 
intergroup discrimination. Second, Abrams & Hogg' s 
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formulations of the corollaries of the self-esteem hypothesis 
within social identity theory are inadequate. Their corollary 
1 neglects to adequately specify the nature of successful 
intergroup discrimination and ignores the importance of in-
group salience, out-group relevance, the value of the 
dimension upon which discrimination occurs, and the role of 
conflicts of value involved in some instances of intergroup 
discrimination. Their corollary 2 neglects the role of 
perceptions of cognitive alternatives (i.e. whether intergroup 
discrimination is likely to be successful) and also ignores 
the importance of in-group salience, out-group relevance, the 
value of the dimension upon which discrimination may occur, 
and the availability of alternative or additional routes to 
improved self-esteem. Third, no tests of social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis seem to have employed the most 
appropriate type of self-esteem measure: one which measures 
self-esteem derived from membership of a particular social 
group at a particular moment in time. With respect to 
corollary 1 such measures appear best able to capture changes 
in self-esteem resulting from changed in-group circumstances 
and with respect to corollary 2 such measures seem best able 
to predict intergroup discrimination intended to improve the 
situation of particular in-groups at particular times (and 
therefore the social identity and that part of self-esteem 
which is of interest) . 
It is illuminating to re-consider one of the tests of 
corollary 2 in the light of the above arguments. Wagner et 
ale (1986: 19) found that levels of general self-esteem did 
not significantly correlate with subsequent discrimination 
across groups, but that levels of self-esteem contingent upon 
subjects' perceived achievement at university did. The lower 
subjects' university achievement specific self-esteem the 
greater their derogation of out-group members' "discussion 
ability". Thus, while low general self-esteem did not result 
in greater discrimination across groups than high general 
self-esteem, thus proving no support for corollary 2 of social 
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identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis, low levels of 
specific "university achievement" self-esteem did result in 
greater out-group derogation on a dimension of "discussion 
ability" than high levels of such specific self-esteem. If it 
can be assumed that subjects with high "university 
achievement" self-esteem were secure in their evaluations of 
their own achievement at university this latter result 
supports corollary 2. The important point for present 
purposes is that a measure of general self-esteem was not 
sufficiently sensitive to "predict" subsequent discrimination 
across groups on a particular dimension but a measure specific 
to an aspect of self-esteem related to that dimension was. 6 
In the study reported here an attempt was made to develop four 
"equivalent" self-esteem measures, one for each "type" 
identified above, i.e. GT8E, GS8E, ST8E and S88E, with the 
"specific" aspects of the relevant measures referring to self-
esteem derived from evaluation of particular group memberships 
(i.e. social identities). Each of these measures were then 
used to try and detect changes in self-esteem resulting from 
manipulations intended to raise or lower subjects' evaluations 
of a particular in-group (national) membership. Consistent 
with the arguments developed above, hypothesis 1 was that the 
888E measure would be significantly more sensitive to such 
changes than the other three measures. 
A fifth measure was developed in the present study which was 
intended to tap evaluation of the in-group at particular 
points in time, i. e. a General State In-group Evaluation 
(GSIE) measure. This was done to enable a manipulation check 
to be made as to whether or not subjects' evaluations of their 
in-group did in fact alter as a result of the experimental 
manipulation intended to bring about such a change. This 
manipulation check can also be considered to be a test of 
6 If it can be assumed that aChievement at university 
was perceived by subjects to be related to or correlated with 
discussion ability. 
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social identity theory's prediction that group members' social 
identity contingent self-esteem is determined by those group 
members' evaluations of their in-group. 
A final measure employed in the present study was a measure of 
the extent to which subjects identified with the (national) 
in-group of interest. Hypothesis 2, in line with social 
identity theory, predicted that the greater a subject's social 
identity, the greater the effects of in-group evaluation on 
that subject's self-esteem. 
METHOD 
Participants 
246 undergraduate psychology students from either the London 
School of Economics and Political Science or Royal Holloway 
and Bedford College filled out usable response booklets. Of 
these 104 were male, 141 were female, and one additional 
respondent did not indicate their sex. A further 10 subjects 
returned spoiled or incomplete booklets. Approximately 50 
students either declined to take a booklet or returned 
completely blank booklets. 
Materials 
Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale (RSE) was used as a 
template to produce four separate self-esteem questionnaires 
and one in-group evaluation questionnaire. The Rosenberg 
self-esteem measure was chosen because of its widespread use 
in social-psychological research (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991) 
and because of the relative ease with which it could be 
adapted for present purposes. 
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The questions of the original Rosenberg scale were modified 
only slightly to produce the first scale, a measure of general 
trait self-esteem (GTSE}.7 A measure of general state self-
esteem (GSSE) was produced by simply starting each question 
used in the GTSE scale with the phrase "AT THE MOMENT, ... ". 
A measure of specific trait self-esteem (STSE) was produced by 
starting each question used in the GTSE scale with the phrase 
"I am a member of this group and, AS SUCH ... ". A measure of 
specific state self-esteem (SSSE) was produced by starting 
each question used in the GTSE scale with the phrase "I am a 
member of this group and AS SUCH, AT THE MOMENT ... ". Finally, 
a general state in-group evaluation (GSIE) scale was produced 
by starting each question used in the GTSE scale with the 
phrase "AT THE MOMENT" and changing the object of esteem from 
the self ("1") to the in-group ("this group"). All questions 
on all scales were to be answered on 7-point scales running 
from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Negative and 
positive items were initially randomly ordered and the same 
order was used on each version of the scale. The order of the 
questions was different on the first and second presentations 
of each scale (see below), but the order of positive and 
negative questions was kept the same. 
10 four-page response booklets were made up. Each started 
with a brief introduction assuring anonymity and 
confidentiality. Respondents were then asked to indicate 
their sex and their national group. The latter served as each 
subject's in-group. Also on the front page of the booklet 
there was a three-question social identity scale measuring the 
strength, valance and centrality of national group membership 
in the respondent's self-concept (Fraser, 1991; Hofman, 1988). 
7 A pilot study revealed that respondents disliked and 
reacted negatively to certain words and phrases used in the 
original RSE. In addition, slight word changes were necessary 
to make the scale as similar as possible to the other versions 
of the scale used in this study. 
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The second page of each booklet contained one of the five 
esteem scales mentioned above. Instructions were slightly 
different for each scale. Respondents receiving the GTSE 
scale were told to answer each question in terms of how they 
"VSUAT,T,Y" felt about themselves, FOR WHATBYBR REASON. 
Respondents receiving the GSSE or the GSIE scales were 
instructed to answer each question in terms of how they felt 
about themsel ves "RIGHT NOW" , FOR WDATEYBR REASON. 
Respondents receiving the STSE scale were told to respond in 
terms of how they "USUAT,I,Y" felt about themselves IN TERMS OF 
YOUR MEMBERSHIP OF YOUR NATIONAL GROpp. Finally, subjects 
receiving the SSSE scale were told to answer in terms of how 
they felt about themselves "RIGHT NOW", IN TERMS OF YOUR 
MEMBERSHIP OF YOUR. NATIONAL GROlJP. These instructions were in 
addition to any prefixes to each question mentioned above. 
page three of each response booklet differed according to the 
self-esteem manipulation, positive or negative. Apart from 
the single word used to achieve this manipulation, all 
respondents received the same instructions:-
Obviously there will be both good and bad aspects, but 
what sort of things make you feel POSITIYB (NEGATIYB) 
about your national group and/or your membership of it? 
Please spend about two minutes answering this question 
(and/or giving examples) in the space below. 
Page four of each booklet contained a second copy of the scale 
each respondent received on page 2 of their booklet. On this 
occasion all respondents received the same instructions, which 
were to answer each question as honestly as possible without 
looking back to previous answers or trying particularly to 
give answers that they might think "consistent" or "expected". 
All of the pages used in each of the response booklets can be 
found in Appendix 10. 
Erocedure 
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Response booklets were randomly distributed in three sessions 
at the beginning of a practical workshop (Royal Holloway), or 
at the beginning (LSE) or the end of a lecture (LSE). 
Respondents were given 12-15 minutes to complete the booklets, 
which were immediately collected in. Respondents were thanked 
for their participation. 
RESULTS 
Scale scoring 
Each question on each scale scored 1 for "strongly agree" 
increasing one point at a time up to 7 for "strongly 
disagree". Scores were then reversed for all "pro-trait" 
items. Mean scores over all ten items on a given scale were 
then calculated. Thus, mean scores were calculated for each 
scale and mean scores ranged from 1 (low mean self-esteem or 
in-group evaluation) to 7 (high mean self-esteem or in-group 
evaluation) . 
calculating esteem and in-group evaluation change scores 
Self-esteem scores obtained on the second presentation of each 
measure were subtracted from self-esteem scores obtained on 
the first presentations of those scales. A positive change 
score therefore indicates a rise in self-esteem and a negative 
change score indicates a fall in self-esteem as a result of 
the experimental manipulation. Similar change scores were 
calculated for in-group evaluations. 
Also, a single measure was calculated to indicate the mean 
change in self-esteem in the predicted direction as a result 
of the experimental manipulation, regardless of whether the 
manipulation was positive or negative. This MPC {mean 
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predicted change} figure is positive if the mean self-esteem 
change was in the direction predicted by the manipulation and 
negative if it is in the direction opposite to that predicted 
by the manipulation. 
Comparable scores were calculated for in-group evaluation. 
Scale reliability 
Reliability coefficients were calculated for each presentation 
of each scale. These ranged from a low of 0.82 {first 
presentation of SSSE} to a high of 0.96 {second presentation 
of GSIE}.8 The reliability coefficient for the social 
identity score was 0.86. 
Initial self-esteem and in-group evaluation scores 
Initial mean self-esteem scores, i.e. before the experimental 
manipulation, were as follows: GTSE1 = 5.64 (SO = 1.11, n = 
47); GSSE1 = 5.79 (SD = 0.92, n = 52); STSEl = 5.65 (SD = 
0.84, n = 45); SSSE1 = 5.81 (SD = 0.72, n = 48). Initial mean 
evaluation of the national in-group was similarly positive at 
5 . 22 ( SD = 1. 1 7), n = 46) . 
Manipulation checks 
subjects listed a mean of 2.78 items which made them feel 
positive or negative about their national group and/or 
membership of it. 29 subjects (11.8%) listed no items, 45 
(18.3%) listed only 1 item, 53 (21.5%) listed 2 items, and 
almost half of the subjects (119, 48.4%) listed two or more 
In full: GTSE1=0.94, GSSE1=0.92, STSE1=0.85, 
SSSE1=0.82, GSIE1=0.93, GTSE2=O.95, GSSE2=0.93, STSE2=O.88, 
SSSE2=O.83, GSIE2=O.96. 
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items. Each item listed was evaluated by the experimenter on 
a scale from 1 - 5, where 1 = strongly in direction opposite 
to that implied by the manipulation and 5 = strongly in 
agreement with direction implied by the manipulation. The 
mean score was 3.99 (SD = 0.73), indicating that, on average, 
subjects listed items which were in accordance with the 
manipulation. Only 8 items (3.5\) were in a direction 
opposite to the manipulation, 34 (14.8%) were neutral, and 187 
(81.7\) were in the direction suggested by the manipulation. 
Thus, the vast majority of items listed were in accordance 
with the manipulation (i.e. were positive for the positive 
manipulation and negative for the negative manipulation), with 
a very small minority of items being in the opposite direction 
to that suggested by the manipulation. There were no 
differences in the number of items listed for the positive or 
the negative manipulation and neither was there any difference 
across manipulations in the extent to which items listed were 
consistent with those manipulations. 
GSIE2 - GSIE1 provides a measure of how evaluation of the in-
group altered as a result of the experimental manipulation. 
Evaluation of the in-group became more positive as a result of 
the positive manipulation (+0.15, SD = 0.42) and more negative 
as a result of the negative manipulation (-0.05, SD = 0.34). 
Neither of these changes were significantly greater than zero 
by one-tailed paired t-tests, however, although the positive 
change approached significance (t21 = 1.62, P = 0.06). Mean 
predicted change (MPC) for in-group evaluations (i.e. positive 
when the manipulation was positive and negative when the 
manipulation was negative) was +0.10 (SD = 0.38). This was 
only just non-significantly different from zero at the 5\ 
level by a one-tailed one-sample t-test (t43 = 1.66, P = 
0.053). Thus, mean evaluations of the in-group were in the 
directions predicted by the experimental manipulations and 
although neither effect was strong, the effect of the positive 
manipulation was stronger than the effect of the negative 
manipulation, which was insignificant. 
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Self-esteem changes 
The table below shows the mean changes in self-esteem 
resulting from the experimental manipulation by both scale 
type and the direction of the manipulation (with standard 
deviations in brackets) . 
GTSE GSSE STSE SSSE 
+ .05 ( .19) .12 ( .27) .10 ( .55) .14 ( .28) 
- .11 ( .31) .04 ( .40) .05 ( .40) -.21 ( .48) 
MPC -.03 ( .27) .04 ( .35) .03 ( .35) .18 ( .38) 
+/_ • poaitive or negative manipulation ot in-group eveluetion; MPC. mean pre4icte4 change; GTSB. 
Ganaral Trait Self-Betaem; GSSB. Ganeral Stata Salf-Beteem; STSB. (in-group' Specific Trait Salf-
Beteem; SSSB. (in-group) Specific Stata Salf-Betaam. 
Table 5.1: Mean self-esteem changes by 
scale-type and manipulation 
The table above suggests that all of the measures indicated 
varying degrees of self-esteem improvement as a result of the 
manipulation intended to improve in-group evaluation, but only 
the SSSE measure indicated a fall in self-esteem as a result 
of the manipulation intended to worsen in-group evaluation. 
A 4 (scale type) X 2 (manipulation) ANOVA with esteem change 
as the dependent variable revealed no main effect of scale 
type, a significant main effect of manipulation F(l,180) = 4.02, 
P = 0.046), and a very nearly significant interaction effect 
(F(3,180) = 2.58, P = 0.055). Separate I-WAY ANOVAs for each 
manipulation revealed that there were no significant 
differences between the measures for the positive manipulation 
(F(3,921 = 0.31, P = 0.82) but there were for the negative 
manipulation (F(3,92' = 2.80, P = 0.045). Similarly, planned 
contrasts between the SSSE measure and the other three 
measures were not significant for the positive manipulation 
but were for the negative manipulation (T(88) = 2.82, P = 
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0.006). Additionally, planned comparisons between the two 
"state" measures (i.e. GSSE and SSSE) versus the two "trait" 
measures (i.e. GTSE and STSE) were not significant for the 
positive manipulation but very nearly were for the negative 
one (T css ) = 1.98, P = 0.051). Unplanned comparisons (Duncan 
Tests) showed no significant differences between the measures 
for the positive manipulation but revealed that the SSSE 
measure was significantly different from each of the other 
three measures for the negative manipulation. 
A 1-WAY ANOVA also revealed an almost significant difference 
between the measures on MPC (mean predicted change) across the 
manipulations (F c3 • 184l = 2.51, P = 0.060). Planned comparisons 
revealed that with respect to MPC the SSSE measure was 
significantly different to the other three measures (T (184 ) = 
-2.58, P = 0.01) and that the two state measures were 
significantly different to the two trait ones (T Cl84l = -2.04, 
P = 0.043). An unplanned comparison indicated only that the 
SSSE measure was significantly different to the GTSE one. 
Finally, a series of one-tailed one-sample t-tests revealed 
significant changes in self-esteem in predicted directions as 
a result of the experimental manipulations only for GSSE and 
SSSE on the positive manipulation (t25 = 2.23, P = 0.04 and tH 
= 2.60, P = 0.02, respectively), for SSSE on the negative 
manipulation (t21 = -2.09, P = 0.02), and for SSSE for MPC (tu 
= 3.17, P = 0.002). 
It seems, therefore, that in the present study there was very 
little difference between the measures with regards to 
detecting self-esteem changes resulting from the positive 
manipulation (although only the two state measures showed 
significant levels of self-esteem improvement resulting from 
that manipulation), but that the SSSE scale was more sensitive 
than the other measures to self-esteem deterioration resulting 
from the negative manipulation. 
The effects of social identity 
Social identity scores were used 
categories of either relatively 
relatively high social identity. 
240 
to divide subjects into 
low social identity or 
The former (n = 117, 47.6% 
of all subjects) had a mean social identity score of 3.57 (SD 
= 0.67) and the latter (n = 129, 52.4% of all subjects) had a 
mean social identity score of 5.62 (SD = 0.70). Thus, "low" 
social identity students had an approximately neutral mean 
social identity and the "high" social identity students had a 
reasonably positive mean social identity. 
A between-groups t-test revealed no significant differences in 
MPC scores for in-group evaluation (i.e. GSIE) between 
subjects with "low" and subjects with "high" social identity. 
Further, a 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects on in-group evaluation changes according 
to the experimental manipulation (positive or negative) and/or 
the level of subjects' social identity ("low" or "high"). 
Thus, the social identity levels do not seem to have 
influenced the degree to which the experimental manipulation 
affected subjects in-group evaluations. 
A similar set of results were obtained with the self-esteem 
measures. A 4 (scale type) X 2 (Social identity level) ANOVA 
with MPC as the dependent variable did not resul t in a 
significant main effect of social identity or a significant 
interaction effect. 9 Similarly, a 4 (scale type) X 2 
(manipulation) X 2 (social identity level) ANOVA with self-
esteem change as the dependent variable did not result in a 
significant social identity main effect or any significant 
9 There was an almost significant main effect of scale-
type (F(3,180) = 2.498, P = 0.06), as expected from the results 
reported above. 
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interaction effects involving social identity levels. 10 Thus, 
as before, the SSSE scale obtained somewhat better MPC scores 
than the other three scales; the positive manipulation 
resulted in slight self-esteem improvement while the negative 
manipulation resulted in slight self-esteem deterioration 
(averaged over scale types); and the SSSE scale was better 
than the other scale types at detecting self-esteem 
deterioration as a result of the negative manipulation. For 
present purposes, though, the important result is that social 
identity levels had no effect on self-esteem change, whatever 
the manipulation or the self-esteem scale used. 
Noo-parametric analysis 
The analyses above were supplemented by a series of Kruskal-
Wallis 1-WAY ANOVAs comparing self-esteem and in-group 
evaluation changes between scale-types for each manipulation 
and by a series of Wilcoxon tests comparing pre- and post-
manipulation levels of self-esteem between scale-types. This 
supplementation was done for a number of reasons. First, the 
assumptions necessary to employ parametric statistics may not 
have been met in the present study. In particular, self-
esteem tends to be negatively skewed and the measures of self-
esteem employed used scales which are probably more properly 
thought to be ordinal rather than interval. ll Second, 
relatively small numbers of subjects fell into each cell of 
some of the more complex ANOVAs conducted above. Third, non-
parametric statistics have the advantage of revealing how many 
10 Again, the former result was expected from a previous 
analysis, as were the near significant main effect of 
manipulation (F(l.lW = 3.581, P = 0.060) and interaction effect 
of scale-type by manipulation (F(3.1721 = 2.450, P = 0.065). 
11 All pre-manipulation self-esteem scores were 
negatively skewed in the present study: GTSE = -1.756, GSSE = 
-0.972, STSE = -0.327, SSSB = -0.296. Pre-manipulation in-
group evaluation scores were also negatively skewed, GSIE = 
-0.921. 
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subjects' self-esteem changes were in the directions predicted 
by the manipulation, rather than relying on differences 
between average self-esteem changes within conditions.12 
The table below shows the results of the separate Wilcoxon 
tests comparing pre- and post-manipulation self-esteem scores 
for each scale-type. The table also shows Wilcoxon tests 
comparing pre- and post-manipulation evaluations of the in-
group. The latter reveals a significant improvement in 
subjects' evaluation of the in-group following the positive 
manipulation but no significant deterioration in their in-
group evaluation following the negative manipulation, relative 
to pre-manipulation levels. Overall, evaluation of the in-
group changed in the direction predicted by the manipulations, 
with this change only just failing to reach significance. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there were significant 
differences between the measures in terms of their indication 
of mean predicted self-esteem change as a result of the two 
manipulations considered together <Xl = 9.04, P = 0.03). 
Kruskal-Wallis tests carried out separately for each of the 
manipulations, however, revealed no significant differences 
between the scale-types in indicating self -esteem change, 
although the test carried out on the negative manipulation 
approached significance (Xl = 2.77, P = 0.43 for the positive 
manipulation and X2 = 6.40, P = 0 .09 for the negative 
manipulation) . 
12 The parametric tests were run because the tests used 
are relatively robust (i.e. remain valid despite minor 
violations of the assumptions needed to run those tests) and 
allowed more complex analysis than is possible with non-
parametric tests on SPSS. 
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Scale Manip Changes Changes No Z p 
in in change (I-Tail) 
predicted opposite 
direction direction 
GTSE + 9 6 7 1.22 0.111 
- 5 15 3 1.51 0.655 
Both 14 21 10 0.52 0.303 
GSSE + 9 6 11 1.79 0.037 
- 10 11 4 0.47 0.320 
Both 19 17 15 0.93 0.177 
STSE + 13 6 4 1.05 0.148 
- 7 11 4 0.57 0.286 
Both 20 17 8 0.25 0.402 
SSSE + 17 5 3 2.37 0.009 
- 13 6 3 1.79 0.037 
Both 30 11 6 2.86 0.002 
GSIE + 11 5 2 1.86 0.032 
- 9 11 2 0.41 0.341 
Both 20 16 8 1.62 0.053 
Table 5.2: Number of cbanges in self-esteem in predicted or 
unpredicted directions by scale-type and manipulation 
The table above makes it clear that neither of the "trait" 
self-esteem measures (i.e. GTSE and STSE) detected significant 
changes in self-esteem as a result of either the positive or 
the negative manipulation, or overall. The GSSE measure shows 
a significant increase self-esteem following the positive 
manipulation, no change in self-esteem following the negative 
manipulation, and no change in self-esteem (in the directions 
predicted by the manipulations) when both manipulations are 
considered together. The SSSE measure shows a significant 
improvement in self-esteem as a result of the positive 
manipulation, a significant deterioration in self-esteem as a 
result of the negative manipulation, and a significant change 
244 
in self -esteem (in the directions predicted by the 
manipulations) when both manipulations are considered 
together. Additionally, the SSSE measure shows far more 
consistency of self-esteem change resulting from the 
experimental manipulation than any of the other measures. 
That is, two or three times more subjects show self-esteem 
change in the direction predicted by the manipulation than in 
the opposite direction on the SSSE measure, a proportion far 
higher than for any other measure. Similarly, far fewer 
subjects show no self -esteem change following experimental 
manipulations on the SSSE scale than on any of the other 
scales. 
Repeating the above analyses separately for subjects with 
"low" and for subjects with "high" social identity resulted in 
outcomes similar to the above and to each other. That is, as 
with the parametric tests, no significant differences were 
found in subjects' changes in self-esteem as a result of the 
experimental manipulations according to their levels of social 
identity. 
DISCUSSION 
The results above suggest that evaluation of the in-group 
improved as a result of the manipulation designed to have this 
effect but that evaluation of the in-group did not deteriorate 
as a result of the manipulation designed to have that effect. 
With regards to self-esteem, the two "trait" measures (GTSE 
and STSE) indicated no change in self-esteem as a result of 
the experimental manipulations (positive, negative or in 
combination) , the GSSE measure indicated self-esteem 
improvement as a result of the positive manipulation but no 
self-esteem deterioration as a result of the negative 
manipulation and no "overall" self-esteem change when the two 
manipulations were considered in combination, and the SSSB 
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scale detected both self-esteem improvement as a result of the 
positive manipulation and self-esteem deterioration as a 
result of the negative manipulation, and therefore also 
indicated significant self-esteem change in the directions 
suggested by the manipulations when both manipulation were 
considered together. The SSSE measure was also more 
"reliable" or "consistent" than the other measures in that 
more subjects' self-esteem changes were in the direction 
suggested by the experimental manipulation than was the case 
for the other scales, relative to the number of subjects who 
showed no self-esteem change or showed self-esteem change in 
the direction opposite to that suggested by the experimental 
manipulation. Thus, hypothesis 1 received support in that the 
SSSE measure was more sensitive than other measures to self-
esteem changes resulting from manipulations intended to raise 
or lower subjects' evaluations of their (national) in-groups, 
particularly for the manipulation intended to worsen in-group 
evaluation. Hypothesis 2 receive no support in that there 
were no differences in self-esteem change as indicated by any 
of the measures according to whether subjects had relatively 
high or relatively low levels of (national) social identity. 
The problem with this first conclusion is of course that 
although SSSE fell as a result of the negative manipulation, 
G8IE did not. 888E cannot sensibly be claimed to be sensitive 
to changes in evaluations of the in-group if SSSE changes when 
in-group evaluations do not. There are three possible 
explanations for the mismatch found between GSIE and SSSE as 
a result of the negative manipulation. The first is that in-
group evaluation was indeed unaffected by the negative 
manipulation and that social identity contingent self-esteem 
was indeed adversely affected. The second is that evaluation 
of particular attributes of the in-group were adversely 
affected by the negative manipulation but that the "general" 
in-group evaluation measure was not sensitive enough to detect 
these "specific" changes. The third is that evaluation of 
particular attributes of the in-group were adversely affected 
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by the negative manipulation but that the threat to social 
identity and self-esteem caused by this exercise led subjects 
to spontaneously recall and/or generate positive in-group 
attributes with the net result of no change in overall in-
group evaluation. Each possible explanation will be 
considered in turn. 
The first essentially claims that each measure was equally 
valid and the results indicated by them can be taken at face 
value. The challenge then is to explain why social identity 
contingent self-esteem fell as a result of the negative 
manipulation even though evaluation of the in-group itself did 
not. This is inconsistent with social identity theory which 
says that evaluation of oneself as an in-group member is 
wholly determined by evaluation of the in-group itself. 
However, the present results suggest that situations in which 
negative in-group attributes are made salient to people may 
not cause those people to think negatively about the in-group 
per se, or even about all in-group members, but rather may 
cause them to think negatively about their own membership of 
their group. So, for example, English football hooliganism 
(antagonism to Europe, or any other negatively evaluated in-
group attribute or behaviour) may not make the English feel 
bad about England as such, or even about English people, but 
it may make them feel bad about themselves as English people, 
perhaps because of "reflected appraisal", i . e. a SUspl.cl.on 
that negatively evaluated in-group attributes make others 
think negatively and stereotypically about in-group and about 
in-group members, and therefore about them as particular 
members of the in-group. Such a possibility suggests that 
research is needed to investigate the exact relationship 
between evaluation of the in-group (e.g. the police), 
evaluation of in-group members (e.g. policemen and 
policewomen) and evaluation of the self as an in-group member 
(e.g. myself as a policeman) . 
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The second possible explanation for the mismatch found between 
changes in SSSE and GSIE as a result of the negative 
manipulation essentially claims that the latter measure was 
not as valid as the former in the present study. This 
argument rests upon ideas similar to those expounded in the 
introduction to this chapter. The claim is that the negative 
manipulation did result in depressed in-group evaluations, but 
only for specific in-group attributes (i.e. the ones the 
subjects thought of and listed), and that the general measure 
of in-group evaluation used was not sensitive enough to 
capture these changes in specific aspects of in-group 
evaluation. Evaluation of one's national identity can be 
assumed to be dependent upon many, many evaluations of 
specific elements of one's nation and membership of it, and 
relatively small changes in relatively minor specific national 
attributes are unlikely to affect general or overall national 
evaluations. The conclusion of this argument is that just as 
self-esteem measures should be tailored to the temporality and 
the generality of the self-esteem of interest, so too should 
measures of other psychological states such as in-group 
evaluation. The present study employed a general state in-
group evaluation (GSIE) measure when perhaps it should have 
employed a specific state in-group evaluation (SSIE) one, 
focusing on those specific positive or negative aspects of the 
in-group which were made salient to subjects. 13 This suggests 
that future studies could manipulate evaluations of identified 
specific in-group attributes and tailor their in-group 
evaluation measures to evaluation of these specific 
attributes. Additionally or alternatively, future studies 
13 This was not possible in the present study because 
subjects were asked to think of their own examples of things 
which made them feel good or bad about their national groups 
and/or membership of them. This method was chosen because of 
the numerous nationalities of the respondents and an inability 
on my part to think of positive and/or negative national 
attributes which would apply equally to the nationalities of 
all the subjects from such a heterogeneous group. It was also 
hoped that self-accessed attributes would have more "impact" 
than experimenter-generated ones. 
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could manipulation overall in-group evaluations (or take 
advantage of "naturally occurring" events which could be 
assumed to cause changes in overall in-group evaluations) and 
employ GSIE measures similar to the one employed in this 
study. That is, future studies could tailor the specificity 
or generality of their in-group evaluation measures to the 
generality or specificity of the in-group evaluations of 
interest. 
Two problems remain with this second response to the GSIE/SSSE 
mismatch, however. First, even if it is accepted that changes 
did occur to specific in-group evaluations (but that the 
general in-group evaluation measure was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect them), this still does not explain why 
changes did occur to social identity contingent self-esteem. 
The SSSE measure is specific to national in-group membership, 
not to specific aspects of that membership. That is, if the 
negative manipulation was not sufficiently strong to cause a 
change in overall in-group evaluation, why was it strong 
enough to cause a change in the self-esteem of in-group 
members which was determined by (" overall") in-group 
membership? Second, the GSIE measure was sufficiently 
sensitive to capture improvements to overall in-group 
evaluation resulting from the positive manipulation, although 
these improvements were presumably every bit as specific as 
those caused by the negative manipulation, especially as there 
were no differences in the number or the "appropriateness" 
(i.e. the manipulation-consistent "direction") of the items 
listed for each of the manipulations. 
The third potential explanation for the mismatch found between 
changes in SSSE and GSIE as a result of the negative 
manipulation concerns the possibility that the negative 
manipulation resulted in psychological processes which were 
not engendered by the positive manipulation. The idea here, 
consistent with social identity theory's self-esteem 
hypothesis, is that making negative in-group attributes 
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salient threatened subjects' social identities and that 
subjects responded to this threat by spontaneously and 
privately making positive in-group attributes more salient. 
Thus the net effect on general in-group evaluation was zero. 
This potential solution avoids the difficulty of the previous 
one caused by the asymmetry between the positive and the 
negative manipulations. There is no reason to assume that 
subjects asked to make positive in-group attributes more 
salient would have been motivated to "counter" the positive 
effects this had on in-group evaluations (and on social 
identity contingent self-esteem) by spontaneously making 
negative in-group attributes more salient. It shares with 
that proposed solution, however, the task of explaining why 
the zero net change in general in-group evaluation as a result 
of the negative manipulation was not accompanied by a similar 
zero net change at the level of social identity contingent 
self-esteem. After all, if the overall result of the negative 
manipulation on in-group evaluation was zero, why should 
subjects feel worse about themselves as in-group members? 
Here again the possibility arises that there may not be 1:1 
correspondence between evaluation of the in-group, evaluation 
of in-group members and evaluation of the self as an in-group 
member. Perhaps it was the case that the negative in-group 
attributes were more salient than the positive ones at the 
level of social identity contingent self-esteem but not at the 
level of the in-group as a whole. At the level of the group 
subjects may have been able to effectively counter salient 
negative in-group attributes by making equivalent positive in-
group attributes salient, but at the level of themselves as 
in-group members perhaps this was not so easily achieved. The 
latter is, after all, potentially far more relevant to their 
self-concepts. Evaluations of the group are just that, 
evaluations of a group of which each subject is only a small 
part. Evaluations of the self as an in-group member is, 
almost by definition, far more self-relevant. One can 
distance oneself from others' evaluation of an in-group (liThe 
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English do tend toward ethnocentrism, but I'm not 
ethnocentric") but it is perhaps more difficult to distance 
oneself from others' evaluations of oneself as an in-group 
member ("The English do tend toward ethnocentrism and I am 
English,,).14 This is all highly speculative, of course, but 
it seems worthy of investigation nonetheless. Future studies 
could investigate if (and when) making negative in-group 
attributes salient results in spontaneous recall and/or 
generation of positive in-group attributes (and indeed if 
making positive in-group attributes salient ever results in 
spontaneous recall or generation of negative in-group 
attributes). It could also be investigated whether negative 
in-group attributes are more threatening at the level of 
individual group membership than at the level of in-group 
evaluation (and/or whether positive in-group attributes are 
more beneficial at the level of individual group membership 
than at the level of in-group evaluation) . 
The second main finding in the present study was that social 
identity did not interact with the effects of in-group 
evaluation manipulation on self-esteem changes. This is 
problematic for social identity theory which suggests that the 
stronger people's social identity the more their self-esteem 
should be affected by changes in in-group evaluations. One 
potential reason for the failure to support this assertion in 
the present study could be that the social identity scale 
employed was invalid. A more likely reason is simply that 
most subjects had relatively positive national social 
identities. Only 26\ of subjects had a social identity of 
. less than the scale midpoint of 4, and only 6\ had social 
identities less than 3 on this (7-point) scale. Thus, it 
appears that the vast majority of subjects had some sort of 
positive national social identity and therefore differential 
14 If this is correct it suggests that social identity 
contingent self-esteem (SSSE) measures may be more reliable 
indicators of the negative aspects of group evaluations than 
are more direct in-group evaluation measures. 
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effects on self-esteem change as a result of in-group 
evaluation change were minimal. Future research could 
investigate whether the social identity contingent self-esteem 
of people with "genuinely" low social identity (i.e. 
"negative" social identity, significantly below the scale mid-
point) is differentially affected by changes in in-group 
evaluations relative to the social identity contingent self-
esteem of people with "genuinely" high (i.e. "positive") 
social identity. 
It is important to be explicit about the relevance of the 
present results to social identity theory's self-esteem 
hypothesis. This hypothesis has not been tested at all by the 
present study (although it will be in Chapter 7.) All that 
has been shown is that the self-esteem measure which is most 
sensitive to changes in in-group evaluation is the one which 
measures social identity contingent self-esteem. This is 
highly relevant to the self-esteem hypothesis, however, as to 
my knowledge no tests of that hypothesis have employed this 
most appropriate measure. Thus, previous empirical studies 
which have found no self-esteem change as a result of 
successful intergroup discrimination cannot be counted as 
evidence against corollary 1 (even if they had adequately 
conceptualized and operationalized successful intergroup 
discrimination) because the measures they have employed may 
not have been sensitive enough to detect such "specific" and 
"state" (i.e. transient) self-esteem changes. 15 Similarly, 
previous empirical studies which have failed to find that 
self-esteem needs promote intergroup discrimination cannot be 
counted as evidence against corollary 2 (even if they had 
adequately taken into account needs stemming from insecure as 
well as negative self-esteem derived from particular group 
15 This criticism is made less severe by the fact that 
several studies have employed GSSE measures and the GSSE 
measure in the present study was as good as the SSSE measure 
at detecting rises in self-esteem resulting from the positive 
manipulation. On the other hand some of the GSSE measures 
used have been of very dubious validity. 
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memberships) because the measures employed may not have been 
sensitive enough to detect changes in specific (i.e. social 
identity contingent) self-esteem. The results of the present 
study suggest that SSSE measures are the best suited for use 
in tests of the self-esteem hypothesis and because such 
measures have never been used, the self -esteem hypothesis 
cannot be considered to have been tested at all. 
Before finishing it is interesting to consider the wider 
implications of the results of the present study. If it true 
that self-esteem measures can usefully be thought of in terms 
of their temporality and specificity, it seems equally true 
that many other psychometric measures can also be thought of 
in similar ways. Thus, any measure which attempts to measure 
changes in postulated psychological states should be a "state" 
measure, and any measure which attempts to predict behaviours 
(broadly understood) dependent upon particular aspects of 
psychological states should be "specific" measures. Perhaps 
it is time to wonder how many research areas besides the self-
esteem hypothesis have been blighted by employing "general" 
and or "trait" measures in empirical investigations when 
"specific" and/or "state" measures would have been more 
appropriate (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein's (1977) "principal of 
compatibility" in attitude research and Haslam et al.'s 
(Haslam & Turner, 1992; Haslam et al., 1992) work on the 
"context-dependency" of social stereotyping). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The sole conclusion of this chapter is simply that social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis has not yet been 
adequately empirically tested. This claim can be justified 
methodologically, theoretically and empirically. The 
methodological point is primarily that the empirical "tests" 
of the self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory 
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have simply not been adequate to test even Hogg & Abrams' 
impoverished formulations of the corollaries of that 
hypothesis. In particular, tests of corollary 1 have at best 
investigated the link between levels of in-group favouritism 
and subsequent changes in self-esteem rather than 
investigating the link between "successful" intergroup 
discrimination and subsequent changes in social identity 
contingent self-esteem. Tests of corollary 2 have, at best, 
typically investigated whether people with relatively low 
self-esteem engage in more subsequent discrimination across 
groups than people with relatively high self-esteem rather 
than investigating whether people with negative or threatened 
social identity contingent self-esteem engage in more 
subsequent intergroup discrimination than people with securely 
positive social identity contingent self-esteem. The 
theoretical point is that Abrams & Hogg's formulations of the 
corollaries of social identity theory's self -esteem hypothesis 
do not accurately reflect that theory. In particular, Abrams 
& Hogg's first corollary is deficient in not elucidating what 
constitutes "successful" intergroup discrimination and 
therefore obscures the importance within social identity 
theory of people obtaining or protecting positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values. Their second 
corollary is deficient in not accounting for the fact that 
intergroup discrimination is by no means postulated by social 
identity theory as the only route available to address self-
esteem needs and will not be taken if it is not deemed 
appropriate to serve such needs, for example if "cognitive 
alternatives" are not available. The empirical point is that 
the present study provides evidence that the most appropriate 
measure for use in tests of the self-esteem hypothesis is an 
855E one (where state social identity contingent self-esteem 
is measured) and no tests of the self-esteem hypothesis have 
to date employed such a measure. None of this, of course, 
provides a shred of evidence that the self-esteem hypothesis 
is or is not valid or correct. It simply illustrates that it 
has yet to be tested. Provisional tests of each corollary are 
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presented in Chapter 7. The next chapter, however, again 
examines the role of in-group evaluations on in-group members' 
self-esteem, this time in the context of comparing predictions 
derived from social identity theory with predictions derived 
from Tesser's (1988) self-evaluation maintenance model. 
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QU\mR 6; STQPY 5 - TIm CONSBOlJENCiS OF SOCIAL COMPARISON; 
!ESSER'S SELF-EVALUATION MAINTENANCE MODEL VBR,SYS 
TAJfEL'S SOCIAL IDENTITY DIBORX 
CHAPTBR OVERVIEW 
The study reported in this chapter compared predictions 
derived from Tajfel's social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) with predictions derived from Tesser's (1988) self-
evaluation maintenance model, concerning the effects of social 
comparison outcomes on self-esteem and related phenomena. 
Social identity theory predicts that, when social identity is 
salient, only between-group social comparison outcomes on in-
group valued dimensions affect self-esteem. In such 
circumstances, the theory predicts that in-group superiority 
contributes positively to self-esteem, while in-group 
inferiority contributes negatively to self-esteem. 
The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts that, 
regardless of whether or not social identity is salient, only 
individual inferiority to another affects self-esteem. 
Individual inferiority on self-relevant dimensions contributes 
negatively to self-esteem, while individual inferiority on 
self-irrelevant dimensions contributes positively to self-
esteem. Individual superiority does not affect self-esteem, 
regardless of the self-relevance of comparison dimensions. 
Social identity theory's predictions received considerably 
more support from the present study than the predictions 
derived from the self-evaluation maintenance model. However, 
between- individual and between-group social comparison 
outcomes on relevant dimensions had an interactive effect on 
self-esteem. It was concluded that social identity theory 
would benefit from incorporating a between-individual element 
into its currently purely between-group perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) claims that when people think of themselves as group 
members (i.e. when they think of themselves in terms of their 
social identities), their self-esteem is dependent upon the 
outcome of comparisons between the groups they are members of 
(i.e. their in-groups) and relevant out-groups on dimensions 
of importance to the in-groups. Positive in-group 
distinctiveness (i.e. in-group superiority over relevant out-
groups on positively valued dimensions) generally makes a 
positive contribution to evaluations of the in-group, of all 
in-group members (perceived as such), and of oneself 
(perceived as an in-group member), while negative in-group 
distincti veness generally makes a negative contribution to 
evaluations of in-groups, in-group members and oneself.l The 
positive contribution to the self-esteem (i.e. self-
evaluation) of in-group members from positive in-group 
distinctiveness will be secure if that positive in-group 
distinctiveness is itself secure, but will be threatened if 
the positive in-group distinctiveness is insecure. Thus, 
negative in-group distinctiveness is detrimental to the level 
of in-group members' self-esteem, and insecure positive in-
group distinctiveness is detrimental to the security of such 
self-esteem. 
Social identity theory goes on to say that the detrimental 
effects of negative or insecure positive in-group 
distinctiveness on in-group members' self-esteem can be 
countered by in-group members: (i) physically or 
psychologically distancing themselves from the in-group (i.e. 
1 The qualifier "generally" is required because 
exceptions to this "general" rule occur when status 
differentials are perceived to be "illegitimate" and/or so 
"stable" as to seem "natural" (e.g. Tajfel, 1981a: 279-287, 
see also Chapter 1 of this thesis). These caveats will not be 
considered in this chapter. 
257 
employing "social mobility" or "exit"); (ii) attempting to 
improve the between-group status differential in favour of the 
in-group (i.e. employing "social competition"); and/or, (iii) 
decreasing the importance of the comparison dimension to the 
in-group (i.e. employing "social creativity"). Similarly, the 
beneficial effect of secure positive in-group distinctiveness 
on in-group members' self-esteem can be enhanced by in-group 
members increasing the closeness between themselves and the 
in-group, increasing the between-group differential in favour 
of the in-group, and/or increasing the relevance of the 
comparison dimension to the in-group. 
Social identity theory, as an explicitly intergroup theory, is 
relatively "silent" about the effects of between-individual 
social comparison outcomes, except in so far as such outcomes 
reveal, reflect, or make salient between-group social 
comparison outcomes. Schiffmann & Wicklund (1992) have 
suggested that this silence makes the theory superfluous as, 
they claim, all of the effects of between-group social 
comparison outcomes can be reduced to and explained by a 
theory of the effects of between-individual social comparison 
outcomes, such as that provided by Tesser's self-evaluation 
maintenance model (Pleban & Tesser, 1981; Tesser, 1980, 1984, 
1986, 1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1980, 1982, 1983; Tesser & 
Collins, 1988; Tesser & Paulus, 1983; Tesser & Smith, 1980; 
Tesser et aI, 1984, 1988). 
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Table 6.1 below shows the effects of between-individual social 
comparison outcomes on self-esteem according to Tesser's self-
evaluation maintenance model. 2.3 
Relevant Dimension: Irrelevant Dimension: 
"Comparison" Process "Reflection" Process 
Distant I Close Distant Close 
Other Other Other Other 
Self 
Inferior - - - + + + 
Self 
superior a a a a 
Xey: --. major drop in .elf-e.teem; -. minor drop in •• If-e.t.em; ++. major ri •• 1n •• If •• t ••• ; 
+ • ainor ria. in •• If-e.teem. 
Table 6.1: Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model 
Self-relevant comparisons result in a process of "comparison" 
and self-irrelevant comparisons result in a process of 
"reflection".4 Comparisons are self-relevant if they (i) 
occur on dimensions which are important to a person's self-
definition and (ii) involve comparisons between oneself and 
others who are "roughly similar" to oneself on that dimension. 
A comparison dimension is important to a person's self-
definition to the extent that the person strives for 
It will be assumed that Tesser's concept of self-
evaluation is equivalent to Tajfel's notion of self-esteem, 
and the two terms are used interchangeably throughout this 
chapter (see Tesser & Campbell, 1983: 9). 
From this point forth all discussion concerning 
effects on self-esteem will be restricted to effects on the 
level (as opposed to the stability) of self-esteem, unless 
stated to the contrary. 
4 Quote marks will be used for Tesser's hypothesized 
processes of "comparison" and "reflection" in order to 
distinguish the former from the more general notion of social 
comparison employed in the literature. 
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competence on the dimension, describes themself in terms of 
the dimension, or freely chooses to engage in tasks related to 
the dimension (Tesser, 1988: 183). Comparison others are 
"roughly similar" to a person on a comparison dimension if the 
others are neither "so much better or worse" than the person 
as to make comparisons "difficult" (i.e. meaningless for self-
evaluation purposes) . 
"Reflection" is analogous 
Basking In the Reflected 
Cialdini et al., 1976). 
to Cialdini' s notion of BIRGing: 
Glory of a superior other (e . g . 
Positive contributions to self-
evaluation can be obtained by "reflection" from another who is 
superior to oneself on dimensions which are not self-relevant, 
and the closer one is to the other who is superior on self-
irrelevant dimensions, the greater the positive contribution 
to self-evaluation. Closeness is similar to Heider's (1958) 
concept of unit-relatedness: "anything that tends to put two 
persons into a unit relationship increases closeness" (Tesser, 
1986: 438). However, as comparisons with others on self-
irrelevant dimensions result in a process of "reflection", and 
as one cannot bask in the glory of an inferior other, there 
are no effects on self-evaluation following social comparison 
outcomes which reveal individual superiority to another on 
self-irrelevant dimensions, regardless of how close the self 
and other. 
"Comparison" essentially involves feeling "bad by comparison" 
(Tesser, 1986: 438). Inferiority to another on a self-
relevant dimension will promote negative contributions to 
self-evaluation, and the closer one is to the other who is 
superior on self-relevant dimensions, the greater the 
resultant negative contributions to self-evaluation. However I 
as comparisons on self-relevant dimensions result in a process 
of "comparison", and as one cannot look bad in comparison to 
an inferior other, there are no effects on self-evaluation 
following social comparison outcomes which reveal individual 
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inferiori ty to another on sel f - relevant dimens ions, regardless 
of how close the self and other. 
Like social identity theory, Tesser's self-evaluation 
maintenance model is "dynamic" in that it predicts that self-
evaluation is a mediating variable between comparison outcomes 
and "dynamic" behaviour aimed at maintaining, enhancing or 
reinstating positive self-evaluation. In "comparison" 
situations, where negative contributions to self-evaluation 
accrue because of inferiority to a close other who is superior 
on self-relevant dimensions, the model predicts that a person 
will attempt to prevent further "comparison" by (i) reducing 
closeness, (ii) decreasing or reversing the performance 
differential, and/or (iii) decreasing the relevance of the 
comparison (Tesser & Campbell, 1983: 8). The model is silent 
about the dynamic consequences of "reflection" situations, 
where positive contributions to self-evaluation accrue because 
of association with a close other who is superior on self-
irrelevant dimensions. It is possible that there are no 
dynamic consequences in such situations, as people are already 
obtaining positive contributions to self-evaluation, or it is 
possible that people in "reflection" situations may wish to 
take dynamic action in order to maintain or enhance those 
positive contributions, i.e. by (i) increasing closeness, (ii) 
decreasing relevance, and/or (iii) increasing the performance 
differential so that the other is increasingly superior to 
oneself! 
The model is also silent about the dynamic consequences of 
social comparison outcomes which reveal individual superiority 
to another. 
Finally, the self-evaluation maintenance model, as an 
explicitly interindi vidual theory, is silent about the effects 
of between-group social comparison outcomes, except in so far 
as such outcomes reveal, reflect, or make salient between-
individual social comparison outcomes. 
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There are a number of similarities between Tesser' s self-
evaluation maintenance model and Taj fel' s social identity 
theory. Both assume individual needs to obtain, maintain, 
protect, or enhance positive self-esteem; both suggest that 
such self-esteem needs are affected by social comparison 
outcomes; and both postulate dynamic cognitive or behavioural 
strategies to serve self-esteem needs by altering closeness to 
others, relevance of comparison dimensions and/or 
differentials between the units of comparison. 
There are also a number of stark differences between the 
theories. First, within the self -evaluation maintenance model 
"closeness" can only be zero or positive, never negative, 
whereas it is at least implicit within social identity theory 
that others can be negatively close (i.e. out-groups and their 
members) and that comparisons with these negatively close 
others will have different effects than comparisons with 
others who are "merely" distant (i. e. who are not in-group 
members but who are also not relevant out-groups or members of 
them - see Introduction and the next chapter). Second, the 
self -evaluation maintenance model claims that only upward 
social comparisons can affect self -evaluation while social 
identity theory predicts that both upward and downward social 
comparisons will do so. Third, social identity theory 
explicitly posits dynamic strategies in response to situations 
where positive contributions to self-esteem accrue as well as 
situations where negative contributions to self-esteem accrue, 
while the self-evaluation maintenance model explicitly deals 
with dynamic strategies only in the latter situations. 
Fourth, social identity theory conceives of situations in 
which people will wish to increase the relevance of social 
comparison dimensions, whereas the self -evaluation maintenance 
model never explicitly conceives of such a possibility. 
Fifth, the self-evaluation maintenance model conceives of 
situations in which the outcomes of upward social comparisons 
can be beneficial for self-evaluation, but social identity 
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theory predicts that all upward comparison outcomes result in 
negative, or at best no, contributions to self-esteem. Sixth, 
and perhaps most important, social identity theory explicitly 
concerns only between-group social comparisons while the self-
evaluation maintenance model explicitly concerns only between-
individual social comparisons. 
In the light of this last point, it seems worth considering 
whether each of the theories above can be extended to 
incorporate both between-individual and between-group social 
comparisons. 5 
An "extended" self-evaluation maintenance model 
Table 6.2 below is essentially Table 6.1 modified simply by 
substituting "in-group" for the self and "out-group" for the 
other. 
Relevant Dimension: Irrelevant Dimension: 
"Comparison" Process "Reflection" Process 
Distant Close Distant Close 
Out-group Out-group Out-group Out-group 
In-group 
Inferior - - - + + + 
In-group 
Superior 0 0 0 0 
l.y: -- ... ajor <'rop in •• If- •• t .... ; - ... inor <'rop in •• If- •• t .... ; ++ .... jor ril. in •• If •• t •• II; 
+ • minor ria. in .elf-•• t.ami 0 - no chang. 1n •• If- •• t •••. 
Table 6.2: A between-group version of Tesser's SElf model 
5 For now only the "direct" (self-esteem/self-
evaluation) and not the "indirect" or "dynamic" consequences 
of social compar~son outcomes will be considered whilst 
developing the extended theories. 
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Consistent with the "original" self -evaluation maintenance 
model, a "between-groups" version of that model predicts that 
where social comparisons take place on dimensions which are 
relevant to in-group members a process of "comparison" takes 
place. When in-group inferiority is revealed by such 
comparisons a negative contribution will be made to in-group 
members' self-evaluation, and the closer the in-group to the 
out-group, the greater the detrimental effect on the self-
evaluation of in-group members from in-group inferiority on 
in-group relevant dimensions. Where social comparisons reveal 
in-group superiority to the out-group on in-group relevant 
dimensions, in-group members' self-evaluation is unaffected as 
one cannot suffer in comparison to inferior others, regardless 
of the closeness of the in-group to the out-group. 
Similarly, where social comparisons take place on dimensions 
which are irrelevant to in-group members a process of 
"reflection" takes place. When in-group inferiority is 
revealed by such comparisons a positive contribution will be 
made to in-group members' self-evaluation, and the closer the 
in-group to the out-group, the greater the positive effect on 
the self-evaluation of in-group members from in-group 
inferiority on in-group relevant dimensions. Where social 
comparisons reveal in-group superiority to the out-group on 
in-group relevant dimensions, in-group members' self-
evaluation is unaffected as one cannot bask in the reflected 
glory of inferior others, regardless of the closeness of the 
in-group to the out-group. 
Combining the original self-evaluation maintenance model with 
the between-group version of it, an "extended" self-evaluation 
maintenance model predicts that: social comparisons which 
reveal superiority of the self to another or of the in-group 
to an out-group will not affect the self-evaluation of 
individuals or in-group members, irrespective of closeness and 
relevance; all social comparisons which reveal inferiority of 
the self to another or of the in-group to an out-group on 
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relevant dimensions will result in negative contributions to 
self-evaluation; all social comparisons which reveal 
inferiority of the self to another or of the in-group to an 
out-group on irrelevant dimensions will result in positive 
contributions to self-evaluation; and, the closer the self to 
a superior other or the in-group to a superior out-group, the 
greater the effects of social comparison outcomes on self-
evaluation. 
An "extended" social identity theory 
A "between-individuals" version of social identity theory 
would suggest that when personal identity is salient 
individual superiority over another on a personally relevant 
comparison dimension will result in positive contributions 
being made to self-esteem while individual inferiority to 
another on a personally relevant comparison dimension will 
result in negative contributions being made to self-esteem 
(see Lemaine, 1974; Lemaine et al., 1978; Tajfel, 1978b: 16-
17). Individual inferiority or superiority to others on self-
irrelevant dimensions will not be predicted to affect self-
esteem. 
Combining the original social identity theory with the 
between-individuals version of it, an "extended" social 
identity theory predicts that, when the relevant personal 
and/or social identities are salient and when the comparison 
others are relevant comparison others: individual inferiority 
or superiority to others on personally irrelevant dimensions 
and/or in-group inferiority or superiority to out-groups on 
in-group irrelevant dimensions do not affect self -esteem; 
individual superiority to others on personally relevant 
dimensions and/or in-group superiority to out-groups on in-
group relevant dimensions result in positive contributions to 
self-esteem; and, individual inferiority to others on 
personally relevant dimensions and/or in-group inferiority to 
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out-groups on in-group relevant dimensions result in negative 
contributions to self-esteem. 
The present study 
The study presented here was conceived primarily in response 
to Schiffmann & Wicklund's (1992) argument that social 
identity theory is superfluous as a social psychological 
theory as the effects of all between-group social comparison 
outcomes can be reduced to and fully explained in terms of the 
effects of between-individual social comparison outcomes. 
In the study subjects were randomly categorized as members <0, 
R, S or T) of one or the other of two groups (0 and R in Group 
M, and Sand T in Group N) and were given both individual and 
group false feedback on two bogus performance dimensions of 
differing relevance to subjects: cognitive dexterity (CD, high 
relevance) and creative empathy (eE, no relevance) . 
In order to maximally test Schiffmann & Wicklund's claim that 
interindividual theories of social comparisons such as 
Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model make intergroup 
theories of social comparisons such as social identity theory 
redundant, strenuous attempts were made to maximize the 
salience of subjects' social identities and of the intergroup 
social comparisons, and to minimize the salience of subjects' 
personal identities and of the interpersonal social 
comparisons. If Schiffmann & Wicklund's claim is correct, 
this should present no difficulties for the self-evaluation 
maintenance model. But if the claim is incorrect, and social 
identity theory is correct in claiming that between-group 
social comparison outcomes can affect self-esteem above and 
beyond the effects of between-individual social comparison 
outcomes, it should. 
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Table 6.3 below shows that false feedback resulted in Group M 
being positively distinct on the dimension of high relevance 
(CD) but negatively distinct on the dimension of no relevance 
(eE) , while the opposite was true for Group N. Additionally, 
while for the sake of conceptual and methodological simplicity 
the false feedback ensured that individual-level comparisons 
between members of different groups corresponded to or were 
consistent with group-level differentials (i.e. when one was 
positive or negative the other was too), one individual group 
member outperformed the other within-groups. This resulted in 
different patterns of social comparison outcomes for each 
subject. 
Subject Q, for example, was a member of a positively distinct 
group on the relevant dimension, a member of a negatively 
distinct group on the irrelevant dimension, outperformed their 
team-mate on the relevant dimension, and underperformed their 
team-mate on the irrelevant dimension. The other member of 
Group M, however, subject R, was similarly the member of a 
positively distinct group on the relevant dimension and of a 
negatively distinct group on the irrelevant dimension, but 
underperformed their team-mate on the relevant dimension while 
outperforming them on the irrelevant dimension. 
Similarly, subjects Sand T were members of a negatively 
distinct group on the relevant dimension and of a positively 
distinct group on the irrelevant dimension, but whereas 
subj ect T outperformed their team-mate on the former dimension 
and underperformed them on the irrelevant dimension, for 
subject S these between-individual team-mate comparisons had 
the opposite pattern of outcomes. 
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Group M Group N 
Subject Q Subject R Subject S Subject T 
Team CD 
Score 67 38 
Team 
Member CD 37 30 15 23 
Score 
Team CE 
Score 35 75 
Team 
Member CE 11 24 42 33 
Score 
CD • Cognitive dexterity. the high relevance compari.on dimen.ion; and CI • Creative Impathy. 
the irrelevant one. 
Table 6.3: False feedback employed in the present study 
Self-esteem change predictions from the self-evaluation 
maintenance model 
For between-individual comparisons the original self-
evaluation maintenance model predicts a three-way interaction 
between relevance, closeness and individual distinctiveness on 
self-esteem. For both relevant and irrelevant comparison 
dimensions positive individual distinctiveness (PIO, i.e. 
individual superiority over the comparison other) will have no 
effect on self-esteem, regardless of closeness and relevance. 
Negative individual distinctiveness (NID, i.e. individual 
inferiority to the comparison other) will have a detrimental 
effect on self-esteem on the high relevance comparison 
dimension but a beneficial effect on self-esteem on the 
irrelevant comparison dimension. Further, the greater the 
closeness to the comparison other, the more extreme the 
respective effects on self-esteem of negative individual 
distinctiveness. 
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The original self-evaluation maintenance model, as a purely 
individualistic theory, makes no predictions about the effects 
of between-group social comparisons on the self-esteem of 
group members, except in so far as such comparisons reveal, 
reflect or make salient between-individual differences. As in 
the present study between-group differences are always 
consistent with between-individual differences across groups, 
the model suggests that in-group inferiority to the out-group 
reveals individual inferiority to both out-group members, 
while in-group superiority to the out-group reveals individual 
superiority to both out-group members. Thus, in-group 
inferiority on the relevant dimension will have a detrimental 
effect on in-group members' self-esteem; in-group inferiority 
on the irrelevant dimension will have a beneficial effect on 
in-group members' self-esteem; and, in-group superiority will 
have no effect on in-group members' self-esteem, regardless of 
comparison dimension relevance. 
Assuming that the out-group in the present study is a close 
one, (as the only out-group present), the between-groups 
version of the self-evaluation maintenance model makes the 
same between-group predictions as the original model: in-
group inferiority on the relevant dimension will make a 
negative contribution to in-group members' self-esteem; in-
group inferiority on the irrelevant dimension will make a 
positive contribution to in-group members' self-esteem; and, 
in-group superiority will not affect in-group members' self-
esteem, irrespective of dimension relevance. 
The between-groups version of the self-evaluation maintenance 
model makes different predictions to those made by the 
original model concerning the effects of intragroup between-
individual social comparisons outcomes, however. According to 
the between-groups version of the theory between-individual 
social comparisons within groups will not affect self-
evaluation at all. Rather, self -evaluation will be determined 
by the between-group social comparison outcomes, even when 
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comparisons are made wi thin groups (remembering the high 
salience of social identity and between-group social 
comparisons and the low salience of personal identities and 
between-individual social comparisons in the present study). 
Thus, in-group inferiority to the out-group on the relevant 
dimension will result in negative contributions to self-
evaluation, regardless of whether individuals compare 
themselves with in-group or out-group others and, in the 
former case, regardless of whether the individuals are 
inferior or superior to in-group others. Similarly, in-group 
inferiority to the out-group on an irrelevant dimension will 
result in positive contributions to self-evaluation, again 
regardless of whether individuals compare themselves with in-
group or out-group others and, in the former case, regardless 
of whether individuals are inferior or superior to in-group 
others. Finally, in-group superiority to the out-group on 
irrelevant dimensions will result in no change to self-
evaluation, regardless of whether individuals compare 
themselves with in-group or out-group others and, in the 
former case, regardless of whether the individuals are 
inferior or superior to in-group others. 
The extended version of the self-evaluation maintenance model 
combines the above two versions and predicts effects for both 
between-individual and between-group social comparison 
outcomes on self -evaluation. In the present study, where 
between-group differences are consistent with between-
individual differences across groups, between-group 
predictions are simple, whether they occur at the genuinely 
between-group level or at the between-individual level across 
groups. Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group on a 
relevant dimension ("comparison" situation), individuals' 
self -evaluation will suffer, both because of the in-group 
inferiority on a relevant dimension and because of 
individuals' inferiority to both out-group members on that 
dimension. Similarly, where the in-group is inferior to the 
out-group on an irrelevant dimension ("reflection" situation), 
~ .. 
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individuals' self-evaluation will benefit, both because of the 
in-group's closeness to an irrelevantly superior out-group, 
and because of the individuals' closeness to both irrelevantly 
superior out-group members. Where the in-group is superior to 
the out-group, and each in-group member is superior to each 
out-group member, self-evaluation will not be affected by 
between-group comparisons, either at the genuinely between-
group level or at the between-individual level across groups. 
Intragroup between-individual comparisons are more complex 
according to the extended self-evaluation maintenance model. 
Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group and 
individuals are inferior to other in-group members on a 
relevant comparison dimension the in-group inferiority will 
contribute negatively to self-evaluations, both because of the 
in-group's inferiority on a relevant dimension per se, 
according to the between-groups version of the self-evaluation 
maintenance model, and because of the individuals' inferiority 
on a relevant dimension to both out-group members, according 
to the original version of that model. Also, the individuals' 
inferiority on a relevant dimension to in-group others will 
make a further negative contribution to self-evaluation, again 
according to the original model. These effects will be 
additive, so that individual and in-group inferiority on a 
relevant dimension combine to result in a substantially 
negative contribution to self-evaluation. 
Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group and 
individuals are inferior to other in-group members on an 
irrelevant comparison dimension the "in-group inferiority" 
will contribute positively to self-evaluations, both because 
of the closeness of the in-group to the irrelevantly superior 
out-group, according to the between-groups version of the 
self-evaluation maintenance model, and because of the 
individuals' (lesser) closeness to both irrelevantly superior 
out-group members, according to the original version of that 
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model. 6 Also, the individuals' (greater) closeness to the 
irrelevantly superior in-group others will make a further 
positive contribution to self-evaluation, again according to 
the original model. These effects will be additive, so that 
individual and in-group inferiority on irrelevant dimensions 
combine to result in substantially positive contributions to 
self-evaluation. 
Where the in-group is superior to the out-group and 
individuals are inferior to other in-group members on a 
relevant comparison dimension the in-group superiority will 
not affect self-evaluation and thus self-evaluation will be 
wholly determined by the intragroup between-individual social 
comparison. This is negative, according to the original self-
evaluation maintenance model. Thus, according to the extended 
version of the self-evaluation maintenance model, negative 
contributions to self-evaluation when individuals are inferior 
to in-group others on a relevant comparison dimension will be 
less marked when the in-group is superior to the out-group on 
that dimension than when the in-group is inferior to the out-
group on that dimension. 
Where the in-group is superior to the out-group and 
individuals are inferior to other in-group members on an 
irrelevant comparison dimension the in-group superiority will 
not affect self-evaluation and thus self-evaluation will be 
wholly determined by the intragroup between-individual social 
comparison. This is positive, according to the original self-
evaluation maintenance model. Thus, according to the extended 
version of the self-evaluation maintenance model, positive 
contributions to self-evaluation when individuals are inferior 
to in-group others on an irrelevant comparison dimension will 
be less marked when the in-group is superior to the out-group 
6 "In-group inferiority" is in quote marks in this 
sentence as it is not the inferiority per se which affects 
self-evaluation, it is the individuals' or the in-group's 
closeness to the irrelevantly superior other. 
Ii' 
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on that dimension than when the in-group is inferior to the 
out-group on that dimension. 
Finally, where the in-group is superior to the out-group and 
individuals are superior to other in-group members there will 
be no affect on self-evaluation, regardless of the relevance 
of the comparison dimension, as superiority does not affect 
self-evaluation according to any version of the self-
evaluation maintenance model. 
Thus, for between-individual social comparisons within groups, 
the extended version of the self-evaluation maintenance model 
predicts a three-way interaction between in-group 
distinctiveness, individual distinctiveness and comparison 
relevance on self-evaluation. Where the in-group is superior 
to the out-group and individuals are superior to other in-
group members, self-evaluation will be unaffected, regardless 
of comparison relevance. Where the in-group is inferior to 
the out-group on a relevant comparison dimension there will be 
a detrimental affect on self-evaluation when individuals are 
inferior to other in-group members on such a dimension and a 
lesser detrimental affect on self-evaluation when individuals 
are superior to other in-group members on such a dimension. 
Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group on an 
irrelevant comparison dimension there will be a positive 
affect on self-evaluation when individuals are inferior to 
other in-group members on such a dimension and a lesser 
positive affect on self-evaluation when individuals are 
superior to other in-group members on such a dimension. Where 
the in-group is superior to the out-group effects on self-
evaluation will be determined solely by between-individual 
social comparison outcomes. Thus, negative contributions to 
self-evaluation will result from individual inferiority to in-
group others on relevant dimensions (but not as great as where 
the in-group is also inferior to the out-group on these 
dimensions); positive contributions to self-evaluation will 
result from individual inferiority to in-group others on 
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irrelevant dimensions (but, again, not as great as when the 
in-group is inferior to the out-group on these dimensions); 
and, as already mentioned, self-evaluation will be unaffected 
by individual superiority to in-group others, regardless of 
comparison dimension relevanc~. 
Self-esteem change predictions from social identity theo~ 
For between-group social comparisons social identity theory 
predicts an interaction between dimension relevance and group 
distinctiveness on the self-esteem of group members. On the 
irrelevant dimension neither positive nor negative in-group 
distinctiveness will have much effect on the self-esteem of 
group members. On the dimension of high relevance, however, 
positive in-group distinctiveness will have a beneficial 
effect on the self-esteem of in-group members and negative in-
group distinctiveness will have a detrimental effect on the 
self-esteem of in-group members. 
As social identity theory is an explicitly intergroup theory, 
between-individual social comparisons within groups are not 
predicted to affect self-esteem at all, except in as much as 
they reveal, reflect or make salient between-group 
differences. Thus, self -esteem will be determined by between-
group social comparison outcomes, even when comparisons are 
made within groups (remembering the high salience of social 
identity and between-group social comparisons and the low 
salience of personal identities and between-individual social 
comparisons in the present study). Nevertheless, it can be 
predicted that between-group differences are considerably less 
salient during intragroup between-individual social 
comparisons than during between-individual social comparisons 
across groups, especially as in the present study between-
group differences are consistent with between-individual 
differences across groups. Thus, in-group superiority on the 
relevant dimension will have a beneficial effect on self-
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esteem, regardless of individual inferiority or superiority to 
in-group others, but the beneficial effect on self-esteem will 
be greater following across-group individual-level social 
comparisons (which make the in-group superiority more salient) 
than following intragroup between-individual ones; in-group 
inferiority on the relevant dimension will have a detrimental 
effect on self-esteem, regardless of individual inferiority or 
superiority to in-group others, but the detrimental effect on 
self-esteem will be greater following across-group individual-
level social comparisons (which make the in-group inferiority 
more salient) than following intragroup between- indi vidual 
ones; and, in-group inferiority or superiority on irrelevant 
dimensions will leave self-esteem unaffected, regardless of 
individual inferiority or superiority to in-group others or 
whether between-individual social comparisons occur within or 
across groups. 
For between-individual social comparison outcomes, therefore, 
social identity theory predicts a three-way interaction 
between dimension relevance, closeness and group-
distinctiveness on the self-esteem of in-group members. In-
group superiority on the relevant dimension will have a 
beneficial effect on self-esteem, but this will be greater 
when between-individual comparisons occur across groups than 
when they occur within groups; in-group inferiority on the 
relevant dimension will have a detrimental effect on self-
esteem, but again this will be greater when between-individual 
comparisons occur across groups than when they occur within 
groups; and in-group inferiority or superiority on the 
irrelevant dimension will not affect self-esteem, regardless 
of whether between-individual comparisons occur within or 
across groups. 
The between-individuals version of social identity theory 
makes slightly different between-individual predictions, in 
that individual differences are important in their own right, 
rather than and instead of "indirectly" in terms of 
4 
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reflecting, revealing or making salient between-group 
differences. Thus, individual superiority to another on the 
relevant dimension will make a beneficial contribution to 
self-esteem and individual inferiority to another on the 
relevant dimension will make a detrimental contribution to 
self-esteem, and the closer the other to the self the greater 
the effect on self-esteem. Individual inferiority or 
superiority to another on the irrelevant dimension will not 
affect self-esteem, regardless of how close the comparison 
other. 
The extended version of social identity theory combines the 
above two versions and predicts effects for both between-
individual and between-group social comparison outcomes on 
self -esteem. In the present study, where between-group 
differences are consistent with between-individual differences 
across groups, between-group predictions are simple, whether 
they occur at the genuinely between-group level or at the 
between-individual level across groups. Where the in-group is 
inferior to the out-group on a relevant dimension, 
individuals' self-esteem will suffer, both because of the in-
group inferiority on a relevant dimension and because of 
individuals' inferiority to both out-group members on that 
dimension. Similarly, where the in-group is superior to the 
out-group on a relevant dimension, individuals' self-esteem 
will benefit, both because of the in-group superiority on a 
relevant dimension and because of individuals' superiority to 
both out-group members on that dimension. Where the in-group 
is inferior or superior to the out -group on an irrelevant 
dimension, self-esteem will not be affected. 
For between-individual social comparisons within groups the 
effects on self -esteem are again rather more complicated. 
Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group on a relevant 
dimension and individuals are inferior to other in-group 
members on the same dimension, the in-group inferiority will 
contribute negatively to self-esteem, both because of the in-
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group's inferiority on a relevant dimension per se, according 
to the original version of social identity theory, and because 
of the individuals' inferiority on a relevant dimension to 
both out-group members, according to the between-individuals 
version of that model. Also, the individuals' inferiority on 
a relevant dimension to in-group others will make a further 
negative contribution to self-esteem, according to the 
between-individuals version of social identity theory. These 
effects will be additive, so that individual and in-group 
inferiority on a relevant dimension combine to result in a 
substantially negative contribution to self-esteem. 
Where the in-group is inferior to the out-group on a relevant 
dimension and individuals are superior to other in-group 
members on the same dimension, the in-group inferiority will 
contribute negatively to self-esteem, both because of the in-
group's inferiority on a relevant dimension per se, according 
to the original version of social identity theory, and because 
of the individuals' inferiority on a relevant dimension to 
both out-group members, according to the between-individuals 
version of that model. However, here the individuals' 
superiority on a relevant dimension to in-group others will 
make a positive contribution to self-esteem, according to the 
between-individuals version of social identity theory. These 
effects will be additive, so that in-group inferiority but 
individual superiority to other in-group members on a relevant 
dimension combine to result in either no affect on or a slight 
negative contribution to self-esteem. 
Where the in-group is superior to the out-group on a relevant 
dimension and individuals are superior to other in-group 
members on the same dimension, the in-group superiority will 
contribute positively to self-esteem, both because of the in-
group's superiority on a relevant dimension per se, according 
to the original version of social identity theory, and because 
of the individuals' superiority on a relevant dimension to 
both out-group members, according to the between-individuals 
277 
version of that model. Also, the individuals' superiority on 
a relevant dimension to in-group others will make a further 
positive contribution to self-esteem, according to the 
between-individuals version of social identity theory. These 
effects will be additive, so that individual and in-group 
superiority on a relevant dimension combine to result in a 
substantially positive contribution to self-esteem. 
Where the in-group is superior to the out-group on a relevant 
dimension and individuals are inferior to other in-group 
members on the same dimension, the in-group superiority will 
contribute positively to self-esteem, both because of the in-
group's superiority on a relevant dimension per se, according 
to the original version of social identity theory, and because 
of the individuals' superiority on a relevant dimension to 
both out-group members, according to the between-individuals 
version of that model. However, here the indi viduals ' 
inferiority on a relevant dimension to in-group others will 
make a negative contribution to self-esteem, according to the 
between-individuals version of social identity theory. These 
effects will be additive, so that in-group superiority but 
individual inferiority to other in-group members on a relevant 
dimension combine to result in either no affect on or a slight 
positive contribution to self-esteem. 
Finally, when social comparisons take place on irrelevant 
dimensions there will be no effect of intragroup between-
individual social comparison outcomes on self-esteem, 
regardless of in-group or individual distinctiveness from in-
group others. 
Thus, for between-individual social comparisons within groups, 
the extended version of social identity theory predicts a 
three-way interaction between in-group distinctiveness, 
individual distinctiveness and comparison relevance on self-
esteem. Where social comparisons take place on irrelevant 
dimensions self-esteem will be unaffected, regardless of in-
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group or individual distinctiveness from other in-group 
members. Where the in-group is superior to the out-group on 
a relevant dimension self-esteem will benefit when individuals 
are also superior to in-group others on this dimension but 
will benefit much less, if at all, when individuals are 
inferior to in-group others on this dimension. Where the in-
group is inferior to the out-group on a relevant comparison 
dimension self-esteem will suffer when individuals are also 
inferior to in-group others on this dimension but will suffer 
much less, if at all, when individuals are superior to in-
group others on this dimension. 
DYnamic predictions from the self-evaluation maintenance 
model' 
As the self -evaluation maintenance model hypothesizes that the 
effect on self-evaluation of comparisons with a superior close 
other on a relevant dimension will be detrimental while the 
effect on self-evaluation of comparisons with an inferior 
close other on a relevant dimension will be neutral, the model 
predicts that subjects will not wish to aid the performance of 
close others on a relevant dimension, especially if there is 
an indication that the close others' performances on that 
dimension are likely to be superior to their own. 
Similarly, as the model hypothesizes that the effect on self-
evaluation of comparisons with a close other on a relevant 
dimension will be strongly detrimental (if the other is 
superior) or neutral (if the other is inferior), while the 
effect on self-evaluation of comparisons with a distant other 
on a relevant dimension will be relatively less detrimental 
(if the other is superior) or neutral (if the other is 
inferior), the model predicts that subjects will distance 
For "dynamic" predictions, only the "original" 
versions of the self-evaluation maintenance model and social 
identity theory will be considered. 
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themselves from close others performing on a relevant 
dimension, especially if the others' performances on that 
dimension are superior to their own. 
Finally, as the model hypothesizes that the effect on self-
evaluation of comparisons with a close other on a relevant 
dimension will be detrimental (if the other is superior) or 
neutral (if the other is inferior), while the effect on self-
evaluation of comparisons with a close other on an irrelevant 
dimension will be beneficial (if the other is superior) or 
neutral (if the other is inferior), the model predicts that 
subjects will reduce the relevance of a comparison dimension 
when asked to compare themselves with close others on that 
dimension, especially when the others' performances are 
superior to their own. 
Qynamic predictionS from social identity theo~ 
As social identity theory hypothesizes that subjects with 
salient social identities derive their self-esteem from group-
level social comparison outcomes on relevant comparison 
dimensions, the theory predicts that subjects will wish to 
improve the performance of a close (i.e. in-group) other on 
relevant performance dimensions, especially if there is an 
indication that unless this is done the in-group may be 
outperformed by the out-group. 
Similarly, as social identity theory hypothesizes that 
subjects with salient social identities derive positive self-
esteem from membership of in-groups which are positively 
distinct on relevant comparison dimensions but negative self-
esteem from membership of in-groups which are negatively 
distinct on such comparison dimensions, the theory predicts 
that subjects will increase their closeness to other in-group 
members when the in-group is positively distinct on a relevant 
comparison dimension but will decrease their closeness to 
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other in-group members when the in-group is negatively 
distinct on such a comparison dimension. 
Finally, as social identity theory hypothesizes that positive 
in-group distinctiveness on a relevant dimension has a 
beneficial effect on the self-esteem of subjects with salient 
social identities and negative in-group distinctiveness on a 
relevant dimension has a detrimental effect on the self-esteem 
of subjects with salient social identities, but neither 
positive nor negative in-group distinctiveness on an 
irrelevant dimension have much effect on the self-esteem of 
in-group members, the theory predicts that subjects will 
increase the relevance of comparison dimensions on which the 
in-group is positively distinct but will reduce the relevance 
of comparison dimensions on which the in-group is negatively 
distinct. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Over the space of four days 60 students from Keele University 
took part in a study which they were told was part of a 
programme to develop two psychometric measures for possible 
later adoption by the British Civil Service for selection/ 
recruitment purposes. The majority of subjects were first 
year psychology students who volunteered to participate in the 
study in partial fulfilment of "subject time" requirements 
applying during the first year of their degree programme. A 
small minority of subjects were student friends of the above 
who volunteered at the last minute to take part in the study 
because of non-attendance by others who had previously 
volunteered but did not turn up (as four subjects were 
required in each session - see below) . 
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procedure 
Subjects were seen in fifteen sessions of four subjects each. 
upon arrival each subject was asked to sit "wherever they 
liked". In fact only four chairs were available, each at a 
separate individual desk. These chairs were arranged so that 
two desks were next to each other, but separated, and faced 
another pair of desks similarly organized. 8 On each desk was 
a piece of paper clearly marked with a large "identifying 
letter": Q, R, S or T. Subjects were requested to write their 
own letter at the top of each piece of paper they used in 
order to be able to compare individual's responses across 
measures whilst assuring anonymity. Subjects were then asked 
to complete Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale modified for 
use as a "state" measure (i.e. by inserting the phrase "at the 
moment" at the beginning of each item and removing all "trait-
like" phrases such as "In general". See first self-esteem 
measure in Appendix 10) . 
These were then collected and the experimenter explained the 
ostensible purpose of the study. Subjects were "reminded" 
that the study was one part of a programme of research aimed 
at developing two measures of cognitive ability for possible 
later use by the British Civil Service in their selection 
procedures. Subj ects were informed that one measure had 
provisionally been termed "cognitive dexterity" and had 
already been discovered to "reliably distinguish between 
people with high or low verbal reasoning, spatial awareness, 
problem solving abilities, initiative, and even social 
skills". The other measure, provisionally termed "creative 
empathy", had, however, failed to live up to expectations and 
did not reliably distinguish between people in terms of any 
practical abilities whatsoever. Subjects were told that the 
present study was the final one in the programme and, although 
As far as the experimenter could tell subjects who 
were friends with other subjects sat next to them or sat 
opposite them with approximately equal frequency. 
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important for validation purposes, was not expected to 
disconfirm these previous findings. The importance of the 
validation procedure was emphasized, however, and subjects 
were requested to complete their tasks diligently and with 
full honesty. 
subjects were told that many of their tasks required the use 
of semantic differential scales and these scales were 
explained and demonstrated with examples. Ostensibly merely 
to ensure that subjects understood how to use semantic 
differential scales, and also to introduce to subjects some 
concepts which would be important during the main part of the 
study, subjects were asked to complete "scale practice sheets" 
which used semantic differential scales to measure their self-
esteem, their feelings of closeness to the person sitting next 
to them (who, unbeknownst to the subjects were to be in-group 
members during the main study), and the relevance of the two 
measures being developed (i.e. cognitive dexterity and 
creative empathy). In fact, these measures served as pre-
manipulation measures of each of these constructs. The" scale 
practice sheet" can be seen in Appendix 11. 
The experimenter then read out the following prepared text:-
For the next part of the study I need to split you into 
two teams or groups. You two, Q and R, will be in Group 
M and you two, Sand T, will be in Group N. Please move 
your desk so that you are close to the other person in 
your group. In a moment each team will be competing with 
the other, with the possibility of one of the teams 
winning an £18 prize. Before then, though, please work 
within your teams for one minute and come up with as many 
words as you can beginning with your Group letter (i.e. 
M or N) . 
When subjects had completed this short task they were then 
asked to work together within their groups for another minute 
to generate as many words as they could starting with the 
Group letter of the other group present (i.e. the out-group) . 
Both the tasks (which were not scored or analysed) and the 
anticipated intergroup competition for desired scarce 
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resources were introduced to engender within-group cohesion 
and salient social identities related to subjects' particular 
experimental in-group membership. 
Next, the experimenter read out the following:-
I am now going to give each of you tests of "Cognitive 
Dexterity" and "Creative Empathy". Although I want you 
to work individually, your aim should be to get as high 
a score as possible for your Group, with the overall goal 
of your Group beating the other Group by as much as 
possible on each test. As an added incentive, the team 
that beats their opponents by the largest amount this 
week on the cognitive dexterity test will win £18. The 
tests are very difficult and you will have only 10 
minutes to complete both tests. If you are having 
trouble on a question, don't panic: leave it and come 
back to it later if you have time. The more questions 
you answer, the higher your score is likely to be. You 
must spend a minimum of 2 minutes on each task. You may 
divide the remaining 6 minutes between each task as you 
see fit, but I remind you that only the cognitive 
dexterity task has the possibility of a cash prize 
associated with it. Begin with the cognitive dexterity 
task. At the end of two minutes I will instruct you to 
turn to the creative empathy task. After a further two 
minutes I will tell you that you may continue with either 
or both tasks as you see fit. 
This manipulation was intended to again strengthen within-
group cohesion and social identity. More importantly, it was 
also intended to impress upon subjects the inter-group nature 
of the competition inherent in their task. That is, it was 
hoped that this manipulation would cause subjects to be more 
interested in the performance of their group relative to their 
out-group (in order to obtain more positive in-group 
distinctiveness from their out-group on the cognitive 
dexterity dimension than any other in-group obtained from 
their out-group across the experimental sessions) than in the 
performance of anyone individual, other than in terms of how 
individual performances contributed to group performances. 
Finally, this manipulation was intended to enhance the 
dimension relevance manipulation, so that subjects perceived 
cognitive dexterity performance as relevant but creative 
empathy performance as irrelevant. 
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Subjects were then asked to individually complete bogus 
cognitive dexterity and creative empathy tasks (which were not 
scored or analysed). The cognitive dexterity task involved 
subjects completing a number of categorization tasks. Item 1 
on this task, for example, informed subjects that "Any letter 
between f and p is in Group 1 and all other letters are in 
Group 2. Which groups are the following letters in (1 or 2)?: 
x, 1, q, f, 0". The creative empathy task involved subjects 
looking at a series of pictures (taken from an unidentified 
projective test) and either selecting or generating a word 
which they thought was most popular when "a number of 
established poets were asked to select a word that best 
communicates the "feeling" of that picture". Item 1 on this 
task, for example, referred subjects to a picture of a seated 
boy looking at a violin on the table in front of him and asked 
them to select one of the following words: "melancholy, gulf, 
ambitious, hungry". Each of the tasks (except the pictures 
used, which can be obtained from the author on request) can be 
seen in Appendix 12. 
When the subjects had spent ten minutes on the two tasks their 
response booklets were collected in and the experimenter 
said: -
While I score these, please work within your teams to 
find as many words of three or more letters as you can 
within the phrase "Cognitive Dexterity". 
Subj ects did this filler task (which was not scored or 
analysed) for five minutes whilst the experimenter made a show 
of ostensibly marking each of the subjects' response booklets 
and writing down scores on a blank piece of paper. The 
experimenter used an overhead projector to project a blank 
table onto the screen, and proceeded to write the false 
feedback scores into that table. These scores can be seen in 
Table 6.3 above. Once the "raw scores" had been entered into 
the table the experimenter made a show of calculating the 
difference in team cognitive dexterity scores and stressed 
that Group M's superiority over Group N on this score was the 
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"best seen yet" and would be "difficult to beat" in later 
sessions. It was also pointed out that Group N beat Group M 
on the creative empathy score, but it was reiterated that this 
result had little consequence. The false feedback scores were 
projected onto the screen for the remainder of the 
experimental session. 
The subjects were then asked to fill out a second "state" 
version of Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale. Once these 
scales had been completed and collected the experimenter said: 
Finally, this is the part of the study that is most 
important in developing the measures mentioned earlier. 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you 
can. 
The subjects were then each given response booklets containing 
the principal post-manipulation measures. This booklet was 
headed "Cognitive dexterity/creative empathy study" and began 
with a short section asking subjects to indicate their 
individual and team membership letters, and whether their team 
"won" or "lost" the cognitive dexterity and the creative 
empathy tasks just completed. There then followed four more 
sections concerning subjects' self-esteem, their willingness 
to have aided the performance of their team-mate in the tasks 
just completed had they been able to do so, how close they 
felt to their team-mate, and how relevant they thought the two 
comparison dimensions. Each section contained a number of 
items. Before each item subjects were asked to consider a 
particular team or other-individual cognitive dexterity or 
creative empathy score. In the self-esteem section, for 
example, subjects were asked to indicate their self-esteem on 
single semantic differential scales immediately after 
considering: the out-group's cognitive dexterity score; each 
out-group member's cognitive dexterity score; their team-
mate's cognitive dexterity score; and each creative empathy 
score for each of these comparison others. It was assumed 
that being asked to focus on particular other individual or 
out-group scores would encourage social comparisons between 
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those other individuals and the self or between the out-group 
and the in-group for each salient dimension. The final page 
of the booklet also asked subjects to indicate their 
perceptions concerning the purpose of the present study and 
invited them to make any comments they wished to about the 
study. The response booklet used in this part of the 
experiment can be seen in Appendix 13. 
When this final procedure was completed subjects were asked to 
refrain from telling subjects yet to take part in the study 
anything about it and were asked if they themselves had heard 
anything about the study prior to their own session. All 
promised the former and denied the lat ter . Subj ects were then 
informed that a notice would be pinned up in the Psychology 
Department the following week indicating the results of the 
study and who had won the team cognitive dexterity prize. In 
fact the notice revealed the nature of the false feedback; 
explained that the study was attempting to compare Tajfel's 
social identity theory and Tesser's self-evaluation 
maintenance theory with regards to the predictions each made 
about the effects of various social comparison outcomes; and 
that two participating teams had been selected at random to 
each receive £18 (i.e. £9 per selected subject). The members 
of these selected teams were personally approached by the 
experimenter, given their money and quizzed once again about 
whether or not they had heard anything about the study prior 
to participating in it, and about how they had interpreted 
what the study was all about. All four of these subjects 
reiterated that they had heard nothing about the study prior 
to completion, insisted that they had made every effort to 
complete all tasks as instructed, and claimed to have accepted 
the experimenter's cover story concerning the ostensible 
development of cognitive dexterity and creative empathy 
measures. 
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RESULTS 
Pre-mapipulation measures 
Self-esteem scores derived from the modified Rosenberg measure 
administered immediately upon subjects' arrival revealed 
slightly positive mean self-esteem (X = 4.84, SO = 0.97, on a 
seven-point scale ranging from 1 = very negative self-esteem 
to 7 = very positive self-esteem) and no significant 
differences in that self-esteem according to the subjects' 
"identifying letters" (F(l.56) = 0.68, P = 0.57) or according to 
subjects' (as yet unknown to them) group memberships (planned 
contrast, T = -1.28, P = 0.21). 
Similarly, the single pre-manipulation semantic differential 
self-esteem scale indicated moderate positive mean self-esteem 
(X = 6.93, SO = 1.67, on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 = 
bad self-esteem to 9 = good self-esteem) and no significant 
differences in that self-esteem according to identifying 
letters (F(l.56) = 1.01, P = 0.40) or group membership (planned 
contrast T = -1.40, P = 0.17). This measure was significantly 
and reasonably strongly positively correlated with the first 
presentation of the modified Rosenberg self-esteem measure (r 
= 0.68, P < 0.001, one-tailed). 
Prior to the experimental manipulation subjects felt neither 
close to nor distant from the person sitting next to them 
(Le. their as yet unrevealed fellow in-group member, X = 
5.07, SO = 2.11, on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 = very 
distant to 9 = very close), with no significant differences in 
closeness according to identification letter (F (3.56) = 0.62, P 
= 0.61) or group membership (planned contrast T = 1.09, P = 
0.28) . 
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Manipulation check 
Strenuous efforts were taken to make cognitive dexterity a 
highly relevant dimension for subjects and to make creative 
empathy an irrelevant one. However, prior to the main 
experimental manipulation (i.e. the false feedback) subjects 
felt that both were relevant dimensions: mean cognitive 
dexterity (CD) relevance = 6.70 (SD = 1.53), and mean creative 
empathy (CE) relevance = 6.12 (SD = 1.59) (both significantly 
above the mid-point on nine-point scales ranging from 1 = 
irrelevant to 9 = relevant). A 2 X 4 ANOVA using the MANOVA 
procedure of SPSS,9 with the relevance of the CD and the CE 
measures as a within-subject factor and subjects' 
identification letters as a between-subject factor, revealed 
no main effect of identification letter and no significant 
interaction, but a main effect of relevance was found (F(I,56) 
= 10.2, P = 0.002). Thus, in line with expectations, subjects 
evaluated cognitive dexterity performance as more relevant 
than creative empathy performance but the difference, al though 
statistically significant, was slight, and it is perhaps best 
to say that subjects perceived both of the performance 
dimensions as relevant, even though they thought cognitive 
dexterity performance slightly more relevant than creative 
empathy performance. In as much as subjects did not perceive 
creative empathy performance to be irrelevant, the relevance 
manipulation failed. In all analyses to follow, therefore, 
both dimensions were considered as relevant and "collapsed" .10 
9 All statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS. 
Within this package all ANOVAs including within-subject 
factors have to be calculated using the MANOVA procedure. All 
ANOVAs including within-subjects factors reported below were 
therefore calculated using this procedure but for the sake of 
exposition this will not be made explicit each time. 
10 The author nevertheless repeated each analysis with 
each dimension considered separately, and again with relevance 
included as a separate factor. In every instance, each of 
these non-reported additional analyses resulted in a similar 
pattern to those reported (i.e. with relevance collapsed) . 
2& 
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Thus, only predictions pertaining to the effects of social 
comparison outcomes on relevant dimensions can be examined. 
scoring 
Change scores as a result of the experimental manipulation 
were calculated by subtracting subjects' pre-manipulation 
scores from their post-manipulation scores for self-esteem, 
closeness, and relevance, in each case using the appropriate 
semantic differential scores. Change in self -esteem as a 
result of focusing on the out-group' s cognitive dexterity 
score, for example, (which was assumed to encourage a between-
groups comparison on this dimension), was calculated by 
subtracting pre-manipulation self-esteem from the self-esteem 
indicated immediately following this focus. These change 
scores could range from -8 to +8, with minus scores indicating 
a decrease and positive scores indicating an increase in 
whatever measure was being examined. 
No pre-manipulation performance scores were obtained and thus 
no change in such scores as a resul t of the experimental 
manipulation were calculable. Thus, for performance, there 
are simply post-manipulation scores. 
Two measures were obtained for each comparison with out-group 
members, one for each out-group member. Where this occurred 
single "comparison with a distant (i. e. out-group) other" 
measures were calculated by simply taking the mean average of 
each of these equivalent measures. 
Self-esteem results; the self-evaluation maintepance model 
with respect to between-individual social comparisons on 
relevant dimensions, the original self-evaluation maintenance 
model predicts that comparison with an inferior other will not 
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affect self-esteem but that comparison with a superior other 
will be detrimental to self-esteem, and that the closer the 
relevantly superior comparison other to the self, the greater 
the detrimental effect on self-esteem. 
To test this a 2 X 2 ANOVA was calculated, with closeness of 
the comparison other to the self and individual superiority or 
inferiority to the comparison other as two within-subject 
factors. This revealed a significant main effect of 
individual distinctiveness (F(1,59) = 28.82, P < 0.001), no 
significant main effect of closeness (F(1.59) = 0.04, P = 0.85), 
and a significant interaction (F(l.s9) = 15.67, P < 0.001). The 
table of means below suggests that comparison with a superior 
other on a relevant dimension was detrimental to self-esteem, 
and that the more distant the relevantly superior comparison 
other to the self, the greater the detrimental effect on self-
esteem. Further, comparison with an inferior other on a 
relevant dimension was beneficial to self-esteem, and the more 
distant the relevantly inferior other to the self, the greater 
the beneficial effect on self-esteem. 
Relevant Dimension: 
"Comparison" Process 
Distant Other Close Other 
Self inferior -0.617" -0.267 
(1.88) (1.89) 
Self superior 0.692" 0.317 
(1.49) (1.62) 
ley: ". Significantly different from zero by on •••• ple t-te.t (two-tailed) 
Table 6.4: Change in self-esteem as a resul t of upward or 
downward comparison wi th a close or distant other 
A series of two-tailed one sample t-tests revealed that only 
the effects on self-esteem of comparisons with a distant (i.e. 
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out-group) other were significantly greater than zero. That 
is, the fall in self-esteem as a result of comparison with a 
relevantly superior close (i.e. in-group) other was not 
significant (t(59) = -1.09, P = 0.28},11 and nor was the rise 
in self-esteem as a result of comparison with a relevantly 
inferior close (i. e. in-group) other (t(59) = 1.51, P = 0.136) . 
Self-esteem change was only significantly greater than zero 
for the fall in self-esteem following comparison with a 
relevantly superior distant (i.e. out-group) other (t(59) = -
2.54, P = 0.014} and for the rise in self-esteem following 
comparison with a relevantly inferior distant (i.e out-group) 
other (t(59) = 3.59, P = 0.001). 
These results are almost wholly inconsistent with the 
"comparison" process within the original self-evaluation 
maintenance model. Comparison with a relevantly superior 
close other did not result in a significant fall in self-
esteem; comparison with a relevantly superior distant other 
did result in a significant fall in self-esteem; and 
comparison with a relevantly inferior distant other resulted 
in a significant rise in self-esteem. Although the model can 
attempt to explain the greater fall in self-esteem following 
upward individual-level social comparisons on relevant 
dimensions across groups than following such comparisons 
within-groups in terms of the across-group performance 
differences being greater than the within-group performance 
differences, 12 the model cannot explain why comparison with 
a superior close other on a relevant dimension was not 
sufficient to cause a significant drop in self-esteem, or, 
especially, why comparison with a relevantly inferior distant 
other was sufficient to cause a significant increase in self-
esteem. 
11 All t-test probabilities are two-tailed except where 
specified. 
12 I am grateful to Mark Schaller for pOinting this 
possibility out. 
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with respect to between-group social comparisons on relevant 
dimensions, the original self -evaluation maintenance model 
predicts that comparison between the in-group and an inferior 
out-group will not affect self-esteem but that comparison 
between the in-group and a superior out-group will be 
detrimental to self-esteem (as the in-group inferiority 
reveals or makes salient individual inferiority to both out-
group members). Table 6.5 below shows that in support of the 
model in-group inferiority on the relevant dimension did 
indeed cause a significant drop in self-esteem (X = -0.617, SO 
= 1.89, t(H) = -2.53, P = 0.014), but against the model in-
group superiority on this dimension significantly raised self-
est eem (X = O. 633, SO = 1. 34 , t (5') = 3. 66, P = O. 001) . 
Relevant Dimension: 
"Comparison" Process 
In-group superior In-group inferior 
Self-esteem change 0.633" -0.617" 
(1.34) (1.89) 
Key: ". Significantly different fro •• ero by one .a.ple t-te.t (two-tailed) 
Table 6.5: Self-esteem change as a result of in-group 
superiority or inferiority an relevant dimensions 
Several of the above results are relevant to the extended 
version of the self-evaluation maintenance model. Consistent 
with the extended model: (i) comparisons between in-groups and 
relevantly superior out-groups were significantly detrimental 
to self-esteem; and, (ii) comparisons between individuals and 
superior out-group members, which could only occur in 
conjunction with out-groups being superior to in-groups, 
resulted in detrimental effects on self-esteem. Inconsistent 
with the extended model, however: (i) comparisons between in-
groups and relevantly inferior out-groups did not leave se1f-
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esteem unaffected - they were significantly beneficial to 
self-esteem; and, (ii) comparisons between individuals and 
inferior out-group members, which could only occur in 
conjunction with out-groups being inferior to in-groups, also 
did not leave self-esteem unaffected they too were 
significantly beneficial to self-esteem. 
The extended version of the self-evaluation maintenance model 
makes different predictions to the original version of that 
model concerning the effects on self -esteem of intragroup 
between-individual social comparisons on relevant dimensions, 
however. In such situations the extended model predicts a 
two-way interaction between in-group distinctiveness and 
individual distinctiveness: where the in-group is inferior to 
the out-group there will be a detrimental effect on self-
esteem when individuals are inferior to other in-group members 
and a lesser detrimental effect on self-esteem when 
individuals are superior to other in-group members; where the 
in-group is superior to the out-group there will be a 
detrimental effect on self-esteem when individuals are 
inferior to in-group others (but not as great as where the in-
group is also inferior to the out-group on these dimensions) , 
but no effect on self-esteem when individuals are superior to 
in-group others. 
These predictions were tested by a 2 X 2 ANOVA with in-group 
distinctiveness as a within-subjects factor and "consistency 
of individual distinctiveness" as a between-subjects factor, 
with self-esteem change as the dependent variable. The latter 
factor refers to whether or not subjects' individual 
distinctiveness is consistent with their group distinctiveness 
(i.e. positive when the latter is positive or negative when 
the latter is negative) or inconsistent with it (i.e. negative 
when the latter is positive or positive when the latter is 
negative) . This resulted in a significant main effect of 
group distinctiveness (F(1,58) = 18.45, P < 0.001), no 
significant main effect of "consistency" (F o ,5I) = o. 000, p = 
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0.968), and a significant interaction (F(l,58) = 10.23, P = 
0.002). It can be seen from the table of means below that the 
extended version of the self-evaluation maintenance model is 
supported in so far as there is a detrimental effect on self-
esteem when the in-group is inferior to the out-group on 
relevant dimensions, and that this detrimental effect is 
stronger when individuals are inferior to in-group others than 
when they are superior to them. Against the extended model, 
however, there was no change (instead of a fall) in self-
esteem when the in-group was superior to the out-group and 
individuals were inferior to in-group others, and there was a 
beneficial (rather than no) effect on self-esteem when the in-
group was superior to the out-group and individuals were 
superior to in-group others. 
In-group In-group 
Inferior Superior Mean 
Self Inferior -0.661' 0.133 -0.267 
(2.29) (1.31) (1.89) 
Self Superior -0.067 O. 700· 0.317 
(1.64) (1.54) (1.62) 
Mean -0.367 o .417" 
(2.00 ) (1.44) 
Key: ". Significantly different from .ero by one ••• ple t-te.t (two-t.iled) I and' • d1rrerence from 
zero approached significance by one •• mple t-te.t (two-t.iled, p • 0.061). 
Table 6. 6: Changes in self -esteem as a resul t of in-group 
inferiority or superiority to the out-group and 
individual inferiority or superiority to in-group others 
Self-esteem change results; social identity theQ~ 
Social identity theory predicts that in-group superiority on 
a relevant dimension will raise self -esteem and in-group 
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inferiority on such a dimension will lower it. As was seen in 
Table 6.5 above, these predictions were fully supported: for 
between-group social comparisons on relevant dimensions, in-
group superiority significantly raised self -esteem (X = 0.633, 
SD = 1.34, t(59) = 3.66, P = 0.001) and in-group inferiority 
significantly lowered it (X = -0.617, SD = 1.89, t(59) = -2.53, 
P = 0.014) . 
with respect to between-individual social comparisons on 
relevant dimensions, social identity theory predicts that in-
group superiority will be beneficial to self-esteem and in-
group inferiority will be detrimental to self-esteem, 
regardless of individual inferiority or superiority to the 
comparison other, except in so far as such individual 
distinctiveness reveals, 
group distinctiveness. 
reflects or makes salient between-
These effects will be stronger for 
between-individual comparisons with distant (i.e. out-group) 
others than for between-individual comparisons with close 
(i.e. in-group) others, therefore, as between-group 
comparisons are more salient in the former than in the latter 
situation. 
To test this a 2 X 2 ANOVA was calculated, with closeness of 
the comparison other to the self and in-group superiority or 
inferiority to the out-group as two within-subject factors. 
This revealed a significant main effect of group 
distinctiveness (F(l.59) = 40.36, P < 0.001), no significant 
main effect of closeness (F(1.59) = 0.04, P = 0.85), and a 
significant interaction (F n . 59 ) = 6.89, P = O. 011}. The table 
of means below suggests that in-group inferiority was 
detrimental to self-esteem, but more so when the self was 
compared with an out-group other than when the self was 
compared with an in-group other. In-group superiority was 
beneficial to self-esteem, and more so when the self was 
compared with an out-group other than when the self was 
compared with an in-group other. 
296 
Out-group other In-group other 
In-group -0.617· -0.367 
Inferior (1.88) (2.00) 
In-group o .692· 0.417· 
Superior (1.49) (1.44) 
Key: •• Significantly different from zero by one .ample t-te.t (two-tailed) 
Table 6.7: Changes in self-esteem as a result of in-group 
inferiority or superiority following c~isons 
with in-group or out-group others 
A series of two-tailed one sample t-tests revealed that in-
group inferiority or superiority significantly altered self-
esteem from pre-manipulation levels except when in-group 
inferiority was accompanied by a comparison between the self 
and an in-group other. That is, comparison with an out-group 
other significantly lowered self-esteem when the in-group was 
inferior to the out-group (t(59) = -2.54, P = 0.014) and 
significantly raised it when the in-group was superior to the 
out-group (t(59) = 3.59, P = 0.001). Comparison with an in-
group member significantly raised self -esteem when the in-
group was superior to the out-group (t(5t) = 2.24, P = 0.029) 
but did not significantly lower it when the in-group was 
inferior to the out-group (t(59) = -1.42, P = 0.161). 
These results are almost wholly consistent with the 
predictions derived from social identity theory. Subjects' 
self-esteem increased as a result of in-group superiority and 
decreased as a result of in-group inferiority, especially when 
the self was compared with an out-group member rather than an 
in-group member (with the sale exception that in-group 
inferiority did not significantly lower self -esteem when 
individuals compared themselves with in-group others) . 
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Several of the above resul ts are relevant to the extended 
version of social identity theory. Consistent with the 
extended theory: (i) comparisons between the in-group and 
inferior out-groups resulted in significantly beneficial 
effects on self-esteem; (ii) comparisons between the in-group 
and superior out-groups resulted in significantly detrimental 
effects on self-esteem; (iii) comparisons between individuals 
and inferior out-group others, which could only occur when 
out-groups were also inferior to in-groups, resulted in 
significantly beneficial effects on self-esteem; and, (iv) 
comparisons between individuals and superior out-group others, 
which could only occur when out-groups were also superior to 
in-groups, resulted in significantly detrimental effects on 
self-esteem. None of the results so far are inconsistent with 
the extended version of social identity theory. 
The extended version of social identity theory makes different 
predictions to the original version of that theory concerning 
the effects on self-esteem of intragroup between-individual 
social comparisons on relevant dimensions, however. In such 
situations the extended version of social identity theory 
predicts a two way interaction between in-group inferiority or 
superiority to the out-group and individual inferiority or 
superiority to in-group others: where the in-group is 
superior to the out-group self-esteem will benefit when 
individuals are also superior to in-group others but will 
benefit much less, if at all, when individuals are inferior to 
in-group others; and, where the in-group is inferior to the 
out-group self-esteem will suffer when individuals are also 
inferior to in-group others but will suffer much less, if at 
all, when individuals are superior to in-group others. 
This is exactly the pattern of results shown in Table 6.6 
above. Where the in-group is superior to the out-group on 
relevant dimensions there is a significant rise in self-esteem 
when individuals are also superior to in-group others (X = 
0.700, SD = 1.54, t(m = 2.50, P = 0.009, one-tailed), and a 
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slight but non-significant change in self-esteem when 
individuals are inferior to in-group others (X = 0.133, SD = 
1.31, t(29) = 0.56, P = 0.580, two-tailed}. And, when the in-
group is inferior to the out-group on relevant dimensions 
there is a near significant fall in self-esteem when 
individuals are also inferior to in-group others (X = - 0.667, 
SD = 2.29, t(29) = -1.59, P = 0.061, one-tailed}, and a slight 
but clearly non-significant fall in self-esteem when 
individuals are superior to in-group others (X = -0.067, SD = 
1.64, t(29) = -0.22, P = 0.825, two-tailed). 
Performance results 
The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts that subjects 
will be unwilling to aid the performance of close others on 
relevant dimensions, particularly when the other's performance 
is likely to be superior to the self's on those dimensions. 
Social identity theory, on the other hand, predicts that 
subjects will want to help the performance of in-group others 
on relevant performance dimensions, especially if the out-
group seems likely to outperform the in-group on the dimension 
unless this is done. 
These predictions were tested by post-manipulation measures. 
Subjects were asked to consider their team-mate's performance 
during the previously completed tasks and were then asked if 
they would have aided their team-mate's performance during 
those tasks had they legitimately been able to do so. They 
responded that they almost certainly would have (X = 7.35, SD 
= 1.87, on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 = certainly not 
to 9 = certainly, with this mean being significantly above the 
scale mid-point, t(59) = 9.75, P < 0.001). Further, subjects 
were equally willing to aid their team-mate' s performance 
whether that performance was inferior (X = 7.40, SD = 2.01) or 
superior (X = 7.30, SD = 2.15) to their own (T(59) = -0.42, P 
= 0.68}, although they were more willing to help when the in-
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group's performance on the previous tasks had been inferior (X 
= 7.67, SD = 1.87) rather than superior (X = 7.03, SD = 2.23) 
to the out-group's performance on those tasks (t'59) = 2.84, P 
= 0.006). Also, when subjects were asked if they would have 
helped their team-mate' s performance after being asked to 
consider the out-group' s performance during the previous tasks 
(rather than their team-mate's), they still indicated that 
they would have (X = 7.21, SD = 1.93, significantly above the 
scale mid-point, t (59 ) = 8.87, p< 0.001), although they showed 
more willing when the in-group' performance had been inferior 
(X = 7.52, SO = 1.99) than when it had been superior (X = 
6.90, SD = 2.41) to the out-group's (test) = 2.25, P = 0.028). 
These results are wholly inconsistent with the self-evaluation 
maintenance model and wholly consistent with social identity 
theory. As predicted by social identity theory but in 
opposition to the predictions derived from the self-evaluation 
maintenance model, subjects were very willing to aid the 
performance of a close (i.e. in-group) other on a relevant 
dimension, regardless of whether their team-mate' s performance 
on the recently completed tasks had been superior or inferior 
to their own. Further, again in line with social identity 
theory, this willingness to help was stronger when the in-
group's performance on the completed tasks was inferior to the 
out-group's than when it was superior, regardless of whether 
subjects were invited to compare their own performance with 
their team-mate's or whether they were invited to compare in-
group and out-group performances directly. 
ClOSeneSS results 
The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts that subjects 
would wish to distance themselves from close others performing 
on relevant comparison dimensions, especially if the close 
other is likely to outperform the self on those dimensions. 
Social identity theory, on the other hand, predicts that 
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subjects would wish to increase the closeness to in-group 
others when the in-group achieved superiority over the out-
group on relevant dimensions, but would wish to distance 
themselves from in-group others when the in-group "achieved" 
inferiority to the out-group on such dimensions. 
When subjects were asked to consider their team-mate's 
performances on the recently completed tasks and were then 
asked to indicate how close or distant they felt to them, they 
indicated that they felt closer to them than they had prior to 
the false feedback manipulation (X = +1.042, SO = 1.86, t C591 
= 4.35, P < 0.001), regardless of whether their team-mate's 
performances had been superior (X = +0.983, SO = 1.94) or 
inferior (X = +1.100, SO = 1.85) to their own (t C59 ) = -1.15, 
P = 0.253). There was a significant difference between 
increased closeness on this measure according to whether the 
in-group's performance had been inferior (X = +0.900, SO = 
1.82) or superior (X = 1.183, SO = 1.961) to the out-group's 
(t C59 ) = -2.97, P = 0.004). This difference was repeated when 
subjects were asked to indicate their closeness to in-group 
others after being asked to consider the out-group's 
performances on the recently completed tasks (rather than 
their team-mate's). Again, subjects reported greater 
increased closeness to in-group others when the in-group' s 
performance had been superior (X = 1.183, SO = 1.86) rather 
than inferior (X = 0.967, SO = 1.90) to the out-group's (t C591 
= -2.09, P = 0.041). 
These results are again inconsistent with the self-evaluation 
maintenance model in that subjects reported increased 
closeness to in-group (i. e. close) others performing on a 
relevant dimension, even when the other's performance on such 
dimensions was better than their own. Consistent with social 
identity theory, subjects reported significantly greater 
increased closeness to in-group others when the in-group was 
superior to the out-group on relevant dimensions than when it 
was inferior, but contrary to social identity theory subjects 
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still reported significant increased closeness to in-group 
others in the latter situation. 
Relevance results 
The self-evaluation maintenance model predicts that subjects 
will attempt to reduce the relevance of dimensions on which 
they are compared to close others, particularly if the close 
others are likely to be superior to the self on such 
dimensions. Social identity theory, on the other hand, 
predicts that subjects will attempt to increase the relevance 
of dimensions on which the in-group obtains superiority over 
the out-group and reduce the relevance of dimensions on which 
the in-group is inferior to the out-group. 
When subj ects were asked to indicate the relevance of the 
performance dimensions after being invited to consider their 
team-mate's performance on those dimensions they significantly 
reduced the relevance of the dimensions compared to pre-
manipulation levels (X = -0.592, SO = 1.382, tIn) = -3.32, P 
= 0.002). There was, however, no effect at all of individual 
inferiority (X = -0.592, SO = 1.69) or superiority (X = -
0.592, SO = 1.78) to the in-group other (t(5t) = 0.00, P = 
1.000). There was an effect of group distinctiveness on this 
measure, with subjects reducing the relevance of the 
performance dimensions less when the in-group achieved 
superiority over the out-group (X = -0.275, SD = 1.61) than 
when it "achieved" inferiority (X = -0.908, SD = 1.79) from 
the out-group (t(S9) = -2.46, P = 0.017). Additionally, 
relevance was significantly lower than pre-condition levels 
when the in-group was inferior to the out-group, but was not 
significantly lower than pre-manipulation levels when the in-
group was superior to the out-group. That is, the significant 
difference in relevance change as a result of in-group 
distinctiveness carne from significant relevance reduction when 
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the in-group was inferior to the out-group, but no significant 
change in relevance when the in-group was superior. 
When subj ects were asked to indicate the relevance of the 
performance dimensions after being asked to directly consider 
out-group performance on those dimensions (as opposed to their 
team-mate's), there was no significant difference in relevance 
reduction when the in-group achieved superiority over the out-
group (X = -0.342, SO = 1.61) compared to when it "achieved" 
inferiority to the out-group (X = -0.675, SD = 1.86, tIn) = -
1.17, P = 0.245). However, relevance was significantly less 
than pre-manipulation levels when the in-group was inferior to 
the out-group, but was not significantly less than pre-
manipulation levels when the in-group was superior. That is, 
although there was no significant difference in relevance 
change as a result of in-group superiority to the out-group, 
as found above there was a significant reduction in relevance 
as a result of in-group inferiority to the out-group but no 
significant change in relevance as a result of in-group 
superiority. 
These results provide mixed support for the self-evaluation 
maintenance model. As predicted by the model, subjects did 
reduce the relevance of dimensions upon which they compared 
themselves with close others. They did not do so more when 
the close other was superior rather than inferior to them, 
however, thus failing to support that aspect of the model. 
Social identity theory also receives mixed support. In line 
with the theory subjects significantly reduced the relevance 
of performance dimensions upon which the in-group was inferior 
to the out -group. However, they did not increase the 
relevance of performance dimensions upon which the in-group 
was superior to the out-group, as the theory would suggest: 
there was no significant change in relevance following in-
group superiority to the out-group. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of the present study do nothing to support 
Schiffmann & Wicklund's contention that theories of the 
effects of between-individual social comparison outcomes such 
as Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model make Tajfel's 
social identity theory redundant. Both the original and the 
extended versions of the self-evaluation maintenance model 
failed to receive much support from the present findings. In 
particular those theories failed to predict: (i) that downward 
social comparisons would raise self -esteem: and, (ii) that 
between-group social comparisons outcomes would affect self-
esteem above and beyond the effects of between- individual 
social comparison outcomes, even for between- indi vidual social 
comparisons within groups .13 
The "original" version of social identity theory, on the other 
hand, received considerable support from the present study, 
particularly in regard to the two main weaknesses of the self-
evaluation maintenance model just mentioned in the paragraph 
above. The only resul ts obtained which were inconsistent wi th 
predictions derived from the original version of social 
identity theory, were: (i) that there was no greater increased 
closeness when the in-group was superior to the out-group on 
relevant dimensions than when it was inferior on such 
dimensions; and, (ii) subjects did not increase the relevance 
of comparison dimensions on which the in-group was superior to 
13 The self -evaluation maintenance models are also caused 
problems by comparisons with superior close others on relevant 
dimensions not significantly affecting self-esteem; subjects 
showing significant willingness to aid the performance of 
close (i.e. in-group) others on relevant comparison 
dimensions, regardless of whether or not those others were 
already superior to the subjects concerned; subjects reporting 
increased closeness to close (i.e. in-group) others performing 
on relevant comparison dimensions, again regardless of whether 
or not those close others outperformed the subjects concerned; 
and the lack of significantly greater relevance reduction by 
subjects for performance dimensions on which they were 
outperformed by close (i.e in-group) others than for 
dimensions on which they outperformed such close others. 
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the out-group. These are very minor difficulties, however, 
especially when weighed against the vast amount of support for 
the theory.14 
The present results do support the argument that the original 
version of social identity theory is however "limited" in not 
adequately taking into account the effects of between-
individual social comparison outcomes. The self-esteem 
results of the present study supporting the original version 
of social identity theory are clearly also fully supportive of 
the proposed extended version of social identity theory. 
Where social identities were salient across-group social 
comparisons which revealed in-group superiority to the out-
group on relevant comparison dimensions raised self -esteem and 
those which revealed in-group inferiority to the out-group on 
relevant comparison dimensions lowered self-esteem, whether 
the across-group comparisons occurred at a genuine between-
group level or at the level of individual in-group members 
being superior or inferior to individual out-group members. 
In addition, the effects on self-esteem of intragroup between-
individual social comparisons were affected by between-group 
social comparison outcomes. 
However, in line with the extended version of social identity 
theory but not the original version of that theory, the 
effects on self-esteem of intragroup between-individual social 
comparisons were also affected by the between-individual 
social comparison outcomes as well. That is, although 
personal identities were made as non-salient as possible, the 
14 In addition, with respect to the first point Turner 
et al. (1984) suggest that both group success and group 
failure can increase in-group cohesiveness if group members 
identify with the group and to some extent feel responsible 
for the group outcome, both of which were likely in the 
present study. With respect to the second point it can be 
noted that subjects did not reduce the relevance of dimensions 
on which the in-group was superior to the out-group: relevance 
"merely" did not increase from its already relatively high 
pre-manipulation level. 
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effects of between-individual social comparison outcomes 
within groups on self-esteem were determined by an interaction 
of in-group and individual distinctiveness. Where intragroup 
between-individual social comparisons revealed that 
individuals were superior to in-group others on relevant 
dimensions a significant rise in self-esteem only came about 
when the in-group was also superior to the out-group on such 
dimensions, and where intragroup between- indi vidual social 
comparisons revealed that individuals were inferior to in-
group others on relevant dimensions a significant fall in 
self-esteem only came about when the in-group was also 
inferior to the out-group on such dimensions. Or, to put the 
same point the other way around, where the in-group was 
superior to the out-group on relevant dimensions a significant 
rise in self-esteem only came about following intragroup 
between-individual social comparisons when individuals were 
also superior to in-group others on such dimensions, and where 
the in-group was inferior to the out-group on relevant 
dimensions a significant fall in self-esteem only came about 
following intragroup between-individual social comparisons 
when individuals were also inferior to in-group others on such 
dimensions. Thus, as predicted by the extended version of 
social identity theory, both individual and in-group 
distinctiveness affect self-esteem, even for intragroup 
between-individual social comparisons. 
This is an important result not only because it suggests a 
needed modification of the original version of social identity 
theory, but also because it counts against important aspects 
of two major contemporary developments of social identity 
theory, namely Turner's self-categorization theory (Turner et 
al., 1987) and Brewer's (1991, 1993) optimal distinctiveness 
model. 
Self-categorization theory argues that personal and social 
identities are mutually inhibitory or functionally 
antagonistic (Turner et al., 1987: 49, but see also Turner, 
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1988: 115): when one is salient it reduces the salience of the 
other. The finding here, though, that the effects on self-
esteem of intragroup between-individual social comparisons 
were determined by an interaction of between-group and 
between-individual comparison information, strongly suggests 
that both personal and social identities were salient at the 
same time, rather than one or the other squeezing the other 
out, or some sort of flipping between the two. 
The optimal distinctiveness model argues that when social 
identities are salient superior performance by in-group others 
on relevant dimensions should raise self-esteem, perhaps 
especially when in-group superiority on such dimensions has 
been achieved (Brewer, 1993: 9-10; Brewer & Weber, 1994: 268) . 
The present results strongly indicate, however, that the 
superior performance of in-group others on relevant dimensions 
lowers self-esteem, even when social identities are very 
salient and in-group superiority over the out-group is 
achieved. 
The present study, although strongly supportive of the 
extended version of social identity theory argued for here, 
does not of course fully test that theory. In particular, the 
design of the present experiment meant that all across-group 
comparisons involved "consistent" group-level and individual-
level distinctiveness. That is, if the in-group was superior 
or inferior to the out-group, individual in-group members were 
also superior or inferior to individual out-group members. 
The extended version of social identity theory suggests that 
had in-group distinctiveness been fully crossed with 
individual distinctiveness (across-groups), then in-group 
superiority accompanied by individual superiority of in-group 
members over particular out-group others (as in the present 
study) would have resulted in greater self-esteem rises than 
in-group superiority accompanied by individual inferiority of 
in-group members to particular out-group others. Similarly, 
in-group inferiority to the out-group would be predicted to 
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result in greater self-esteem deterioration when accompanied 
by individual inferiority of in-group members to out-group 
others than when accompanied by individual superiority to 
them .15 Such predictions were not tested in the present 
study, however. 
Another limitation in testing the extended version of social 
identity theory concerns the lack of dynamic predictions 
derived from that theory in the present study. Social 
identity theory makes dynamic predictions in the light of 
self-esteem needs derived from in-group distinctiveness, but 
the present study makes it clear that self-esteem can also be 
affected by individual distinctiveness. If we were to 
extrapolate social identity theory's dynamic hypotheses to the 
individual level it could be predicted that following 
comparisons with relevantly superior others subjects would 
wish to improve the performance differential in their own 
favour, would wish to distance themselves from the relevantly 
superior comparison others, and/or would wish to reduce the 
relevance of the comparison dimension. These predictions are, 
of course, identical to those of the self-evaluation 
maintenance model. Further, we could also predict that 
following comparisons with relevantly inferior others subjects 
would wish to improve or protect the performance differential 
in their own favour, increase their closeness to the 
relevantly inferior comparison others,16 and/or increase the 
15 Such predictions would be particularly appropriate 
when neither between-group and social identity nor between-
individual comparison outcomes and personal identity were 
deliberately made more relevant or important than the other 
(e.g. when there were prizes for both group and individual 
performances) . 
16 In this instance increased closeness should probably 
be thought of in terms of increased willingness to be compared 
with the comparison others, rather than in terms of 
identifying with them. 
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relevance of the comparison dimension. These predictions are 
inconsistent with the self-evaluation maintenance model.l"I 
The extended version of social identity theory can thus make 
predictions both at the exclusively between-group and at the 
exclusively between-individual level. The present study makes 
it clear, however, that at least some (if not many) situations 
are neither exclusively between-group nor exclusively between-
individual, and that in such situations both in-group and 
individual distinctiveness can affect self-esteem. Dynamic 
predictions in such situations are complicated because one has 
to consider the effects of any dynamic strategy upon both 
individual and in-group distinctiveness. 
Generally speaking, we can predict that subjects will employ 
the combination of dynamic strategies which seems most likely 
to optimize the mix of positive in-group and positive 
individual distinctiveness. When only in-group 
distinctiveness is important this will result in the 
predictions derived from the original version of social 
identity theory, and when only individual distinctiveness is 
important this will result in the predictions derived from the 
between-individuals version of social identity theory. When 
both in-group and individual distinctiveness are important, 
however, we need to consider both the individual and the in-
group differential implications of any dynamic strategy 
adopted. 
In such situations it can be predicted that subjects will wish 
to aid the performance of close (i.e. in-group) others on 
relevant dimensions if and only if doing so seems likely to be 
more beneficial at the level of in-group distinctiveness than 
it seems likely to be detrimental at the level of individual 
distinctiveness. Similarly, subj ects will wish to avoid 
17 Both of these sets of hypotheses, however, are very 
similar to those formulated by Major et al. (1991) and deserve 
further empirical investigation. 
.414 
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aiding (or will wish to hamper) the performance of in-group 
others on relevant dimensions if and only if doing this seems 
likely to be more beneficial at the level of individual 
distinctiveness than it seems likely to the detrimental at the 
level of in-group distinctiveness. 
To illustrate, a person will be willing to aid the performance 
of in-group others on relevant dimensions when doing so 
obtains in-group superiority for a presently inferior in-group 
whilst leaving their individual superiority over in-group 
others intact. Such a person will not be willing to aid the 
performance of in-group others on relevant dimensions, 
however, if doing so will not obtain in-group superiority for 
a presently inferior in-group, but will result in individual 
inferiority to in-group others that the person is presently 
superior to. Similar "performance" predictions could be 
formulated for all other possible permutations of situations 
of secure or insecure, positive or negative, and individual or 
in-group distinctiveness. 
In situations in which both individual and in-group 
distinctiveness are important, closeness predictions are even 
more complicated than performance ones. This is because 
individual-level comparisons with in-group others have both 
individual and between-group distinctiveness implications. 
Thus, there will be pressures to increase closeness to 
superior in-group others because of the contribution those 
others are making to in-group superiority over out-groups (and 
therefore to positive evaluations of the in-group and to 
social identity contingent self-esteem), but there will also 
be pressures to increase distance from those superior in-group 
others because their superiority suggests both personal (i.e. 
individual) failure and failure as an in-group member (i.e. 
with regard to one's own contribution to in-group superiority 
over the out-group). Similarly, there will be pressures to 
increase distance from inferior in-group others because of 
their relative poor contribution to in-group superiority over 
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out-groups (and therefore to positive evaluations of the in-
group and to social identity contingent self -esteem), but 
there will also be pressures to increase closeness to those 
inferior in-group others because their inferiority suggests 
both personal (i.e. individual) success and success as an in-
group member (i.e. with regard to one's own contribution to 
in-group superiority). And, in addition to all these 
considerations, there will also be pressures to increase 
closeness to in-group others (and to the in-group) when the 
in-group is superior to out-groups and pressures to increase 
distance from in-group others (and from the in-group) when the 
in-group is inferior to out-groups,18 regardless of the 
individual distinctiveness between the self and those in-group 
others. With all this in mind, it does not seem unduly 
defeatist to say that at present the closeness predictions 
from the extended version of social identity theory are 
difficult to specify and more research is needed in this area. 
Relevance predictions are similar in form to performance ones. 
In situations in which both individual and in-group 
distinctiveness are important subjects will increase or 
decrease the relevance of comparison dimensions in such a way 
as to optimize the combination of positive individual and in-
group distinctiveness on relevant comparison dimensions. That 
is, subjects will increase the relevance of dimensions if and 
only if the benefits of doing so in terms of positive 
individual and/or in-group distinctiveness on those dimensions 
outweigh the cost of doing so in terms of negative individual 
and/or in-group distinctiveness on those dimensions. 
To illustrate, if a person is both superior to in-group others 
and a member of a superior in-group on given comparison 
dimensions, they will increase the relevance of those 
dimensions. 
others and 
Similarly, if a person is inferior to in-group 
a member of an inferior in-group on given 
18 But see Turner et al. (1984), and above. 
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comparison dimensions, they will decrease the relevance of 
those dimensions. If a person is inferior to in-group others 
but is a member of a superior in-group on given comparison 
dimensions, or if they are superior to in-group others but are 
members of an inferior in-group on given comparison dimensions 
(when both individual and in-group distinctiveness are equally 
important), whether they chose to increase or decrease the 
relevance of the dimensions will depend on the relative 
contributions of the two forms of distinctiveness on their 
self-esteem. That is, if the superiority contributes more 
positively to their self-esteem than the inferiority detracts 
from it, they will increase the relevance of the dimensions. 
If, on the other hand, the inferiority contributes more 
negatively to their self-esteem than the superiority 
contributes favourably to it, they will decrease the relevance 
of the dimensions. 
To reiterate, the dynamic predictions from the extended social 
identity theory will depend upon the relative importance of 
individual and in-group distinctiveness and will be formulated 
in terms of the general rule that subjects will employ the 
combination of dynamic strategies which seems most likely to 
maximize 
derived 
the positive contributions 
from positive in-group 
to their 
and/or 
self-esteem 
individual 
distinctiveness whilst minimizing the negative contributions 
to their self-esteem derived from negative in-group and/or 
individual distinctiveness. 
There are also a number of methodological limitations 
associated with the present study. The first concerns the 
repeated use of "single-shot" measures of self-esteem, 
performance, closeness and relevance. Such single-shot 
measures are obviously of dubious reliability, and the 
repeated use of them must also threaten their validity. It 
could be objected that rather than actually measuring 
subjects' self-esteem, etc., the measures used invited 
subjects to estimate how they "should" feel in response to 
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particular social comparisons they were invited to make. If 
such an objection is accepted then the present study is still 
important in that at the very least it suggests that subjects' 
"lay theories" are more in line with social identity theory 
(or theories) than they are in line with the self-evaluation 
maintenance model (or models). That is, subjects felt that 
in-group and individual superiority "would" or "should" raise 
self-esteem and that in-group and individual inferiority 
"would" or "should" lower self-esteem, even if such changes in 
self -esteem did not actually occur. The methodological 
weakness remains, however, and future research could 
profitably employ more rigorous measures to test hypotheses 
similar to those addressed in the present study one or a few 
at a time. 
A related problem with the present study is that no attempt 
was made to control for the various "dynamic" strategies for 
self-esteem maintenance, protection or enhancement. That is, 
faced with self-esteem needs subjects in the present study 
could attempt to meet those needs by either changing their 
closeness to in-group others or by changing the relevance they 
attached to the comparison dimensions. 111 This opens up the 
possibility of explaining failures to support predictions with 
regard to one "dynamic" variable by claiming that use of 
another "dynamic" variable obviated subjects' needs to use the 
former one. It might be claimed, for example, that subjects 
did not decrease closeness to superior in-group others because 
they met self-esteem needs by reducing the relevance of the 
comparison dimensions instead, which negated the need to meet 
self-esteem needs by reducing closeness. Such ad hoc 
theorizing is not particularly convincing, particularly as 
both closeness and relevance were still significantly above 
their scale mid-points following the false feedback 
19 Subjects could not easily use the "performance" option 
to meet self-esteem needs, as they were given no opportunity 
to actually affect the performance of others. They were only 
asked if they "would have" done so. 
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manipulation (i. e. subjects still felt close to in-group 
others and felt the two dimensions relevant). Nevertheless, 
future research could usefully compare the dynamic predictions 
of the self-evaluation maintenance model and of social 
identity theory separately. 
Before concluding this chapter it should be made explicit that 
the purpose of the present study was not to falsify or 
demonstrate the invalidity of the self-evaluation maintenance 
model. The purpose was rather more modest in trying to 
demonstrate that contrary to Schiffmann & Wicklund's claim, 
when social identities are salient between-group social 
comparison outcomes have effects not reducible to the effects 
of between-individual social comparison outcomes. This was 
found to be the case, and so Schiffrnann & Wicklund's claim 
that theories such as Tesser' s self -evaluation maintenance 
model make Tajfel's social identity theory redundant must be 
rejected. Such a finding, though, clearly says little or 
nothing about the validity or the invalidity of Tesser's self-
evaluation maintenance model in situations in which only 
personal identities are salient, i.e. in the domain in which 
the model is held by Tesser to apply. Nevertheless: (i) the 
current study's results do present some difficulties for 
Tesser's model;20 and, (ii) the proposed extended version of 
social identity theory does make differing predictions to 
(each version of) the self-evaluation maintenance model where 
only personal identities are salient, where only social 
identities are salient, and where both personal and social 
identities are salient. Clearly a wide-ranging and systematic 
programme of research would be needed to fully evaluate the 
relative merits of each theory. 
20 The finding that downward social comparisons on 
relevant dimensions can raise self-esteem is, for example, 
clearly inconsistent with the self-evaluation maintenance 
model. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the present 
chapter is that there is no foundation for a claim that 
Tajfel's social identity theory is redundant when an 
individualistic theory such as Tesser's self-evaluation 
maintenance model is adopted. In the present study, where 
subjects social identities were salient, Tesser's model 
received almost no support whilst Tajfel's theory was strongly 
supported. In addition, Tajfel's theory predicted the effects 
of between-group social comparison outcomes, which Tesser's 
individualistic model is unable to do. 
Second, when the between-group differential hypotheses 
inherent in Tajfel's social identity theory is "extended" to 
encompass between- individual social comparison outcomes as 
well, the modified theory can be used to account for all of 
the self-esteem results obtained in the present study. It has 
also been argued that the extended social identity theory can 
provide a complete account of all self-esteem and "dynamic" 
consequences of social comparison outcomes, at both the 
between-individual and the between-group levels of analysis, 
and when both levels of analysis need to be considered 
together. Thus, if either theory is to supersede the other, 
it appears that it must be social identity theory which 
supersedes the self-evaluation maintenance model rather than 
the other way around, especially when the "extended" version 
of social identity theory is employed. 
There were undoubtably methodological weaknesses in the 
present study, however, and considerably more research is 
needed into the relative (and absolute) strengths and 
weaknesses of both social identity theory and the self-
evaluation maintenance model before it is sensible to call for 
the abandonment of either. In the next chapter, the final 
empirical one in this thesis, a number of aspects of social 
dIS) .111 
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identity theory receive further attention before evaluating 
the theory as a whole in the concluding chapter. 
z z 22. su 
CHAPTER 7; SDlDY 6 - THE "LOQSE-ENDS" OUBSTI9NNAIBB 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The study reported in this chapter employed a questionnaire 
designed to address a number of issues within social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Supporters of charitable and of political groups each engaged in 
mean evaluative in-group preference. This was accompanied by 
mean out-group derogation, however, only when political group 
members were asked to evaluate particular out -groups against whom 
their political in-groups had a tradition of conflict. This 
suggests that social categorization plus both identification as 
an in-group member and identification with an in-group (see 
Chapter 1, pp. 41-42, for this distinction) may be sufficient for 
in-group preference, but not for out-group derogation. 
Positive in-group distinctiveness without a conflict of values 
was sufficient to provide respondents with positive self-esteem, 
regardless of whether or not intergroup discrimination was used. 
Intergroup discrimination per se was not so sufficient. This 
suggests that Abrams & Hogg (1988) are incorrect to postulate 
that levels of intergroup discrimination will be positively 
correlated with subsequent levels of positive self-esteem. 
Social identity contingent self-esteem was shown to be affected 
by movement toward or away from absolute or relational in-group 
goals, as well as by attainment or non-attainment of positive in-
group distinctiveness. 
In general, regardless of respondents' prior levels of social 
identity contingent self-esteem, charitable group supporters were 
universally unwilling to employ intergroup discrimination, while 
political group supporters were universally unwilling not to. 
This suggests that "conflicts of values" play an important 
mediating role between low or threatened self-esteem and 
Subsequent use of intergroup discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of a 
questionnaire designed to address a number of issues within 
social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1978a). These issues, 
several of which have already been raised earlier in the thesis, 
include: (i) the nature of intergroup discrimination; (ii) how 
in-groups are evaluated; and (iii) the two corollaries of the 
self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory. 
The nature of intergroup discrimination 
Social identity theory suggests that group members often employ 
intergroup discrimination in order to bolster evaluation of the 
in-group and thereby enhance their social identity and self-
esteem. Such in-group bias tends to take the form of in-group 
preference rather than out-group derogation, however, such that 
both in-group and out-group are dealt with in a relatively 
positive fashion, with the in-group merely receiving a greater 
degree of positive treatment than the out-group (Brewer, 1979). 
In Brown et al.'s (1986) study of intergroup discrimination in 
a paper factory, for example, sub-groups within the factory 
tended to evaluate all sub-groups within the factory positively, 
EVen though each tended to evaluate their own sub-group more 
l>ositively than they evaluated each of the others. This 
:relatively "benign" form of "intergroup discrimination" perhaps 
restricts the validity of employing social identity theory to 
llarsher or more "vicious" forms of intergroup discrimination: 
~.e. those in which genuine out-group derogation Occurs (as in, 
~or example, Sherif's summer camp studies, e.g. Sherif & Sherif, 
~953, 1967, or in the St. Pauls riots investigated by Reicher and 
~is colleagues, e.g. Reicher & Potter, 1985; Reicher, 1984, 
:::t987) • The theoretical and empirical question which such 
~onsiderations raise is: on what occasions will intergroup 
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discrimination take the form of, or be accompanied by, out-group 
derogation? 
There are two related possible answers to this question. The 
first, similar to propositions within Sherif's "realistic 
conflict theory" (Campbell, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1967), is that 
strong intergroup discrimination will occur when one group is 
negatively dependent upon another for the achievements of its own 
goals. That is, when the progress of one group toward its goals 
is perceived by group members as likely to be enhanced by out-
group derogation, such out-group derogation will take place. The 
second possibility is that over time particular groups develop 
and adopt a culture of strong discrimination against particular 
other groups. That is, for whatever reason (perhaps because of 
a history of perceived negative dependence), some groups develop 
particular out-groups against whom they more or less standardly 
employ out-group derogation. 1 
Such reasoning, if well grounded and empirically supported, might 
justify modifying and extending the standard in-group/out-group 
distinction made within social identity theory, such that the 
phrase "out-group" could be restricted to those particular groups 
toward which particular in-groups have a "culture" or a 
"tradition" of hostility and/or against whom the in-group has a 
particular interest in competing against at a given moment. 
Other groups, against whom in-groups have little or no interest 
in competing, might then be referred to simply as non-in-groups. 
If such a distinction were accepted then social identity theory 
might be held to predict that: (i) in-group members will employ 
only "weak" intergroup discrimination (i.e. in-group preference 
without out-group derogation) against non-in-groups and their 
1 This possibility is also consistent with realistic 
conflict theory, which says that hostile in-group attitudes and 
behaviour toward particular out-groups can exist far beyond the 
circumstance which originally gave rise to such hostility, and 
also with the work of some social identity theorists, who stress 
the need to ,take account o~ the "ideolo~" of groups, 
particularly wl.th respect. to l.ntergroup relatl.o~s ?ver time 
between in-groups and part~cular out-groups (e.g. Bl.lll.g, 1975). 
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members; and, (ii) in-groups will employ both "weak" (i.e. in-
group preference) and "strong" (i.e. out-group derogation) 
against out-groups.2 
BOY in-groups are evaluated 
Social identity theory claims that in-groups are evaluated 
primarily or exclusively in terms of their position relative to 
other groups on dimensions of value to the in-groups (e.g. Taj fel 
& Turner, 1979: 40). That is, in-groups are usually evaluated 
positively if they are perceived as superior to (i.e. positively 
distinct from) relevant comparison groups on such dimensions and 
negatively if they are perceived as inferior to (i.e. negatively 
distinct from) them on such dimensions. 
Hinkle & Brown (1990) draw upon Abrams (1984) to suggest that in-
group evaluation may be affected by "objective" as well as by 
between-group social comparison outcomes (see also Brown et aI, 
1991, 1992). That is, groups may sometimes evaluate their 
performances or situations (and thereby themselves) in relation 
to some "objective" criterion (e. g. where a political party 
evaluates itself in terms of how close it is to achieving full 
employment), instead of or as well as by comparing the in-group 
with relevant comparison groups (e.g. where a political party 
evaluates itself in terms of whether or not they are closer to 
achieving full employment than another political party). In 
other words, "objective" evaluation occurs by an in-group 
comparing its actual situation against a "possible" (e.g. past, 
future, ideal, etc.) in-group situation, rather than by an in-
group comparing its situation against a particular out-group 
situation. 
2 Another way of making the same point is to employ terms 
used in Chapter,3 whereby in-gro~ps show relational ~ntergroup 
discriminat10n 1n fayour of the 1n-gr~up toward n?n-1n-groups, 
but employ both relat10nal and absolute 1ntergroup d1scrimination 
against out-groups. 
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If individual-level theorizing about the effects of comparison 
outcomes on self-esteem can be extrapolated to the effects of 
group-level comparison outcomes on in-group evaluation (as Taj fel 
believed, e.g. Tajfel, 1981a: 337), then Tajfel himself raised 
this possibility, among several others. Tajfel (1978b: 9) wrote 
that: 
a person's self-image is essentially based on certain kinds 
of comparisons, and it consists to a large extent of the 
outcomes of these comparisons. The comparisons may go in 
a number of directions such as: one's expectations, wishes 
or hopes as related to [one's] achievement, actual or 
subjectively assessed; a person's past as related to 
[their] present; one's characteristics (again, objectively 
ascertainable or subjectively assessed) as related to those 
of other people with whom meaningful comparisons can be 
made. 
Extrapolating to the group-level, this quote suggests that in-
group evaluation can be affected: by comparing an in-group' s 
present situation to its previously expected, wished for, or 
hoped for future situation; by comparing an in-group's present 
situation with a past in-group situation; and/or, by comparing 
an in-group's present situation with the present situation of 
relevant comparison groups. Only the latter of these 
possibilities precludes "objective" evaluation, and this is the 
only option which has been taken seriously within social identity 
theory research. 
If such reasoning is valid, rather than the simple "superiority 
good, inferiority bad" assertion dominant within social identity 
theory, it can be predicted that levels of in-group evaluation 
(and hence social identity and social identity contingent self-
esteem) will benefit from perceived achievement of or movement 
toward any objective, temporal or social "in-group goal" (of 
which positive in-group distinctiveness may be only one), and 
will suffer from failure to achieve or movement away from such 
goals. 
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]he self-esteem ~thesis within social identity tbe0hY 
Hogg & Abrams (1990: 33) identify two corollaries of social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis. These are: (i) that 
"Successful intergroup discrimination ... elevates self -esteem" ; 
and, (ii) that "depressed or threatened self-esteem promotes 
intergroup discrimination". As has already been argued in 
Chapter 5, these corollaries inadequately specify social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis. 
Leaving aside issues of in-group salience, out-group relevance 
and comparison dimension importance, with respect to the first 
corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis social identity theory 
says that positive in-group distinctiveness unaccompanied by a 
conflict of values results in positive evaluation of the in-group 
and a positive contribution being made to in-group members' 
social identity contingent self-esteem. Thus, intergroup 
discrimination which successfully achieves or increases such 
positive in-group distinctiveness will elevate that aspect of 
overall self-esteem. Intergroup discrimination which maintains 
or protects such positive in-group distinctiveness will "only" 
make that aspect of self-esteem more secure. Intergroup 
discrimination will only reliably elevate self-esteem, therefore, 
if it: (i) achieves or increases positive in-group 
distinctiveness (as opposed to making it more secure); and, (ii) 
does so without a conflict of values. Even then, it is only 
social identity contingent self-esteem which is elevated, not 
necessarily "overall" self-esteem. 
Again leaving aside issues of in-group salience, out -group 
rel~vance and comparison dimension importance, with respect to 
the second corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis social 
identity theory says that depressed (i.e. "negative") or 
threatened (i.e. "insecure") social identity contingent self-
esteem will promote intergroup discrimination if and only if: (i) 
there are "cognitive alternatives" available (i.e. the 
discrimination is likely to result in new, enhanced, or more 
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secure positive in-group distinctiveness) ; ( ii) the 
discrimination is not perceived as likely to result in a conflict 
of values; and, (iii) the discrimination does not preclude more 
attractive routes to meeting self-esteem needs (e.g. social 
mobility or exit). Depressed or threatened self-esteem will not 
reliably promote intergroup discrimination if: (i) the esteem is 
not social identity contingent; (ii) cognitive alternatives are 
not available; (iii) a conflict of values is involved; and/or, 
(iv) discrimination precludes more attractive routes to self-
esteem improvement. 
n,e present study 
In the present study it was assumed that there may be essential 
differences between the consequences of belonging to and/or 
supporting two potentially rather different "types" of in-groups: 
one charitable and one political. Political group affiliation 
tends to occur within essentially competitive intergroup arenas. 
That is, pairs or sets of political parties "traditionally" have 
negatively interdependent goals and to a large extent (although 
not necessarily exclusively) are evaluated in terms of their 
successes or failures relative to other particular pOlitical 
groups. Thus, social identity theory's hypotheses are perhaps 
most likely to be supported with respect to such groups (e.g. 
Kelly, 1988: 330). Charitable group affiliation seems likely to 
be somewhat different in that charitable groups: (i) tend to be 
rather more focused toward specific "objective" goals (e.g. 
raising money, recruiting members, reducing poverty, etc.); and, 
(ii) are not "essentially" or "traditionally" in conflict with 
particular comparison groups. In the terminology suggested 
above, charitable groups, unlike political groups, do not tend 
to have out-groups, only non-in-groups. Further, charitable 
groupS are perhaps more (although not necessarily exclusively) 
reliant on non-socially comparative evaluation than are political 
groups. These assumed differences allow a number of hypotheses 
to be formulated and tested. 
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Additionally, respondents' evaluation of various hypothetical 
situations involving between-sex differences were investigated 
(see below) . 
JlnX>theses 
The 
Hla 
Hlb 
nature of intergroup discrimination 
Supporters of charitable groups will employ only "weak" 
mean intergroup discrimination against comparison groups 
(i.e. in-group preference, with in-groups receiving the 
best and positive mean evaluation, but with comparison 
groups still receiving neutral or positive mean 
evaluation) . 
Supporters of political groups will employ both "weak" 
(i.e. in-group preference) and "strong" (i.e. out-group 
derogation) mean intergroup discrimination against out-
groups against whom the in-groups "traditionally" compete, 
but will employ only "weak" mean intergroup discrimination 
against other comparison groups. 
In-group evaluation 
H2a 
H2b 
H2c 
H2d 
Increasing ~rogress toward or exceeding of objective or 
relational 1n-group goals will result in increasingly 
positive (or less negative) mean evaluation of the in-
group. 
Increasing movement away from objective or relational in-
group goals will result in increasingly negative (or less 
positive) mean evaluation of the in-group. 
Achievement of objective or relative in-group goals will 
always result in positive mean evaluation of the in-group. 
Non-achievement of objective or relative in-group goals 
will result in mean negative evaluation of the in-group 
when and only when that non-achievement is accompanied by 
(or indicates) movement away from those goals. 
The self-esteem hypothesis: corollary 1 
H3a 
H3b 
Respondents' mean self-esteem will be positive 
situations where positive in-group distinctiveness 
achieved without a conflict of values. 
in 
is 
Respondents's mean self-esteem will be negative in 
situations where a conflict of values occurs and positive 
in-group distinctiveness is not achieved. 
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H3c Respondents' mean self-esteem will not be significantly 
different from zero in situations where (i) no conflict of 
values occurs but positive in-group distinctiveness is not 
achieved, or (ii) positive in-group distinctiveness is 
achieved but is accompanied by a conflict of values. 
The self-esteem hypothesis: corollary 2 
H4a 
H4b 
H4C 
H4d 
Respondents will be willing to employ intergroup 
discrimination when in-group distinctiveness is insecure 
(i.e. when cognitive alternatives are available) and exit 
is unavailable. 
Respondents will not be willing to employ intergroup 
discrimination when in-group distinctiveness is secure. 
When in-group distinctiveness is insecure and exit is 
available, respondents who are members of superior groups 
will employ intergroup discrimination but members of 
inferior groups will not. 
Exit will be employed, when available, considerably more 
frequently by members of securely inferior in-groups than 
by members of positive or insecurely negative groups (with 
members of securely positive groups not employing exit at 
all) . 
METHOD 
Respondents and procedure 
over two days approximately 120 first-year psychology 
undergraduates at Keele University were approached during 
tutorials and asked if they would volunteer to take away and 
complete questionnaires concerning "the effects of group 
membership", which would to be collected during the following 
week's tutorial. It was stressed that the questionnaire required 
quite a lot of thought and effort and that volunteers should 
complete it alone when they had at least half an hour to spare. 
101 respondents returned complete or near-complete 
questionnaires. Of these, 23 were male, 76 were female and 2 did 
not indicate their sex. Respondents' ages ranged from 18-49 
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years old, with a mean of 22.6 (SD = 6.1, mode = 19, median = 
20) . 
llaterials 
A questionnaire was designed to address each of the issues of 
interest and was piloted on two separate samples: one of health 
care professionals (primarily nurses) attending courses held at 
Keele university, and another of students attending an Open 
University Surmner School, again at Keele University. Minor 
amendments to and clarifications of particular items on the 
questionnaire were made after each pilot, with the major change 
being to more or less abandon a third sec·tion of the pilot 
questionnaires which dealt with sex category membership. The 
structure of the final questionnaire used was as follows (see 
Appendix 14) . 
section A dealt with charitable group affiliation; Section B 
dealt with political group affiliation; and Section C contained 
"miscellaneous" questions, including one (Question C1) dealing 
with sex category membership. In each of the first two main 
sections questions followed the same sequence. 
Questions A1 and B1 asked about psychological affiliation (or 
non-affiliation) with various charitable and political groups, 
respectively. Questions A2 and B2 asked respondents to indicate 
"how they felt" about individual members each of those groups on 
15-point scales, ranging from -7 = very negative to +7 = very 
positive. These questions were designed to investigate the 
nature of intergroup discrimination by supporters of each type 
of group against various comparison groups and/or their 
members .3 
3 The response scales included negative numbers to allow 
the possibility of respondents derogating target groups and/or 
their members. 
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Questions A3, A4, B3 and B4 asked respondents to indicate "how 
they would feel" (on identical scales as before) in a variety of 
hypothetical situations. Question A3 informed respondents that 
the previous year their favourite charity had achieved only 70% 
of its annual fund-raising target and then asked them to evaluate 
situations in which this year the same charity had aChieved 50%, 
70t, 90t, 100% and 120% of its annual fund-rasing target. 
Question A4 informed respondents that the previous year their 
favourite charity had achieved 140% of its annual fund-raising 
target and then asked them to evaluate situations in which this 
year the same charity had achieved 90%, 100%, 120%, 140% and 160% 
of its annual fund-rasing target. These questions were designed 
to investigate evaluation of situations in which achievement or 
non-achievement of, and movement toward or movement away from, 
in-group goals could be "objectively" assessed. 
Question B3 informed respondents that at the last election the 
political party they supported was runner-up and received 500 
votes less than the winning party. They were then asked to 
evaluate situations in which at the latest election their party 
received 1000, 500 or 250 votes less than the winning party, the 
same number of votes as the (jointly) winning party, or 250 votes 
more than the nearest runner-up. Question B4 informed 
respondents that at the last election the political party they 
supported won, and received 500 votes more than its nearest 
rival. They were then asked to evaluate situations in Which at 
the latest election their party received 250 votes less than 
their nearest rival (who won the election), the same number of 
votes as them (joint winners of the election), or 250, 500 or 
1000 votes more than them (with their own party winning). These 
questions were designed to investigate evaluation of situations 
in which achievement or non-achievement of, and movement toward 
or movement away from, in-group goals could be "relationally" 
(i.e. socially comparatively) assessed. 
Questions AS, B5 and Cl investigated corollary 1 of social 
identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis by asking respondents 
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how they would feel (using the same scales as before) in various 
situations involving either positive or negative in-group 
distinctiveness, use or non-use of intergroup discrimination, and 
the presence or absence of a conflict of values. 
Questions A6 and B6 investigated corollary 2 of social identity 
theory's self-esteem hypothesis by asking respondents how likely 
they would be to employ intergroup discrimination (on lS-point 
scales ranging from -7 = definitely not to +7 = definitely) in 
various situations of either positive or negative in-group 
distinctiveness, and where cognitive alternatives and/or exit 
either were or were not available. (Where exit was available 
respondents could opt for it by placing an "X" instead of a 
number between -7 and +7 in response to that particular item.) 
Questions C2 and C3 asked respondents for their sex and age, 
respectively. Questions C4 and CS, respectively, asked 
respondents to indicate their favourite charitable and political 
groupS (open-ended). 
"Question" C6 invited respondents to make any cotmlents or 
criticisms they wished on any aspect of the questionnaire and/or 
clarifications to any of the answers they had given. 
III 
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RESULTS 
De nature of intergroup discrimination 
Table 7.1 below shows mean evaluation of various charitable groups 
(from Question A2a-g), both for the sample overall and according to 
respondents' self-professed favourite charity (with standard 
deviations shown in brackets).4 
Eval Favourite charity Mean 
of OXFAM RSPCA G'Pce AI Shelt Other None 
n=9 n=10 n=9 n=7 n=6 n=28 n=9 n=101 
OXFAM 6.33 3.90 3.67 2.14 4.00 4.46 3.67 4.15 
(0.7) (2.0) (2.3) (4 .2) (2.4 ) (3 .0) (2 .2) (2 .7) 
RSPCA 5.33 6.90 4.00 4.43 2.83 5.57 4.56 5.10 
(2 .2) (0.3) (2.1) (1 .9) (1. 9) (1.8) (2.6) (2.3) 
G'pce 4.47 2.40 5.67 4.71 4.67 3.57 3.44 3.77 (2 .3) (3 .8) (2.3) (2 .0) (2.3) (2.8) (2.7) (3.0) 
AI 4.44 4.80 4.33 6.43 3.83 3.96 3.78 4.24 (2.7) (1.4) (2 .3) (0.5) (1. 7) (2.6) (2.5) (2.4) 
Shelt 4.78 3.30 3.56 4.57 6.67 4.61 3.56 4.38 (2 .7) (4.6 ) (3.0) (1.8) (0.5) (2.3) (2.5 ) (2.7 ) 
MIND 3.67 3.00 2.67 2.57 2.50 3.32 2.67 3.38 (2 .9) (4.3) (2.6) (2 .8) (2.1) (3.2) (2.9) (3.0) 
BHF 4.47 4.60 2.89 4.29 3.83 4.61 3.44 4.24 
(2.2) (2.3 ) (3.1) (2.3 ) (1. 2) (2 .3) (2.7) (2.2) 
K . G'Pce _ Greenpeacei AI - Amneaty International; Shelt. Shelter; BHP. 8riti.h Heart PoundatioD . 
• :riuation on a Is-point Bcale tro. -7 • Very .egative to +7 • Very Po.1tlve 
Table 7.1: Mean evaluation of various charitable 
groups by favoured charitable group 
• As indicated on question C5. The evaluations of subjects 
whose favourite charitable group was MIND (n=3) or the British 
Heart Foundation (n=2) , ~r who indicated more ~ha~ one favourite 
charity (n=5) , or who d~d not respond to th~s ~tem (n=6) are 
included in the overall means \right-hand column) but are not 
given separate columns. Also, ~t should be noted that similar 
analyses were calculated 01'1; t.he basis of subj ects' :-esponses on 
question A1a-g, and very s~m~lar results were obta~ned. These 
results are not reported here (i) to avoid redundancy, and (ii) 
because the results shown are somewhat easier to interpret. 
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A 7 X 7 MANOVA with favourite charity as a between-subjects 
factor, the charitable groups to be evaluated as a within-
subjects factor, and evaluation of those charities as the 
dependent variable, revealed no significant between-subjects main 
effect (F C6 • 71 ) = 0.56, P = 0.762).5 Multivariate tests, however, 
revealed both a significant within-subjects main effect 
(Hotellings P = 0.000) and a significant interaction (Hotellings 
p = 0.001). 
Inspection of means in the right-hand column of Table 7.1 shows 
that on average the RSPCA received the most favourable evaluation 
overall, and MIND and Shel ter received the least favourable 
overall evaluation. The bold figures in the main body of Table 
7.1 show that respondents evaluated their own favourite charity 
(where this was possible) positively, and tended to evaluate them 
more favourably than they evaluated other target charities. No 
target charity, however, received negative (or even neutral) mean 
evaluation from respondents who indicated favouring a particular 
charity. Thus, Hypothesis Ala was fully supported: supporters 
of particular charitable groups employed only "weak" mean 
intergroup discrimination against comparison groups (i.e. in-
group preference: with in-groups receiving the best and positive 
mean evaluation, but with comparison groups still receiving 
neutral or positive mean evaluation) . 
It can also be noted that all target charities also received 
positive mean evaluation from respondents who explicitly said 
that they had no favourite charity. 
Table 7.2 shows mean evaluation (with standard deviations shown 
in brackets) of various political parties (from Question B2a-g) , 
5 within-subjects ANOVA designs can only be calculated 
within the MANOVA procedure of the statistic package used (SPSS) . 
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both for the sample overall and according to respondents' self-
professed favourite political party.' 
Eval Favoured political party Mean 
of Labour Lib-Dem Con Green None 
n=33 n=16 n=8 n=7 n=24 n=101 
comm -1. 55 -3.38 -2.88 -2.57 -2.75 -2.66 
(3.5) (3.2) (2.8) (3.6) (3.6) (3.5) 
Labour 4.94 0.69 -1.13 1.43 -0.13 1.77 
(2.6) (2.2) (3.6) (2.9) (3.3) (3.7) 
Lib- 1.73 4.50 1.25 3.57 1.25 2.13 
Dem (2.7) (1.5) (1.8) (2.0) (2.3) (2.5) 
Con -4.94 -0.75 2.75 -3.43 -1.18 -1.94 (2.7) (3.3) (1. 8) (2.1) (3.4) (3.8) 
BNP -6.49 -4.31 -2.25 -5.29 -4.08 -5.12 
(1. 6) (3.8) (4.2) (3.3) (3.3) (3.1 ) 
Green 1. 58 1.38 1.50 5.86 2.50 2.80 (3.4) (3.4) (3.2) (0.9) (2.8) (3.4 ) 
MRL -2.09 -2.88 -1.00 -0.29 -1.50 -1.83 (3.3) (3.5) (2.6) (1. 0) (2.9) (3.3) 
I.. CO •• - Briti.h Communist Party; Labour. Labour Party; Lib-De •• Liberal Democrat Party; Con. co~ •• rv.t1V. party; BMP - Britia,b National Party; M~L .• Monater Raving Loony party. .valuation on a 15~ 
polD~ 8eale from -7 - very Hegatlve to .7 - Very P081tlve 
Table 7.2: Mean evaluation of various political parties 
by favoured poli tical party 
A 5 X 7 MANOVA with favourite political party as a between-
subj ects factor, the political parties to be evaluated as a 
within-subjects factor, and evaluation of those parties as the 
dependent variable, revealed no significant between-subjects main 
effect (F lt • sl ) = 0.76, P = 0.553). Multivariate tests, however, 
, As indicated on question C5. No subjects indicated that 
they favoured either the British Communist Party, the BritiSh 
National Party, 0: the Monster Raving Loony Party. The 
evaluations of subJects who favoured more than one political 
party (n=8), who favoured a political party not examined here 
(n=l) or who did not respond to item C5 (n=6) are included in 
the o~erall means (right-hand column) but are not given separate 
columns. As before, similar analyses calculated on responses to 
question b1a-g gave similar results and are not reported. 
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revealed both a significant within-subjects main effect and a 
significant interaction (Hotellings p = 0.000 for each) . 
Inspection of means in the right-hand column of Table 7.2 show 
that on average the Labour Party and the Green Party received the 
most favourable evaluations overall, and the British National 
party received the least favourable overall evaluation. The bold 
figures in the main body of Table 2 show that respondents' 
evaluation of their own favoured political group (where such 
evaluation was possible) was positive and tended to be more 
favourable than their evaluation of other target pOlitical 
groups. 
Most importantly for present purposes, though, and in marked 
contrast to the results shown in Table 7.1, Table 7.2 shows 
considerable evidence of negative mean evaluation of particular 
target groups by supporters of particular favoured groups. 
Labour party supporters, for example, made clearly negative mean 
evaluation of the Conservative and British National parties, 
while Conservatives made (less pronounced) negative mean 
evaluation of the Labour and British National parties. Thus, 
strong support was found for Hypothesis Alb: supporters of 
political groups employed both "weak" (i.e. in-group preference) 
and "strong" (i.e. out-group derogation) mean intergroup 
discrimination against out-groups against whom the in-groups 
"traditionally" compete, but employed only "weak" mean intergroup 
discrimination against other comparison groups. 
It can also be noted that respondents who explicitly indicated 
that they favoured no particular political party made negative 
mean evaluation of certain target parties (e.g. the British 
National party). 
JfgW in-groups are evaluated 
Question A3 
Percentage of 
annual target 
reached 
50% 
70%-
90% 
100%-
120%-
Evaluation 
-1.48 
0.90 
3.40 
5.25 
6.07 
(3.95) 
(3 .45) 
(2 .92) 
(2.47) 
(2.56) 
.valuation on a 15-point Beale from -7 • Very Negative to +, • very Positive. 
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Tab~e 7.3: Mean evaluation according to percentage of charitable 
in-group's annual target reached, when 70t of the annual target 
was reached the previous year 
Table 7.3 shows that as the in-groupls success in meeting its 
annual fund-raising target improved, so too did respondents' mean 
evaluation of the situation (from Question A3). A MANOVA with 
the various situations to be evaluated as a within-subjects 
factor and evaluation of those situations as the dependent 
variable revealed a significant multivariate difference between 
the mean evaluation (Hotellings p = 0.000). Further, a planned 
pOlynomial contrast revealed a significant linear trend, such 
that as in-group success increased, so too did respondents' 
evaluation (Fcl • n ) = 233.36, P = 0.000).' 
In situations where the in-group both achieved its annual target 
and improved on its previous year's performance, mean evaluation 
of those situations was significantly above zero by two-tailed 
one-sample t-tests (p < 0.001 in each case) . 
7 There were also significant quadratic (Fcl • U) = 30.86, P 
_ 0.000) and cubic trends (FCI • 99 ) = 6.88, P = 0.010), However, 
;xamination of the sums of squar~s clearly indicated that the 
linear trend (SS = 3896.68) expla1ned far more of the variance 
than did either the quadratic (SS = 96.73) or the cubic (SS = 
12.77) trends. It can be n~ted that ,this r~sult is particularly 
striking as the percentage 1ncrease 1n the 1n-group's success in 
reaching its annual target was not an interval scale increase, 
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Where the in-group did not achieve its annual target but improved 
upon its performance the previous year (i.e. when the in-group 
achieved 90% of its annual target), mean evaluation of the 
situation was also significantly greater than zero (t oOO ) :: 11.66, 
P < 0.001). 
If the in-group failed both to reach its annual target and to 
improve on the previous year's performance (i.e. when the in-
group again reached only 70% of its annual target), mean 
evaluation of the situation was still significantly (if only 
slightly) positive (toOO ) = 2.63, P = 0.01). 
When the in-group both failed to reach its annual target and its 
performance worsened compared to the previous year's performance 
(i.e. the in-group achieved only 50% of its target), mean 
evaluation of the situation was significantly negative (t(100) = -
3.76, P < 0.001). 
Question A4 
percentage of 
annual target 
reached 
90% 
100% 
120% 
140% 
160% 
Evaluation 
0.78 
2.86 
4.07 
5.04 
5.88 
(4.06) 
(3.31) 
(2.80) 
(2.72 ) 
(2.70 ) 
.valuation on a 15-point scale from -7 • Very Negative to +7 • Very poaitive. 
Table 7.4: MeaD. evaluation according to percentage of charitable 
in-group'S allllual target reacbed, when 140t of the annual target 
was reached the previous year 
Table 7.4 again clearly shows that as in-group success in meeting 
its annual fund-raising target improved, so too do respondents' 
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mean evaluation of the situation (Hotellings p = 0.000, linear 
contrast F(I.IOO) = 131.99, P = 0.000).8 
Where the in-group both reached its annual target and exceeded 
its previous year's performance (i.e. the in-group achieved 160% 
of its annual target), mean evaluation of the situation was 
significantly positive by a two-tailed one-sample t-test (t(lOO) 
= 21.90, P < 0.001). 
If the in-group reached its annual target but its performance did 
not change compared to the previous year (i. e. the in-group again 
achieved 140% of its annual target), mean evaluation of the 
situation was again significantly above zero (t(lOO) = 18.62, P < 
0.001). 
When the in-group achieved its annual target but had inferior 
performances to those obtained the previous year (i.e. where the 
in-group achieved 100% or 120% of its annual target), mean 
evaluation of the situations was still significantly positive (p 
< 0.001 in each case). 
Where the in-group both failed to achieve its annual target and 
its performance worsened compared to the previous year (i. e. 
where the in-group achieved only 90% of its annual target), mean 
evaluation of the situation was not (quite) significantly 
different from zero (t oOO ) = 1.94, P = 0.055}. 
FUrther, mean evaluation of the situation when the in-group 
achieved 90% of its target after it had achieved 140% of its 
target the previous year was significantly lower than when the 
in-group achieved the same percentage of its annual target after 
8 Again ther~ were significant quadratic (F(l.lOO) = 26.85, 
_ 0.000) and cubl.c (F(l.lOO) = 7.53, P = 0.007} trends, but again ~x;mination of the sums of squares makes it clear that the linear 
trend is the one explaining the majority of the vari~nce (SSlin 
_ 1547.03, SSquacS = 53.09, SSCUb = 5.57). As above, l.t can be 
~oted that this z::esul t is particular,ly strik~ng ~s the percentage 
increase in,the l.n-group's ~uccess l.n reachl.ng l.ts annual target 
was not an l.nterval scale l.ncrease. 
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achieving only 70\ of its target the previous year (X90% (pon 140t) 
= 0.78, X90\(Po8t 70t) = 3.40, t(U) = 6.90, two-tailed p = 0.000). 
Similarly, mean evaluation of the situation when the in-group 
reached its annual target was significantly lower when the in-
group had exceeded its target the previous year than when it had 
failed to reach the previous year's target (X100%(Pon 140t) = 2.86, 
XI00% (poat 70t) = 5.25, t(lOO) = 8.45, two-tailed p = 0.000). Finally, 
mean evaluation of the situation was significantly lower after 
the in-group exceeded its annual target when the in-group had 
failed to equal the previous year's surplus than when it had 
clearly converted the previous year's deficit into an excess in 
the current year (X120\ (pon 140t) = 4.07, X120% (poU 70t) = 6.07, t(lOO) 
= 7.40, two-tailed p = 0.000). 
Question B3 
Number of votes 
relative to 
previously winning 
party 
1000 less 
500 less 
250 less 
same 
250 more 
Evaluation 
-3.97 
-2.06 
-0.41 
3.11 
5.88 
(2.95) 
(3.08) 
(3.67) 
(3.19) 
(1.72) 
.valuation on a ls-point Bcale from -7 • Very Negative to +7 - Very P081tive. 
Table 7.5: Mean evaluation according to political in-group'S 
electoral performance, when it bad been beaten by the winning 
party by 500 votes the previous year 
abl 7 5 Shows that respondents' T e . mean evaluation of the 
situation increased with improving in-group performance relative 
to the previously winning party. A MANOVA with planned 
pOlynomial contrasts confirmed this linear trend as significant 
(Hotellin9s P = 0.000, linear F(1,99) = 609.57, P = 0.000) .9 
9 There was also a significant quadratic (but not cubic) 
trend {F(l, 99) = 12.23, p=:,O. 001), but the relevant sums of 
squares revealed that the ll.near trend (SSl1D = 6185.17) explained 
far more of the variance than the quadratic one (SSquad = 92.06) . 
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Where the in-group achieved positive in-group distinctiveness and 
improved on the previous election's performance (i.e. where the 
in-group obtained 250 votes more than its rival) , mean evaluation 
of the situation was significantly above zero by two-tailed one-
sample t-test (t(n) = 36.24, P < 0.001). 
If the in-group failed to achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness but improved on its previous performance, mean 
evaluation of the situation was also significantly positive (t(U) 
= 9.74, P < 0.001), as long as the in-group was not negatively 
distinct from the comparison group (Le. where the in-group 
obtained the same number of votes as the jointly winning party) . 
When the in-group improved on its previous performance but 
remained negatively distinct (i.e. where the in-group obtained 
250 votes less than the winning party), mean evaluation of the 
situation was not significantly different from zero (t(n, = -
1.12, P = 0.266). 
Where the in-group failed to achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness and its performance did not change compared to 
the previous election (i.e. where the in-group again obtained 500 
votes less than the winning party), mean evaluation of the 
situation was significantly negative (t(n) = -6.68, P < 0.001), 
as was the case when the in-group both failed to achieve positive 
in-group distinctiveness and had a worsened performance relative 
to the previous election (i.e. where the in-group obtained 1000 
votes less than the winning party) (t(U) = -13.45, P < 0.001). 
Again, it can be n~ted that.this result is particularly striking 
S 
the percentage ~ncrease ~n the votes received by the in-group 
a . 1 l' was not an ~nterva sca e ~ncrease. 
Question B4 
Number of votes 
relative to 
previously beaten 
party 
250 less 
same 
250 more 
500 more 
1000 more 
-3.60 
0.75 
4.55 
5.27 
6.09 
Evaluation 
(3.33) 
(3.57) 
(2.12) 
(1.68) 
(1.26) 
.valuation on a 1s-point Bcale from -7 - Very Negative to +7 - Very Positive. 
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Table 7.6: Mean evaluation according to political in-group's 
electoral performance, when it had beaten its nearest rival 
party by 500 votes the previous year 
Table 7.6 again clearly demonstrates improving respondent mean 
evaluation with improving in-group performances relative to its 
previous nearest rival (Hotellings p = 0.000, linear F O • 98 ) = 
646.38, P = 0.000) .10 
The in-group both achieving positive in-group distinctiveness and 
improving its performance from the previous election (i.e. where 
the in-group obtained 1000 votes more than its rival) resulted 
in a significantly positive mean evaluation of the situation by 
a two-tailed one-sample t-test (t(U) = 48.01, P < 0.001). 
The in-group achieving positive in-group distinctiveness and 
equalling its previous performance (i. e. the in-group again 
obtaining 500 votes more than its rival) also resulted in a 
significantly positive mean evaluation of the situation (t lte ) = 
31.17, P < 0.001). 
10 Again there was a significant quadratic (but not cubic) 
trend (F(l 98) = 179.77 I P = 0.000), but again examination of the 
relevant sums of squares revealed that the linear trend (SSl1 = 
5654.50) explained much more of the variance than the quadratic 
trend (SSqua4 = 724.39). 
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Where the in-group' s performance worsened from the previous 
election but positive in-group distinctiveness was still obtained 
(i.e. where the in-group received 250 votes more than its rival), 
mean evaluation of the situation was still significantly positive 
(tIn) = 21.38, P < 0.001}. 
Where the in-group performance worsened from the previous 
election and positive in-group distinctiveness was not achieved 
the situation received a significantly positive mean evaluation 
as long as the in-group was not negatively distinct (i.e. where 
the in-group received the same amount of votes as the jointing 
winning party) (t I98 ) = 2.08, P < 0.05). Where the in-group 
performance worsened from the previous election and the in-group 
was negatively distinct, however, (i.e. where the in-group 
obtained 250 votes less than the winning party), mean evaluation 
of the situation was significantly negative (t(98) = -10.76, P < 
a . 001) . 
FUrther, obtaining 250 votes less than the nearest rival resulted 
in significantly lower evaluation when the in-group had 
previously beaten the out-group than when the in-group' s negative 
in-group distinctiveness was nevertheless an improvement on 
previous between-group comparison outcomes (X(250 le .. , prev!o".ly 500 eore) 
= -3.60, X(250 1 ... , previouBly500 1 ... ) = -0.41, tItS) = 8.92, two-tailed p 
= 0.000). Similarly, obtaining the same amount of votes as the 
out-group resulted in significantly poorer evaluation when the 
in-group had previously beaten the out-group than when the out-
group had previously beaten the in-group (X( ..... , previouly 500 more) = 
0.75, X( .... : previoualy5001 ... ) = 3.11, t(98) = 7.29, two-tailed p = 
O.OOO}. Finally, the in-group obtaining 250 votes more than its 
nearest rival resulted in significantly lower evaluation when the 
in-group had previously beaten the out-group by 500 votes than 
when the out-group had previously beaten the in-group by the same 
amount (X(250 .ore: previously 500 .. ore) = 4.55, X(450 .ore, previously 500 1 ... ) = 5.88, 
to,.) = 7.46, two-tailed p = o. 000) . 
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This pattern of results provides strong support for hypotheses 
H2a to H2c. In line with hypothesis H2a increasing progress 
toward or exceeding of objective or relative in-group goals 
resulted in increasingly positive (or less negative) mean 
evaluation of the in-group; in line with hypothesis H2b 
increasing movement away from objective or relative in-group 
goals resulted in increasingly negative (or less positive) mean 
evaluation of the in-group; and, in line with hypothesis H2c 
achievement of objective or relative in-group goals always 
resulted in positive mean evaluation of the in-group. 
It was not the case, however, that non-achievement of objective 
or relative in-group goals only resulted in negative mean 
evaluation of the in-group when that non-achievement was 
accompanied by movement away from those goals. In the case of 
the political in-groups striving to achieve the relational goal 
of positive in-group distinctiveness, negative in-group 
distinctiveness resulted in negative mean in-group evaluation 
when accompanied by no progress toward or movement away from that 
goal (i.e. when the in-group remained as negatively distinct as 
it had previously been). Thus, against hypothesis H2d, in-groups 
were not only negatively evaluated when non-achievement of 
relational in-group goals was accompanied by movement away from 
those goals. l1 
AlsO, failure to achieve the relational goal of positive in-group 
distinctiveness did not result in negative mean evaluation of the 
in-group, even when this failure represented movement away from 
that goal (i.e. when the in-group had previously aChieved 
positive in-group distinctiveness), as long as the in-groupls 
performance had only deteriorated to non-distinctiveness (i.e. 
11 In line with hypothesis H2d, however, when failure to 
achieve the relational in-group goal was accompanied by progress 
toward that goal (i.e. lessened negative in-group distinctiveness 
or "achievement" of zero in-group distinctiveness from the out-
group), this did not ~esult in significantly negative evaluations 
of the in-group (and 1.n the: latter case resulted in significantly 
positive in-group evaluatl.on) . 
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equal performance) rather than to negative in-group 
distinctiveness. Similarly, charitable groups "just" failing to 
reach the objective goal of an annual fund-raising target did not 
result in negative mean evaluation, even when this failure was 
clearly accompanied by worsened in-group performance. II Thus, 
again against hypothesis H2d, failure to achieve objective or 
relational in-group goals, accompanied by movement away from 
those goals, did not reliably result in negative mean evaluation 
of the in-group, as long as the failure to reach the respective 
goals was not "too" stark. 
fbe self-esteem hypothesis: CorgllahY 1 
Question A5 
Discrimination No discrimination 
PGD NGD PGD NGD 
No COV COV No COV COV No COV COV No COV COV 
6.34 -2.33 0.20 -4.78 5.22 1. 83 0.19 -3.62 
(1.3) (4.1 ) (4.0) (2.9) (2.5) (4.1) (3.7) (3.2) 
. ~GD. positive in-group distinctivene8s; NGD. negative in-group di.tinctivene •• , COV. conflict !:Y~.lU... 1s-pDint .eale ranging from -, • very negative to +7 • very po.ltiva. N. 100. 
Tab~e 7. 7: Mean self -esteem levels for chari table group members 
accordUng to use or non-use of intergroup discrimination, 
positive or negative in-group distinctiveness, and 
presence or absence of a conflict of values 
A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA with use or non-use of intergroup 
discrimination, positive or negative in-group distinctiveness, 
and presence or absence of a conflict of values as within-
subjects factors, and respondents' self-esteem as the dependent 
12 Although deteriorating charitable in-group performance 
plus a "clear" failure to reach an objective in-group goal did 
result in such negative evaluation. 
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variable, revealed significant main, first-order, and second-order 
interaction effects. 
Averaged across in-group distinctiveness and conflicts of value, 
respondents who did not employ intergroup discrimination had 
significantly higher mean self-esteem (+0.91) than those who did 
(-0.14, F(1.99) = 23.57, P = 0.000); averaged across use of 
intergroup discrimination and conflicts of value, respondents in 
positively distinct groups had significantly higher mean self-
esteem (+2.8) than those in negatively distinct groups (-2.0, 
F
U
• 99 ) = 316.03, P = 0.000); and, averaged across in-group 
distinctiveness and use of intergroup discrimination, respondents 
experiencing a conflict of values had significantly lower mean 
self -esteem (-2.2) than those who experienced no conflict of 
values (+3.0, F(l.!I9) = 306.26, P = 0.000). 
All first-order effects were also significant. Averaged across 
conflicts of value, positive in-group distinctiveness was 
accompanied by significantly higher mean self-esteem when 
intergroup discrimination was not employed (+3.5) than when it 
was (+2.0), and negative in-group distinctiveness was accompanied 
by significantly lower mean self-esteem when accompanied by 
intergroup discrimination (-2.3) than when unaccompanied by such 
discrimination (-1.7, F(l.99) = 9.88, P = 0.002}. Averaged across 
in-group distinctiveness, use of intergroup discrimination 
accompanied by a conflict of values lead to negative mean self-
esteem (-3.6) but unaccompanied by a conflict of values lead to 
positive mean self-esteem (+3 .3), and non-use of intergroup 
discrimination lead to relatively neutral mean self-esteem when 
accompanied by a conflict of values (-0.9) but raised mean self-
esteem when unaccompanied by such a conflict (+2.7, F o . .,) = 
59.23, P = O.OOO}. Averaged across use of intergroup 
discrimination, positive in-group distinctiveness lead to 
relatively neutral mean self-esteem when accompanied by a 
conflict of values (-0.3) but resulted in positive mean self-
esteem when unaccompanied by such a conflict (+5.8), while 
negative in-group distinctiveness lead to relatively neutral mean 
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self-esteem when unaccompanied by a conflict of values (+0.2) but 
resulted in negative mean self-esteem when there was such a 
conflict (-4.2, F(1.991 = 17.15, P = 0.000). 
These results are qualified by 
interaction (F(1.991 = 47.66, P = 
a significant second-order 
0.000) . Positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values resulted in positive 
mean self-esteem whether intergroup discrimination was (+6.34) 
or was not (+5.22) employed, while positive group distinctiveness 
with a conflict of values resulted in only slightly positive mean 
self-esteem when intergroup discrimination was not employed 
(+1.83) and resulted in slightly negative mean self-esteem when 
intergroup discrimination was employed (-2.33). Negative in-
group distinctiveness without a conflict of values resulted in 
more or less neutral mean self-esteem whether intergroup 
discrimination was (+0.20) or was not (+0.19) employed, while 
negative in-group distinctiveness with a conflict of values 
resulted in slightly more negative mean self-esteem when 
intergroup discrimination was employed (-4.78) than when it was 
not (-3.62). 
Question B5 
PGD NGD 
COV No COV COV No COV 
-3.53 6.30 -4.27 2.13 
(3.5) (1.2) (3 .4) (3.4) 
. POD. positive in-group diatinctivene •• ; MGD. negative in-group distinctivene.al COV. conflict of 
!:r~... Is-point acale ranging from -7 • very negative to .7 • very poaitive. M. 100. 
Table 7.8: Mean self-esteem levels for political party 
supporters accordUng to positive or negative in-group 
d1stinctiveness and presence or absence of a conflict of values 
A 2 X 2 MANOVA with in-group distinctiveness (positive or 
negative) and conflict of values (present or absent) as within-
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subjects factors and respondents' self-esteem as the dependent 
variable revealed significant main and interaction effects. 
Averaged across group distinctiveness respondents experiencing 
a conflict of values had significantly lower mean self-esteem 
(-3.90) than respondents without a conflict of interest (+4.22, 
Fu. tt) = 587.11, P = 0.000), and averaged across conflicts of 
value respondents in positively distinct groups had significantly 
higher mean self-esteem (+2.97) than respondents in negatively 
distinct groups (-1.07, Fcl,n) = 65.78, P = 0.000). 
These results are qualified by a significant interaction (F(1,u) 
= 42.04, P = 0.000). As can be seen from Table 7.8, there was 
little difference in mean negative self-esteem levels according 
to positive (-3.53) or negative (-4.27) in-group distinctiveness 
when that distinctiveness was accompanied by a conflict of 
values. However, when no conflict of values was involved mean 
self-esteem was more positive for positively distinct groups 
(+6.30) than for negatively distinct ones (+2.13). 
Question Cl 
Own sex's earnings 
relative to other 
sex's earnings 
Own sex more 
Same 
Own sex less 
Evaluation 
-4.36 
6.15 
-6.17 
(3.93) 
(2.16) 
(2.50) 
Syaluat10D OD a Is-point Beale from -7 - very Hegative to .7 • Very poa1tlva. 
Table 7.9: Mean evaluations according to own sex's earnings 
relative to other sex's earnings for the same work 
Table 7.9 shows that respondents gave negative mean evaluation 
to situations in which either sex earned more than the other for 
the same work (which was assumed to involve a conflict of 
equalitarian values), and gave positive mean evaluation when each 
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sex earned equal money for equal work (Hotellings p = 0.000).13 
Planned polynomial contrasts revealed a significant quadratic 
trend (FC1 • 97 ) = 666.78, P = 0.000) ,14 It should be noted, 
however, that mean evaluation was significantly more negative 
when the other sex out-earned respondents' own sex than when the 
reverse was true (t C99 ) = 3.99, two- tailed p = O. OOO} . 
The above results provide strong support for hypotheses H3a and 
H3b. As predicted by hypothesis H3a positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values resulted in positive 
mean self-esteem whether or not intergroup discrimination was 
employed. Similarly, as predicted by hypothesis H3b, negative 
in-group distinctiveness accompanied by a conflict of values 
resulted in negative mean self-esteem, again, whether or not 
intergroup discrimination was employed, 
The results relating to hypothesis H3c are more complicated. 
Negative in-group distinctiveness accompanied by no conflict of 
values resulted in neutral mean self-esteem, as predicted by the 
hypothesis, but there is quite a lot of evidence that positive 
in-group distinctiveness accompanied by a conflict of values 
resulted in negative mean self-esteem (except when the conflict 
of values came about by not employing intergroup discrimination -
where self-esteem was more or less neutral, as predicted) . 
13 A MANOVA with the three evaluations as a within-subject 
factor and s7x as a between-Subjects factor revealed no 
significant ma~n or interaction effects for sex. 
14 Running from "own sex more", through "same", to "other 
sex more". There was also a significant linear trend (FCl • 97 ) = 
13.82, P = O.OOO}. However, sums of ~quares r 7vealed that the quadratic trend (SSqUad =. 666. 78) expla~ned cons1derably more of 
the variance than the l1near one (SSlin = 134.82). 
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%be self -esteem hywthesis ; Corollaxy 2 
Question A6 
Negative in-group Positive in-group 
distinctiveness distinctiveness 
Exit No Exit Exit No Exit 
CA No CA CA No CA CA No CA CA No CA 
-0.61 -2.06 -0.23 -2.59 -1.14 -2.06 -0.92 -2.51 
(4.5) (3 .4) (4.7) (3.9) (4.5) (4.4) (4.8) (4.7) 
Number of respondents who chose exit:-
[ 7 26 10 12 
Ke: axit. exit available; No Bxit • exit unavailable; CA • cognitive alternative. available; "0 CA • co~ .. itive alternative. unavailabla. lS-point ."ale ranging from -, • atrongly oppoae the 'poeching' 
.u~~e.tion and +7 • strongly support the 'poaching' suggestion. ". 98. 
Table 7.10: Levels of use of exit and/or intergroup 
discrimination by charitable group members according to 
poBitiv~ or.n~gative i~-group dis~inc~i~eneBS, avail~ility or 
.DO.ll-ava~lab~l~ty of ex~t, and ava~lab~l~ty or non-ava~lability 
of cognitive alternatives 
A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA with availability or non-availability of 
cognitive alternatives, availability or non-availability of exit, 
and positive or negative in-group distinctiveness as within-
subjects factors, and willingness to engage in intergroup 
discrimination as the dependent variable, revealed a significant 
main effect for group distinctiveness and a significant first-
order effect for the interaction between group distinctiveness 
and availability of exit. No other main or interaction effects 
were significant. 
Averaged across availability of exit and of cognitive 
alternatives, positive in-group distinctiveness resulted in a 
slightly stronger mean disinClination to employ intergroup 
discrimination (-1.66) than negative in-group distinctiveness 
(-1. 4 , F(l.91l = 20.02, P = 0.000). 
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This was qualified by the significant first-order interaction 
between in-group distinctiveness and availability of exit (FI1 • 97 ) 
= 9.91, P = 0.002). For both positively and negatively distinct 
groupS, mean disinclination to employ intergroup discrimination 
was slightly stronger when exit was unavailable than when it was 
available, and mean disinclination to employ such discrimination 
was stronger in positively distinct groups than in negatively 
distinct ones (PGD+No Exit = -1.72, PGD+Exit = -1.60, NGD+No Exit 
= -1.41, NGD+Exit = -1.34). 
It can also be noted that where exit was available it was 
employed most when in-groups were negatively distinct and 
cognitive alternatives were unavailable. The differences between 
the numbers of respondents employing exit (where it was 
available) according to in-group distinctiveness and availability 
of cognitive alternatives was not significant however (X2 = 
2.587, P > 0.05). 
Question B6 
Negative in-group Positive in-group 
distinctiveness distinctiveness 
Exit No Exit Exit No Exit 
CA No CA CA No CA CA No CA CA No CA 
5.36 0.87 5.99 3.52 5.56 5.69 5.83 6.94 
(2.6) (3.0) (2.0) (4.7) (2.9) (2.4) (2.4) (6.8) 
Number of respondents who chose exit:-
[ 10 71 7 13 I 
• it exit available; No .xit • exit unavailable; CA • cognitive alternetivee available, No CA 
aey: i X ;lternative. unavailable. 15-point 8cale ranging fro. -7 • atrongly oppoa. the 'poaching: 
COgDittVten aDd +7 ~ atrongly 8upport tbe 'poacbing' auggeation. N· 93 . 
• ugg.. 0 
Table 7.11: Levels of use of exi t and/or intergroup 
discrimination by political party supporters according to 
sitive or negative in-group distinctiveness, availability or ~_availabilitY of exit, and availability or non-availability 
of cognitive alternatives 
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A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA with availability or non-availability of 
cognitive alternatives, availability or non-availability of exit, 
and positive or negative in-group distinctiveness as within-
subjects factors, and willingness to engage in intergroup 
discrimination as the dependent variable, revealed significant 
main and first-order interaction effects. Averaged across group 
distinctiveness and availability of exit, respondents for whom 
cognitive alternatives were available were significantly more 
willing to employ intergroup discrimination (+5.69) than 
respondents for whom cognitive alternatives were unavailable 
(+4.26, F C1 ,92) = 78.51, P = 0.000); averaged across group 
distinctiveness and availability of cognitive alternatives, 
respondents were significantly more willing to engage in 
intergroup discrimination when exit was unavailable (+5.57) than 
when it was available (+4.37, F(1,92) = 23.47, P = 0.000) i and, 
averaged across availability of cognitive alternatives and of 
exit, respondents were significantly more willing to engage in 
intergroup discrimination when their group was positively 
distinct (+6.01) than when it was negatively distinct (+3.94, 
F U .92) = 31.58, P = 0.000) . 
These main effects are qualified by significant first-order 
interactions. Averaged across group distinctiveness, when 
cognitive alternatives were available there was very little 
difference between respondents' mean willingness to employ 
intergroup discrimination according to whether exit was available 
(+5.46) or unavailable (+5.91), but when cognitive alternatives 
were unavailable respondents were more willing to employ 
intergroup discrimination when exit was unavailable (+5.23) than 
when it was (+0.94, F C1 • 92 ) = 4.62, P = 0.034). Averaged across 
availability of exit, when cognitive alternatives were available 
there was very little difference between respondents' mean 
willingness to employ intergroup discrimination according to 
whether their group was positively (+5.70) or negatively (+5.68) 
distinct, but when cognitive alternatives were unavailable 
respondents were far more willing to employ intergroup 
discrimination when their group was positively distinct (+6.32) 
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than when it was negatively distinct (+2.20, FO • 92 ) = 56.54, P = 
0.000) . Finally I averaged across availability of cognitive 
alternatives, for both positively and negatively distinct groups, 
mean inclination to employ intergroup discrimination was slightly 
stronger when exit was unavailable than when it was available, 
and mean inclination to employ such discrimination was stronger 
in positively distinct groups than in negatively distinct ones 
(PGD+NO Exit = +6.40, PGD+Exit = +5.63, NGD+No Exit = +4.80, 
NGD+Exit = +3,12, F(1.92) = 10.74, P = 0.001). The second-order 
interaction was not significant (F(l.92l = 1.54, P = 0.218) . 
It can also be noted that when exit was available it was employed 
considerably and significantly more by respondents in negatively 
distinct groups for whom cognitive alternatives were not 
available (71) than by respondents in positively distinct groups 
for whom cognitive alternatives were available (7) or unavailable 
(13), or by respondents who were in negatively distinct groups 
with cognitive alternatives available (10) (X2 = 4.360, P = 
0.05) . 
In evaluating these results with respect to hypotheses H4a to 
H4d, it is clear that very different results were obtained for 
charitable groups than for political ones. No significant 
intergroup discrimination was indulged in by members of the 
former groups whereas intergroup discrimination was the norm for 
members of the latter ones, almost irrespective of in-group 
distinctiveness and availability of cognitive alternatives and 
of exit. For this reason the results of each type of group will 
be evaluated separately. 
For charitable groups, the overwhelming result with respect to 
corollary 2 of the self -esteem hypothesis was that across 
conditions respondents were never willing to employ intergroup 
discrimination. The effects of in-group distinctiveness and 
availability of exit and of cognitive alternatives were on 
relative disinclination to employ such discrimination, and these 
effects, although significant, were small. Further, willingness 
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to employ exit (where available) was similarly slight and did not 
differ significantly according to in-group distinctiveness and 
availability of cognitive alternatives. Rather than try to 
evaluate hypotheses H4a to H4d in the light of these results, it 
seems more sensible to simply accept that members of charitable 
groups were generally not willing to employ either intergroup 
discrimination or exit, irrespective of in-group distinctiveness 
and availability of cognitive alternatives and exit. 
The results from the political groups are much more amenable for 
evaluating hypotheses H4a to H4d. In support of hypothesis H4a 
respondents were willing to employ intergroup discrimination when 
cognitive alternatives were available but exit was not, 
irrespective of in-group distinctiveness. However, contrary to 
hypothesis H4b, respondents were also generally willing to employ 
such discrimination when cognitive alternatives were not 
available, regardless of in-group distinctiveness and the 
availability of exit. 
Hypothesis H4c was not supported by the political group members. 
This hypothesis stated that when both cognitive alternatives and 
exit were available, members of positively distinct groups would 
discriminate but members of negatively distinct groups would not. 
In fact, although in such situations members of positively 
distinct group were slightly more willing to engage in intergroup 
discrimination than members of negatively distinct groups, 
members of both groups were willing to employ high levels of mean 
discrimination. 
Hypothesis H4d received strong support from political group 
members in the sense that when exit was available it was used 
considerably more by members of securely negative inferior groups 
than by any other respondents. It should be noted, however, that 
there was little difference in the use of exit in the other three 
relevant conditions. In particular, members of securely positive 
groupS did not employ significantly less exit than members of 
insecurely positive or negative groups. 
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It appears then that while members of charitable groups were 
universally unwilling to employ intergroup discrimination, for 
members of political groups intergroup discrimination was the 
norm. Thus, while it is to some extent possible to evaluate the 
hypotheses derived from corollary 2 of social identity theory's 
self-esteem hypothesis, it seems that there was an unaccounted 
for "extraneous" variable driving the main results, such that 
non-discrimination and non-exit was the norm for charitable group 
members and discrimination and non-exit was the norm for 
political group members. 
DISCUSSION 
A number of interesting results were obtained from the present 
study, many of which have considerable implications for the 
formulation of social identity theory. 
The nature of intergroup discrimination 
It was found in the present study that although supporters of 
charitable groups on average employed "weak" intergroup 
discrimination in the form of in-group preference, this in-group 
preference was accompanied by mean positive evaluation of both 
in-groups and out -groups. In the terminology introduced in 
Chapter 3, supporters of charitable groups engaged in relative 
discrimination in favour of the in-group, but not absolute 
discrimination against either in-groups or out-groups. 
Supporters of political groups, by contrast, employed "strong" 
absolute discrimination against certain selected out -groups. 
That is, against these out-groups political group members adopted 
both in-group preference and out-group derogation. Against other 
out-groups, however, political group supporters employed only 
"weak" discrimination. The determining factor in whether group 
supporters employed weak or strong intergroup discrimination 
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seemed to be whether or not the in-groups concerned had a 
"tradition" or a "culture" of competition with the relevant 
comparison groups. Where such a tradition existed strong 
intergroup discrimination took place, and where it did not, only 
weak discrimination was employed. 
Social identity theory says that to the extent that social 
identities tied to particular groups are salient in multigroup 
contexts, there will be a need for individuals to perceive their 
in-groups as positively distinct from relevant out-groups. Weak 
intergroup discrimination (i.e. in-group preference without out-
group derogation) would clearly serve such needs. The problem 
for social identity theory, if indeed there is one, is to explain 
when, if ever, social identity needs will promote strong 
intergroup discrimination, i.e. in-group preference with out-
group derogation. 
There are several possible responses to this problem which might 
be given on social identity theory's behalf. The first is simply 
to argue that the theory does not attempt to explain strong 
intergroup discrimination. Rather, its role is to supplement 
Sherif's realistic conflict theory by pointing out that whenever 
social identities are salient in-group members will need their 
in-groups to be positively distinct from all relevant comparison 
groups. Thus, social identity theory supplements realistic 
conflict theory by predicting that in-group members will usually 
display or employ in-group preference when comparing salient in-
groupS with relevant out-groups. Further, this can be done 
without out-group derogation, even when between-group social 
comparison outcomes reveal that the in-group is negatively 
distinct from relevant out-groups (remembering that social 
identity theory conceives of in-group status as an outcome 
variable, Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 43): i.e. by simply giving more 
"goods" to the in-group than to the out-groups, thus improving 
the between-group situation in favour of the in-group. Such an 
approach would then maintain that explanations of strong 
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intergroup discrimination fall within the province of Sherif's 
theory. 15 
While such a response is possible (and indeed seems close to the 
position eventually taken by Tajfel - see Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 
46-47), it does seem to rather reduce the impact of social 
identity theory as an explanatory theory of intergroup 
conflict: 16 the theory is relegated to explaining situations in 
which in-group members are simply "nicer" to in-groups and their 
members than they are to out-groups and theirs, which applies 
only to very tame instances of intergroup "discrimination" and 
intergroup "conflict". 
A second response might be to argue that supporting charities is 
very different to supporting political parties, in that each is 
associated with a different aspect of an individual's self-
concept. Such an argument might claim that supporting a 
political party involves cognitions to the effect that "I am a 
member of this particular political group", whereas supporting 
a charity involves rather different cognitions to the effect that 
n I approve of and support this particular charity". The 
difference, of course, is that the former is claimed to inVOlve 
a self-definition as a group member, thus invoking social 
identity, whereas the latter involves a self-definition in terms 
of a particular individual characteristic, thus invoking personal 
15 An exception occurs "when a group's action for positive 
distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded, or in any way actively 
prevented by an out-group [which] will promote overt conflict and 
hostility between the groups" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 46). Such 
an exception points to the fact that social identity theory does 
not in the final analysis, conceive of in-group status solely 
as ~n outcome variable, but also conceives of it as a group goal. 
The processes resulting from conceiving positive in-group 
distinctiveness as a group goal, however, are already 
incorporated within Sherif's theory, and so examination of social 
identity theory's distinctive contribution must be restricted to 
situations in which in-group status is (at least in the first 
instance) an outcome vari~le. Th~se points will be returned to 
in the final chapter of th1s thes1s. 
16 The title of Tajfel & Turner (1979) is 'An integrative 
theory of intergroup conflict' . 
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identity. Thus, such an account might continue, supporting a 
political party leads to processes tied up with social identity 
needs (i.e. social identity, social comparison, and intergroup 
discrimination), whereas supporting a charity does not. 
Therefore, such an account would conclude, social identity theory 
has nothing to say about the behaviour of people who support 
charities, but does apply to supporters of political parties by 
predicting that they will engage (in appropriate circumstances) 
in social competition. 
There are a number of things to say in response to such a 
possibility. First, it may rely on a false distinction between 
supporters of each of the groups. To the extent that a 
particular charity can be identified and numbers of people are 
known to support it (i.e. identify with it), it seems that social 
identity theory would in fact predict that supporters of such a 
charity would identify themselves as group members, and act 
accordingly (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). At the very least, 
it is a matter of empirical investigation to determine whether 
or not there is a legitimate distinction to be made between 
supporters of political parties and supporters of charities in 
terms of their self-conceptions as psychological group members 
and/or their social identities. More importantly, even if for 
the sake of argument it is conceded that social identity theory 
only applies in the present study to supporters of political 
groups, it is still the case that such supporters employed both 
weak and strong average intergroup discrimination relative to 
particular out-groups. Therefore it is also still the case 
either that social identity theory must be restricted to 
explaining in-group preference rather than stronger forms of 
intergroup discrimination, or that something within social 
identity theory must be identified to enable prediction and 
explanation of each form of discrimination. 
A third possibility is to attempt to explain the differences in 
strength of discrimination in terms of differences in the 
relevance of the comparison groups. Such an account would argue 
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that other charities are not relevant comparison groups for any 
given charity and so strong intergroup discrimination against 
such groups would not be anticipated. Further, not all political 
parties are relevant comparison groups for any given political 
party, and strong intergroup discrimination would be anticipated 
only against those which are. According to such an 
interpretation, the results of the present study wholly support 
social identity theory, as (strong) intergroup discrimination 
occurs only when respondents identify with in-groups and compare 
them with relevant out-groups. 
Apart from perhaps more or less removing social identity theory 
as an explanation of weak intergroup discrimination (i.e. in-
group preference without out-group derogation), the main problem 
with such a response is that it is far from clear how to identify 
whether or not any given comparison group is a relevant 
comparison group. Social identity theory identifies "similarity, 
proximity, and situational salience [as] among the variables that 
determine out-group comparability" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 41), 
but it is difficult to see how such variables would apply 
differentially across the out-groups of interest here. All of 
the comparison groups in the present study, for both political 
parties and charitable groups, seem to be roughly equivalent to 
their respective in-groups in terms of their similarity, 
proximity, and situational salience. perhaps the only way to 
defend the notion of out-groups being relevant or irrelevant 
comparison groups is therefore to reintroduce the idea that in-
groupS can have "traditional" out-groups, against whom there is 
a "culture" of strong intergroup discrimination. This, of 
course, returns us to the position we started out with. 
It seems, then, that social identity theory is supported in so 
far as multigroup social categorization plus identification by 
in-group members (both as members of one in-group but not of 
others, and with the in-group) seems sufficient to promote those 
members to engage in weak intergroup discrimination, i.e. in-
group preference without out-group derogation. Explanations of 
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strong intergroup discrimination or intergroup conflict, however, 
involving out-group derogation as well as in-group preference, 
seem to require that in-group "customs", "traditions", or "norms" 
of behaviour toward particular comparison groups be 
considered. 17 
Such a conclusion still leaves at least two important questions 
unanswered. First, where do such in-group norms come from? 
second, are such norms, in advocating out-group derogation rather 
than simple in-group preference, concerned only (or even 
necessarily) with the achievement and maintenance of positive in-
group distinctiveness from particular "relevant" out-groups: that 
is, do they easily fall within the province of Tajfel's social 
identity theory? These questions will be addressed below. 
%he level at which social identity theO~ qperates 
It is worth reiterating that derogation of particular political 
groupS was not restricted to members of other groups. People who 
explicitly disclaimed political group membership still engaged 
in derogation of specific target groups. The importance of this 
for social identity theory is that it highlights the possibility 
of "cross-level" behaviour (broadly conceived). That is, it is 
possible for individuals to take particular stances (e.g. 
attitudes, behaviours) toward or against groups. Individuals may 
hate the BNP without needing to affiliate themselves to any 
distinct political group. By the same token, it seems possible 
for particular groups to adopt particular stances toward or 
against specific individuals (e.g. "fan clubs") . 
17 Here established group "n?rms" ~re being investigated 
and discussed. Although, as ment10ned 1n the Introduction to 
this chapter, it is also likely that in-group norms of strong 
intergroup discriminatio~ wil~ result when situational factors 
Suggest that such behav10ur 1S necessary and/or appropriate. 
(See also footnote 15, p. 352.) 
356 
Such reasoning suggests that in attempting to explain and predict 
widespread discrimination against particular groups and group 
members, social identity theory could potentially benefit from 
abandoning its exclusive focus on between-group phenomena to 
allow for the possibility of "across-level" phenomena (as well 
as between-individual phenomena, as suggested in the previous 
chapter. See also Horton, 1993). 
~n-group evaluation 
In the present study it was found that evaluation of in-groups 
involved much more than simple attainment or non-attainment of 
positive in-group distinctiveness from relevant comparison groups 
on dimensions positively valued by in-groups. Such between-group 
social comparison outcomes did affect in-group evaluations, but 
so did: (i) outcomes of comparing in-groups against temporal or 
objective standards (e.g. previous in-group situations or desired 
criteria); and, (ii) progress toward or away from (temporal, 
objective, or between-group relational) in-group goals. 
one might want to argue that the temporal and objective 
comparison outcomes had the effects they did on in-group 
evaluations only because they were indicative to respondents of 
how in-group positions were changing relative to specific 
relevant out-groups. Thus, it is possible that discovering an 
in-group has achieved certain temporal or absolute goals may not 
be directly beneficial for positive in-group evaluations, but 
rather may be indirectly beneficial because such achievement 
Suggests that the in-group is also achieving or enhancing 
positive in-group distinctiveness (or reducing negative in-group 
distinctiveness) with respect to some relevant out-group. 
Similarly , perceiving that an in-group has failed to aChieve 
certain temporal or absolute goals may only be indirectly 
detrimental to in-group evaluation because such failure suggests 
decreased positive in-group distinctiveness or increased negative 
in-group distinctiveness with respect to some relevant out-group. 
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That is, achievement or non-achievement of absolute and/or 
temporal group goals may only be relevant to in-group evaluations 
to the extent that such achievement or non-achievement reveals 
or suggests changed between-group social comparison outcomes. 
(A similar argument can be made with respect to movement toward 
or away from absolute and/or temporal goals having only indirect 
effects on in-group evaluations to the extent that such movement 
is relevant in revealing or suggesting altered between-group 
social comparison outcomes relative to some relevant out-group.) 
The first thing to note about such a possibility is that it 
concedes that in-group evaluations can be affected by temporal 
as well as straightforward relational between:group social 
comparison outcomes. That is, change in valued in-group 
distinctiveness is conceded to affect in-group evaluations in 
addition to valued in-group distinctiveness per se. Evidence of 
exactly this point was obtained in the present study where 
respondents evaluated their political in-groups in situations 
where those groups won an election by obtaining 250 votes more 
than their nearest rivals. There were two such situations: one 
where the in-group had previously been beaten by its rival by 500 
votes, and one where the in-group had previously beaten its rival 
by a similar margin. If it were only positive in-group 
distinctiveness which affected in-group evaluation the in-group 
evaluations in each of these situations would have been 
identical. However, while the in-group received positive 
evaluations in both situations, where the in-group both beat its 
rival and reversed previous negative in-group distinctiveness the 
in-group was evaluated significantly more positively than where 
the in-group beat its rival by a narrower margin than it had on 
a previous occasion. Thus, the changes in the respective 
intergroup situations (i.e. the temporal comparison outcomes) 
made contributions to in-group evaluation other than those 
l 
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provided by the in-group distinctiveness per se (i.e. the 
between-groups social comparison outcome) .18 
The second thing to note in response to the claim that temporal 
and absolute comparison outcomes may affect in-group evaluation 
only to the extent that they reveal or suggest particular 
between-group social comparison outcomes (and/or changes in such 
outcomes) is that such a claim is potentially unfalsifiable. For 
example, in the present study it was found that supporters of 
charitable groups evaluated those groups positively if the groups 
were deemed to have achieved and/or to have made progress toward 
absolute goals. In this chapter such a finding was accepted at 
face value, but it could nevertheless have been argued that such 
achievements only affected in-group evaluations to the extent 
that they were relevant in revealing or suggesting changed 
intergroup relationships between the charities and some relevant 
(but not easily identified) out-group (s). But why might one want 
to make such a claim? That between-group social comparison 
outcomes undoubtedly affect in-group evaluations in some 
circumstances does not entail that in-group evaluations can only 
be affected by such between-group social comparison outcomes. 
Neither is it enough that one could always claim that absolute 
or temporal comparison outcomes only affect in-group evaluations 
to the extent that they reveal or suggest changed between-group 
social comparison outcomes. Unless it is a dogmatic assertion, 
such a claim is an assumption: an assumption which the present 
study was set up in part to test. And this test revealed exactly 
the same sort of evidence that absolute and temporal comparison 
outcomes affect in-group evaluations as was found to support the 
claim that between-group social comparison outcomes do. To then 
insist that the temporal and absolute comparison outcomes had the 
effects they did only in so far as they revealed or suggested to 
l' It cannot be determined from the present study whether 
the reversed negative in-group distinctiveness made an addi tional 
ositive contribution and/or whether the attenuated positive in-
p roup distinctiveness mad~ a detrime;ntal contributio.n to the 
g sitive in-gr?up evaluat10ns result1ng from the pos1tive in-
~oup distinct1veness per se. 
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respondents changed between-group relationships is no more 
legitimate than to insist that between-group social comparison 
outcomes have the effects they do only to the extent that they 
reveal or suggest changed absolute or temporal comparison 
outcomes. 
Therefore, unless and until evidence can be obtained which 
indicates that effects on in-group evaluation from all comparison 
outcomes are (perhaps "at root") actually effects of actual or 
inferred between-group social comparison outcomes, the present 
study provides evidence that in-group evaluation can be affected 
by attainment or non-attainment, or progress toward or away from, 
between-group relational and/or temporal or absolute in-group 
goals. 19 Broadly speaking, it is argued here that the evidence 
from this study supports the claim that achievement of and/or 
movement toward in-group goals tends to provide positive 
contributions to in-group evaluation, and non-achievement of 
and/or movement away from such goals tends to make negative 
contributions to in-group evaluation - be those goals temporal, 
objective, or between-group relational (i.e. socially 
comparative) . 
The common thread to each of these evaluative phenomena is the 
presence and importance of in-group goals, of which positive in-
group distinctiveness seems to be only one. This raises the 
possibility that in some situations in-groups might be very 
positively evaluated even in the absence of social comparisons, 
and perhaps even when the in-group is negatively distinct to 
specific relevant out-groups. So, for example, it is possible 
19 positive in-group distinctiveness and/or the absence of 
negative in-group distinctiveness of salient in-groups from 
relevant out-groups is conceived here as an in-group goal. 
Although not usually conceived in such terms within social 
identity theory, such a formulation is at least consistent with 
the theory. See footnote 15, p. 352. There is a difference 
between what is claimed here and what is claimed in social 
identity theory, however. In social identity theory positive in-
group distinctiveness is conceived as a universal goal for groups 
and/or their members, whereas it is considered here as a possible 
(albeit common) one. 
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that an in-group might be positively evaluated by its members if 
it both achieved (or exceeded) what it had set out to do and 
showed signs of constant improvement (perhaps closing the gap 
between itself and one or more rival out-groups), even if at a 
particular moment it happened to be negatively distinct on in-
group valued comparison dimensions from one or more relevant out-
groups. In such an instance, it is also possible that in-group 
members would derive positive social identity contingent self-
esteem from membership of the group, again, regardless of the 
current negative in-group distinctiveness. 
One is reminded here of Tajfel's notion of "satisfactory self-
realization" (Tajfel, 1978b: 9). This is a phrase Tajfel 
considered using to refer to· the motivation behind using 
comparison outcomes for self -evaluation purposes. That is, 
Taj fel thought that people desired "satisfactory self-
realization" and used comparisons to determine the extent to 
which they had achieved it. Taj fel rej ected the term as 
"hopelessly vague" and "synthetic", because it "can mean so much" 
as to be "in danger of meaning very little at all". Tajfel 
adopted instead the notion of satisfactory (or positive) self-
esteem (or self -regard, self - image, self -concept, etc.) (e. g. see 
Tajfel 1978a, 61; 1978b, 9; Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 40). It is 
a moot point whether such a notion is any less vague, synthetic 
or meaningless than satisfactory self-realization (see previous 
chapters), but, more importantly, such a preference appears 
misplaced in as much as: (i) it seems likely that it is the 
knowledge or belief that one has not achieved satisfactory self-
realization which results in unsatisfactory self-esteem (and the 
motivation to do something about it) in the first place (that is, 
self-esteem is "merely" a mediating variable between assessment 
of satisfactory self-realization and behaviour intended to bring 
such satisfactory self-realization about); and, (ii) 
unsatisfactory self-realization can be conceived as a much more 
general term than self -esteem. With respect to the latter point, 
the knowledge that one has yet to achieve one's goals may not 
affect one's self-esteem (if, for example, one can make an 
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external attribution for one's failure so far}, but may well 
provide a motivation to continue trying to bring such 
"satisfactory self-realization" about. 
In attempting to develop this line of thought, it is possible to 
coin the phrase "satisfactory in-group realization" to refer to 
the state where an in-group has achieved one or more of its 
goals. Achievement of (or acceptable progress toward) in-group 
goals (be they terminal or instrumental) can be considered to 
contribute to a sense of satisfactory in-group realization and 
non-achievement (or unacceptable progress toward/movement away 
from) terminal or instrumental in-group goals can be considered 
to contribute negatively to a sense of satisfactory in-group 
realization. In turn, the extent of satisfactory in-group 
realization can be considered to determine evaluation of the in-
group (although not necessarily "in-group esteem"). Finally, to 
the extent that in-group members adopt in-group goals as their 
own, extent of satisfactory in-group realization will (partially) 
determine in-group members' sense of satisfactory self-
realization (which mayor may not affect their self-esteem) . 
The relevance of all this to social identity theory is manifold. 
Three main considerations are as follows. First, it shifts the 
focus of attention away from between-group social comparison 
outcomes per se to seeing such outcomes as one of several 
possible means of evaluating progress toward or away from 
satisfactory self-realization. Second, it allows for the 
possibility of non-social comparison outcomes (e.g. temporal, 
objective, actual-ideal) affecting evaluation of in-groups and 
in-group members, and in turn affecting in-group behaviour aimed 
at bringing about or maintaining such realization. Third, it 
allows for the possibility of between-group social comparison 
outcomes not affecting the self-esteem of in-group members, for 
two reasons: the comparison outcome may simply not be relevant 
to evaluating satisfactory in-group (and self -) realization (e. g. 
if the in-group goal is best evaluated via objective 
comparisons), and, even if such evaluation does occur, this will 
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not affect in-group members' self-esteem unless the self and/or 
the in-group are held responsible for its current position and/or 
the perceived nature of the in-group (and/or its members) is 
challenged in some way. 
Put simply, the present study calls into question the traditional 
(or at least widely promulgated) tenet of social identity theory 
that positive in-group distinctiveness is necessarily good for 
in-group evaluation and in-group members' self-esteem while 
negative in-group distinctiveness is necessarily bad for in-group 
evaluation and in-group members' self-esteem. 
All that said, however, one finding from the present study 
concerning in-group evaluation merits further attention. This 
is that when political groups failed to achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness which they had previously enjoyed, this did not 
result in negative evaluation of the in-group as long as the in-
group was still not negatively distinct. That is, even though 
the in-group had both failed to achieve its relational in-group 
goal (of positive in-group distinctiveness) and had moved away 
from that goal, the in-group still received (admittedly very 
small) positive evaluation when it had least not fallen to a 
position of inferiority. This perhaps attests both to the bias 
toward positive evaluation of the self (and by extension, 
identified-with in-groups) and to the possibility that it is 
negative in-group distinctiveness which is most damaging to in-
group (and self-) evaluation, rather than a simply failure to 
attain positive in-group distinctiveness. That is, the 
possibility still seemed open to these respondents to say "at 
least we didn't come out worse than we did": an actual-possible 
in-group (downward) comparison from which respondents were able 
to claw a vestment of positive evaluation. 
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Corolla&y 1 of social identity theo&y's self-esteem hypothesis 
The results from the present study bearing on corollary 1 of the 
self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory strongly 
support the arguments that: (i) Hogg & Abrams do not give an 
adequate formulation of that hypothesis (with respect to 
corollary 1); and, (ii) a more adequate formulation of corollary 
1 can be empirically supported. Thus, it is clear from the 
present study that it is not use of intergroup discrimination per 
se (or even "successful" intergroup discrimination) which leads 
to positive evaluation of the in-group (and of in-group 
membership): it is positive in-group distinctiveness without a 
conflict of values (regardless of whether or not intergroup 
discrimination is employed). Thus, successful intergroup 
discrimination is a means to an end (i.e. positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values), not an end in 
itself. lO 
Further, it seems that both negative in-group distinctiveness 
and/or a conflict of values contribute negatively to in-group 
evaluation, presumably because such occurrences indicate 
unsatisfactory in-group realization (i.e. both because of in-
group inferiority and because of violation of cherished values) . 
Indeed, of the two factors (i.e. in-group distinctiveness and 
value conflict), it appears that it is a conflict of values which 
has the stronger effect, as positive in-group distinctiveness 
accompanied by a conflict of values so often led to negative 
evaluation. It can be hypothesized that this is because a 
conflict of values entails unsatisfactory in-group realization, 
in that it violates members' "in-group-concept" ("this is not the 
sort of group we are/ should be") , whereas in - group 
distinctiveness only has the potential (see above) to affect 
lO Note: In the light of the previous discussion it should 
also be clear that positive in-group distinctiveness without a 
conflict of values is similarly not an end in itself. It is one 
possible indication of satisfactory in-group realization. 
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evaluation of in-group progress toward or movement away from a 
particular goal (as opposed to threatening the "very essence of 
its existence") . 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the large body of literature which 
reports "tests" of corollary 1 cannot be considered as evidence 
for or against it, as most if not all of the relevant studies 
investigate (at best) the link between use of intergroup 
discrimination and subsequent self-esteem rather than whether in-
group members' (social identity contingent) self-esteem is 
affected by positive or negative in-group distinctiveness with 
or without a conflict of values. 
CQrolla~ 2 of social identity theQ~'S self-esteem hypothesis 
The results of the present study are not nearly as "clean" with 
respect to the second (as compared to the first) corollary of the 
self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory. 
The general thrust of the "reformulated" corollary 2 argued in 
this thesis to adequately reflect social identity theory's self-
esteem hypothesis is that group members will employ intergroup 
discrimination when: (i) they need to (i.e. when in-groups are 
inferior or insecurely superior); (ii) such discrimination seems 
likely to achieve their desired end (i. e. secure superiority 
without a conflict of values); and, (iii) preferential 
alternatives are not available (e.g. social mobility to a more 
securely superior group). When any of these conditions are not 
in place intergroup discrimination is not predicted (at least not 
nearly as confidently as when they are in place) . 
The results from the present study indicated that members of 
charitable groups were more or less consensually unwilling to 
employ intergroup discrimination, even when all of the above 
conditions were in place, and they were also generally unwilling 
to employ alternative methods of meeting positive social identity 
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needs (e.g. social mobility). Members of political groups, on 
the other hand, were more or less universally willing to employ 
intergroup discrimination, although they too were generally 
(although not consensually) reluctant to avail themselves of 
available social mobility strategies. 
The key to interpreting these results is perhaps the now familiar 
notion of "conflicts of values". The discussion in the previous 
sub-section makes it clear (as does a careful reading of Tajfel) 
that achieving positive in-group distinctiveness is unlikely to 
result in positive evaluation of the in-group and of in-group 
membership if it is achieved only at the cost of a conflict of 
values. By extension, group members are unlikely to employ 
intergroup discrimination to achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness if by doing so they give rise to a conflict of 
values, as such an outcome is likely to be detrimental to 
evaluation of the in-group and of in-group membership. 
Unfortunately, the variable of possible value conflict was not 
incorporated into the present study's examination of corollary 
2 of social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis. 
If one belongs to a charitable group it is probable that 
objective goals are considerably more important than relational 
(i.e. between-group) ones, especially if the other groups have 
objectives similar to the in-group's own. It also probable, 
bearing in mind the benevolent nature of charitable work, that 
use of intergroup discrimination against other charities striving 
for similar goals as the in-group would entail a conflict of 
values. Thus, the antecedents identified by social identity 
theory to lead to intergroup discrimination were not in place in 
the present study's attempted test of corollary 2 of the self-
esteem hypothesis, at least for charitable group membership, and 
the results obtained are silent both on the adequacy of the 
argued-for formulation of that corollary and on the empirical 
validity of it. Put Simply, the corollary and its formulation 
were just not tested by the items concerned with charitable group 
membership. 
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Political group membership, by contrast, has intergroup 
discrimination (at least in the sense of voting for one's party) 
as an intrinsically valuable thing (above and beyond its 
instrumental value in striving for one's party to be elected) . 
Here, not employing intergroup discrimination would actually 
constitute a conflict of values other than in exceptional 
circumstances. One such exceptional circumstance is where one's 
own party cannot possibly win but another (similar in important 
respects) party can, especially when defeating a particular out-
group is perceived as the over-reaching in-group goal. In the 
case of political group membership, therefore, we should expect 
that group members will standardly employ intergroup 
discrimination, and will only fail to do so in circumstances in 
which getting rid of a hated out-group overcomes the lesser goal 
of expressing support for one's favourite party. The results 
obtained in the present study are consistent with such a 
scenario. That is, political group members typically employed 
intergroup discrimination (sometimes to contribute to in-group 
victory, sometimes to express in-group solidarity), and only 
failed to do so when a more important in-group goal could be 
achieved by alternative action (which perhaps should be 
considered as indirect intergroup discrimination, rather than an 
absence of it). 
In other words, the present 
group values (and potential 
to adequately investigate 
study failed to take account of in-
conflicts thereof), and thus failed 
corollary 2 of the self-esteem 
hypothesis within social identity theory. It can be noted, 
however, that the discussion of the results considered in this 
sub-section, although post-hoc, are perfectly consistent with the 
second corollary of social identity theory's self-esteem 
hypothesis. The problem was with an inadequate method to test 
that formulation, rather than with the corollary itself. 
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A short note about methodology 
Although it produced some interesting and potentially important 
findings, the results from the present study must be viewed with 
some caution. Because of the variety of rather disparate issues 
the study tried to address at once, the "manipulations" and 
measurements used are potentially somewhat unreliable and 
invalid. Two particular difficulties or limitations should be 
especially noted. First, many of the "manipulations" used 
concerned respondents imagining how they believed they would feel 
in a variety of hypothetical situations. Obviously, future 
research would improve considerably on the present study if real 
situations were manipulated and/or examined. Second, rather 
"lax" dependent measures were employed in the present study, 
several of which involved making questionable assumptions. To 
draw attention to just one example, in question 3 of each of the 
two main sections of the present questionnaire, respondents were 
asked to indicate "how they would feel" in a variety of 
situations, which was assumed to be a measure of in-group 
evaluation/social identity contingent self-esteem. Bearing in 
mind several of the arguments offered earlier in this thesis, 
such assumptions are questionable. Such assumptions are given 
some credence, however, by the fact that the pattern of results 
obtained supported many or most of the a priori predictions made. 
Nevertheless, future research would clearly benefit from using 
more obviously reliable and valid indicators of the various 
dependent variables examined in the present study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding the methodological limitations of the present 
study just noted, the main conclusion to be made is clearly that 
social identity theory (or at least common understandings, 
applications and tests of it) is considerably too simplistic with 
regard to several of its key notions and propositions. 
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Specifically, it pays scant attention to: (i) potential 
differences between particular "sorts" of "out-groups" (and in-
groups) ; (ii) potential variations in types of intergroup 
discrimination toward these different "out-groups"; (iii) 
phenomena (including group derogation) which may not occur at a 
strictly between-group level; (iv) possible alternative sources 
of in-group (and in-group membership) evaluation other than in-
group distinctiveness; (v) the potential complexity of the 
relationship between in-group distinctiveness and in-group (and 
in-group membership) evaluation; (vi) alternatives to "self-
esteem" as determinants and consequences of intergroup 
discrimination (and other phenomena); and (vii) the complexity 
of the motivational account commonly known as the "self-esteem" 
hypothesis, particularly with respect to the potentially crucial 
variable of "conflicts of value". 
Of these issues, it appears that the notion of in-group goals, 
(broadly conceived to include in-group values), is perhaps the 
most important. It is arguable that social identity theory 
cannot adequately explain or predict group (or group members') 
behaviour without taking such goals (and values) into 
consideration. This argument will be returned to in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. 
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CHApTRR 8; CONCLUSION - DEyEWPING SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to provide the link between the material 
presented in this thesis on the one hand, and future research 
in the area of social identity theory on the other. The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the main results 
obtained (and conclusions reached) during the empirical 
studies reported in earlier chapters. This is followed by a 
section considering the possible implications of those main 
findings, to the extent that they are valid, for various 
aspects of social identity theory. The next section examines 
the possible methodological and theoretical limitations which 
potentially threaten the validity of those main findings. 
This is followed by a section in which an attempt is made to 
very tentatively sketch a bare-bones account of what social 
identity theory might look like if modified to be consistent 
with most relevant contemporary research (including the 
research presented in this thesis). This modified account is 
then compared and contrasted with Tajfel's original version of 
the theory. 
The final section suggests potentially fruitful areas for 
future research and development of social identity theory. 
REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS 
In Study 1 (reported in Chapter 2), social categorization 
accompanied by a "thinkaloud" procedure did not resul t in 
significant mean sample-level in-group favouritism. Further, 
at an individual level, subjects seemed to employ a variety of 
strategies, and they gave a variety of rationales for those 
strategies. 
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Neither was it the case that social categorization accompanied 
by thinkaloud resulted in most subjects identifying with their 
minimal groups and/or membership of them. Only a minority of 
subjects explicitly mentioned identifying with their groups, 
and fewer referred to such identification to explain their 
allocation behaviours. It is noteworthy that those subjects 
who did employ in-group favouritism all explicitly mentioned 
that they identified with their minimal groups (although 
others who identified in this way did not employ such 
discrimination). No subjects, however, explained their in-
group preference (or any other strategy) in terms of striving 
to achieve positive in-group distinctiveness, positive social 
identity, or satisfactory self-esteem. 
The main conclusions drawn from Study 1 were as follows. 
First, (accepted, multigroup) social categorization per se 
does not inevitably promote intergroup discrimination in 
favour of the in-group, at either individual or sample level. 
Second, (accepted, multigroup) social categorization per se is 
insufficient as an explanation of any uniformities of social 
behaviour, not just of intergroup discrimination. Third, 
(accepted, multigroup) social categorization per se is 
insufficient to result in people identifying with their 
imposed social categories and/or their membership of them (as 
opposed to identifying themselves as in-group members). 
Fourth, social identification with in-groups may be a 
necessary, but it is certainly not a sufficient, precondition 
of in-group favouritism. Fifth, behaviour in the minimal 
group paradigm does not seem to be motivated by social 
identity needs, at least not in the sense of using intergroup 
discrimination as a means to try and achieve positive in-group 
distinctiveness, and thereby satisfactory social identity 
contingent self-esteem. 
In Study 2 (reported in Chapter 3), significant sample-level 
in-group favouritism did follow social categorization in the 
minimal group paradigm. As in Study 1, however, only a subset 
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of individual subjects employed such in-group preference. 
Other subjects pursued a variety of other, non-discriminatory, 
strategies. 
Where subjects did engage in in-group favouritism, two 
distinct forms could be identified. One form accompanied in-
group preference with out-group derogation. The other form 
strove for maximum in-group profit consistent with in-group 
superiority. 
The main conclusions drawn from Study 2 were as follows. 
First, (accepted, multigroup) social categorization is not a 
sufficient cause of in-group favouritism at an individual 
level. Second, where individuals do employ in-group 
favouritism following social categorization, that social 
categorization is not sufficient to determine which form of 
discrimination favouring the in-group individuals will employ. 
In Study 3 (reported in Chapter 4), both mean sample-level in-
group favouritism and mean sample-level fairness across groups 
followed social categorization in the minimal group paradigm 
(i.e., in condition 1). Following intragroup communication 
mean in-group favouritism polarized, and mean fairness across 
groups depolarized to zero. 
In all three conditions, individual subjects and particular 
sub-groups pursued a variety of strategies. When transcripts 
of sub-groups' decision-making processes in condition 2 were 
examined, it was possible to identify for each sub-group: (i) 
whether sub-group norms were established; (ii) what the 
contents of any established norms were, and in which contexts 
they applied; and, (iii) individual sub-group members' levels 
of commitment to any sub-group norms established. using such 
a normative analysis, all individual, sub-group, and sample-
level condition 2 and condition 3 behaviour could be fully 
explained. 
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The main conclusions drawn from Study 3 were as follows. 
First, social categorization per se is insufficient as an 
explanation of the complexity of behaviour which follows such 
social categorization. Second, if group norms can be 
identified, as well as group members' commitment to them, then 
all individual and group behaviour can be satisfactorily 
explained in normative terms. 
In Study 4 (reported in Chapter 5), a manipulation was 
employed to make subjects feel either better or worse about 
their national group and/or their membership of it than they 
had moments earlier. Four different self -esteem measures were 
administered across conditions, with subjects receiving one 
measure both before and after one or the other of the 
experimental manipulations. 
A "general trait" self-esteem measure did not detect either a 
rise in self-esteem as a result of the positive manipulation, 
or a fall in self-esteem as a result of the negative 
manipulation. A "trait" self-esteem measure specific to 
national group membership similarly did not detect changes in 
self-esteem from either manipulation. A "general state" self-
esteem measure detected self -esteem improvement as a resul t of 
the positive manipulation, but detected no significant change 
in self-esteem as a result of the negative manipulation. Only 
a measure of "state" self-esteem specific to national group 
membership detected both self-esteem improvement as a result 
of the positive manipulation and self-esteem deterioration as 
a result of the negative manipulation. 
Strength of social identity with one's national group did not 
correlate with self-esteem change on any of the measures as a 
result of either manipulation. 
A "general state" in-group evaluation 
improvements in in-group evaluation as 
measure detected 
a result of the 
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positive manipulation, but detected no significant change in 
in-group evaluation as a result of the negative manipulation. 
The main conclusions drawn from Study 4 were as follows. 
First, the self -esteem hypothesis within social identity 
theory is best tested using a state measure of self-esteem 
which is contingent on (i. e. is specific to) a particular 
group membership. No published tests of the self -esteem 
hypothesis have to date employed such a measure. Second, 
there is a possibility that there may not be a one-to-one 
correspondence between evaluations of particular groups, 
evaluations of members of those groups, and evaluations of 
oneself as a member of such groups. It is also possible that 
threats to evaluations of particular groups may be more easily 
countered than threats to one's self-esteem as a member of 
such groups. 
In Study 5 (reported in Chapter 6), self-esteem was found to 
be determined by an interaction of between-group and between-
individual social comparison outcomes on relevant dimensions. 
It seemed to be the case that, when subjects' social 
identities were salient, both positive in-group 
distinctiveness and positive individual distinctiveness from 
in-group others on relevant dimensions made positive 
contributions to subjects' self-esteem. Similarly, when 
subjects' social identities were salient, it seemed that both 
negative in-group distinctiveness and negative individual 
distinctiveness from in-group others on relevant dimensions 
made negative contributions to subjects' self-esteem. 
Subjects in this study reported a willingness to aid the 
performance of in-group others on relevant dimensions, 
particularly when the in-group had previously been beaten by 
the out-group on such dimensions. This was so regardless of 
whether in-group others had previously beaten or been beaten 
by subjects on these dimensions. 
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Following intergroup competition, subjects in this study 
reported feeling closer to in-group others than they had 
before the intergroup competition, particularly when the in-
group had beaten the out-group during that competition. This 
was so regardless of whether the in-group others' performances 
during the competition had been inferior or superior to the 
subjects' own. 
When the in-group had been beaten by the out-group during the 
intergroup competition, subjects reduced the subjective 
relevance of comparison dimensions relative to pre-competition 
levels. When the in-group had beaten the out-group during the 
competition, subj ects neither reduced nor raised the 
subjective relevance of the comparison dimensions. There was 
no significant effect on subjective relevance change according 
to whether the performance of in-group others during the 
intergroup competition exceeded or was exceeded by the 
subjects' own performances. 
The main conclusions drawn from Study 5 were as follows. 
First, contrary to Tesser' s self -evaluation maintenance model, 
downward individual-level social comparison outcomes on 
relevant dimensions seem to have a beneficial effect on self-
esteem. Second, again contrary to Tesser's self-evaluation 
maintenance model, when social identity is salient, between-
group social comparison outcomes on relevant dimensions have 
an effect on in-group members' self-esteem levels; indeed, a 
greater effect than between-individual social comparison 
outcomes on such dimensions. Third, even when social identity 
is salient, the outcomes of between-individual social 
comparisons with in-group others do have a significant effect 
on self-esteem. This effect is positive when the comparisons 
reveal individual superiority and negative when they reveal 
individual inferiority. Fourth, when social identity is 
salient, between-individual and between-group social 
comparison outcomes on relevant dimensions have an interactive 
effect on self-esteem. Superiority on either level makes a 
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positive contribution to the self-esteem of in-group members, 
and inferiority on either level makes a negative contribution 
to the self -esteem of in-group members. These effects seem to 
be additive. Fifth, contrary to Brewer's optimal 
distinctiveness model, the previous conclusion suggests that 
it is not necessarily the case that when social identity is 
salient people will derive positive contributions to their 
self-esteem from superior performance of in-group others on 
relevant dimensions. Such superiority will raise self-esteem 
only to the extent that it contributes to positive in-group 
distinctiveness (or reduced negative in-group 
distinctiveness) . However, this positive contribution to 
social identity contingent self-esteem may be more than 
cancelled out by negative contributions to self -esteem because 
of the comparing individual's inferiority to the superior in-
group other (both in terms of personal performance, and in 
terms of relative contributions to the between-group outcome) . 
Sixth, similar thoughts suggest that, contrary to Turner's 
(1987) self-categorization theory, personal and social 
identities are not mutually antagonistic: both can be salient 
(and psychologically operative) at the same time. 
Study 6 (reported in Chapter 7) yielded several resul ts . 
First, although respondents showed evaluative in-group 
preference in both charitable and political contexts, such in-
group preference was only accompanied by out-group derogation 
when political in-group members evaluated out-groups which 
their in-groups were "traditionally" antagonistic toward. 
Additionally, individuals who did not identify with any 
particular charitable or political in-group also made 
favourable or unfavourable evaluations of particular groups, 
including derogation of certain political groups. 
Second, evaluations of in-groups were shown to be affected by 
much more than simple attainment or non-attainment of positive 
in-group distinctiveness from particular out-groups. In-group 
evaluations were positively affected by movement toward, as 
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well as by attainment or enhancement of, positive in-group 
distinctiveness. In-group evaluations were also positively 
affected by movement toward, as well as by attaining or 
exceeding, "absolute" or temporal in-group goals. Similarly, 
in-group evaluations were negatively affected by movement 
toward, as well as "attainment" or enhancement of, negative 
in-group distinctiveness. And, in-group evaluations were also 
negatively affected by movement away from, as well as by non-
attainment of, "absolute" or temporal in-group goals. 
Third, use of in-group favouritism was found not to correspond 
with subsequent levels of social identity contingent self-
esteem. Instead, attainment of positive in-group 
distinctiveness without a conflict of values was shown to 
result in positive social identity contingent self-esteem, 
regardless of whether or not such positive in-group 
distinctiveness was achieved via discrimination in favour of 
in-groups. Similarly, where negative in-group distinctiveness 
was accompanied by a conflict of values, respondents' social 
identity contingent self-esteem was negative, again regardless 
of whether or not respondents had employed in-group 
favouritism. Where positive in-group distinctiveness was 
accompanied by a conflict of values, and where negative in-
group distinctiveness did not involve a conflict of values, 
respondents' social identity contingent self-esteem was 
neutral, once again irrespective of use or non-use of in-group 
favouritism. 
Fourth, levels of social identity contingent self-esteem were 
found not to correspond with subsequent use of in-group 
favouritism. Instead, charitable group members were found to 
be generally unwilling to employ such discrimination, 
regardless of their prior levels of social identity contingent 
self-esteem. Political group members, on the other hand, were 
found to be almost universally willing to employ in-group 
favouritism, again irrespective of their prior levels of 
social identity contingent self-esteem. The main exception to 
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this latter finding was that members of securely negatively 
distinct political groups were unwilling to employ in-group 
favouritism when exit from those groups to more attractive 
ones was available. Such respondents chose exit significantly 
more than when such an option was available for members of 
securely or insecurely superior political groups, or when 
members' political group inferiority was insecure. 
The main conclusions drawn from Study 6 were as follows. 
First, social categorization per se may be sufficient for 
evaluative in-group preference, (or at least for evaluating 
in-groups as positively as, if not always more positively 
than, other groups), but it is not sufficient for out-group 
derogation. Such out-group derogation may be explained, at 
least in some circumstances, according to in-group norms. 
Second, achievement of positive in-group distinctiveness, and 
perhaps more importantly, avoidance of negative in-group 
distinctiveness, may be best thought of in terms of being in-
group goals. Movement toward and exceeding such goals, as 
well as attaining them, seems to contribute positively to in-
group evaluations and to social identity contingent self-
esteem. Similarly, movement away from such goals, as well as 
non-attainment of them, seems to contribute negatively to in-
group evaluations and to social identity contingent self-
esteem. Importantly, between-group relational (i.e. in-group 
distinctiveness) goals are not the only goals in-groups can 
have. They can also have "absolute" or temporal ones. Thus, 
it seems to be the case that attainment of, movement toward, 
and/or exceeding any in-group goals makes positive 
contributions to in-group evaluations and social identity 
contingent self -esteem. Similarly, it appears that non-
attainment of and/or movement away from any in-group goals may 
make negative contributions to in-group evaluations and social 
identity contingent self-esteem. 
The third main conclusion drawn from Study 6 is that corollary 
1 of the self-esteem hypothesis within social identity theory 
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(Abrams & Hogg, 1988) should be framed in terms of the 
relationship between securely legitimate 
distinctiveness and subsequent social identity 
self-esteem, rather than in terms of use of 
in-group 
contingent 
intergroup 
discrimination and subsequent self-esteem. Similarly, 
corollary 2 of the self-esteem hypothesis within social 
identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) should be framed in 
terms of social identity contingent self-esteem and subsequent 
efforts to achieve or retain legitimate and secure 
contributions to self-esteem, rather than in terms of self-
esteem and subsequent use of intergroup discrimination. With 
respect to both of these corollaries, the possibility of 
"conflicts of values" accompanying actual or potential in-
group distinctiveness requires particular attention. In turn, 
this seems once again to point toward the need for social 
identity theory to take in-group norms into account when 
explaining and predicting the consequences of 
membership. 
IMPLICATIONS OF KEY FINDINGS FOR TAJFBL'S THEORY 
group 
To the extent that the key findings reported in this thesis 
are reliable and valid, they have quite dramatic implications 
for Tajfel's social identity theory. 
Evidence supporting social identity theory 
The least dramatic findings (in the sense that they suggest 
that no theoretical change is required), are those which 
support various aspects of social identity theory. Perhaps 
the most important of these are the findings which support 
social identity theory's notion that uniformities of social 
behaviour can stem from in-group members acting in terms of 
particular common social identities (rather than in terms of 
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disparate personal identities, or in terms of social 
identities other than those associated with a common group 
membership}. This was most clearly demonstrated in Study 3 
(reported in Chapter 4). In this study it was relatively 
common for members of particular sub-groups to adopt unique 
strategies in the first individual allocation situation (i.e. 
Condition 1), but to act in ways more or less identical to 
other in-group members once intragroup communication (in 
Condition 2) allowed them to reach consensus concerning what 
constituted in-group appropriate behaviour. The notion that 
in-group members identifying with their social groups can lead 
to uniformities of social behaviour also received some support 
from Study 1 (reported in Chapter 2). In that study, all 
subjects who engaged in in-group favouritism also explicitly 
indicated that they identified with their imposed minimal 
group membership. 
Another important result which supports social identity theory 
is the finding in Study 5 (reported in Chapter 6) that when 
particular social identities are salient, the self-esteem of 
in-group members can be at least partially determined by 
between-group social comparison outcomes on dimensions valued 
by in-group members. positive in-group distinctiveness on 
such dimensions made a positive contribution to in-group 
members self-esteem, and negative in-group distinctiveness on 
such dimensions made a negative contribution to in-group 
members self-esteem, exactly as predicted by social identity 
theory. The general notion within social identity theory that 
individuals' self-esteem can be affected by evaluations of 
their in-groups also received support from Studies 4 and 6 
(reported in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively). 
A third area of support for social identity theory came from 
the finding in Study 6 (reported in Chapter 7) that members of 
charitable and political in-groups always evaluated their own 
groups at least as positively as they evaluated other groups, 
and indeed often showed considerable preference for their own 
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groups over others. This supports social identity theory's 
postulate that people generally derive satisfaction from their 
in-groups and membership of them, because when they do not 
they either leave those groups or try to improve the situation 
of them (e.g. via strategies of in-group favouritism) so that 
satisfactory self-esteem can be restored. 
This does not entail that people always evaluate every aspect 
of all their group memberships positively. It was found in 
Study 6 (reported in Chapter 7), that subjects experienced low 
or negative social identity contingent self-esteem when they 
were members of situationally inferior groups and/or were 
members of groups whose situation was associated with a 
conflict of values. This is exactly what social identity 
theory would predict. Further, there was also evidence from 
Study 6, again consistent with social identity theory, that 
when social identity was securely unsatisfactory for subj ects, 
those subjects would tend to wish to leave their groups to 
join more favourable ones where such a strategy was possible. 
Findings such as these suggest that Tajfel's social identity 
theory is to a considerable extent both a valid and a valuable 
theory. Perhaps its primary theoretical contribution is to 
stress the importance of social identity for: (i) bringing 
about and directing certain uniformities of group and 
intergroup behaviour (such as evaluative in-group preference 
except when conflicts of values or secure and legitimate 
negative in-group distinctiveness - or perhaps other forms of 
perceived in-group "failure" - make such in-group preference 
impossible) i and, relatedly, (ii) making group members' 
psychological well-being at least partially dependent upon the 
fate of their in-groups. In addition to the results above 
supporting various aspects of social identity theory, however, 
many more findings suggest that other aspects of that theory 
require and/or could benefit from revision or development. 
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Evidence suggesting necessary and/or desirable revisions to 
social identity theory 
Social categorization and subsequent in-group favouritism 
At repeated points in this thesis social categorization per se 
(plus identification as group members by those categorized) 
has been shown to be insufficient to promote (and therefore 
explain) intergroup discrimination (see Studies 1, 2, and 3) . 
This is consistent with previous research where: (i) sample-
level in-group favouritism is not inevitably found following 
mere social categorization (see Mullen et al., 1992); and (ii) 
substantial proportions of minimal group subj ects do not 
individually engage in the in-group favouritism which occurs 
at a mean sample-level (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Such findings present certain difficulties for social identity 
theory. First, the theory must "explain away" all non-
discriminatory behaviour following mere social categorization, 
for example in terms of individual differences in self-esteem. 
This is unfortunate considering the wide variety of individual 
behaviour which seems to regularly follow such mere social 
categorization. Additionally, where in-group favouritism does 
follow social categorization per se, it appears that at least 
two distinct forms of intergroup discrimination can be 
distinguished (see below). Thus, even where social 
categorization does result in discrimination in favour of in-
groups, it appears that something other than social 
categorization per se is needed to explain which sort of 
intergroup discrimination occurs. 
Second, the claim that mere social categorization is a 
sufficient cause of intergroup discrimination was one of the 
main justifications for needing social identity theory as a 
supplement to Sherif's realistic conflict theory. If, as 
seems to be the case, social categorization per se is not a 
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sufficient cause of intergroup discrimination, then the claim 
that negative interdependence of group goals is not a 
necessary cause of intergroup conflict remains unjustified. 
Third, if individuals in the minimal group paradigm do not 
reliably engage in in-group favouritism following mere social 
categorization, this casts doubt on hypothesized sequence of 
social identity intergroup comparison intergroup 
discrimination: a sequence which forms the backbone of social 
identity theory. In the minimal group paradigm, it will be 
remembered, individuals who recognize that they are members of 
minimal groups (i.e. individuals for whom social identity as 
minimal in-group members is salient) are held to have little 
choice but to engage in in-group favouritism, as this is the 
only way they can try and ensure positive in-group 
distinctiveness, positive evaluation of their minimal groups 
and membership of them, and positive social identity 
contingent self-esteem. In-group favouritism in the minimal 
group paradigm is taken to be evidence that all of these 
processes are happening. But, if significant numbers of 
individuals do not engage in in-group favouritism following 
mere (accepted, multigroup) social categorization, then the 
empirical evidence for such a sequence is seriously 
undermined. Further, the fact that group members often show 
in-group preference outside of the minimal group paradigm 
cannot provide evidence of the kind required, as: (i) too much 
else other than mere social categorization is involved outside 
of that paradigm (and so explanations in terms of perceived 
interdependence, established norms, etc., cannot be ruled 
out); and, (ii) it cannot be ruled out that such in-group 
preference outside the minimal group paradigm represents a 
reflection of perceived existing between-group differences 
rather than an action to bring certain desired between-group 
differences (i.e. positive in-group distinctiveness) about. 
Overall, then, if social categorization per se is not a 
sufficient cause of intergroup discrimination in favour of the 
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in-group, social identity theory needs to modified to specify 
more clearly: (i) what the sufficient causes of (perhaps 
various types of) intergroup discrimination are; and, (ii) 
what the exact effects of (accepted, multigroup) social 
categorization are, both alone and in combination with other 
factors. In light of the importance of sub-group norms in 
Study 3 (reported in Chapter 4), and of conflicts of values in 
Study 6 (reported in Chapter 7), in affecting use or non-use 
of intergroup discrimination, it appears that in order to do 
these things social identity theory needs to incorporate a 
normative element (or to more adequately specify the normative 
elements already at least implicit in the theory) . 
Social categorization and subsequent social identity 
Study 1 suggests that not only is social categorization 
insufficient to promote intergroup discrimination in favour of 
the in-group, it is also insufficient to promote social 
identification with the in-group. If so, this suggests that 
social identity theory needs to: (i) specify the conditions 
under which social categorization will and will not result in 
social identification with in-groups; and, (ii) more 
adequately conceptualize the distinction between social 
categories (which people identify themselves as members of but 
do not necessarily identify with - see Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 
41) and social groups (which people both identify themselves 
as members of and necessarily identify with - see Taj fel, 
1982: 485-506). 
In-group distinctiveness and subsequent in-group evaluation 
Various results from Study 6 strongly suggest that social 
identity theory needs to re-conceptualize its proposed link 
between in-group distinctiveness and evaluations of the in-
group. It seems simply not to be the case that positive in-
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group distinctiveness entails positive in-group evaluations 
and negative in-group distinctiveness entails negative in-
group evaluations. First, consistent with the exposition of 
social identity theory given in Chapter 1, only in certain 
situations do positive and negative in-group distinctiveness 
reliably make positive or negative contributions to in-group 
evaluations, (e.g. where there are no conflicts of values -
see Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 45-46), even when such in-group 
distinctiveness obtains relative to relevant out-groups on in-
group valued dimensions. Second, in-group evaluations clearly 
seem to be affected by processes other between-group social 
comparison outcomes (cf. Brown et al., 1991). 
In-group evaluation and subsequent social identity contingent 
self-esteem 
Studies 4 and 5 each seem to suggest that there may not be a 
one-to-one correspondence between evaluations of particular 
in-groups and the self-esteem of in-group members which is 
contingent upon those particular in-group memberships. This 
may be so because self-esteem derived from membership of a 
particular in-group is determined both by evaluation of the 
in-group "as a whole" (e.g. "this is a good in-group") and by 
one's unique position within that group relative to other in-
group members (e.g. "this is not such a good in-group, but at 
least I have high status wi thin the group"). Similarly, 
evaluation of an in-group "as a whole" may not affect 
evaluation of oneself as a member of that group if one feels 
that one is not personally responsible for the in-group' s 
situation (e.g. "my group lost the competition, but not 
because of me"). Conversely, it is possible that an in-group 
member's social identity contingent self-esteem may suffer 
from a particular situation when in-group evaluation does not 
(e.g. "my group won, no thanks to me") . 
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Such possibilities also suggest that social identity theory 
needs to clarify the personal identity/social identity 
distinction. Having a certain prestige within a particular 
group is an individual or "personal" situation which one 
cannot share with all other in-group members, but it still 
contributes to one's evaluation of one's own membership of 
that group (i.e. one's "social" identity). 
Self-esteem and subsequent intergroup discrimination 
The arguments above, and the results of Studies 4 and 6, 
strongly suggest that it is not the case that low or 
threatened self-esteem inevitably promotes intergroup 
discrimination, even when the self-esteem in question is 
contingent upon a particular in-group membership. Rather, low 
or threatened social identity contingent self-esteem will 
promote in-group favouritism when, and only when, such 
discrimination is perceived as part of a viable strategy for 
obtaining secure and legitimate positive contributions to in-
group members' self-esteem. Discrimination will not always 
provide such an option (e.g. when no cognitive alternatives to 
the current situation exist), and alternative strategies for 
obtaining secure and legitimate positive contributions to in-
group members' self-esteem will often be preferred to in-group 
favouritism (e.g. exit, or renewed efforts toward non-
intergroup relational in-group goals). Social identity theory 
therefore needs to more clearly specify the antecedents of 
(perhaps various types of) in-group favouritism motivated by 
in-group members' self-esteem needs (i.e. social competition). 
Further, Studies 1, 3 and 6 suggest that in-group favouritism 
may sometimes be motivated by factors associated with in-group 
membership/social identity other than attempts to achieve 
secure and legitimate social identity contingent self-esteem. 
In-group members may sometimes discriminate simply because 
they perceive it to be expected of them as group members, 
386 
perhaps even when their self-esteem suffers as a result (e.g. 
the subject in Study 1 who felt "pretty bad" about 
discriminating - see also Tajfel, 1982: 503). 
Intergroup discrimination and subsequent self-esteem 
The same reasoning and results strongly suggest that it is not 
the case that intergroup discrimination (however 
conceptualized) inevitably raises in-group members' self-
esteem, even that part of their self-esteem which is derived 
from membership of discriminating in-groups. If 
discrimination fails to achieve secure and legitimate positive 
in-group distinctiveness, for example, or if intergroup 
discrimination is motivated by factors other than social 
identity contingent self-esteem needs, enhanced self-esteem 
for in-group members should not be expected. At the very 
least, it seems to be the case that it is secure and 
legitimate positive in-group distinctiveness, rather than 
intergroup discrimination per se, which contributes positively 
to social identity contingent self-esteem. But even this may 
be too bold a claim, as it has been argued above that: (i) 
positive in-group distinctiveness {even when legitimate and 
secure} is not the only route to positive in-group evaluation; 
and, {ii} there may not be a direct correspondence between in-
group evaluation and social identity contingent self-esteem. 
The implication of this and of the previous sub-section for 
social identity theory is clearly that the theory needs to do 
much more than postulate that unsatisfactory self -esteem leads 
to intergroup discrimination, and that intergroup 
discrimination leads to satisfactory self-esteem. 
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Conceptualizing social identity and self-esteem 
various results from the present thesis, but particularly 
those from Studies 4 and 5, suggest that social identity 
theory needs to be much more rigorous in its conceptualization 
of social identity, and also in its conceptualization of the 
link between social identity and self-esteem. In particular, 
care needs to be taken to delineate the specificity and 
temporality of social identity and self-esteem referred to in 
particular contexts. To give just one example, a member of a 
particular low-status group may have corresponding negative 
contributions to their social identity and self-esteem, but 
their overall social identity and self-esteem may be extremely 
satisfactory. In its present form, social identity theory can 
be used to predict both that the individual will discriminate 
in favour of that particular group (i.e. because of low group-
membership contingent self-esteem), and that the individual 
will not discriminate in favour of that group (i.e. because 
their overall social identity and self-esteem is 
satisfactory) . 
Conceptualizing intergroup discrimination 
Studies 2 and 6 suggest that social identity theory also needs 
to be more rigorous in its conceptualization of intergroup 
discrimination, intergroup competition, and intergroup 
conflict. In particular, differences between in-group 
preference which is or is not accompanied by out-group 
derogation need to considered, as do the antecedents and 
consequences of each. Social identity theory also needs to 
distinguish more fully between "intergroup discrimination" 
which is a subjective reflection of existing states of affairs 
(e.g., in-group preference stemming from the fact that in-
group members already evaluate the in-group at least as 
positively as they evaluate other groups), from intergroup 
discrimination which is an action to bring about desired 
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states of affairs (e.g. in-group favouritism engaged in to 
bring about new or enhanced secure and legitimate in-group 
superiority). This latter consideration also suggests that 
care should be taken to differentiate both the dimensions on 
which intergroup discrimination occurs (i. e. evaluative or 
behavioural), and the different possible beneficiaries of 
intergroup discrimination (i.e. the in-group as a whole, in-
group members, oneself as an in-group member, an in-group 
product, etc.). 
Levels of behaviour 
Finally, it will be remembered from Study 6 that subjects who 
did not claim to be members of any particular charitable or 
political groups still managed to adopt certain attitudes 
towards such groups. That is, individuals made either 
positive or negative evaluations of certain groups they were 
not members of, even though they were not obviously thinking 
of themselves in terms of their membership of other groups. 
Thus, it seems that even when people are operating in terms of 
their personal identities, it is still possible for them to 
think of others in terms of their social identities. 
This challenges Taj fel ' s notion of an interpersonal- intergroup 
continuum of social behaviour, in as much as these subjects 
seemed to be behaving across levels (i.e. person-to-group, as 
opposed to person-to-person, or group-to-group) .1 Further, 
the resul ts of this study also suggest that there can be 
uniformities of person-to-group behaviour (in as much as 
certain groups were evaluated positively or negatively on 
average by individuals who did not claim to belong to any 
particular group). In turn, this suggests that some instances 
of seemingly intergroup behaviour may actually be instances of 
Group-to-person behaviour also seems to be possible, 
as, for example, when a religious group adopts a particular 
attitude towards a particular individual. 
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uniform person-to-group behaviour, for example when numbers of 
people individually derogate particular groups and/or group 
members. Such instances clearly involve uniformities of 
social behaviour, but such uniformities do not obviously stem 
from particular group memberships or social identities. 
perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from the results 
considered in this sub-section is that social identity 
theory's main weakness is in failing to make explicit the 
importance of in-group norms for initiating and directing 
certain forms of genuinely collective (i.e. group and 
intergroup) behaviour. Such norms are absent, and cannot be 
generated, in the situation of social categorization per se, 
and so mere social categorization cannot (and does not) result 
in genuine collective behaviour. This both seriously 
undermines the claim that social identity theory is needed as 
a supplement to realistic conflict theory, and also seriously 
undermines much of social identity theory's empirical support 
for its notion of social competition (i.e. intergroup 
discrimination in the absence of perceived negative 
interdependence of group goals) . 
That in-group norms are a necessary precondition of genuinely 
collective behaviour is, in fact, implicit in social identity 
theory. 2 If one re-examines Diagrams 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 
1, it is clear that for relative in-group status to promote 
genuinely collective behaviour, in-group norms are necessary 
to ensure that numbers of individuals (i.e. group members) 
commonly: value the comparison dimension; consider the out-
group relevant; consider the between-group status differential 
illegitimate and/or unstable; consider exit inappropriate; and 
believe certain forms of group oriented behaviour (i.e. social 
competition and/or social creativity) necessary and/or 
desirable. This normative aspect of social identity theory 
has been underplayed, however, probably because of the 
Further, it is argued below that in-group norms entail 
in-group goals, e.g. conformity to those norms. 
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theory's account of the motivation for collective behaviour 
and of its corollary account of the consequences of such 
behaviour. In each case the theory relies on the notion of 
self-esteem, but the results considered here {consistent with 
many contemporary studies} suggest that the theoretical 
marriage between self-esteem and group behaviour is not as 
convenient as Tajfel originally proposed. 
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THIS THBSIS 
All of the considerations in the previous section relate to 
the implications of findings presented in this thesis for 
social identity theory, either in terms of supporting aspects 
of that theory, or in terms of suggesting necessary or 
desirable modifications to that theory. However, such 
considerations are only pertinent to the extent that the 
conceptual points made and the empirical results presented are 
valid. This section examines some of the more important 
potential limitations to such validity. 
The main conceptual issue concerns whether or not the 
exposition of Taj fell s social identity theory presented in 
this thesis is in fact true to Tajfel's position. The only 
thing that can be said to address this point is that the 
exposition presented relies wholly on Tajfel's own writings. 
All the components of the presented exposition have Cited 
particular texts by Tajfel, and indeed most if not all of the 
presented exposition can be verified by reference to only two 
papers: Tajfel & Turner {1979} {which essentially is a summary 
of Tajfel, 1978a}, and Tajfel {1978c}. 
A second conceptual issue is that the present thesis has paid 
scant regard to the various proposed modifications of and 
developments to social identity theory since Tajfel 
(especially perhaps Turner's self-categorization theory). One 
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response to this is simply to say that the thesis is explicit 
from the title forward that it concerns only Tajfel's version 
of his own theory. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many of the 
proposed modifications of and extensions to social identity 
theory have failed to be adequately distinguished from or 
integrated with that theory. As a consequence, unless one 
focuses on Tajfel's version of the theory, or upon relatively 
clearly distinct descendants of it (such as self-
categorization theory), it is very difficult to ascertain what 
"the" current content of social identity theory is. And, as 
contemporary developments of Tajfel's theory tend to contain 
large chunks of the original theory as component parts, and 
therefore rely in part for their own validity upon the 
validity of the original theory, the original theory was the 
focus of this thesis. 
There is one clear conceptual limitation to the present 
thesis. This is that certain aspects of that theory have 
received either scant or no attention, e.g., Tajfel's notion 
of accentuation of between-group differences and of between-
group similarities, and the subsequent notions of perceived 
in-group and/or out-group homogeneity, social stereotyping, 
etc .. The only possible response to this limitation is to 
acknowledge that it exists. 
principal methodological limitations of the present thesis 
concern sampling and measurement. In attempting to evaluate 
social identity theory (more or less) "as a whole", empirical 
results relating to any specific part of that thesis are 
clearly insufficient to do more than suggest areas in which 
that theory may receive support or may need modification. 
Sample sizes for almost all of the studies are relatively 
small, and the vast majority of the subjects involved were 
white, British university undergraduates, studying psychology. 
Clearly, none of the studies standing alone would do much to 
convince anyone of the validity of the conclusions drawn from 
those studies. 
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Additionally, many of the measures used in the studies 
presented in this thesis are of uncertain (or, in the case of 
the Taj fel matrices, contested) reliability and validity. 
These problems were dealt in some depth in each of the 
relevant chapters, so perhaps all that is needed here is an 
illustration. In Chapter 5 an attempt was made to develop 
four measures of different "types" of self-esteem from a 
single measure of general trait self-esteem (i.e. Rosenberg, 
1965). This procedure was chosen so that the four measures 
would be as equi valent as possible, and because of the 
popularity and known psychometric qualities of that "template" 
measure (Wylie, 1989). Apart from calculating internal 
reliability, no attempt was made to investigate the 
reliability and validity of any of these measures. Bearing in 
mind the complexity of the wording which was required to try 
and measure such concepts as state self-esteem specific to a 
particular group membership, it seems unwise to place too much 
faith in the psychometric qualities of such measures. 
(Similar, or even more damning, comments could be made about 
the probable reliability and validity of the coding frame used 
in Study 1 i the allocation grids employed in Study 2; the 
self-esteem, closeness, relevance, and performance measures 
used in Study 5; and the whole host of measures adopted during 
Study 6.) 
Apart from referring to the large number of a priori 
hypotheses which received support during the studies reported 
in this thesis, all that can be done in relation to the 
methodological limitations is to accept that they exist, 
accept that any conclusions reached on the basis of single 
studies must therefore be tentative, and to suggest that 
future research employs more sophisticated measures. 
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TOWARD A MODIFIED SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
Accepting for the sake of argument that the results presented 
in this thesis have some validity, some speculative comments 
can be made about how social identity theory might look if it 
were modified in the light of these results (and of other 
research) . In this section some attempt will be made to 
provide a "bare bones" account of a modified version of social 
identity theory which would be consistent with much if not 
most prior research in this area. 
this modified account will be 
contrasted with Tajfel's original 
Then, in the 
critically 
theory. 
A modified account of social categories 
next section, 
compared and 
At a subordinate level, social categories are (actual or 
potential) collections of individuals who are perceived by one 
or more people to have at least one characteristic in common, 
i.e. the mere fact of category membership. Social category 
members need not be perceived to have any other characteristic 
in common, even the extent to which they are perceived as 
category members (Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1978). Social category 
members (actual or potential) will each have many individual 
characteristics other than those determined or entailed by 
social category membership, and the nature of social 
categories will in part be determined by all of the 
characteristics individual social category members have. 
Individuals who are categorized by others as members of a 
particular social category do not themselves necessarily need 
either to know this or, if they do know it, to accept their 
category membership. 
When individuals accept that they are members of particular 
social categories, and/or when individuals believe that others 
perceive them to be members of particular social categories 
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(even if they do not themselves accept this), these cognitions 
can affect those individuals' subsequent cognitions, emotions, 
and behaviour (including social behaviour). For example, 
individuals may infer self-attributes from attributes 
perceived to be associated with social categories which they 
accept themselves as members of, and these self-ascriptions 
may entail particular cognitive, emotional, evaluative, and/or 
behavioural consequences. Or, individuals may believe that 
others who perceive them as members of particular social 
categories will consequently evaluate and act toward them in 
particular ways, and these expectations may themselves entail 
particular cognitive, emotional, evaluative, and/or 
behavioural consequences. 
If numbers of individuals each accept their own membership of 
particular social categories, and/or believe that others 
perceive them to be members of particular social categories, 
and if each of these individuals responds to such situations 
in similar ways (cognitively, emotionally, evaluatively, 
and/or behaviourally), then we have instances of uniformities 
of social behaviour (broadly conceived) resulting from social 
categorization (broadly conceived) . 
At a superordinate level, social categories are cognitive 
entities "in their own right", with their own superordinate 
qualities. Social categories are not sentient, they have 
neither goals nor intentions, and they do not have the means 
to fulfil such goals and intentions were they to exist. 
Nevertheless, social categories do "exist in their own right". 
They can be evaluated and behaved toward in ways unconnected 
with the evaluations of and behaviours toward the members of 
those social categories, and they have qualities that their 
members do not. 
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A modified account of social groups 
Social groups are particular types of social categories and, 
as such, have all of the qualities and limitations of social 
categories expounded in the previous sub-section, with one 
critical exception. 3 The essential difference between social 
categories which are groups and those which are not is that 
the former are perceived to have the additional characteristic 
of having at least one superordinate-level goal. Social 
groups are no more sentient than are any other social 
categories, and, at a superordinate level, they neither have 
goals, know that they are perceived to have goals, nor have 
the means to strive toward such goals. 
However, when one or more individuals perceive a social 
category to have one or more goals, that social category is a 
social group for those individuals. As with other social 
categories, the individuals who perceive social groups may 
also perceive themselves either as members or as non-members 
of those social groups. Again, as with other social 
categories, people may believe that others perceive them as 
members of particular social groups, but may themselves deny 
that they are. Similarly, again as with other social 
categories, when individuals accept that they are members of 
particular social groups, and/or when individuals believe that 
others perceive them to be members of particular social groups 
(even if they do not themselves accept this), these cognitions 
can affect those individuals' subsequent cognition, emotion, 
evaluation, and behaviour (including social behaviour). 
Finally, and again in common with other social categories, if 
numbers of individuals each accept their own membership of 
particular social groups, and/or believe that others perceive 
them to be members of particular social groups, and if each of 
these individuals responds to such situations in similar ways 
(cognitively, emotionally, evaluatively, and/or 
3 But see also the sub-section below entitled "A 
modified account of group behaviour". 
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behaviourally), then we have instances of uniformities of 
social behaviour (broadly conceived) resulting from social 
group membership (broadly conceived). However, because social 
groups necessarily have superordinate goals associated with 
them, whereas other social categories necessarily do not, 
uniformities of social behaviour are considerably more likely 
as a result of social group membership than as a result of 
social category membership. 
A modified account of social identity 
Overall (i. e. "general") social identity comprises of that 
part of an individual's self-concept which derives from: (i) 
subjective membership of social categories and groups; and, 
(ii) beliefs that others perceive one as a member of certain 
social categories and groups. Overall social identity is also 
the totality of specific social identities an individual has. 
A specific social identity is that part of an individual's 
self-concept which derives from: (i) subjective membership of 
a particular social category or group; and/or, (ii) a belief 
that others perceive one to be a member of a particular social 
category or group. 
Specific social identities have cognitive and evaluative 
components. For any specific social identity, the cognitive 
component of that identity consists of a belief that one is a 
member of a particular social group or category; and/or the 
belief that one is perceived by others to be a member of a 
particular social group or category; and also, beliefs 
concerning the consequences of such membership (subjective 
and/or other-perceived) of the social group or category of 
concern. For any specific social identity, the evaluative 
component of that identity consists of all the positive and 
negative consequences of membership (subjective and/or other-
perceived) of the social group or category which provides the 
identity. {The evaluative component of specific social 
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identities will be determined, at least in part, by evaluating 
actual subjective and/or other-perceived category or group 
memberships relative to other possible subjective and/or 
other-perceived conceptions of the self.) 
The cognitive and evaluative components of overall social 
identity are determined by the totality of cognitive and 
evaluative components of all the specific social identities an 
individual has. 
A modified account of the relationship between social and 
personal identity 
When referring to an individual's particular specific social 
identity, the term "personal identity" can be used to specify 
all the characteristics that the individual has which are not 
determined or entailed by membership of the particular social 
category or group which the specific social identity is 
derived from. This is potentially misleading, however, as 
many of these characteristics will be determined or entailed 
by the individual's membership of other social categories and 
groups. 
It makes even less sense to try to distinguish between an 
individual's overall social and personal identities. If 
overall social identity is that part of an individual's self-
concept which is derived from membership of all the social 
groups and categories they are a member of (and/or believe 
others perceive them to be a member of), then there is 
precious little left over, if anything, to call overall 
personal identity. What characteristics are there which 
cannot be conceived as associated with membership of social 
groups or categories (e.g. extroverts, tall people, people 
with swimming certificates, people called Tom, etc.)? 
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As conceptualized here, overall personal identity refers to 
the unique totality of an individual's self-concept. Overall 
social identity refers to that unique part of an individual's 
overall self-concept (i.e. overall personal identity) which is 
derived from membership of social categories and groups and/or 
from beliefs that others perceive one as a member of certain 
social categories and groups. Specific personal identities 
refer to those parts of an individual's self-concept which 
derive from particular characteristics that individual has. 
Finally, specific social identities are those parts of an 
individual's self-concept which derive from membership of 
particular social categories and groups, and/or from beliefs 
that others perceive one as a member of particular social 
categories or groups. Thus, all other identities are nested 
within overall personal identity, and specific social 
identities are simply collections of specific personal 
identities which are associated with membership of particular 
social groups or categories, and/or with beliefs that others 
perceive one as a member of such social categories or groups. 
A modified account of group behaviour 
Social groups and other social categories can have descriptive 
norms associated with membership of those social groups and 
other social categories. That is, proportions of members of 
social groups and other social categories can have particular 
characteristics in common to such an extent that those 
characteristics become associated with membership of those 
social groups and other social categories. 
Social groups, but not other social categories, can also have 
prescriptive social norms. Social categories with at least 
one superordinate goal become social groups. Prescriptive 
social norms associated with superordinate social units entail 
superordinate goals (i.e. conformity to the prescribed norm), 
and so superordinate units with prescriptive superordinate 
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norms must therefore be social groups. Conversely, 
superordinate goals entail superordinate norms (i.e. pursuit 
of the goals). Thus, we can further distinguish social groups 
from social categories by saying that social groups are social 
categories with superordinate-level goals and prescriptive 
norms (i.e. group goals and prescriptive norms) . 
Group behaviour can now be defined as the totality of 
individuals' behaviour which is determined by attempts by 
those individuals to conform to the prescriptive norms 
associated with a particular group they are members of. 
By this account, group behaviour is, at a subordinate level, 
simply a particular type of individual behaviour (or, rather, 
the totality of certain aspects of individuals' behaviour). 
Group behaviour occurs when individuals strive to make 
progress toward goals associated with particular groups those 
individuals belong to. Nevertheless, when engaging in group 
behaviour, individuals are in some sense "serving the needs" 
of the groups they belong to. Therefore, although it is 
individual group members who are providing the means for 
attempted satisfaction of group goals, it still makes sense to 
talk (at a superordinate level) about the group "itself" 
behaving. For example, when England declared war against 
Germany in 1939, it was an individual who did the declaring. 
Chamberlain did not personally declare war against Germany (or 
even against Hitler). Rather, Chamberlain declared war 
against Germany on behalf of a particular group he was a 
member of (i.e. England). At a superordinate level, 
therefore, it makes sense to say that England (i.e. a group) 
declared war on Germany.· 
• This account presupposes National-level goals which 
Chamberlain was pursuing (possibly including goals specifying 
conformity to National-level prescriptive norms). Discourse 
analytically inclined social psychologists might profitably 
study group representatives' accounts of, or justifications 
for, decisions they have taken on behalf of their groups, and 
see how often such accounts take the form of pursuing group 
goals and/or conforming to prescriptive group norms. 
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A modified account of uniformities of social behaviour 
The phrase "uniformities of social behaviour" refers to 
numbers of individuals behaving in similar ways in social 
situations. Such uniformities can come about via all sorts of 
processes, including habit, conformity, innate or commonly 
learned responses to particular social stimuli, innate or 
commonly learned needs, etc .. However, the uniformities of 
social behaviour of interest here are those which stem from 
group membership. 
When numbers of individuals strive toward superordinate goals 
of groups they belong to, uniformities of social behaviour are 
likely to result. The more salient, unambiguous, and 
important a group's goals, the greater the consensus among 
group members concerning how to pursue them, and the more 
group members wish to promote progress toward those goals, the 
more uniformities of social behaviour can be expected. 
The existence of group goals promotes uniformities of social 
behaviour when numbers of group members try to satisfy those 
goals. When numbers of group members do this, group behaviour 
results. Only uniformities of social behaviour which result 
from group members striving to satisfy group goals should be 
considered "genuine" group behaviour. Thus, numbers of group 
members behaving in similar ways because of common individual 
responses to certain social stimuli (e.g. group membership per 
se), although interesting and important, should not be 
considered instances of group behaviour. Because such 
individuals are "serving their own needs", rather than 
"serving the needs" of the group, their behaviour is not group 
behaviour. (AI though, of course, it may look I ike group 
behaviour, both from within and without the group, and indeed 
may become group behaviour, if individuals interpret the 
uniformities of social behaviour by other members of their 
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group as providing a prescription for how group members should 
act.) 5 
A modified account of group evaluation 
Because the characteristic which distinguishes social groups 
from other social categories is the existence of 
superordinate-level (i.e. group) goals, it is possible to 
conceive of the notion of "satisfactory group realization". 
Satisfactory group realization is the superordinate-level 
equivalent of Tajfel's (1978: 9) notion of satisfactory self-
realization (see next sub-section). Satisfactory achievement 
of, maintenance of, or progress toward group goals promotes 
satisfactory group realization. Conversely, unsatisfactory 
maintenance of, or unsatisfactory progress toward, group goals 
promotes unsatisfactory group realization. 
At a superordinate level, groups will be evaluated positively 
to the extent that they achieve satisfactory group 
realization, and groups will be evaluated negatively to the 
extent that they do not. 
Group goals can specify the sorts of situations groups would 
like to be in (which might be termed "terminal" group goals) ; 
the means by which groups would like to be in such situations 
(which might be termed "procedural" group goals); and/or, the 
sorts of groups groups would like themselves to be (which 
might be termed "existential" group goals). Satisfactory 
group realization, and therefore superordinate-level positive 
evaluation of groups, will only reliably be achieved to the 
extent that each of these sorts of goals (where each exists) 
are adequately satisfied. 
5 As descriptive norms can become prescriptive ones. 
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For example, if a group suddenly and novelly finds itself in 
a desired situation (i.e. satisfaction of a terminal group 
goal), this will not reliably promote satisfactory group 
realization (or, therefore, positive evaluation of the group 
at a superordinate level) if the group wanted to be, but was 
not, responsible for getting itself into this desired 
situation (i.e. non-satisfaction of a procedural group goal) . 
In this example, although the in-group situation (i.e. "where 
the in-group is") may be positively evaluated, the in-group 
itself is not. Similarly, if through its own efforts a group 
achieves a desired situation (i.e. satisfaction of terminal 
and procedural group goals), but this achievement is 
accompanied by an unacceptable change in the nature of the 
group (i.e. non-satisfaction of an existential group goal), 
this will also not reliably promote satisfactory group 
realization (or, therefore, positive evaluation of the group 
at a superordinate level). In this example it is again the 
case that the in-group situation is positively evaluated (both 
in terms of "where the in-group is" and "how it got there"), 
but the in-group itself is not. 
At a superordinate level, groups are evaluated positively 
"overall" to the extent that satisfactory progress toward 
certain group goals exceeds unsatisfactory progress toward 
others. Similarly, at a superordinate level groups are 
evaluated negatively "overall" to the extent that 
unsatisfactory progress toward certain group goals exceeds 
satisfactory progress toward others. However, it may 
sometimes be misleading to talk of "overall" evaluations of 
groups, as certain aspects of groups may be evaluated 
positively while other aspects of groups are simultaneously 
evaluated negatively: 
evaluations of groups. 
talk of the "totality 
evaluations. 
it is possible to have ambivalent 
It is therefore often preferable to 
of" , rather than "overall", group 
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A modified account of the consequences of social category 
membership 
Individuals strive for "satisfactory self-realization" 
(Tajfel, 1978c: 9). Satisfactory achievement of, maintenance 
of, or progress toward an individual's goals promotes 
satisfactory self-realization for that individual. 
Unsatisfactory maintenance of an individual's goals promotes 
unsatisfactory self-realization, as do unsatisfactory progress 
toward or away from such goals. 
Individuals evaluate themselves positively to the extent that 
they achieve satisfactory self-realization, and evaluate 
themselves negatively to the extent that they do not. 
As with group goals, individual goals can specify the sorts of 
situations individuals would like to be in (i.e. "terminal" 
individual goals); the means by which individuals would like 
to be in such situations (i.e. "procedural" individual goals) ; 
and/or, the sorts of people individuals would like themselves 
to be (i.e. "existential" individual goals). Satisfactory 
self-realization, and therefore positive self-evaluation, will 
only reliably be achieved to the extent that each of these 
sorts of goals (where each exists) are adequately satisfied. 
A large part of an individual's self-concept comprises of 
their social identity. Thus, an individual may desire 
membership of certain social categories (including social 
groups), either as an end in itself, or as a means to 
satisfaction of other self-goals the individual has. 
Similarly, but distinctly, an individual may desire to avoid 
membership of certain social categories (including social 
groups), either as an end in itself, or as a means to 
satisfaction of other self-goals the individual has. 
Individuals may also desire that others perceive them to be 
members of certain social categories (including social 
groups), again either as an end in itself, or as a means to 
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satisfaction of other self-goals the individual has. Finally, 
individuals may desire to avoid others perceiving them as 
members of certain social categories (including social 
groups), either as an end in itself, or as a means to 
satisfaction of other self-goals the individual has. 
Thus, an individual may have membership and/or non-membership 
(actual and/or perceived by others) of certain social groups 
and of other social categories as self-goals. Therefore, 
membership and/or non-membership (actual and/or perceived by 
others) of certain social groups and of other social 
categories can have a strong bearing on individuals' 
satisfactory self-realization, and on their subsequent self-
evaluation. In turn, where people have such social category 
membership and/or non-membership goals, those people will be 
motivated to make satisfactory progress toward such goals, 
will obtain positive contributions to their self-evaluations 
to the extent that they achieve satisfactory progress toward 
such goals, and will obtain negative contributions to their 
self-evaluations to the extent that they make unsatisfactory 
progress toward such goals. 
It is because membership (and/or non-membership, actual and/or 
other-perceived) of certain social categories (including 
social groups) has a bearing on an individual's self-concept, 
and consequently on their satisfactory self-realization, that 
such memberships have the cognitive, emotional, evaluative, 
and/ or behavioural consequences they do (see sub- section above 
entitled "A modified account of social categories"). But, 
because individuals can have wildly different personal goals, 
individuals can also differ greatly in their cognitive, 
emotional, evaluative, and/or behavioural responses to 
membership (and/or non-membership, actual and/or other-
perceived) of any particular social group or other social 
category. Thus, predicting uniformities of social behaviour 
(broadly conceived) as a result of particular social category 
memberships (broadly conceived) requires either that 
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individuals have similar personal goals and respond to certain 
social category memberships in similar ways to pursue those 
goals,6 and/or that individuals have different personal goals 
but nevertheless respond to certain social category 
memberships in similar ways to pursue those goals. In each of 
these instances, however, we are talking about indi vidual 
behaviour: i.e., behaviour aimed at satisfying exclusively 
individual goals. Any uniformities of social behaviour which 
resul t from social category memberships in such cases are 
"simply" the consequence of common individual goals and/or 
common action aimed at satisfying those individual goals. 
Fortunately, there are circumstances in which we can predict 
with a fairly high degree of confidence that members of 
certain social categories will 
and will also share some degree 
go about satisfying such goals. 
have common individual goals, 
of consensus concerning how to 
These are situations in which 
members of social groups strive to achieve 
superordinate-level (i.e. group) goals. 
common 
A modified account of the consequences of social group 
membership 
Besides having "purely" personal goals, individuals can also 
identify with the goals of others. When individuals identify 
with the goals of other individuals, the identifying 
individuals' satisfactory self-realization will depend, in 
part, upon the perceived satisfactory self-realization of the 
identified-with individuals. 
identify with the goals of 
Similarly, when individual s 
groups, those individuals' 
, For example, the "popular" understanding of Tajfel's 
social identity theory says that individuals respond to any 
and all social category memberships in similar ways (i. e . 
intergroup discrimination) in order to satisfy common personal 
goals they have (i.e. obtaining positive in-group 
distinctiveness in order to obtain satisfactory social 
identity and self-esteem) . 
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satisfactory self-realization will depend, in part, upon the 
satisfactory group realization of those groups. When 
individuals identify with the goals of others, be those others 
individuals or groups, the identifying individuals take on the 
others' goals as goals for themselves (i.e. "personal" goals). 
This does not necessarily entail that the identifying 
individuals feel any responsibility to bring about 
satisfactory self- or group realization of the identified-with 
others. It only means that the identifying individuals' 
satisfactory self-realization is in some sense "tied-up" with 
the satisfactory self- or group realization of the identified-
with other. That said, it will usually be the case that when 
one identifies with the goals of another (individual or 
group), one also takes on some personal responsibility to 
bring those goals about, if only because one's satisfactory 
self-realization is partially dependent upon the satisfactory 
progress by the other toward their goals. When one does take 
on such responsibility, then one's satisfactory self-
realization will be affected both by the others' progress 
toward or away from their own goals, and by one's own 
contributions to that progress. 
What this means is that when individuals identify with the 
superordinate (i. e. group) goals of groups they perceive 
themselves as belonging to (i. e . in-groups) , those 
individuals' satisfactory self -realization will be determined, 
in part, by the satisfactory group realization of those in-
groups (i.e. by satisfactory in-group realization). To the 
extent in-group members take on responsibility for the 
attainment of satisfactory in-group realization, those group 
members' satisfactory self-realization will be partially 
determined both by satisfactory in-group realization, and by 
their own perceived contribution to that satisfactory in-group 
realization. 
To the extent, therefore, that individuals identify with in-
group goals, individuals will be motivated to strive for 
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satisfactory in-group realization, in order to aChieve 
contributions to satisfactory self-realization. This is the 
mechanism by which group behaviour comes about. Numbers of 
individual members of a particular group accept their group's 
goals as "personal" goals, and strive to make satisfactory 
progress toward them. 
It was noted above that, at the superordinate level, groups 
are evaluated positively to the extent that they achieve 
satisfactory group realization, and are evaluated negatively 
to the extent that they do not. It has also been noted that 
when individuals identify with in-group goals, those 
individuals' satisfactory self-realization is partially 
determined by satisfactory in-group realization. However, it 
is not the case that superordinate evaluations of in-groups 
fully determine either: (i) individual in-group members' 
subordinate-level evaluations of their in-groups; or, (ii) in-
group members' evaluations of themselves as particular in-
group members. In each case, this is because individual in-
group members' goals are usually not fully exhausted by the 
superordinate-level goals of the in-groups they identify with. 
Group members, as individuals, have all manner of personal 
goals which are associated with in-group membership, only a 
fraction of which are those deriving from identification with 
in-group superordinate goals. To take a simple example, 
imagine that an individual has the following personal goals 
associated with a particular in-group membership: (i) the 
achievement of satisfactory in-group realization; (ii) to be 
personally responsible for bringing such satisfactory in-group 
realization about; (iii) to remain as leader of the in-group; 
and, (iv) to enjoy the respect of other in-group members. Let 
us say that this individual takes action to ensure that the 
in-group achieves its goals, but in the process of doing so 
loses their leadership of the group and the respect of other 
in-group members. Because it achieves its goals, the in-group 
achieves satisfactory group realization and will be positively 
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evaluated at a superordinate level. Because the individual 
identifies with the group's goals, and also satisfies a 
personal goal of bringing those group goals about, the 
individual will obtain positive contributions to their 
satisfactory self-realization. However, in losing both the 
leadership of the group and the respect of other in-group 
members, the individual fails to satisfy two important 
personal goals (which are related to in-group membership), and 
therefore also receives negative contributions to their sense 
of satisfactory self-realization. Thus, it is quite possible 
for the individual to evaluate the in-group negatively at the 
subordinate level, even though the same individual accepts 
that the in-group achieved all of its goals (and is therefore 
evaluated positively at the superordinate level) . 
Now consider the case of an individual whose in-group achieves 
satisfactory group realization, but whose individual 
contribution to that group achievement was negligible. If 
that individual had a personal goal of contributing 
significantly to the in-group achievement, that individual may 
evaluate the in-group positively at both the superordinate and 
subordinate levels, but still evaluate themself (as a 
particular in-group member) negatively. 
The usual mismatch between group-level goals and the goals of 
group members means that in-group evaluations at superordinate 
and subordinate levels are rarely identical. It also means 
that evaluations of particular in-group members (including the 
self) can be distinct from either or both of these evaluations 
of the in-group. At a superordinate level, in-groups are 
evaluated positively or negatively according to whether or not 
they have achieved satisfactory group realization. At a 
subordinate level, in-groups are evaluated positively or 
negatively according to whether membership of them contributes 
positively or negatively overall to individual group members' 
satisfactory self-realization. Finally, in-group members 
evaluate themselves as particular individual group members 
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(i.e. "within the group") positively or negatively according 
to whether they contribute positively or negatively to the 
satisfactory group realization of their in-groups.7 
The mis-match between group goals and the goals of individual 
group members has one more important consequence. This is 
that, even if they identify with them, group members will not 
strive toward perceived in-group goals which are incompatible 
with other goals which those individuals hold to be personally 
more important. Group behaviour will therefore only come 
about when conformity to perceived group goals by in-group 
members does not entail violation of other goals which those 
in-group members are more committed to (which mayor may not 
be goals associated with membership of the group in question) . 
A modified account of the effects of in-group distinctiveness 
Groups can have superordinate-level goals which involve 
striving to achieve, maintain, or enhance positive in-group 
distinctiveness from particular comparison groups on 
particular dimensions, and/or striving to avoid, reduce or 
reverse negative in-group distinctiveness from particular 
comparison groups on particular dimensions. Groups can also 
have goals which are not explicitly concerned with in-group 
distinctiveness, but which nevertheless consider such in-group 
distinctiveness as indicative of satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory progress towards the goals they do have. To 
the extent that perceptions of in-group distinctiveness entail 
or suggest satisfactory progress toward in-group goals, 
positive contributions to superordinate evaluations of in-
groups will result from such perceptions. Conversely, to the 
extent that perceptions of in-group distinctiveness entail or 
7 Although, of course, in-group members' evaluations of 
themselves as individual s (i . e . "in total") will depend on 
much more than this, i.e. on their "overall" satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory self-realization. 
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suggest unsatisfactory progress toward in-group goals, 
negative contributions to superordinate evaluations of in-
groups will result from such perceptions. However, to the 
extent that perceptions of in-group distinctiveness neither 
entail nor suggest either satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
progress towards in-group goals, such perceptions will not 
influence superordinate evaluations of in-groups. 
Similar considerations apply with respect to the effects of 
perceptions of in-group distinctiveness on subordinate 
evaluations of in-groups. To the extent that perceptions of 
in-group distinctiveness entail or suggest satisfactory 
progress toward group members' goals, positive contributions 
to subordinate evaluations of in-groups will result from such 
perceptions. Conversely, to the extent that perceptions of 
in-group distinctiveness entail or suggest unsatisfactory 
progress toward in-group members' goals, negative 
contributions to subordinate evaluations of in-groups will 
result from such perceptions. And, to the extent that 
perceptions of in-group distinctiveness neither entail nor 
suggest either satisfactory or unsatisfactory progress towards 
in-group members' goals, such perceptions will not influence 
subordinate evaluations of in-groups. 
Finally, 
effects 
similar considerations apply with respect to the 
of perceptions of in-group distinctiveness on 
individual group members' evaluations of themselves in terms 
of their particular in-group memberships. To the extent that 
in-group members perceive that they have personally 
contributed toward in-group distinctiveness which entails or 
suggests satisfactory progress toward in-group goals, positive 
contributions to their self-evaluations as in-group members 
will result from such perceptions. To the extent that in-
group members perceive that they have personally contributed 
toward in-group distinctiveness which entails or suggests 
unsatisfactory progress toward in-group goals, negative 
contributions to their self-evaluations as in-group members 
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will result from such perceptions. Finally, to the extent 
that in-group members believe that perceived in-group 
distinctiveness neither entails nor suggests either 
satisfactory 
goals, such 
or unsatisfactory 
perceptions will 
progress towards in-group 
not influence their self-
evaluations as in-group members, regardless of their perceived 
personal contributions to that in-group distinctiveness. 
It follows from the above, but should be made explicit, that 
evaluations of in-groups and in-group members can be affected 
by situations other than ones of perceived in-group 
distinctiveness. Any situations which entail or suggest 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory progress toward in-group goals 
will affect superordinate evaluations of in-groups; any in-
group situations which entail or suggest satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory progress toward in-group members' goals will 
affect subordinate evaluations of in-groups; and, any 
situations which entail or suggest that individual in-group 
members have 
satisfactory 
affect those 
contributed positively or negatively to 
or unsatisfactory in-group realization will 
individual in-group members' evaluations of 
themselves as particular in-group members. 
A modified account of the causes of intergroup discrimination 
Groups will prescribe that their members should engage in 
intergroup discrimination (or any other form of behaviour) 
when such discrimination appears likely to promote 
satisfactory in-group realization. Groups will prescribe that 
their members should not engage in intergroup discrimination 
(or any other form of behaviour) when such discrimination 
appears unlikely to promote satisfactory in-group realization, 
especially when such discrimination seems likely to promote 
unsatisfactory in-group realization. 
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Group members will engage in intergroup discrimination (or any 
other form of group behaviour) when engaging in such 
intergroup discrimination appears to likely to promote both 
satisfactory in-group realization and satisfactory self-
realization for those group members. (When individuals engage 
in behaviour intended to promote satisfactory self-realization 
regardless of the likely effects on in-group realization, such 
behaviour should not be thought of as group behaviour. ) Group 
members will not engage in intergroup discrimination (or any 
other form of group behaviour) when engaging in such 
intergroup discrimination does not appear likely to promote 
both satisfactory in-group realization and satisfactory self-
realization for those group members, especially when engaging 
in such discrimination seems likely to promote unsatisfactory 
self-realization for those in-group members. 
As superordinate entities, groups do not have the power to 
promote their own goals, except by "encouraging" in-group 
members to strive for those goals on the groups' behalf. They 
achieve this to the extent that in-group members' satisfactory 
self - realization is or becomes dependent upon satisfactory in-
group realization. However, because group goals and the goals 
of in-group members are rarely identical, group members' will 
not slavishly conform to in-groups' "wishes". Rather, group 
members act on behalf of their groups to the extent that dOing 
so contributes to their satisfactory self-realization (i.e. to 
the extent that the consequences of acting on behalf of the 
group seem personally more attractive than the consequences of 
failing to do so). Clearly, the more that groups can improve 
in their favour the cost/benefit ratio for in-group members 
who do or do not conform to in-group wishes (such as 
intergroup discrimination) , the more likely behaviour 
prescribed by the group will be. 
A COMPARISON OF THE ORIGINAL AND MODIFIED 
VERSIONS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
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Although the considerations in the above section are conceived 
individually as 
identity theory, 
possible 
rather 
amendments to Tajfel's 
than conceived jointly 
social 
as a 
replacement for it, for aid of exposition the account above 
will be referred to as "goal identification theory". 
The first thing to note is that the two theories share 
considerable amounts of common ground. Among other 
similarities, both accept or claim that individuals often 
conceive of themselves and others in terms of their membership 
of social groups and categories; that membership of social 
groups and categories has cognitive, emotional, evaluative and 
behavioural consequences; that uniformities of social 
behaviour, including intergroup discrimination, can stem from 
membership of certain social categories in particular 
situations; that both individual and superordinate-level 
factors need to be used to explain and predict uniformities of 
social behaviour stemming from group membership (i.e. self-
esteem and in-group distinctiveness in the case of social 
identity theory, and satisfactory self-realization and 
satisfactory group realization in the case of goal 
identification theory); that both identity and "realistic" 
concerns can motivate group behaviour; that between-group 
social comparison outcomes (e. g. perceptions of in-group 
distinctiveness) can affect group members' cognitions, 
evaluations, and behaviours; that people in unfavourable 
social group or category membership situations can either try 
to leave those groups or categories, or to take action to 
improve membership of them; and that group norms are important 
in specifying the limits of group membership motivated 
behaviour. 
However I there are clearly several important differences 
between the two accounts. The first of these differences 
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concerns the postulated individual motivation for group 
behaviour: i.e. self-esteem in the case of social identity 
theory, and satisfactory self-realization in the case of goal 
identification theory. Despite the problems associated with 
the formulation and previous testing of the self-esteem 
hypothesis within social identity theory (see Chapters 5 and 
7), there can be no doubt that evidence for that hypothesis is 
mixed at best, and that several adherents of social identity 
theory are now searching for alternative accounts for the 
motivation behind group behaviour (e.g. Abrams, 1992). Goal 
identification theory provides such an alternative, and does 
so in a way that accepts that group members' self-esteem needs 
can motivate and be affected by group action, but nevertheless 
argues that it need not necessarily be. It does this by 
postulating that self-esteem is one, non-necessary, component 
of satisfactory self-realization. 
This is consistent with Tajfel's own original thoughts 
(Tajfel, 1978c). Tajfel, however, rejected the notion of 
satisfactory self-realization as "a hopelessly vague, 
synthetic term which can mean so much that it is in danger of 
meaning very little at all" (p. 9). In response to this it 
can be claimed that the notion of self-esteem, as employed 
within social identity theory, is not obviously any less vague 
or synthetic than the notion of satisfactory self-realization. 
Further, it has been argued above that satisfactory self-
realization is preferable to self-esteem when discussing the 
antecedents and consequences of group action, as individuals 
can engage in group action regardless of both their prior 
levels of self-esteem and their anticipations of the effects 
that such group action will have upon their self-esteem. 
Thirdly, it does not seem that the notion of satisfactory 
self-realization is necessarily hopelessly vague and 
synthetic. The term simply attempts to capture the intuitive 
truth that people are motivated by many concerns whiCh can 
differ across both individuals and situations. It therefore 
allows for (and indeed "insists on") the possibility for 
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empirical research to identify what motivates certain people 
in certain situations. This seems preferable to a blanket 
assumption that people are always (and only?) motivated by 
self-esteem needs. 
A second difference between the two accounts concerns the 
group-level factor which is postulated to affect and motivate 
individuals to group action. This is the "drive" to positive 
in-group distinctiveness (and thus satisfactory social 
identity and self-esteem) in the case of social identity 
theory, and the "drive" to satisfactory in-group realization 
(and thus satisfactory social identity and self-realization) 
in the case of goal identification theory. Clearly 
satisfactory in-group realization is the more inclusive of the 
two concepts, just as satisfactory self-realization is more 
inclusive than self-esteem. And, as with self-esteem, 
adherents of social identity theory are beginning to question 
whether in-group distinctiveness is sufficient for the task 
social identity theory requires of it (e.g. Brown et al., 
1992) . Goal identification theory again offers an 
alternative, by postulating that positive in-group 
distinctiveness can be a component of satisfactory in-group 
realization, but it need not necessarily be. 
A powerful objection to this line of argument might be to cite 
the vast amount of research which supports social identity 
theory's notion that people do tend to display in-group 
preference, and that people do seem to "prefer" and to be 
motivated to achieve positive in-group distinctiveness and to 
avoid negative in-group distinctiveness. Such evidence might 
seem to suggest that social identity theory is correct to 
stress the importance of in-group distinctiveness, both as a 
motivation for group behaviour and as a determinant of group 
members' psychological well-being. The response to such an 
objection is to agree that the notion of in-group 
distinctiveness is indeed important in these ways, but to deny 
that it is necessarily involved in motivating group action or 
416 
in affecting in-group members' psychological well-being. 
positive in-group distinctiveness and, perhaps particularly, 
avoidance of negative in-group distinctiveness are important 
because such states are often either group goals in and of 
themselves, or taken by group members to be indicative of 
progress toward or away from other goals in-groups have. 
However, as with the debate above concerning the relative 
merits of self-esteem and satisfactory self-realization, goal 
identification theory does not assume that group members are 
always (and only?) motivated and psychologically affected by 
in-group distinctiveness. Rather, it suggests that it is a 
matter of empirical enquiry to determine the circumstances in 
which such concerns will (and will not) motivate group members 
and affect their psychological well-being. 
A third difference between the two accounts concerns the 
relative centrality of group goals/norms within each theory. 
Goal identification theory might be held to fall foul of 
Occam's razor in its proliferation of (unnecessary) 
theoretical concepts. At first glance, social identity the,ory 
appears to rely on very few constructs to explain and predict 
the antecedents and consequences of (at least) all intergroup 
situations; namely self-esteem, social categorization, social 
identity, intergroup social comparison, and the unique group 
goal of positive in-group distinctiveness. Goal 
identification theory, on the other hand, as we have seen, 
relies on a considerably more complex set of constructs, the 
most prominent member of which is group goals (and norms). 
Clearly, if we can account for all instances of intergroup 
behaviour without such additional concepts, we should. 
However, there are several compelling reasons to argue that 
group goals are a necessary, or at least desirable, component 
of any theoretical account of group behaviour. These have 
been relatively well rehearsed in this chapter and there is 
little to be gained by excessive repetition. However, certain 
points may benefit from reiterated. First, social identity 
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theory does, in fact, rely on many more concepts that the list 
given just above. In particular, its notions of "valued 
comparison dimensions" and of conflicts of values at least 
implicitly accept that group goals do need to be considered 
when attempting to 
consequences of 
superordinate-level 
predict and explain antecedents and 
group behaviour. 8 Second, unless 
(i.e. group) phenomena are explicitly 
considered, there is no way to distinguish between 
uniformities of social behaviour which are "genuinely" the 
resul t of group behaviour and those which are "simply" the 
result of individuals responding in similar ways to similarly 
perceived stimuli. Third, without considering group-level 
goals and norms, social identity theory offers a rather 
unsatisfactory account of all instances of non-discrimination 
in mUlti-group situations (both by groups and by individual 
group members). Fourth, without acknowledging that groups can 
have various superordinate-level goals and norms, and can 
assign different priorities in different situations to such 
goals and norms, social identity theory is unable to specify 
when social competition (as opposed to realistic competition) 
can be expected (let alone when non-discriminatory group 
behaviour may occur). Finally, a neglect of group goals and 
norms deprives social identity theory (and still more self-
categorization theory) of a genuinely temporal dimension. 
That is, social identity theory seems committed to saying that 
in each and every situation all that will motivate group 
members is the in-group's position relative to one or more 
particular comparison groups. This is intuitively (at least) 
unappealing, as it seems a relatively common phenomenon for 
groups to develop norms of group and intergroup behaviour 
which apply more or less regardless of the particular 
situation groups or group members happen to be in at any given 
time. It seems doubtful, for example, that committed members 
8 See also the importance given to group goals and 
within referent informational influence and 
categorization theory (e.g. Turner et al., 1987, 
Reicher's chapter). 
norms 
self-
esp. 
l 
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of the British National Party would reflect on the relative 
position of blacks and whites in society when deciding how to 
behave toward or evaluate a black person who had just bumped 
into them ... 
Goal identification theory, 
theory, explicitly states 
in contrast to social identity 
that across groups and across 
situations there will be different group-level goals and 
norms, and different priorities among such group goals and 
norms, and that it is a matter of empirical investigation to 
determine what these might be in any given situation. 
A fourth major difference between the two theories on offer, 
and the last one to be considered here, concerns their 
respective ranges of application. Social identity theory, at 
least in the form Tajfel presented, is an explicitly 
intergroup theory. Thus, it has little to say about 
individual, interindividual, within-group, group (as opposed 
to intergroup),9 or "across-level" phenomena (cf. Horton, 
1993). Goal identification theory potentially has a much more 
ambitious application. Its notions of satisfactory self-
realization and identification with the goals of others means 
that it is possible to apply the theory to all areas of human 
behaviour. In particular, as well as concerning itself with 
individuals identifying with groups, and therefore being 
guided in their group and intergroup behaviour, the theory 
allows for considerations of situations in which individuals 
identify with and are guided by the goals of other individuals 
and, possibly most interestingly, of "ideologies" and "causes" 
(e.g. democracy, environmentalism, etc.). 
9 Actually, for Tajfel there appears to be no 
possibility of group behaviour which is not at the same time 
intergroup behaviour (see Tajfel, 1981: 40, 256). 
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POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As noted above, in attempting to investigate Tajfel's social 
identity theory more or less "as a whole", it has not been 
possible to investigate particular aspects of that theory in 
any great depth, theoretically or empirically. Clearly, then, 
the first suggestion for future research has to be that the 
particular concerns addressed in this thesis are returned to 
with greater attention to theoretical complexities and with 
considerably improved methodologies. 
The least interesting (but still worthwhile) thing to suggest 
is that each of the studies presented in this thesis are re-
run with improved samples, manipulations, and measures, and 
perhaps also with different aspects of those studies addressed 
separately (e.g., Study 6, reported in Chapter 7, could be 
broken down into at least 3 separate investigations). 
Another potentially fruitful direction would be to take some 
of the issues raised in this thesis and see how they fare in 
comparison with alternative derivations from or developments 
of Tajfel's theory (e.g. Turner et al.'s 1987 self-
categorization theory), or indeed with "competing" theories 
(e.g. Rabbie et al. 's 1989 behavioural interaction model) . 
A third possible direction for future research is the most 
radical. This would be to consider "goal identification 
theory" not as a derivative of or a modification to social 
identity theory as such, but rather as a separate theory in 
its own right. Clearly, bearing in mind the paucity of, and 
the limitations associated with, the empirical research 
"supporting" that theory at the present time, such a programme 
of research would require a certain leap of faith. However, 
the growing research suggesting that social identity theory is 
too simplistic in certain key areas, coupled with the promise 
of a genuinely social psychological theory applicable to a 
much wider range of phenomena than Simply one form of 
l 
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intergroup discrimination, suggests that such an endeavour 
would not be entirely without merit. If pursued, it is 
envisaged that goal identification theory would best be 
investigated in cOmbination with related theories. 
potentially fruitful links between goal identification theory 
and Taj fel 's social identity theory have been relatively 
extensively explored. Other possibilities include Turner's 
account of the development and adoption of in-group norms in 
his referent informational influence model (Turner, 1981) and 
self-categorization theory (Turner, et al., 1987) (see Chapter 
4), and Moscovici's account of the same thing in his social 
representations theory (Doise et al., 1993; Moscovici, 1984, 
1988). Also potentially useful are theories which postulate, 
and offer methodologies for measuring, actual self/possible 
self (and, by extension actual in-group/possible in-group) 
discrepancies (e.g. Higgins, 1987, 1989; Markus & Nurius, 
1986; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). 
